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ABSTRACT 
Despite the interest they generate in the public and media, changes of political party 
leadership in western de'mocracies have received surprisingly little academic analysis. 
The existing knowledge and understanding of how and why party leadership changes 
is severely limited. New Zealand is no exception. In an attempt to rectify this 
situation, this study seeks to offer a theory which can sufficiently explain (and 
predict) leadership vulnerability of the New Zealand Labour Party. The emphasis is 
placed on caucus members who have exclusive power to select and de-select their 
leaders. Through two case studies - the 1993 leadership change and the unsuccessful 
1996 leadership change attempt - against which the theory is tested, it is argued that 
quality of support that a leader receives on his/her selection has significant 
importance to her/his future. 
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CHAPTERl 
Introduction 
Introduction 
In modern western democracies, leaders of major political parties come and go. Some 
changes are induced by death or age/health-related voluntary retirement, while others are 
caused as a result of internal challenges or a coup. Faced with internal dissent, some 
leaders relinquish the position quietly, while others fight with the utmost resistance. 
Either way, leadership changes attract a significant amount of attention by the media and 
the public. The fascination is understandable. They showcase great human dramas and 
emotions in stark contrast: victor and loser, elation and dejection, naked ambitions and 
their rationalisations (often in the name of the greater public good), intensive contentions 
and ensuing peace. In today's society where issues are often highly complicated and 
technical, leadership cfianges offer the public rare occasions to understand national 
politics on a simple, or even 'primitive', level l . 
Aims of the study 
Despite such a high level of interest, the subject of leadership vulnerability has received 
surprisingly little academic treatment. As discussed in the next chapter, while the 
situation is particularly noticeable in New Zealand, a lack of formalised knowledge of 
the two leadership crises proves to be the norm rather than an exception elsewhere, too. 
For example, clearly, both successful and unsuccessful leadership changes are disruptive 
for a political party. Yet, the existing knowledge cannot provide an adequate explanation 
as to why some succeed and others fail. 
This situation is particularly lamentable because changes of leaders of major political 
parties are events of significant importance, worthy of interest and the attention of 
serious academic analysis. In the Westminster system, it is normally considered 
necessary for any aspiring prime minister to first attain the leadership of his/her own 
political party2. On becoming a party leader, s/he inherits significant power and has a 
role to play in various areas even without assuming the prime ministership, as Marsh 
wrote: 
Parliamentary elections are commonly 'presidential' in character, with each 
party's leader playing a very prominent role in the campaign. In government too 
party leaders playa decisive role in policy formation and selection in both single 
party and coalition governments. (1993: 229) 
I Ridley put it: 'For most, politics is a complicated business and all but the highlights are boring as 
well. The highlights are about people in politics, human interest, too often scandals, rather than the 
machinery of the political system' (Ridley, 1999: 309). 
2 Commenting on the British situation, Stark asserted that: '[p]arty leadership is ... the pathway to 
the premiership'. (1996: 2) For the New Zealand context, see Palmer and Palmer (1997), p.54. 
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There are two main aims of this study. The first is to record the New Zealand 
Labour Party (NZLP)'s 1993 leadership change and 1996 leadership crisis, where the 
leader, Helen Clark came under pressure to resign, as accurately as possible3 • Like most 
of the leadership crises in this country, both events attracted huge media and public 
interest. However, our knowledge of them barely extends beyond an accumulation of 
the media reports as they unfolded. There has been no attempt by journalists to 
investigate and reconstruct exactly what happened in detail. Similarly, no scholars have 
tried to analyse them from an academic viewpoint. 
The second, and more important, aim is to examine the mechanisms of party 
leadership (de )selection processes in the NZLP. Many aspects of these mechanisms are 
not well understood. What qualities do selectors seek in a leader? In particular, what 
are the important variables that influence the positions of selectors? What factors effect 
leaders'durability? Tfiese questions are of significant importance to students of New 
Zealand politics. The ultimate goal here is to contribute to the existing literature of 
leadership durability. As pointed out in the next chapter, one of the problems in the 
existing literature is that there is no systematic theory available sufficiently capable of 
explaining leadership durability in the NZLP. Most of the previous scholarly work in 
this field has been conducted overseas and has tended to use ad hoc case studies. Few 
attempts have been made to 'theorise' findings for wider application. The small number 
of theories that are available offer only limited applications to other studies. In an effort 
to rectify this situation, this study aims to provide a theoretical framework within which, 
at the least, durability of the NZLP leadership can be understood/explained. 
Before explaining how this study seeks to achieve these aims, a brief background of 
the NZLP's past leadership crises is necessary. 
The New Zealand Labour Party and past leadership crises 
Eleven people have served as the NZLP leaders. There have been two periods of 
leadership security in the history of the NZLP since its first inception in Parliament in 
1918. The first period between 1918 and 1974 saw six leaders: Harry E. Holland 
(1918-1933); Michael Joseph Savage (1933-1940); Peter Fraser (1940-1950); Walter 
Nash (1950-1963); Arnold Nordmeyer (1963-1966); and Norman Kirk (1966-1974). 
During this first period, with the exception of Nordmeyer, all the leaders were replaced 
as a result of death or retirement induced by age. The second period from Bill Rowling 
(1974-1983) onwards has been characterised by more volatility. Rowling, David Lange 
(1983-1989); Geoffrey Palmer (1989-1990); and Mike Moore (1990-1993) all lost their 
leadership under pressure of one form or another, whereas in 1996 Clark successfully 
3 The choice of these case studies is justified in the next chapter. 
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withstood pressure to go and eventually became Prime Minister. It is, then, the period 
dating from the Rowling premiership that provides the relevant setting. 
Rowling: The 1980 leadership crisis 
After losing two consecutive elections in 1975 and 19784 , the Labour caucus was in 
disarray (McRobie, 1992: 397). By late 1980, the caucus was roughly divided into two 
groups (James, 1986: 156-157) which were practically pro- and anti-Rowling camps. 
Although the division line was mainly based upon personalities (James, 1986: 157), 
there was also an ideological tinge to it, over economic policy5 (Bassett, 1998: 349-350). 
One of the leaders of the insurgents was Roger Douglas. Although once considered a 
close supporter of Rowling (Bassett, 1976: 164), he had become increasingly frustrated 
with the direction of economic policy under Rowling and his shadow finance minister6 , 
Bob Tizard, and started to develop his own ideas 7 • 
Rowling's personaneadership style became a target of criticism, too. The mild-
mannered leader was often - unfairly at least in one observer's view (Henderson, 1981 
and 1992) - described as 'weak' by his opponents, a label that he struggled to discard 
(Henderson, 1981: 13). His critics in the caucus also saw the leader as 'indecisive' and 
'the old guard'. The morale of the caucus declined as internal discontent continued 
(Moore, 1993b: 82). 
However, what concerned many Labour MPs was Labour's popularity and hence its 
electoral prospect at the coming election. Alarm bells rang when the by-election for an 
Auckland seat, East Coast Bays, was held in September 1980. This former National seat 
went to the Social Credit candidate, Garry Knapp, with Labour occupying the 
humiliating third place. As a result, a number of Auckland MPs became wary, and 
started considering the need for a radical change including a change of leadership 
(Henderson, 1981: 15). 
The worry of the Auckland MPs became more prevalent across the caucus as the 
popUlarity of the Social Credit party soared in the subsequent opinion poll results at the 
expense of Labour. It heightened after the New Zealand Herald - National Research 
Bureau survey was released on 8 December 1980. Labour was, for the first time, ranked 
4 In 1978 and again in 1981, Labour won more votes than National. However, because of the high 
concentration of votes in the safe seats and the first-past-the-post electoral system, National held on to 
the Treasury benches. 
5 There is little question that the economic policy which Douglas later promoted as the Minister of 
Finance in the fourth Labour Government was at variance with that supported by Rowling and his 
supporters. However, how Douglas' view differed from Rowling at the time of 1980 leadership crisis 
is a moot point. See, Oliver (1989). 
6 Rowling introduced, rather unsuccessfully, a shadow cabinet system after the 1978 election 
(McRobie, 1992: 397). 
7 For the sources of his ideas, see, James (1986: 136-137). See, also, Oliver (1989) for the 
development of Douglas' policy views between 1981 and 1984. 
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third behind National and Social Credit. Furthennore, the same poll result showed that 
Rowling was behind not only the National Prime Minister, Muldoon, but also his own 
deputy, David Lange, in the 'preferred Prime Minister' ratings (Henderson, 1981: 17). 
The anti-Rowling fadions capitalised on these opinion poll results. Already having 
failed to persuade the leader to step down voluntarily in October 1980 (Henderson, 
1981: 16), they opted now for a less subtle method. With the belief that a change 
should take place before the election year and outside the parliamentary session 
(Henderson, 1981: 17), the anti-Rowling group hastily organised a fonnal coup. Lange 
was the insurgents' chosen alternative8 • Apart from his rising popularity, his obvious 
talent and non-association with the troubled third Labour Government made him an ideal 
candidate (Moore, 1993b: 82). At the earlier stage of the coup, the numbers looked 
promising for this group. According to Moore (one of the core Lange supporters), they 
had gained signatures from a majority of the caucus in favour of a leadership change 
(Moore, 1993b: 83). -
Rowling and his supporters (which included Helen Clark), however, were not 
prepared to succumb to the pressure. Once the news of the coup was out, intensive 
lobbying for the leader ensued. One of the pivotal figures in this fight-back campaign 
was the Party President, Jim Anderton, who came out publicly calling for support for 
Rowling, while putting enonnous pressure on wavering MPs (Henderson, 1981: 25; 
Moore, 1993b: 83; Wright, 1984: 123-125). Combined with strong support for the 
incumbent shown by local electorates (Henderson, 1981: 15-20), two MPs allegedly 
changed their positions to the Rowling camp within the last 24 hours before the vote, 
depriving the insurgents of crucial numbers (Henderson, 1981: 25; Moore, 1993b: 84). 
A special caucus meeting was organised on 12 December 1980. After some blunt 
exchanges of opinions - including severe criticisms of the leadership - the issue was put 
to a vote. Since no alternative leaders were sought, it was practically a confidence 
motion in Rowling. The result could not have been closer. The incumbent leader won 
by a single vote (Henderson, 1981: 24). 
The Rowling/Lange succession 
As the anti-Rowling group feared, Labour lost the 1981 election - the third consecutive 
election loss under the same leadership. The fact that Labour once again won more 
votes than National gave little comfort to the MPs who were increasingly impatient with 
being in opposition. The anti-Rowling MPs attributed the defeat to a lack of 
imagination as well as the absence of strong leadership (Moore, 1993b: 85). Given this 
view, it was only a matter of time before the move to depose the leader resurfaced. At 
8 However, Henderson noted that Lange was not necessarily the unanimous choice of the pro-change 
group. (Henderson, 1981: 25) 
4 
the same time, support for Lange steadily grew in the caucus as well as in the public 
(Moore, 1993b: 88). There was the prevailing sense of inevitability of a leadership 
change in the caucus. The divisions were no longer between the pro- and anti- Rowling, 
but between the pro- and anti-Lange camps (Wright, 1984: 127). 
What changed the caucus balance in Lange's favour was his handling of the 
leadership during Rowling's one-month overseas trip in September 1982 (James, 1986: 
157). The acting Leader of the Opposition not only demonstrated his delicate political 
skills but also proved his ability to match and beat the Prime Minister, Muldoon, who 
had long dominated Rowling (Wright, 1984: 127-128). In the meantime, Lange's 
ascent in the opinion polls continued. By October 1982, Lange had trebled in the 
preferred Prime Minister ratings, with Rowling trailing far behind (Wright, 1984: 127). 
It was also clear by then that a majority of the caucus members were now supporting the 
popular deputy leader (Bassett, 1998: 370). 
With some staunch supporters behind him, Rowling had refused to step aside on his 
return from the trip (James, 1986: 157). But by early December, even the resilient leader 
realised that he did not have the numbers to retain his position. He called a special 
caucus meeting just before Christmas in 1982 where he announced his intention not to 
stand for the next regular leadership review in the following February (Moore, 1993b: 
88). When the caucus meeting was held on 3 February 1983, Lange's selection was a 
mere formality. Although a long-time Rowling supporter, Russell Marshall, made 
himself available as the alternative candidate, it was seen as a token resistance (James, 
1986:157). 
The 1988-1989 Leadership crises and the LangelPalmer succession 
As his supporters hoped, Lange successfully led the party to an election victory in 1984. 
However, the euphoria did not last long. While implementing sweeping reforms in a 
number of areas (Boston and Holland, 1987; Holland and Boston, 1990), it was 
gradually disintegrating from within. Despite retaining the office with an increased 
majority at the 1987 election, Labour's second term was plagued by prolonged disputes 
between Lange and the Minister of Finance, Douglas over the party's desirable policy 
direction9 . 
The tension steadily and noticeably continued to build up between the two figures 
until Douglas resigned from the Cabinet on 14 December 1988, after several attempts by 
Lange to persuade or compel him to do so. Being furious with the leader's treatment, 
Douglas came to believe strongly that Lange had to go as the leader (Douglas, 1993: 
51). 
9 Lange, content with the economic liberalisation already achieved in the first term, started to feel 
uneasy with Douglas' enthusiasm to extend the 'more market approach' - in the name of efficiency gain 
- to social policy areas (eg., see, Russell, 1996: Chapter 12 and 13). 
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Presumably in the hope of clarifying the situation once and for all and to re-establish 
his authority, Lange himself called for a leadership vote at the caucus meeting following 
Douglas' resignation (McQueen, 1991: 134). Although having entered the race, 
Douglas portrayed himsdf as a reluctant contender. Fully aware of his slim chance of 
winningl 0, his intention appeared to be to find someone else who could muster sufficient 
numbers to oust his arch-rival. When no such person emerged, the former Minister of 
Finance had no choice but to enter the race himself to avert the likely accusation that he 
had shied away from the showdown (Sheppard, 1999: 168). 
The vote result was decisive - 38 for Lange and 15 for Douglas with two informals 
(Sheppard, 1999: 169). However, this by no means put an end to the infighting. After 
the vote, Douglas and his supporters declared a six-month campaign to topple the Prime 
Minister, with himself or someone else as his replacement (McQueen, 1991: 134). 
In April 1989, Lange was once again in trouble. His speech in which New Zealand's 
possible formal withdrawal from the ANZUS council was suggested immediately put 
Lange's own leadership under scrutiny. This time, those who felt let down included 
some of his usual allies (Sheppard, 1999: 207). Probably, the biggest cost of the 
controversial speech was the loss of unconditional support by his deputy, Geoffrey 
Palmer. In the face of the latest crisis, he confessed to the troubled leader that he would 
make himself available in case of a leadership vacancy. Lange long considered Palmer's 
unfailing loyalty, accompanied by his pledge not to make himself available for the 
leadership under any circumstances II, his biggest safeguard against a potential coup 
(Lange, 1990: 206). 
Meanwhile, Douglas kept his word and continued his destabilisation campaign. In 
the caucus and through publications and public meetings, he advocated his own policy 
agendas (Sheppard, 1999: 186). It was obvious that the on-going dispute between the 
two prominent figures was hurting the Government's popUlarity and it had been trailing 
National in the opinion polls for quite a while12 • Worried colleagues attempted to 
reconcile the two by setting up several meetings without significant success (Sheppard, 
1999: 188-189). After the final meeting failed to produce any meaningful result, 
Douglas and his supporters - including some Cabinet Ministers - decided to test 
Lange's leadership in a vote once again (Sheppard, 1999: 189)13. 
10 His chance was unlikely to have been helped by his decision to invite journalists to inspect 
confidential Cabinet papers in the wake of his resignation. Douglas was eventually stopped and 
reprimanded by Palmer, a former law professor before entering Parliament. 
11 Furthermore, Palmer's stance was generally understood to be: 'if the PM went, he would go too' 
(McQueen, 1991: 152). See, also Lange (1990), p.206. 
12 See, for example, Vowles and Aimer (1993: 3, Graph 1-1; 186-188). 
13 The news of a leadership coup travelled fast. Unlike the previous year's vote, this time the result 
was expected to be much closer. This was reflected on the sense of urgency on both sides. MPs who 
were overseas at that time were contacted through different means and they hurriedly came home. 
(Davies, 1997: 109-112). 
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The vote held on 29 June 1989 was not between Douglas and Lange. The former 
Finance Minister and his supporters had judged that the best chance to defeat Lange was 
to focus on a confidence issue without standing an alternative. In case that there was a 
majority no-confidence vote in the leader, Palmer was expected by many to win the 
subsequent leadership vote. By taking this option, the anti-Lange faction was hoping to 
win support from those who held concerns about Lange's leadership but were not 
prepared to support Douglas as the new leader (Sheppard, 1999: 190). 
The vote, taken by secret ballot, confirmed Lange's position as the leader. Although 
the result was never officially revealed, even by Lange's admission, it was believed to be 
by a quite small margin (Sheppard, 1999: 190). 
Lange's narrow victory at the 29 June 1989 caucus meeting was not the end of the 
saga. Shortly afterwards, some Labour MPs publicly started to call for Douglas' return 
to the Cabinet (McQueen, 1991: 178-179). Although the next Cabinet reshuffle was 
scheduled in October, those MPs were demanding that it be advanced. This wish was 
granted and a caucus meeting to decide on who should fill the two vacant positions, 
earlier created by Douglas and Prebble, was held on 3 August 198914 . 
At the caucus meeting, Douglas and Annette King were elected to the Cabinet 
(McQueen, 1991: 188). The result personally hurt Lange who took his arch-rival's 
return as a sign of disloyalty and no confidence in his leadership (Russell, 1996: 203) 
although he had not forewarned his caucus colleagues about the ramifications of their 
votes 15. At the same time, this result forced the leader to ask himself whether he was 
prepared to endure the emotional strain that he had been subjected to ever since his 
relationship with Douglas collapsed. His answer was negative. 
As soon as Lange's intention was known, the race for his replacement commenced. 
As Douglas realised once again that he stood no chance of becoming the leader, the 
contenders were quickly narrowed down to two MPs16: Palmer and Moore (McQueen, 
1991: 192). On 8 August 1989, the caucus elected Palmer by a significant margin. 
The PalmerIMoore succession 
Within thirteen months of Palmer's selection, the Labour caucus had to select another 
leader. On 4 September 1990, Palmer voluntarily stepped down as the leader. 
Palmer succeeded Lange in the most unenviable circumstances. The party was in 
serious disarray. After the five years of controversial Government policies, divisions 
14 The Labour Caucus Rules stipulates that when in Government, the caucus elects the members of 
the Cabinet. It is the role of the leader (Prime Minister) to allocate the portfolios. 
15 See, Cullen's comments in Sheppard (1999), p.193. 
16 Palmer's close personal friend, CaygiU, also considered standing for the election. After discussion 
with Palmer, however, both agreed that only one of them should be a candidate. Palmer was mutually 
preferred because of his deputy status, as well as his family situation (Caygill had a younger family). 
(Jackson, 1992a: 16) 
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throughout the party were obvious to everyone. The feud between Lange and Douglas 
had become so public that the party's public image had been irreversibly damaged 
(Palmer, 1992: 151). To make matters worse, the divisions were not confined to the 
Government caucus; they had also developed within the external Parliamentary Party 
(EPLP) (see, Sheppard, 1999) as well as between the EPLP and the Parliamentary wing 
(see Dyson, 1991). There was little Palmer could do to rectify this dire situation. 
Given the problems that the Government was experiencing, its unpopularity with the 
public was not surprising. Although it enjoyed a brief 'honeymoon' period in the 
opinion polls immediately after the leadership change, the euphoria did not last. Once 
again, Labour was trailing National by a large margin. By July 1990, Palmer's personal 
popularity was also suffering; in some opinion polls, it rated lower than Mike Moore by 
a small margin (Sheppard, 1999: 227). 
The dismal poll performance of both the leader and party gave wary MPs sufficient 
reasons to seriously entertain the idea of having another leadership change. Some MPs 
approached Moore, who had been soundly defeated in the previous leadership contest 
less than one year before, regarding his interest in challenging the troubled leader. 
The leadership issue was discussed at the Cabinet meetings held on 27 August and 3 
September, where the discontent with Palmer was stronger than in the caucus at large 
(McRobie, 1991: 56). At the 3 September meeting, the Cabinet was presented with a 
private polling result which suggested Labour's likely election defeat with the existing 
leader by a large margin. At the same time, the same poll indicated that the party's 
prospect would improve - even to the extent that a surprise victory could be possible - if 
Moore was to take over the leadership (Sheppard, 1999: 230). 
At the caucus meeting held on 4 September 1990, Palmer unexpectedly announced 
his intention to resign from the leadership. A majority of the caucus was allegedly still 
behind him, and if a vote had been taken, it is believed that he would have retained the 
leadership (Brown, 1991). However, the previous day's Cabinet meeting, where more 
than half of the Ministers - including his deputy, Clark - expressed their preference for 
a leadership change (McRobie, 1991: 56), convinced him that it would not be a worthy 
fight. 
After his announcement, the caucus duly held a vote to fill the vacancy. Two 
candidates stood for the contest. They were Moore, who had accepted his supporters' 
invitation to make himself available, and a backbencher, Richard Northey. The latter's 
candidacy was mostly in protest against the pressure brought by some of his colleagues 
to bear on Palmer. Not surprisingly, Moore was victorious although his rival reputedly 
managed to attract more than ten votes (Sheppard, 1999: 230). 
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The 1993 and 1996 leadership crises 
The desperate leadership change to Moore could not rescue Labour from the predictable 
defeat. Despite the magnitude of the loss - the caucus size was nearly halved - he 
continued to lead the party for the next three years. At the 1993 election, Labour 
recovered markedly, coming close to a victory. However, this achievement was not 
enough to save Moore's leadership when a challenge was mounted against him by his 
deputy, Helen Clark in December 1993, shortly after the election. 
Although Moore's failure (narrowly) to recapture power after three years in 
opposition was no doubt a factor in his demise, the dissatisfaction with his leadership 
styles in the caucus was also believed to playa part. Less than two and half years later, 
it was Clark's tum to find herself in trouble. In late May 1996, five frontbenchers 
(Michael Cullen, Phil Goff, Annette King, Jim Sutton, and, Koro Wetere) who were 
concerned about the party's low popularity and its ramifications for the coming election, 
approached the leader asking her to voluntarily step down. Following her refusal, 
intense lobbying took place on behalf of the pro and anti-Clark groups. In the end, the 
former group prevailed and no coup eventuated. In a reflection of the previous contest, 
Moore was reported to be the anti-Clark camp's alternative leader. 
Both incidents seemed to attract especially keen public and media interest. The 
latter's enthusiasm, in particular, led the President of the Labour Party at the time of the 
1996 leadership crisis, Michael Hirschfeld, to comment that the media's attention on 
both occasions exceeded both 'reality' and the attention which it normally payed to 
'disunity in other parties' (Hirschfeld, interview, 1998). What appeared to intensify the 
interest in both crises were the sharp contrasts between Moore and Clark as individuals; 
in addition to the gender difference, the two leaders were poles apart in many respects, in 
one journalist's words, they 'couldn't have been less alike' (McLoughlin, 2000: 83). 
With these added 'personal dimensions', the leadership crises naturally became more 
'dramatic' from a spectator's viewpoint. 
Moore and Clark - contrasting politicians! 7 
The circumstances during their childhoods were vastly different. Michael Kenneth 
Moore was born in 1949 in Whakatane and grew up in Northland. His childhood was 
plagued by numerous hardships. His family were poor and had to endure appalling 
living conditions18 . His father died of a heart attack, brought on by a chronic asthma, 
17 The information on Moore's personal history is drawn from his autobiography (l993b) while that 
of Clark from Myers (1986) unless otherwise indicated. Moore's A Labour of Love was a reprinted 
version (with added essays) of his autobiography, Hard Labour, published in 1987 (Auckland: 
Penguin). 
18 For example, his house became flooded every winter by a nearby river. To drain the water, the 
house had to have holes drilled in the floor. The river also caused the long-drop toilet in the backyard 
to flood. (Moore, 1993b: 9) 
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when Moore was just six, which resulted in him being passed around various members 
of the family. To compound his already severe difficulties, a young Moore suffered 
from a physical handicap, too - a deformed foot possibly as a result of polio - that 
forced him to wear a brace. 
Clark, on the other hand, enjoyed a far more secure and stable upbringing provided 
by farming parents. Born in 1950 in Hamilton, she grew up on the family farm in 
Waikato. Although she had a series of health problems 19, the sort of daily struggles that 
Moore endured were completely alien to her. 
As a consequence of their inhibiting health problems, both Moore and Clark 
developed a love for reading at young age. However, despite their common thirst for 
knowledge and widely recognised intelligence, their academic achievement greatly 
differed. Moore was not a success at educational institutions, and was essentially a self-
taught man. At Dilworth - a boarding school for children from underprivileged homes 
- he often ran away until he was eventually taken out of the school by his mother ° . 
After passing school certificate in non-academic subjects, he unsuccessfully tried UE 
mathematics and physics (McLoughlin, 1991: 47). Clark, in contrast, thrived in 
education. She went to Auckland University, where she majored in political studies. 
She received an MA with honours and then embarked on her study towards a Ph.D. on 
a scholarship, although the degree was never completed. To testify her success at her 
study, Clark was appointed as a junior lecturer in the Political Studies Department at 
Auckland University at the age of 23, even before the completion of her MA. 
Not surprisingly, their career paths prior to politics took drastically different 
directions. As noted above, Clark was a professional academic. Until her election to 
Parliament in 1981, she remained at the university, holding the position as a lecturer. In 
contrast, Moore was a blue-collar worker. His first job after school was as a labourer 
for a bricklayer. The second was a position in a printing company, which he later 
described as a storeman and packer. Between 1975 and 1978, while he was out of 
Parliament, he attempted to find a position as a middle manager without success. He 
eventually worked as a nightwatchman on a dredge, and then as a social worker at a 
psychiatric hospital. 
The differences also extended to their public images, personalities, and personal lives. 
In the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) which had become increasingly representative 
of the educated, middle c1ass21 (to which Clark belonged), Moore rightly (and proudly) 
saw himself as a man of the ordinary people. His public persona was open, warm, 
19 After having spent her formative years associating mainly with family members including her three 
siblings only, she developed a lot of psychosomatic illnesses from having to deal with other children 
when she went to primary school. In addition, she suffered from asthma, bronchitis, pneumonia, and a 
collapsed lung during her youth. 
20 However, Moore claimed that he was expelled (Moore, 1993b: 12). See, also Taylor (1990). 
21 See, for example, Gustafson (1992). 
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extrovert, emotional, and somewhat unpredictable. He openly professed to his lack of 
cultural sophistication, and was fond of smoking and beer drinking. He married his 
wife, Yvonne, when he was 26. Despite their wishes, they were childless, allegedly as a 
result of Moore's bout with a serious cancer in the 1977-79 period. 
Clark, on the other hand, was generally perceived as cold, reserved, unemotional, 
focused and disciplined. Unlike Moore, she did not claim to have the tastes of ordinary 
people. She admitted her dislike of sports including rugby - the national sport - and 
instead listed opera, films, classical music and theatre amongst her interests. As a 
former asthma sufferer, she despised smoking, and indeed as the Minister of Health, 
introduced the Smoke-Free Environments Bill, which restricted smoking areas as well as 
prohibited all tobacco advertising and sponsorship (McCallum, 1993: 153). She 
reluctantly married Peter Davies, a medical sociologist (and her partner of five years), 
prior to her election to Parliament in 1981, in order to pre-empt attacks on her personal 
life during that election campaign. Like the Moores, the couple were without children. 
But Clark's reason was different. She chose not to have offspring because of her 
respect for her own privacy and personal space as well as her devotion to politics 
(Baysting, et al., 1993: 38). 
If there was something in common between these markedly different individuals, it 
was a passion for (or even obsession with) politics, which eventually brought them 
together. After joining the NZLP through the Printers' Union in 1966, Moore rose in 
the party organisation at a remarkable speed. First, he was elected as a newly created 
youth representative on the National Executive in 1968, becoming the youngest member 
of Labour's governing body in its history. After three years in that position, he stepped 
down to be elected as Junior Vice-President of the party. 
Although coming from a pro-National family, at the university Clark became drawn 
to causes such as the anti-Vietnam War and anti-All Black tour to South Africa. She 
joined the NZLP in 1972. Once in the organisation, like Moore, she quickly established 
herself. In 1973, at the Youth Conference, which she attended for the first time, she 
ended up as the president of the Youth Council. In addition, she became an Executive 
Member of the party's Auckland Regional Council, Secretary of the Labour Women's 
Council, and a member of the Policy Council. 
In the meantime, greater political ambitions were driving both of them. After having 
stood unsuccessfully for local elections22 , there was a sense of inevitability that their aim 
shifted to national politics. Having helped several Labour MPs' election campaigns, 
Moore decided to give himself a chance in 1972. Although his chosen seat, Eden, was 
then held firmly by National and considered highly unwinnable, as he had done so on 
22 Clark stood for the Auckland Regional Authority and Auckland City Council in 1974 and 1977 
respectively. Moore tried his luck in 1971 by standing for the Papatoetoe City council election. 
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many occasions throughout his life, Moore beat the odds with vigorous campaigning. 
Also, no doubt assisted by a nation-wide landslide against National, he became the 
youngest MP (at the age of 23) in New Zealand history. 
However, Moore's first parliamentary experience did not last long. At the 1975 
election, he found himself as one of the 23 Labour MPs who lost their seats in the 
landslide victory by National. Once outside parliament, he kept a watchful eye open for 
an opportunity to return to Parliament. After unsuccessfully seeking to secure a 
nomination as a Labour candidate in two seats, in 1978 Moore finally won the candidacy 
in Christchurch North. By winning the seat with a comfortable majority, he re-entered 
national politics. 
Clark's turn arrived in 1975. After missing out on the candidacy of Auckland 
Central, she secured the Labour nomination for the rural Piako seat, strongly held by 
National. With no chance of winning, her sole aim was to gain campaigning experience 
for the future. This experience certainly helped her six years later when she stood for 
and won the seat of Mt Albert. This win made her the second woman MP ever to 
represent an Auckland electorate. 
Once in Parliament, Moore and Clark's paths took a similar route - rising in the 
caucus ranking after initial difficulties. For Moore, a breakthrough came when David 
Lange - of whom he was a strong proponent - replaced Bill Rowling (who was 
suspicious of Moore) as the leader in 1983. Although Moore himself missed out on the 
deputy leader's position to Geoffrey Palmer by one vote, he was not overlooked when 
Labour became the Government in 1984. He was made the third ranked minister, 
holding the portfolio of - amongst others - Overseas Trade and Marketing. He held and 
relished this position until he became the leader in 1990. 
When Labour won office in 1984 and the Cabinet was announced, Clark was one of 
those bitterly disappointed. Allegedly falling victim to factionalism, she missed out not 
only ministership (which was detennined by a caucus vote) but also positions of under-
secretary (that were allocated by the leadership23). Her fortune improved in the second 
term of the fourth Labour Government with her appointment as the Minister of Housing 
and Conservation. She became the Minister of Health in January 1989, and then the 
deputy Prime Minister seven months later. When Moore became the leader (and Prime 
Minister) by replacing Palmer, she retained the No.2 position. 
After surviving the 1996 crisis, Clark led the party to the 1996 election - the first 
election under the Mixed Member Proportional system. Although Labour received the 
smallest percentage share of the popular vote since 1928 (McRobie, 1998: 162) and 
failed to form a coalition government in the post-election negotiation, she escaped any 
23 After recovering from the initial disappointment, Clark thrived on other given responsibilities. In 
particular, she relished her role as the chairperson of the Select Committees on Foreign Affairs and on 
Disarmament and Arms Control. (McCallum, 1993: 149-150) 
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serious criticisms -let alone challenges. Following its healthy popular support for most 
of the 1996 to 1999 period, Labour became the largest party at the 1999 election. With 
the Alliance, the party formed a minority coalition Government, which in tum made 
Clark the ninth Labour Prime Minister of New Zealand and the first elected woman 
Prime Minister. 
After losing the leadership in 1993, Moore did not completely give up his aspiration 
to regain the top position of the party. However, it became blatantly obvious - especially 
after the 1996 leadership crisis - that it was likely to remain an unfulfilled dream. Upon 
this realisation, he eyed another goal. Following a nearly one year-long campaign, he 
was selected as the Director-General of the Geneva based World Trade Organisation in 
late July 199924 • 
Research Method 
Two types of information sources are used in this study. Information on daily 
developments of the leadership crises as well as on general political events are drawn 
from the secondary sources, ie, the media reports. Both the 1993 leadership coup and 
1996 leadership challenge received fairly comprehensive media coverage. Major 
newspapers, radio programmes, and to a considerably lesser extent, TV programmes, are 
consulted. 
However, as already noted, these sources do not provide sufficient information for 
either accurate reconstruction of the events or their detailed analysis. Many key players 
in leadership changes/crises do not always reveal their inner-thoughts or feelings to the 
media. (They may be even tempted to mislead the media.) In order to overcome such 
deficiency, personal interviews play an essential part as the second information source 
for this study. In total, 26 individuals including MPs (both former and incumbent) and 
former party officials were personally interviewed between 1995 and 1999. In addition, 
eight people (including five individuals who had already been interviewed) were 
contacted through correspondence for (further) assistance. 
Although attempts were made to obtain co-operation from more individuals, they 
were unsuccessful for several reasons. On two occasions, interviewees cancelled their 
appointments at the last minute because of their Parliament-related duties. With regard 
to another two MPs, mutually convenient times and locations could not be found for 
interviews. However, in most cases, requests for interviews and/or replies to written 
questions were declined or simply ignored. Although disappointing, this reaction was 
not surprising considering that most of them were sitting MPs when such contacts were 
made. With a snap election being constantly rumoured throughout 1998 and with 
Moore and Clark still remaining in the caucus, they might have had little incentive to 
24 See, for example, Young (1999). 
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discuss this potentially risky topic25 • Because of the media attention which Labour's 
party disunity had attracted in the past, there was unmistakable nervousness26 . 
In total, 17 people contacted did not participate in this study. Amongst them, Helen 
Clark's decision to make herself unavailable was a particular disappointment. Although 
she was approached with several propositions - the final one with written questions on 
general leadership matters only - the present Labour leader was adamant on her view that 
her participation would be inappropriate. 
Despite a number of refusals, a sufficient number of people agreed to participate and, 
in the final analysis, they have covered the caucus' views in the relevant period 
representatively. However, there remains the possibility that the absentees may have 
affected the findings (and thus the conclusion) of the study. In particular, one area 
requires caution. One of the main propositions of this study is that leadership durability 
is strongly influenced by the leader's support composition. To identify an individual 
MP's position towards-the leader at a certain point of time is a difficult task, even with 
the full participation of caucus members. MPs' memories are not infallible, and/or they 
may be tempted to ore-write' history since there is no official record to dispute their 
claim27 • The difficulty of the task increases accordingly without co-operation of some 
MPs. Guessing their positions (or votes) inevitably risks inaccuracy. As veteran MP, 
Jonathan Hunt, warned: 
That's why you've got to be very careful about people's opinions of other 
people's votes. If you get someone who specifically tells you what they did, 
that's probably quite likely to be correct. Probably. But if they won't tell you 
specifically, you don't take anything for granted. (Hunt, interview, 1998) 
In support of Hunt's view, some caucus members' positions were disputed amongst 
their colleagues interviewed for this study. In such cases, the opinions of those who 
were personally closer to the MPs concerned or those who were involved in the 
lobbying were adopted. As a result, I am confident about the overall accuracy of the 
25 A letter from Graham Kelly, MP, one of the MPs who declined my interview requests typifies this 
sentiment. 'This is not a matter that [I] am prepared to discuss now as it would be totally in 
appropriate [sic] to do so. Perhaps in the years ahead, when both the Members concerned are not in 
their current prominent positions, it might then be more appropriate to discuss such matters (Kelly, 
1998)'. 
26 Although only one interviewee asked for complete anonymity prior to the interviews, many 
stipulated their inspection of certain drafts of this study prior to its final submission. After their 
inspections, further two interviewees requested anonymity. 
27 The 1993 caucus leadership vote was by secret ballot. The difficulty of position identification was 
particularly serious for the 1996 situation when Helen Clark's leadership came under pressure. Since 
no caucus vote was taken at that time, who was supporting whom and how strongly was a more 
elusive question than in the other situations. This problem was compounded by the fact that since the 
1996 election, both Labour and Clark have enjoyed consistently high public support in the opinion 
polls. 
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support composition lists in this study, but this by no means guarantees absolute 
precision. It is important to stress that it should be treated with this point in mind. 
A similar caution applies to other areas of this study, where findings are dependent 
upon information provided by the interviewees. I do not believe that any of the 
interviewees deliberately distorted information; on the contrary, in most cases, they were 
quite helpful and forthcoming. However, it seems rather na'ive to expect interviewees to 
share all their insights, thoughts, and feelings. Some things were not said. For example, 
when asked the reasons for their support, or opposition to, a certain leader, no MP listed 
hislher future prospect under that leader. As seen later, the reasons for MPs' positions 
were often explained in terms of policy, the party's collective interest, or the leader's 
personality. However, personal ambitions can be a significant drive for MPs. 
National's short-lived leader, Jim McLay's demise was a good example. The plot to 
oust him was allegedly organised by a group of MPs who had been earlier demoted 
unceremoniously by McLay (Laws, 1998; 52-57). This incident led an observer to 
conclude: 
Watching the supposed leaders-in-waiting of one's country engage in petty 
backbiting and errant behaviour quickly made me realise that personality not 
policy was a critical determinant of parliamentary action. Policy differences were 
simply used as an excuse to mask selfish motivation (Laws, 1998: 53). 
MPs have aspirations and egos28 , which can get boosted and bruised. If given a 
choice, most MPs would prefer their careers to be advanced to more prestigious, 
powerful, influential, and financially lucrative positions29 • This may not form the base 
for deciding their support for many Labour MPs, but it is more than plausible if this 
factor comes into their calculation. 
Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on leadership durability and leadership change 
in the Westminster system. The review also highlights some inadequacies in the 
existing knowledge base of leadership durability. The chapter then goes on to offer a 
theoretical framework with which analysis of leadership durability in the NZLP can be 
better understood. The framework is presented with a number of propositions whose 
validity is duly tested in Chapters 3-8. 
These six chapters are divided into two blocs - Chapters 3, 4, and 5 deal with the 
1993 leadership change while Chapters 6, 7, and 8 examine the 1996 leadership crisis. 
28 Palmer commented in relation to New Zealand Prime Ministers, ' ... I often think that one of the 
greatest obstacles to political harmony is politicians' egos. We might be quite a lot better if a lot of 
politicians had their egos under control, which they don't' (McMillan, 1993: 61). 
29 The positions of party leadership, (some of) deputy leadership, Cabinet Ministers, Whips, and 
Chairpersons of Select Committees all come with monetary rewards. See, Taylor (1999), pp. 200-202. 
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Both blocs follow the same format. The first chapters (Chapters 3 and 6) narrate the 
development of each leadership crisis. The principal objective here is to provide an 
overview and background information about the events. The main sources of this 
information are media reports, supplemented by personal interviews where necessary. 
The following two chapters of each bloc (Chapters 4 and 5, and 7 and 8) constitute 
the core of the case studies. The central question to be addressed in those chapters is 
whether the fate of each leader - the loss of the leadership for Moore and survival for 
Clark - can be satisfactorily explained in terms of the theoretical framework 
propositioned in Chapter 2. Examination of this question is achieved in two parts. 
Chapters 4 and 7 analyse each leader's behaviour and actions in an effort to 
retain/strengthen his/her leadership, as well as analyse his/her followers' reactions to 
them. The information in these chapters finds its source primarily in personal 
interviews. 
Chapters 5 and 8 critically examine the validity of individual propositions against the 
findings. Furthermore, an attempt to explain the success and failure of those 
propositions is made and, where the propositions fail, suggestions for amendments are 
made accordingly. At the same time, any other variable, that seems relevant to leadership 
durability but falls outside the propositions, is identified and analysed. 
The overall validity of the propositioned theory, based upon the evidence gathered in 
both case studies, is discussed in the final part of the study, Chapter 9. It then reviews 
the findings of the research and discusses the possible contribution towards our 
understandings of the subject. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature review 
A political leader must keep looking over his [sic] shoulder all the time to see if 
the boys [sic] are still there. If they aren't still there, he's no longer a political 
leader. (Bernard Baruch30) 
Introduction 
The purposes of this chapter are twofold. First, the existing literature of leadership 
changes/durability is critically examined. Included in the examination is work done in 
New Zealand as well as in other western Westminster countries - most notably Britain. 
The state of our current knowledge and understanding of the subject is clarified. Also 
identified is the gap within the literature and, more specifically, its limited ability to 
sufficiently explain leadership durability and changes - including that of the NZLP. 
The second purpose of the chapter is, in an attempt to rectify this situation, to 
propose an alternative theory. The theory is built upon the existing literature of not only 
immediately relevant fields but also other, wider leadership studies. 
Studies of party leadership change 
Despite their obvious importance, the questions how and why those party leaders are 
selected or de-selected have attracted remarkably little academic interest (Punnet: 1992: 
3). Although this unfortunate trend has changed through a recent addition of studies on 
the subject, mainly in Britain -thanks to the recent changes of party leaders of the two 
major parties, and some other countries (eg., Marsh, 1993b31 ) - the subject still remains 
relatively unexplored (Stark, 1996: 2). 
Likewise, party leadership selection has scarcely been a focus of academic interest in 
New Zealand. Several individual leadership changes and crises have received detailed 
anecdotal treatment by historians, political scientists, as well as those closely involved in 
those events32 . However, so far, only two scholarly studies have been published on the 
subject of leadership selection and duration in general - one nearly twenty years ago 
30 Quoted in Jay (1996: 32: 9) 
31. This special issue of European Journal of Political Research edited by Marsh comprises studies of 
Belgium, Britain, France, Republic of Ireland, Norway, and Spain. For Canadian state level party 
leadership selection, see Blake, Carty, and Erickson (1988) and Carty et al. (1990). 
32 For example, Political Science Professor and historian of the National Party, Gustafson described 
the party's leadership changes and crises in his book on a general history of the party (Gustafson, 
1986a). Gustafson also wrote a useful chapter on a National Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake's 
leadership (l997a). Another political scientist, Henderson, recorded a failed leadership coup attempt 
against Bill Rowling (Labour) in 1980 (Henderson, 1981: Chapter 1). Sheppard, a political science 
graduate and researcher, carefully reconstructed the power struggle between Labour Prime Minister, 
David Lange, and his one-time Finance Minister, Roger Douglas (Sheppard, 1999). The same issue 
was also dealt with by one of Lange's former staff, McQueen (1991). A former Cabinet Minister of the 
Muldoon Government (National), Templeton, touched on the failed leadership coup attempt against the 
leader in 1980 in his memoir (Templeton, 1995: Chapter 14). 
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(Jackson, 1978) with the other more than a decade ago (Welle23 , 1985: Chapter 3). In 
contrast, whilst Prime Ministership which has been studied by various academics (eg., 
Alley, 1992; Henderson, 1997; McLeay, 1995; Mulgan, 1994: Chapter 4; Palmer, 1992: 
Chapter 7; Palmer and Palmer, 1997: Chapter 4; Weller, 1985) little attention has been 
paid to party leadership. This situation is lamentable given the view that political parties 
are now widely recognised as occupying key positions in this country's political system 
(Mulgan, 1997: Chapter 10; the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, 1986). 
In general, previous studies of party leadership change can be categorised into two 
groups according to their aims and analytical angles, although in some cases they 
overlap, especially in New Zealand. 
A. Studies of rules and procedures 
The first group's perspective is 'macro'. It examines 'how' leadership change 
(selection) takes place. Studies in this group typically focus on the mechanism side of 
the phenomenon, ie., party rules and formal leadership selection procedures. The 
characteristics and the reasons/philosophy behind particular systems are a major interest 
of these studies. Although actual leadership changes are often analysed as case studies, 
they are used to illustrate these points in operation. In other words, leadership change 
outcomes are normally explained in relation to the unique biases inherent in each 
selection system. The questions often asked in this type of analysis include: 'Would 
different selection outcomes have resulted if different rules and procedures had been 
utilised?' and even 'Would the leadership change have been at all possible under 
different rules?' Along this vein, the duration of leadership is explained in the context 
of how much protection the incumbent leaders are provided under the existing system. 
Comparative perspectives either domestically or internationally are commonly applied in 
this type of study. Included in this group are Alderman (1992; 1994; and 1999) 
Alderman and Smith (1990), Cowley (1996), Heclo (1973), Marsh (1993b), Peabody 
(1984), Punnet (1992 and 1993), Stark (1996), Weller (1985 and 1992): The findings 
of these previous studies are summarised below: 
33 Weller's primary interest was placed on prime ministers, not party leaders. However, his study is 
still useful for as already mentioned, to become prime minister, one has to assume the leadership of a 
political party, and the loss of the prime ministership normally induces the loss of the party leadership. 
Weller's study was carried out from a comparative perspective, examining three Westminster countries: 
New Zealand, Australia, Britain, and Canada. More recently, the same author repeated a similar attempt 
with the focus on the dismissal of prime ministers, but this time New Zealand was omitted from the 
subject countries (Weller, 1994). 
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1) The vulnerability of party leaders 
A. Timing 
Theoretically, the vulnerability of party leaders is to a considerable extent determined by 
rules and procedures. While the provision of the rules which allow leadership change 
may serve to weaken incumbency, their absence may unduly prolong the tenure of 
incumbent leaders (providing they are healthy and willing) (Alderman and Smith, 1990: 
270-271). Timetabled, automatic re-selection no doubt increases the incumbents' 
vulnerability, but it does not automatically put the leaders in immediate danger. As 
Weller noted, prime ministers with regular performance assessment can use such 
timetables to their advantage: 
Rules predetermine available opportunities and, almost certainly exclude other 
processes of persuasion. If the rules prescribe a timetable, a Prime Minister under 
pressure can always point to the scheduled period and advise critics to wait for the 
opportunity and then use it. (Weller, 1994: 138) 
Any successful leader can undergo difficult periods during their tenure. The 
statistical chances of such troubles coinciding with re-selection can be small, and if the 
timing of re-selection is pre-arranged, leaders can utilise their resources to manipulate 
the political environment to ensure there be no such coincidence. The most vulnerable 
leaders are those in 'open season' (Weller, 1994: 138), ie., they are subject to the rules 
allowing leadership challenge at any given time. 
B. The difficulty of challenges 
Theoretically, the rules determine not only the timing and opportunities for challenges, 
provided they are adhered to, but also the level of difficulties (and thus the vulnerability 
of the incumbents) of those challenges. At least three factors are considered to be 
important. Firstly, who the selectors are can influence incumbents' vulnerability. 
Leaders may be selected by: a) a small group of party elites (as in the British 
Conservative Party until 1965); b) the parliamentary party (MPs) (as in the British 
Labour Party until 1980 and the British Conservative Party from 1965 until 1998); c) an 
electoral college consisting of various sections of the party (as in the British Labour 
Party since 1988); or d) party members at large (as with British Liberals34). Exclusive 
rights by one segment of a party (eg., MPs) to choose the party leader does not 
necessarily mean the selectors do not take the views of other segments of the party (eg., 
rank and file members) into consideration. However, it is important to remember that 
34 As a result of the rule changes in 1998, the British Conservative Party now also allows the entire 
party membership to have a say in deciding the leadership of the parliamentary party. However, 
ordinary members' participation is limited to the final stage of selections, after members of parliament 
have narrowed down contenders to two (Alderman, 1999). 
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they do not need to do so, and this can easily lead to the latter's demands for inclusion 
in the selection process (Alderman, 1992: 34-35). In general, the more diverse and the 
larger the number of the selectors, the more difficult it becomes to organise challenges 
and the less vulnerable incumbents are likely to be (Weller, 1985: 63). 
Secondly, the rules define the eligibility of both challenges and challengers. For 
example, the 1991 revisions of the rules of the British Conservative Party stripped away 
the secrecy hitherto given to the two members who nominated and seconded challengers. 
As a result, their names were to be published and anyone who wished to initiate removal 
of party leaders had to risk becoming the target of potential retribution. The clear aim of 
this revision was to discourage challenges while increasing the security of an incumbent 
leader (Alderman, 1992: 31)35. Similarly, the higher the number of nominations 
required by the rules as a pre-requisite for a challenge, the more difficult it is likely to be 
to unseat an incumbent leader. As Alderman reported, the required nomination 
threshold for the British Labour Party (in written form by 20% of all MPs) has deprived 
some challengers of chances to enter the contests (1994: 20). Also, at a more 
fundamental level, the eligibility of candidates can be restricted to a certain group of 
individuals. Commonly, to be a leader of parliamentary party, a candidate is required to 
be the incumbent member of a parliament representing the party. 
Thirdly, rules define victories. In some cases, a victor needs to achieve an overall 
majority of the total votes. For the British Labour Party's case, until one candidate 
accomplishes this, ballots are repeated, with the bottom candidate being eliminated after 
each round (Punnet, 1992: 108). Prior to the recent revision of the rules, the British 
Conservative Party had employed noticeably more complicated procedures. In order to 
claim victory on the first ballot, a candidate was required to gain not only an overall 
majority of the votes of those entitled to vote (not just those who actually voted) but also 
a lead over the second candidate which amounted to at least 15% of those entitled to 
vote. If any candidate failed to achieve that, a second ballot would be called. It would be 
a new contest; the candidates for the first ballot were required to be re-nominated if they 
wished to remain in the contest (or they could withdraw) and new contenders were 
allowed in. The winner of the second ballot required an overall majority, as the 15% rule 
was applicable only to the first round. If there was no winner in the second round, there 
would be a third ballot between the top two candidates from the second ballot36 . The 
35 Under the new rule, a challenge to the leadership must be initiated with a vote of confidence, which 
may be held at any time. While no less than 15% of members of the parliamentary party's support is 
necessary for such a vote to take place, the identities of instigators will remain anonymous. If the 
incumbent fails to win that vote by securing a simple majority (the 15% rule no longer applies), all 
aspiring candidates are required to enter a subsequent leadership contest. To enter the race, one requires a 
proposer and a seconder, whose names are to be published. See Alderman (1999). 
36 For a detailed description of the rules and procedures of the major British political parties, see 
Punnet (1992 and 1993) as well as Alderman (1994 and 1999). 
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necessity to win 'convincingly' by clearing the 15% threshold set a high hurdle for 
Margaret Thatcher who, despite falling only four votes short of fulfilling the 
requirement, was forced to withdraw from the second ballot in 1990 (Cowley, 1996). 
1) The status of incumbents 
Not surprisingly, the security of party leaders increases while they are prime ministers 
(Weller, 1985: 47). To even consider unseating a leader, the political situation must be 
desperate as the effects of a leadership challenge is considered negative for its 
unwelcome yet inevitable exposure of internal divisions (Alderman and Smith, 1990; 
Punnet, 1992; Weller, 1985: 67)37. Although such divisions can still be fatal to the 
electoral fortune of opposition parties, they - in comparison to governing parties - have 
less at stake and fewer ramifications are expected from the removal of the leader. Also 
as Weller asserted, 'they [opposition leaders] have fewer resources, less prestige and 
less patronage; they do not have the same national stature as prime ministers '( 1985: 
44). With regard to patronage, while the opposition leader can still sanction disloyal 
colleagues through demotion in ranking, it is no comparison to what is available to prime 
ministers. Alderman and Smith described that position as 'probably the most potent 
resource available' for which '[p]otential conspirators could be deterred by fear ofloss 
of office or failure to gain promotion' (1990: 269). Also, prime ministers can 
manipulate cabinet reshuffles to their advantage (Alderman and Smith, 1990: 269-279). 
They can be used for breaking up alliances against the incumbents, burying potential 
rivals in heavy workloads so that little time is left for plotting, and finally nurturing more 
than one credible candidate, which in tum encourages division among conspirators. 
2) The availability of alternative candidates 
The fate of incumbent leaders is considerably affected by the presence or absence of 
alternative leaders. In Weller's words, '[n]o leader can be replaced by a vacuum' 
(1985: 68). Although politicians are often uniformly assumed to be upwardly ambitious 
(Rohde, 1979), only few actually have the necessary abilities and talents to reach the top. 
If there are no alternative leaders who are acceptable to many segments of the party, it is 
less likely that unseating of an incumbent takes place. Thus, from the incumbents' 
viewpoint, it is tempting to utilise the power available to deter the emergence of such 
candidates, as mentioned above. 
37 Contrary to this traditional view, Stark has claimed that leadership contests are 'good' for a political 
party for the opportunities which they create to 'remake its images', 'to display its leading talents, 
show its maturity, and demonstrate its worthiness to govern' (1996: 164). 
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3) What selectors seek in new leadership. 
Stark (1996: Chapter 7) listed three criteria for assessing leadership regardless of the 
selectorate. They were: 
A. Party unity 
The first consideration is the candidates' ability to unify the party. Although this 
criterion is more like a pre-requisite, and is not always explicit, when the party faces a 
serious danger of disunity, it comes to the surface. If a party is in crisis, the victorious 
candidate is the one who is acceptable to many segments of the party even if that means 
a comprOIIDse. 
B. Electoral appeal 
Winning an election and leading the party to power is normally regarded as the most 
prominent task for the party leader, and the prospect of hislher success at the task 
greatly determines hisfher fate. For this reason, it is considered highly unlikely that a 
party leader who has just won an election will face a challenge (Weller, 1985: 67). 
Although the leader is held accountable for hislher party's poor showing in the polls, the 
leader's personal fate is considered safe as long as hislher personal rating runs ahead of 
the party (Alderman and Smith, 1990: 268). 
C. Competence 
The third criterion is a candidate's competence as a potential prime minister to govern 
the country. Included in the calculation of competence are hislher intelligence, ability to 
implement party policies, and general parliamentary skills. 
These three criteria are not rated with equal weight. The first and second factors 
easily outweigh the last criterion, and often competence is readily scarified when the 
selectorate is faced with the task of prioritising the criteria. Although candidates' 
unifying power and electability are both regarded as imperative, in Stark's view, the 
ability to preserve party unity is normally given priority over the other (1996: 126). 
However, acceptability to many segments of a broadly based political party (such as the 
subjects of Stark's study) is not only a basic requirement for unification of the party, 
but also a sound measurement of a leaders' acceptability by the whole electorate in 
general elections. As Stark himself admitted (1996: 126), it is only in 'extraordinary 
circumstances' that a candidates' party-unifying ability becomes the explicit, paramount 
concern in a leadership selection. Under normal situations, unity concern can be 
regarded more as a pre-requisite, an inseparable part of the victory goal38 . 
38 Unlike Stark, King suggested that in Britain selectors' criteria ranking varies according to the 
proximity of the next election: 'the more closely related the selection of candidates and party leaders is 
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New Zealand 
As noted in previous British studies, the chances of a move to unseat an incumbent party 
leader in New Zealand materialising is influenced by the leader's status. Not 
surprisingly, if leaders have just won an eiection, their positions are considered much 
more secure (Jackson, 1992b: 14-15; Upton, 1997). Although the vulnerability of 
opposition leaders is generally considered higher than that of prime ministers (Jackson, 
1992a: 21), there are further variables that need to be considered. Firstly, if leaders are 
yet to win an election (including cases in which they inherit the prime ministership 
following the predecessors' resignation or death), the first one to two years of their 
tenure are a crucial period for establishing their leadership (1992b: 15-16). Secondly, 
an election loss itself is not a sufficient condition for leadership change. The 
performance of the party at the poll (eg., the magnitude of the loss, and its comparison to 
its performance at the previous election) also carries weight in determining the worth of 
the leader. Also important is the performance of the party in opposition following an 
election defeat. As long as the party shows promise of winning the next election under 
the existing leader, s/he is likely to be retained. In other words, leaders are punished for 
their perceived incapability of winning a future election, not for having lost one. For the 
same reason, the leaders who have proven successful at the previous elections may not 
be able to rely on their past records for their survival, once they are considered by the 
selectorate as a future electoral liability . 
The availability of alternative candidates is another imperative. As reported in 
previous international studies, suitable and readily acceptable alternative candidates are 
not something which can be taken for granted. A unique mixture of talents and skills 
required for the party leadership are hard to find despite the abundance of 
'wannabes'39. 
What are the qualities sought in (potential) leaders? Jackson's findings (1992a: 28) 
on the selection criteria for future leaders in New Zealand closely paralleled Stark's list, 
which is earlier mentioned. A successful party leader in New Zealand needs to provide: 
1) Elective: political success in the form of likely victory or improved performance 
of the party at general elections (as monitored by the opinion polls) 
to the holding of popular elections, the more likely it is that the selectors will have electoral criteria in 
mind' (1975: 188) 
39 A former National Cabinet Minister, Simon Upton, wrote: 'In truth, I think every MP who arrives 
in Wellington believes he or she could, given a fair wind and 64 lucky breaks, do the job ... I have been 
in Parliament 16 years and seen an awful lot of pretenders. Very few have what it takes. From what I 
have seen since 1981, there's about one arrival per decade who has what it takes' (1997). 
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2) Policy: s/he should be capable of ensUling a degree of ideological satisfaction 
for party members. 40 
3) Unity: related to this is the ability to ensure party unity. 
Among these three criteria, electoral victory is considered the first and uttermost 
priority in assessing the relative merits of leadership candidates in New Zealand. 
Although the image of party unity and cohesion has been long regarded as important in 
New Zealand politics, it has been argued so in the sense that the lack of them is 
detrimental to political parties' electoral fortune (eg., Jackson, 1987: 58). That is not to 
say, as Stark argued, a candidate's electoral appeal has never been compromised for the 
sake of another contender's perceived ability to restore the sense of unity and stability 
(Jackson, 1991: 52). However, even in that case - Labour's leadership change in 1989 -
it was generally estimated that the united image of the party, projectable under Geoffrey 
Palmer's leadership (rather than the rival, Mike Moore's populist appeal) was the 
necessary remedy to the party's steady decline in popular support following a long and 
bruising internal battle. To demonstrate that the unity goal is secondary to the victory 
concern, the axe relentlessly fell on Palmer and his presumed stabilising ability to make 
a way for Moore some seven weeks before the 1990 election. As McRobie put it: 
If a leader fails to inspire the electorate (regardless of how he is seen by his 
parliamentary colleagues) moves will inevitably be made to oust him (McRobie, 
1991: 61). 
B. Studies of individual leadership changes 
The second type of party leadership selection study is more 'micro' in comparison to 
the first type of studies. It has tried to explore 'why' particular leadership changes 
originate and develop as they do, by examining variables beyond the systematic 
characteristics of the selection rules and procedures. As Weller indicated (1994: 138), 
institutional variables (ie., rules, procedures, and the availability of alternative candidates) 
are necessary but are not in themselves sufficient conditions for leadership changes. In 
order to topple incumbent leaders successfully, there needs to be an 'organisation of 
discontent' , or motives for wanting fresh leaders. This group - which includes studies 
by Alderman (1996 and 1998), Alderman and Carter (1991, 1993 and 1995), Jesse 
(1996), Norton (1990a, 1990b, and 1993) - examined a wide range of 'contextual' (as 
opposed to 'institutional') variables such as the leader's personality, tactical decisions 
during the contests, the leaders and parties' standing in the opinion polls, the state of the 
40 This second criterion of Jackson's appears to be similar to Stark's competence criterion. Elsewhere 
Jackson asserted that a successful leader requires an ability to 'outwit skilful rivals in political tactics', 
'mould a team' and 'carry the myriad of detailed burdens associated with running executive government' 
(Jackson, 1992b: 17). For the National Party leaders' required qualities, see Upton (1997). 
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economy, successes or failures of policies implemented by a leader if the party is in 
government, and the leader's relationship with colleagues. 
New Zealand 
In New Zealand (for both Labour and National), probably as a reflection of a shortage 
of case studies, leadership change has been mostly explained from the institutional 
perspective. Put simply, new leaders are wanted when incumbents can no longer satisfy 
one or a combination of the three criteria earlier noted by Jackson. The key factors 
which precipitate dissatisfaction among the selectorate are: a) 'perceived lack of 
probable electoral success at the next election'; b) 'the availability of an alternative 
leader who appears capable of an improved performance'; c) the performance of the 
leader in parliament with consequent effects upon the morale of parliamentary 
colleagues; and d) differences over policy (Jackson, 1992b: 18). In addition, similar to 
the British findings, external factors such as the size of caucus, the effectiveness of 
opposition parties, and the condition of the economy are all believed to affect the 
assessment of incumbent leaders (Jackson 1992b: 6) presumably through their 
influence in the opinion polls. 
Non-institutional factors too can playa significant role in leadership change. 
Jackson's earlier study on the 1974 leadership change in National highlighted the 
importance of the personalities of the contenders and tactical decisions (or mistakes) 
made by the opposing camps (1975). With regard to the importance of personal 
characteristics, Gustafson asserted that apart from intelligence and physical energy, there 
are some other attributes that are typically necessary to become a party leader. Included 
in his list are: a) 'the compulsive personal ambition to lead'; b) 'the dogged persistence 
to strive year after year for that goal'; c) 'the personality and ability to construct, 
maintain and utilise networks'; d) 'the strength to rise above setbacks and 
disappointments'; and e) 'the single-mindedness ... to devote almost every waking hour 
to politics' (Gustafson, 1997b: 131)41. 
In his recent study, Jackson summarised the reasons for the demise of a short-term 
National leader, who lost the leadership within two years of the attainment as threefold: 
1) he failed to establish himself as a strong political figure in the opinion polls; 2) he 
failed to display strong leadership skills to handle a vocally disgruntled former leader; 3) 
misjudged policy positions and isolated senior MPs who disagreed with his favoured 
policies (1992a: 26-27). The role the opinion polls play has been considered 
41 See, also, Bassett (1999) for a list of 'essential' qualities for 'successful leadership' in New Zealand 
politics. 
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significant in determining party leaders' fate, although their accuracy in reflecting the 
electorate's views has been questioned (McRobie, 199142). Henderson stated: 
The reassurance that caucus will be seeking is that its leader is likely to be able to 
deliver electoral victory. The measuring rod for such a judgement is public 
opinion, as measured by the various party and media opinion polls (Henderson, 
1997: 73). 
Critics of previous studies 
There is no doubt that previous studies have contributed considerably towards our 
understanding of leadership change and leadership duration. However, there are some 
problems, especially regarding the absence of theories that link and integrate both 
institutional framework and individual, contextual variables. 
In relation to the second type of studies that we have examined, there are critics of its 
ad hoc nature. Martin 1. Smith argued in his analysis of Margaret Thatcher's 
resignation, that this approach tends to 'provide a narrative rather than an explanation, 
and even when the explanation is provided they focus on the events immediately 
surrounding the resignation' of the leader. As a result, they have failed to distinguish 
those variables as either 'a cause of the downfall' or 'factors that enabled Mrs Thatcher 
to be removed from office' (1994: 350). 
Smith's criticism was directed at the analysis of Thatcher's resignation, but is 
applicable to the studies of this type in general. It is a realistic expectation that any 
leadership change takes place due to multiple variables, and to oversimplify causal 
factors risks distorting the picture. However, a mere aggregate of seemingly relevant 
causes does not contribute to systematic understanding or theorising of the subject, 
either. There is little doubt contextual variables affect the relationship between leaders 
and followers, but as Smith pointed out, their effects should not be seen as equal - some 
variables are more crucial than others. Also, although each variable may be independent 
of each other, they all work within the given, uniform institutional framework (,factors 
that enable leaders to be removed from office') which may regulate how contextual 
variables are channelled into actual leadership selection/de-selection consideration. 
Without including the institutional aspects in the equation, it is impossible to correctly 
evaluate the significance of individual factors, however relevant and important they seem. 
Smith's criticism also seems to extend to the institutionalists' rigid approach for 
failing to recognise the fluid nature of power. He emphasised that the institutional 
framework which determines the availability of 'resources' operates in relation to 
42 McRobie also questioned the widely spread belief (especially among MPs) as to leadership and 
electoral fortune. His conclusion was at best cautious. For a similar view, see Jackson (1991). Bean 
(1993), however, claimed that there is a more positive correlation between the two variables. 
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contextual factors. Smith argued that the power in the British Government is not 
attributable solely to either the Prime Minister or Ministers, but it is shared by both, 
which makes their relationship co-dependent. Power - capacity to use resources 
(patronage, authority etc". for PM; policy networks, political support etc. for Ministers) -
is relational and, although some circumstances and situations (such as a massive 
electoral victory) allow the Prime Minister almost free and full usage of the resources, 
those circumstances can change as they eventually did for Margaret Thatcher. By the 
time she was challenged by Michael Heseltine in 1990, she had already undermined her 
position by alienating her Cabinet colleagues, to whom she could have turned to for 
support in a time of crisis, through a series of poor tactical and policy decisions. The 
true cause of her downfall therefore, according to Smith, was her failure to recognise her 
dependence on the Cabinet support. To mobilise support among her selectorate (ie., 
Conservative MPs), attainment of full Cabinet support was first required, but was not 
forthcoming. 
Smith's contribution is especially valuable for studies of leadership durability in the 
sense that it has brought our attention to the previous institutional studies' problem 
regarding how to reconcile individual and contextual variables with their findings on the 
systems. However, Smith's theory has problems in two areas. Firstly, it is unclear 
whether his theory can be applicable to party leadership in opposition, which presents a 
particular concern for a study such as this. Does opposition party leadership have a 
similar dependence upon senior colleagues such as those in shadow cabinets? Or, does 
the status of a party (whether in government or opposition) alter the dynamics of 
leadership durability fundamentally? Due to his sole concentration on prime 
ministership, we do not know the answers to these questions. 
The second problem is probably more serious. Smith appeared unwittingly to make 
the same mistake as the traditional institutional analyses with his fundamental 
assumption about how contextual variables affect the 'fluidity' of leadership support. 
In developing the analytical frameworks, the institutionalists have seemed to accept the 
rational choice theory views (Downs, 1957) which regard the selectorate (in Smith's 
case Cabinet Ministers) as consumers who shift their currency (allegiance) between 
commodities (leadership contenders) as they see more benefit with the same degree of 
freedom and willingness. This is a highly convenient and useful assumption which 
enables generalisation of leadership change, which in tum makes predictions based upon 
institutional settings possible. The question we need to address is: Does the selectorate 
actually behave in that manner? For example, if Thatcher's neglect of her cabinet 
colleagues was so detrimental to her leadership, why did some key cabinet ministers 
including John Major and Douglas Hurd remain loyal to her even to the extent that they 
ruled out their candidacy while she remained in the contest? How can we account for 
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this different loyalty level among the Thatcher's ministers who served under the same 
leader? 
An alternative model of leadership chan~e 
What appears to be lacking in previous studies is the realisation that: 1) leadership is 
dependent upon followers who have the power to select/de-select their leaders; 2) both 
leaders and followers work within the given institutional framework; 3) individual and 
contextual factors affect followers' views on their leaders; and 4) the extent to which 
followers' views are affected varies among individuals. What is in need is a theory of 
leadership durability that recognises all these points. 
American psychologists, Edwin P. Hollander and James W. Julian (1969) in their 
influential study on leadership pointed out thirty years ago that leadership is an 
interactive process of three elements: 1) leaders' characteristics; 2) followers' 
perceptions of the leaders; and 3) the characteristics of the situation. Their approach 
(termed 'transactional models') sharply contrasted the then prevailing view on 
leadership (referred to as 'trait approach') which regards leadership as a person, which 
can be analysed through an examination of a leader's personality traits (Hollander, 
1985). The trait approach assigned followers only a passive and insignificant role, while 
directing little attention to contextual factors. As already discussed, the institutionalists' 
approach to political leadership change is somewhat similar to such .a view in the sense 
that both consider leadership a one-way interaction; if leaders maintain their 
performance to a certain standard, which is implied to be 1) measurable by an objective 
scale and 2) stable over time and applicable across situations, they can retain their 
positions. 
However, such an approach seems erroneous43 . Firstly, followers' are not confined 
to the passive role of observing their leaders. Based on the belief that 'our 
understanding of leadership is incomplete if we do not recognize its unity with 
followership' (Hollander, 1992a: 74), Hollander went on to indicate: 
Leadership is not something a leader possesses so much as a process involving 
followership. Without followers, there plainly are no leaders or leadership. Yet, 
far less attention has been given to followers, who accord or withdraw support to 
leaders. Much of the literature on the study of leadership, while ostensibly 
focused on the effects of the leader, neglects to acknowledge or even recognize the 
important role of followers in defining and shaping the latitudes of a leader's 
action. (Hollander, 1993: 29) 
43 Criticism of such a static approach to the leader-follower relationship is not new. See, for 
example, Bion (1961). Several political scientists have raised this point, too. See, for example, Barber 
(1992), and Henderson (1980). Also, although from a different perspective, Miroff (1993) explored the 
delicate relationships between leaders and followers in the context of American democracy. 
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Secondly, through the two-way leader-follower interaction, different assessments of 
leaders' performance are likely to be formed amongst followers, possibly according to 
how they interact with leaders. Therefore, it is possible that even if some followers 
change their views of their leaders, others may decide to adhere to their original views. 
The notion that followers can affect and constrain a leader's activity (Hollander 
1992a) and hislher influence over them (Pfeffer, 1977) is manifest in cases of elected 
political leaders. Leaders can maintain their positions only as long as a sufficient 
number of followers routinely support them. Leaders need to be perceived by their 
followers as effective leaders by constantly satisfying their expectations and demands. 
In the leader-follower relationship, a leader provided 'a resource in terms of adequate 
role behaviour directed toward the group's goal attainment' (Hollander and Julian, 
1969: 388) and in return receives from followers 'heightened esteem for and 
responsiveness to the leader' (Hollander, 1992b: 48). In other words, leaders and 
followers are interlocked in 'reciprocal systems requiring syncronization' (Hollander, 
1992b: 46). This aspect of leadership has been often overlooked by previous studies of 
leadership change44 • 
The transactional approach also clarifies the ambiguous position which contextual 
variables have been long given by the institutional approach of leadership studies - one 
of the problems raised by Smith earlier. As Fillmore Sanford stated: 'Not only is it the 
follower who accepts or rejects leadership, but it is the follower who perceives both the 
leader and the situation and reacts in terms of what he [sic] perceives' (1950: 4, cited by 
Hollander, 1985: 502). In other words, contextual and individual factors do not directly 
affect leadership, nor can their significance to leaders' positions be measured objectively 
and independently. Their importance and relevance to leaders are subjectively perceived 
and judged by followers, and in terms of leadership change, contextual factors are 
significant only to the extent which they affect followers' perceptions of leaders. 
According to this view, the effectiveness of leadership (and leaders' durability) cannot 
be measured by the 'objective' standardised scale. Even when leaders' performance 
output remains steady, followers may well judge their effectiveness differently under 
different circumstances. Similarly, even under the same circumstances, it is plausible to 
expect followers to exhibit diverse evaluation of their leaders' performance among 
themselves. 
Although not linked to the transactional model of leadership, Philip Norton's 
analysis of Thatcher's leadership loss (1990a, 1990b, and 1993) resonates its 
fundamental approach. Instead of adopting the rational-choice-assumption, he 
44 As earlier discussed, Smith pointed out that prime ministers and cabinet ministers are dependent on 
each other in Britain. However, in theory, the loss of support among cabinet ministers who constitute 
a small portion of the whole parliamentary party should not directly lead to a prime ministers' demise 
unless it is proved that cabinet ministers have control over the rest of parliamentary party members. 
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categorised all the Conservative MPs into four main and seven sub-groups mainly 
according to their ideological stances in an effort to explain the former Prime Minister's 
support strength within the party (Norton, 1990a). They were: 
Thatcherites 
(1) Neo-liberals. A belief in the rigorous application of market forces. A rejection 
of the benign influence of government in economic affairs and in social affairs. 
Generally but not exclusively opposed to the EC and hanging. Generally 
supportive of more open government. 
(2) Tory Right. A greater emphasis on morals and the need to maintain social 
order and discipline. Strong belief in the maintenance of law and order. Pro-
hanging. Supportive of legislation to embody social values. Generally 
opposed to open government. 
Party Faithful 
(3) Thatcher Loyalists. Attachment to the style of leadership offered by Mrs 
Thatcher, with no strong ideological commitment. 
(4) Party Loyalists. Loyal to the party rather than to any particular strand of 
thought within the party. Loyalty on particular issues cannot necessarily be 
taken for granted - the group harbours a number of mavericks and free-
thinking MPs - but loyalty will flow to the leader, albeit on a contingent basis. 
As long as the leader provides competent - and successful - leadership, with 
consequent electoral appeal and reward, the loyalty is maintained; if the leader 
falters, Members start to waver. 
Populists 
(5) Populists. So-labelled not because of their style but because they reflect most 
accurately the position taken by the majority of the population, ie., essentially 
right-wing on law-and-order issues (pro-hanging, tougher sentencing, anti-
immigration), generally left-wing on social and economic issues (pro-health 
service, emphasis on creating jobs rather than keeping prices down). Sceptical 
of or opposed to EC. Some scepticism about privatisation. 
Critics 
(6)Wets. Essentially a combination of traditional and progressive conservatives. 
Committed to the concept of "One Nation". Stress need to maintain stability 
and a harmony of relationships between governors and governed. Hence 
accept the need, as occasion demands, for government intervention. Strongly 
pro-EC. Opposed to cuts in public expenditure, the poll tax, health charges, 
reductions in child benefit and the death penalty. 
(7)Damps. Generally sympathetic to the stance of the Wets, but not as rigorous in 
opposing the government on the issues on which the Wets take a stand. Pro-
EC and generally anti-hanging, sympathetic to government intervention. 
Likely but not certain to oppose the poll tax and health charges. More 
amenable than the wets to persuasion by ministers and the Whips on particular 
issues. (Norton, 1990: 49-50) 
The validity of Norton's typology lies in its recognition of the realistic nature of 
selectors' leadership support. It recognised that support fluidity (or stability) varied 
from one member to another according to why they supported the leader. For example, 
the first two groups, Neo-liberals and Tory Right (combined, Norton labelled them as 
'Thatcherites'), supported Thatcher for her policy stances. Thus, once she started to 
deviate from 'Thatcherism', their support would no longer be reliable. Adherence to her 
ideological purity was the key to sustaining these groups' support. On the other hand, 
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the group referred to by Norton as 'Thatcher Loyalists' were regarded as being 
committed to Thatcher as a person and her leadership style, and their support for her 
could be counted upon even in the event of any policy deviation. The Party Faithfuls' 
loyalty was principally directed at the party and its electoral victory, and their loyalty to a 
leader was secondary. They would support Thatcher as long as she could prove her 
worth as the leader. However, once she displayed a sign of weakness, they would shift 
their allegiance to another candidate under whom the party's prospect seemed brighter. 
In this sense, the Party Loyalists are similar to the image which rational-choice theorists 
developed for voters45 ; their loyalty to a leader was contingent and fragile. The 
Populists and the Critics (the Wets and the Damps) were critical of Thatcher's 
leadership for her policies and/or personal styles, and Thatcher could not rely upon them 
for support under normal circumstances. 
Using this categorisation, Norton estimated that more than half (58%) of the British 
Conservative MPs at the time of the 1990 leadership change belonged to the Party 
Faithful (1993: 35). He then concluded that this high proportion of Party Faithful (who 
later changed their views of Thatcher) ultimately cost her the leadership (Norton, 1990b 
and 1993). 
Norton's typology was designed only to describe the Thatcher administration and he 
has never claimed its validity outside this immediate subject (thus he may be guilty of 
Smith's criticism of being ad hoc). However, the implications of his classification 
appear to have far-reaching value to studies of leadership durability in wider contexts. 
Those implications can be summarised in the following terms: 
1) Where a political party leader is selected by (a group of) selectors, survival of 
leadership is dependent upon the selectors' perceptions of (and support for) the 
leader. 
2) Selectors' perceptions of the leader are unlikely to be uniform. They are more likely 
to differ from one member to another, reflecting their individual beliefs, values, 
assessment of the given situation, etc. 
3) Consequently, selectors' stances towards the leader, ie, a) whether they support 
herlhim or not; b) why they support/oppose him/her; and c) how strongly they 
support/oppose her/him, are likely to vary among them. 
4) In this circumstance, leadership durability is likely to be influenced by the 
composition of selectors based upon their stances towards the leader. 
Although promising, the applicability of Norton's classification in its original form 
to other leadership vulnerability studies is limited; his seven categories are far too many 
45 From the rational choice viewpoint, Neal G. Jesse developed a similar concept for those who shift 
their leadership support to a winning candidate, whom he referred to as 'Hobbesian voter'. See Jesse 
(1996). 
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and too detailed as well as too case specific. For wider usage, his model needs to be 
simplified and be developed into a theory. 
Leadership perception formation - information processing model 
The first step of theorisation is to find a guideline for the simplification. Where and 
how do we re-draw the lines between various types? For this, the study once again turns 
to the findings of psychology. 
Industrial psychologists in the United States have long shown interest in leadership 
in (mainly business) organisations. Central to their view is the notion that in order to 
gain an understanding of the perceptions that followers hold of leaders, how followers 
process information is crucial (Lord and Maher, 1991). 
Since people's memory and attention have distinct limitations, they develop 
'hierarchically organized sets of information that enable us to process much more 
information than would be possible without these mental structures' (Lord and Maher, 
1991: 17). This 'categorisation' process takes place in order to 'provide maximum 
information with the least cognitive effort' (Rosch, 1978: 28), and it is done so in terms 
of 'prototype' which represents 'clearest cases' or 'best examples' (Rosch, 1975: 544). 
Over time, people accumulate knowledge about attributes which are most widely, as well 
as least commonly, shared among category members. These attributes become 
associated with one another and finally form an integrated cognitive structure - prototype 
(Lord and Maher, 1991: 43) or ideal images of leadership. 
Leadership prototypes contain information of the necessary attributes of leaders as 
well as of their expected performance guideline. Once prototypes are acquired, 
leadership perceptions are formed by perceivers (selectors) through examination of the 
matching degree between subjects and the prototypes. If the subjects exhibit a 
satisfactory level of matching, they are considered being leaders by the perceivers (Lord, 
De Vader, and Alliger, 1986; Fraser and Lord, 1987). 
Although this leadership typology has been mainly utilised as a gauge for categorical 
judgement, ie, whether subjects are classified as leaders or non-leaders, its validity does 
not stop there. As Lord and his associates asserted, judgement on the proximity of the 
subjects to the prototype can be used for ranking among the subjects (Lord, Foti, and 
Phillips, 1982: 112-113). In a similar vein, Foti, Fraser, and Lord (1982) demonstrated 
that correlation exists between the levels of the match between subjects and ideal 
leadership images and endorsement of political leaders. In other words, the more 
'prototypical' a political leader (or candidate) is perceived to be, the more strongly 
perceivers endorse that person. These results suggest that perceivers can determine 
preferability of leadership contenders based upon how similar individual contenders are 
to their ideal leadership images. 
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According to Hall and Lord, once formed in this manner, followers' perceptions of 
leaders are likely to 'remain relatively stable over time' (Hall and Lord, 1995: 279). 
However, if this is the case, why do some selectors change their allegiance from one 
candidate to another? One possible explanation, of course, is the availability of 
leadership contenders. Through a natural political cycle - in the medium to long term-
individuals with good leadership credentials 'emerge'. Hitherto unknown MPs gain 
support as their abilities and attributes become acknowledged by their selectors. 
Perhaps those 'rising stars' were not available (or not considered by the selectors 
suitable - for example due to their lack of experience) at the time of the previous 
leadership selection where the incumbent was elected. If those newly available 
candidates show a closer prototype match than the existing leader, the selectors are 
sooner or later most likely to switch their support to the former. 
However, change of allegiance can take place even in the short term with all the 
leadership candidates remaining the same from the previous selection. There are at least 
three possible explanations for this. First, some selectors may support one leadership 
candidate over another even when the second candidate's prototype match is higher than 
the first. This unlikely scenario may occur in a situation where a selector herlhimself 
harbours a leadership ambition but feels that the timing is not right yet for his/her own 
candidacy. By selecting someone, Who is not expected to be successful in the long-term, 
as a 'stop-gap' measure, slhe may be able to position himlherself for the next leadership 
selection. However, the risk of having a less likely successful leader can be high; the 
party may fare poorly at an election, which in turn may deprive not only the party of 
government but also the selector of a seat, if slhe is an MP. 
Secondly, selectors may decide to change their positions towards the leader as a 
result of subsequent gaps between the initial prototypes and the leader's perceived 
behaviour. Such gaps can be created by several causes. Once being elected, the leader 
may deviate from the previous behaviour pattern, based upon which selectors formed 
their initial perceptions. Or, selectors' initial perceptions of the leader may experience 
later change. For example, selectors may have initially formed inaccurate pictures of 
candidates. This may be a problem particularly for selectors who are new to a party or 
the leader at the time of a leadership selection. Or, even if their perceptions of the leader 
are accurate, new selectors' ideal images of leadership may change after gaining 
experience in parliament. Either way, gaps between the leader's perceived behaviour and 
the (initial) prototypes will eventuate. If the selectors can find another candidate who fits 
their revised prototypes better, then their support is likely to shift to that person. 
Thirdly, selectors' ideal leadership images do not necessarily consist of concrete 
personal traits and attributes in the form of prototypes. It has been indicated by some 
research that perceivers do not solely rely on the comparison between prototypes and 
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perceived behaviour as the basis for leadership perception formation. Although the 
prototype-perception match process is highly important in situations where direct and 
regular face-to-face contact is possible (Lord and Maher, 1991: 119), followers may 
alter their views according to information on performance of their organisations, for 
which leaders are held - either fairly or unfairly - responsible (Lord and Maher, 1991: 
60-61). As leadership itself cannot be observed in a quantifiable manner, leaders' 
effectiveness and worth are often (especially where face-to-face contact is difficult due to 
the size of organisations) judged by the 'effects' of leaders' behaviour. These 
'inferred' observations or a causal analysis - termed an 'attribution' process by Calder-
can be used in the formulation of leadership perception (Calder, 1982). This process is 
not new to parliamentarians. Vulnerability of party leadership appears to be related to a 
party's performance at an election and at the opinion polls, where the effectiveness of 
leadership can be quantitatively measured. Given this, it is more than plausible to 
assume that some selectors may use inferential processes in making decisions on their 
leadership support by attributing a party's performance in those areas to the leadership. 
What is required now is a model that can accommodate and explain these various 
types of formation processes of leadership support. 
Lord and Alliger's Information Processing Models 
In 1985, Lord and Alliger suggested four separate information processing models 
(IPM) in their attempt to explain how recognition of leadership is formed in interaction 
behaviour in a small group problem-solving situation, using 147 university students as 
subjects. IPM1 posits that leadership perceptions are based solely on the frequency of 
information, or leaders' verbal activities. According to this model, the more oral 
communications followers have (either directly or indirectly), the higher leaders' 
recognition becomes. IPM2 suggests that perceptions of leadership are formed on the 
match of the target person to a prototype of the category leader. Here, a prototype of 
leadership is applicable over time, regardless of situations. IPM3 postulates that 
leadership perceptions depend upon social norms developed for a particular situation. 
As a consequence, IPM2 and IPM3 predict the emergence of different types of 
successful leadership; the former predicts a less flexible, more stereotypic leadership 
due to a universal subordinate conceptualisation of leadership, whereas the latter predicts 
a more flexible leadership style to accommodate different subordinate expectations 
across various situations. The final model, IPM4, suggests that normative definitions of 
leadership change relatively quickly over time within the same situations depending on 
how the demands of tasks are faced. According to this model, followers use the fit 
between leadership behaviour and task demands for formation of leadership perceptions. 
Leaders need to alter their behaviour even more quickly than IPM3 predicts since 
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acceptable behaviour changes according to given tasks. As both IPM3 and IPM4 
consider leaders' effectiveness in dealing with situations and task demands, it is implied 
that causal analysis between leaders' behaviour and the group's goal attainment status 
may be employed in a more significant manner than prototype matching. 
Lord and Alliger never claimed any relevance of their models to leadership 
perceptions in political organisations such as political parties. In fact, they have never 
attempted to repeat the test of their concept again, even in a laboratory situation for 
which these models were designed. This is perhaps due to the disappointing findings in 
the 1985 experiment, which strongly supported IPMl. However, their main concepts 
provide potentially useful guidance for this study, although some modifications need to 
be made to the models. The proposed alterations - in order to suit a study of political 
party leadership - are two-fold. They are: a) omitting IPM1 from our models; and b) 
merging IPM3 and IPM4. 
a) Omitting IPM1 
Although some studies also reported that it is quantity (not quality) that contributes most 
to formation of leadership perception among followers, as Sorrentino and Boutillier 
indicated (1975: 409-410), the findings require some caution due to the conditions 
under which the experiments were conducted. There are two reasons for concluding that 
IPM1 is inappropriate for the context of this study. Firstly, the activities in which 
leadership abilities were assessed were socioemotional (as opposed to task-oriented) in 
which maintenance of personal relationship is paramount for the job. Accordingly, 
motivation or willingness to contribute which was measured in quantity of interaction 
rather than the actual ability to contribute was more highly weighed in the judgement. In 
political party leadership selection, contenders must agree to make themselves available, 
and thus willingness should be a prerequisite rather than 'the' determinant factor. 
Secondly, the experiments were conducted in one-off, limited time-frames. Lengthy 
and regular contacts (such as in political parties) are likely to shift the focus from 
'willingness' to 'competence' of leadership contenders. In other words, a limited 
environment artificially increases the importance of 'willingness' as a leadership quality 
because assessors have limited clues to determine the subject's ability if hislher 
participation rate is low (Hollander and Julian, 1978: 160). (Assessors cannot tell if the 
subject participates less frequently because of a lack of ability or not.) Although 
quantity of contact is considered significant in the early stages of group development 
(Hollander and Julian, 1978: 160), whether raters continue to use it as the major scale 
for leadership ability, in the later stages, seems doubtful. If selectors are novices to a 
political party, the possibility cannot be ruled out that their decisions on the leadership 
are influenced by candidates' perceived willingness expressed through the number of 
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personal contacts they make. However, where the size of selectorate is small enough to 
enable every candidate to personally reach out to every selector (as in the NZLP), this is 
expected to be a minor factor. In this context, once again, candidates' abilities as a 
potential leader are likely to be measured by other gauges than the frequency of 
contacts. 
b) Merging IPM3 and IPM4 
The second alteration to Lord and Alliger's models made for this study is a merger of 
IMP3 and IMP4. As already described, the IPM3 and IPM4 share the core 
characteristic - flexibility and the absence of stable ideal leadership images. The 
difference between the two models is what necessitates re-configuration of prototypes. 
IPM3 suggests changing 'situations', whereas IMP4 postulates 'tasks'. A question 
arises regarding the virtue of this distinction in analysis of political party leadership. 
In Lord and Alliger's experiment, the two 'tasks' given to the participants were 
completely independent from each other in terms of content and were conducted 
separatell6 . Of course, politics does not operate in such a tidy manner. Tasks party 
leaders have to deal with are often inter-woven with one another. Leaders have to face 
multiple tasks simultaneously, and many of those tasks are continuous by nature without 
neat solutions/conclusions. Given this, it seems erroneous to presume that selectors 
would form and alter their ideal images of leadership according to individual tasks in 
actual politics. 
However, political leaders' roles are by no means static. The status of a party 
(whether in government or in opposition as well as whether the party is likely to win the 
next election or not) is likely to affect what leaders are expected to do. Similarly, the 
position in time - or more precisely in an election cycle - may influence behaviours of 
party leaders. These factors seem not only to assign different tasks to leaders but also 
to change emphases or priorities of the existing leadership tasks. It seems more than 
reasonable to expect some selectors to change their perceptions of leaders according to 
how they handle new and/or highlighted tasks, as suggested by IPM3. Nevertheless, 
those changes are induced by changing situations - as postulated in IPM3. Therefore, it 
seems sensible to merge those two types. 
Propositions 
This study proposes that there are two types of support the leader receives, based upon 
which, together with opposition, selectors can be categorised into three groups. 
46 In task 1, the participants were required to make five equal squares from 20 pieces of geometrically 
shaped coloured poster-board in as little time as possible. For task 2, they were asked to arrange nine 
cards in a predetermined 3-by-3 matrix. See, Lord and Alliger (1985: 51-52). 
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Support Types 
Type 1: (Positive support) A leader is supported by followers because slhe 
(approximately) fits their ideal leadership image (prototype). This image 
deals with fundamental characteristics of a leader such as herlhis personality, 
general leadership skills, ideological stances47 , and general perspective on 
politics ('world view' in Barber's (1992) terms). This type of support is 
expected to remain relatively stable across situations and over time. As the 
prototype covers a wide range of leadership definitions, it is unrealistic to 
expect any leader to perfectly satisfy the ideal leadership images. 
However, to gain this type of support from followers, the congruence of a 
leader's characteristics and the prototype needs to be sufficiently strong. To 
make a judgement on the leader/prototype match, followers require sound 
knowledge of the leader, which can only be accumulated over a period of 
time. New selectors may be excluded from forming this type of support 
since they have not had time to acquire such knowledge48 • Similarly, this 
support is less likely to be found in a large selectorate with limited access to 
the leader. Mathematically, the larger the selectorate becomes, the less contact 
with the candidates is likell9 
Probably, positive support is akin to 'personal loyalty' to a leader in 
general terms. The 'Thatcher Loyalists' and (to a less extent) 'Thatcherites' 
in Norton's categorisation typify those who hold this support. 
Type 2: (Non-committal support) Followers base their support for a leader on their 
suitability to given political situations. Unlike positive support, leaders' 
desired qualities are likely to be perceived by followers in the context of the 
given situation, rather than as 'desirable absolutely' (Hollander, 1992b: 44). 
Selectors who possess this type of support may also use 'attribution 
47 Maurer and his associates reported that while those politically involved are likely to support 
candidates with similar views on the issues, politically less involved individuals tend to base their 
support on candidates' generallikeability (Maurer et. al.,1993: 975). Although all politicians are 
politically 'involved', their depth of interest in issues greatly differs. Thus, it is not unrealistic to 
assume that those committed in terms of policies (for whom issues matter) are more likely to give 
weight to leadership candidates' policy stances. If ideological stances are a major concern for the 
electors, the leader's perceived level of commitment to and his/her effectiveness as an advocate of the 
particular views may well constitute the basis of their support of the person. 
48 This assumption is based upon the Lord and Maher position: 'we would expect experts [experienced 
caucus members] and novices [caucus new comers] to differ substantially in the amount and structure of 
underlying knowledge about leadership, as well as to exhibit qualitative differences in leadership 
perception processes' (1991: 35) 
49 Of course, one may correctly argue that it is not the sizes of the selectorate that matters. Regardless 
of the sizes, the selectorate needs either formal or informal settings for selectors to familiarise 
themselves with leadership candidates. 
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processes' in their evaluation of leaders. For them, required normative 
perceptions alter when the surrounding political environment changes. 
Factors which may precipitate such changes include the party's losses (or 
gains) of office, the proximity of the next election, the party's standing in the 
opinion polls, and the personalities of opposition party leaders. 
The 'Party Loyalists' - those whose primary loyalty goes towards the 
political party rather than the leader herselflhimself (thus their support for a 
leader depends on hislher perceived utility to their party) and 'Populists' in 
Norton's study are assumed to have this type of support. 
It is important to clarify one point regarding the nature of prototypes. Studies of 
leadership perceptions generally seem to assume ideal leadership images (prototype) 
which are relatively uniform, possibly formed 'through formal and informal 
socialisation' (Lord and Maher, 1991: 12) and held widely among followers. However, 
following Lord and Maher's suggestion (1991: 64), this study presumes that followers' 
prototypes, especially those for political leaders whose functions and responsibilities are 
more diverse and ambiguous than other sorts of leaders (such as business leaders), are 
different from one another. Although every caucus member wishes hislher leader to be 
decisive, considerate, organised, intelligent, eloquent, fair and telegenic, this hardly 
automatically leads to unanimous support for the victorious candidates in actual 
leadership selections. Why? 
At least two explanations are possible. Firstly, even if every caucus member lists the 
same personal qualities as necessary variables, their interpretation of the variables and 
perceptions thereof in potential leaders may not be the same, as Maurer and his 
colleagues' study (1993) suggested50 . For example, all the caucus members may expect 
'fairness' from their leaders, but what 'fairness' means may differ among them. 
Similarly, it is quite possible that one leadership contender treats some caucus 
colleagues 'more fairly' than others. The first group of the caucus members, perhaps 
unaware of his/her treatment of the second group of fellow members, may genuinely rate 
such a candidate 'fair'. As Hollander and Julian argued, perceptions takes place in a 
subjective, not objective sense (1969). How diverse members' perceptions of one leader 
can be is subject to argument. As Hall and Lord put it (1995: 279): 
although there may be characteristic differences across leaders that describe a 
central tendency, the same leaders perceive, and behave differently toward, 
different group members. That is, different followers are exposed to different 
perceptual targets even though they objectively have the same leader, because of 
50 Their research on perceptions of American presidential candidates showed that different prototypes for 
an effective political leader were held according to the perceivers' party affiliations and political 
involvement, although the differences were not substantial (Maurer et al., 1993: 973-4). 
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their in group or outgroup status. Because followers likely share knowledge about 
how the leader treats them, the behaviours the leader directs toward one follower is 
likely to be evaluated in light of group context of the leader's behaviour toward 
other followers. [Emphasis original] 
Secondly, even if all caucus members interpret desired leadership traits in the same 
manner, the chance of finding a person with all these traits in reality is low. Support for 
one politician over others, thus, is only achievable after inevitable trade-offs among the 
desired traits. In other words, Candidate A is preferred to Candidate B only in relative 
terms. 
Cantor and Mischel (1979) rejected the traditional view that prototypes are a small set 
of equally important critical features that must be possessed by all members, and that a 
clear boundary between members and non-members can be drawn simply by the 
presence or absence of those features. Instead, they introduced the notion of 'a 
continuum of category membership' which assumes prototypes are a 'fuzzy category': 
members of the same prototype need to possess enough, not all, of the critical features 
which define membership, but how well they fit the prototype varies in degree 
(prototypicality). As a result, some members are 'clear, good central cases' while others 
may be 'ambiguous, borderline cases' (Cantor and Mischel, 1979: 8_13)51. This 
(realistic) possibility inevitably complicates the situation. Although ranking among 
members of the 'leaders' category is still possible, if leadership candidates display a 
different pattern of prototype fittings on various variables (eg., candidate A is strong on 
intelligence but weak on public appeal, while candidate B is strong on public appeal with 
weak organisation skills), judgement as to which leadership candidate is more suitable, 
may become troublesome. Every party leader - no matter how 'successful' they are -
has some critics in herlhis selectors. This rarity of unanimous support in political party 
leadership suggests that the trade-off criteria among (or the emphasis on) desirable 
leadership traits differs among selectors. 
Based on the above typology of support, this study hypothesises that a party 
leadership selectorate can be categorised into three groups. They are: loyalists (based 
upon positive support); uncommitted supporters (based upon non-committal support); 
and opponents (with neither type of support). 
a) Loyalists are those who regard the leader (or the candidate) as the best person to 
lead the party. Their positive support is based upon a fundamental belief in hislher 
abilities, skills, and personal assets as a leader, and it is essentially independent of 
the availability of other alternative leaders as leadership contenders. Loyalists 
51 However, Lord, Foti, and Phillips emphasised: 'even though leadership may be a fuzzy category, 
the distinction between the clearest or best leadership examples (ie., leadership prototypes) and 
nonleaders may still remain relatively clear' (Lord. Foti, and Phillips,1982: 109). 
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genuinely share the view that if another person takes over the leadership, the party 
would be worse off. Although positive support is more stable than the other type 
of (non-committal) support, it can wane should the trust in the leader be breached 
by herlhis behaviour which is antithetic to loyalists' leadership prototypes. 
b) Uncommitted supporters are selectors who do not have any specific loyalties to or 
firm support for any particular leadership contenders. Their non-committal 
support depends on the circumstances and rational calculation of the merit/demerit 
which different leaders can produce for them. Or, in the case of newer selectors, 
they may lack sufficient knowledge on contenders to make a firm judgement. Their 
support tends to shift among candidates, and can be easily lost and won back 
according to a change of circumstances. 
c) Opponents do not support the new leader under any circumstances, as they believe 
that slhe is not equipped with the right skills and/or personal qualities and 
characteristics. This type of selectors have serious doubts about the leader's 
suitability and believe that the party's interest would be better served under a 
different leader 2 
Before proceeding further, it seems important to note that there is a major difference 
between the above typology and Norton's categorisation. Unlike Norton's work, this 
study's typology bases the classification of MPs mostly on the strength of support they 
hold for the leader. As seen earlier, the basis of Norton's typology used for 
classification was mixed - ideological stances and personal attachment to the leader. 
Although his categorisation was no doubt effective in his study, his mixed criteria 
caused difficulties in classifying some cases, as they could belong to more than one 
group, according to Norton's own admission (1990a: 51). Also found troublesome by 
Norton (1990a: 51-52) was the fact that some MPs do not retain stable issue positions 
over time. What was made clear by his studies is that despite such a policy shift, the 
effectiveness of his categorisation remained intact, which in tum, may suggest that 
52 One point needs to be clarified at this stage: although opponents will be analysed, the main focus 
of this study is supporters. One may argue - perhaps correctly - that if supporters are assumed to have 
varying degrees of reliability and susceptibility towards position changes, the same logic may be 
applicable to opponents. It is unrealistic to see opponents as a single entity with the uniform level of 
resentment towards the incumbent leader. A more realistic picture is that some of them are more 
susceptible to converting to supporters than others are. It is, therefore, possible to categorise 
opponents into several sub-groups according to their conversion difficulty. However, this study decides 
against such sub-categorisation for two reasons. First, it seems to complicate the typology 
unnecessarily. Second, where a leader is required to have a majority support for his/her selection, s/he 
can remain at the top if the original supporters are retained. Leaders do not lose their positions because 
they fail to cultivate more support from the original opponents. They do so principally because they 
lose support of the original supporters. 
40 
ideological stances as a classification category can be replaced by another criterion such 
as the strength of support for the leader - regardless of the reasons for the support. 
From this study's perspective, the reasons for support are important only as an 
indicator as to what a leader can or cannot do before s/he starts losing his/her support in 
the selectorate. As is to be seen shortly, for an analysis of the vulnerability of a leader, 
what is important is the strength of his/her support within her/his selectorate. It may be 
possible to argue that dividing the support types according to the reasons for that 
support might increase the accuracy of the model's leadership vulnerability prediction 
capability, but it can only be achieved at the expense of simplicity which allows 
generalisation. It is also plausible that some selectors support the leader for a 
combination of reasons. In this case, for retention of support, the leader is required to 
satisfy those separate expectations simultaneously. Under this condition, determining at 
which point support is lost and in reaction to which leadership behaviour, becomes too 
complicated. Such a calculation seems to increase the model's particularity and that can 
only invite criticism of the model being 'ad hoc'. 
The support reliability 
It is assumed in this study that the reliability of support from the leader's perspective 
varies considerably from one support type to another. It is necessary to provide a 
theoretical basis stating why it is supposed to be the case. 
Where leadership support is formed based upon a high degree of prototype matching 
(positive support), the followers simultaneously set an expected appropriate 
behaviour/performance guideline for the new leader as well as for their own reaction to 
the leader (Lord, Foti, and De Vader: 1984). In analysing 'realistic job preview' 
experiments, Premack and Wanous (1985) revealed that realistic views of new jobs 
lower initial job expectations while increasing organisational commitment, job 
satisfaction, job survival, and performance. Since intimate knowledge and sound 
understanding of the leader is required to utilise the high prototype match as the main 
base for support, loyalists should have 'realistic views' of the new leader. Thus they are 
expected to have expectations which are likely to be fulfilled, and exhibit higher 
satisfaction with the leader. Stronger commitment and durable support of the leader are 
also likely. 
Even if the leader fails to fulfil loyalists' expectations, instant erosion of support may 
not be the necessary consequence. The foundation of positive support is fundamental 
trust in the leader as a person. According to Hollander, with such trust comes 
'idiosyncrasy credit', that determines the leader's latitude for deviation from normative 
behaviour, that would be seen as unacceptable by followers otherwise (Hollander, 1958). 
In the process of becoming the leader, a candidate gains acknowledgment of and 
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endorsement for her/his competence from his/her supporters. The more trust the person 
gains from the followers prior to herlhis selection, the more idiosyncrasy credit slhe is 
accredited at the beginning of the leadership. The more idiosyncrasy credit slhe has, the 
greater deviation the leader is allowed from the followers' expectation. Idiosyncrasy 
credit, however, is not a warrant for endless latitude. Instead, it is consumed by all 
idiosyncratic behaviour and when the leader exhausts it, the followers trust in the leader 
will be also lost. For future deviating behaviour, the leader will have to re-earn herlhis 
credit by meeting the followers' expectations first. Nevertheless, one thing seems clear-
the higher the initial credit, the more reliable the followers' support for the leader. Since 
loyalists are assumed to have high credit for the leader, the leader can count upon their 
support with more confidence than any other groups. 
The followers' closer support also means a greater sense of responsibility for and 
investment in the leader, which in tum creates a heightened psychological identification 
with himlher (Hollander and Julian, 1970, 1978). Based upon Hirschman's theoretical 
framework which was introduced to explain a decline of firms, organisations, and states 
(1970), Whitney and Cooper (1989) stated that a high level of emotional investment, 
commitment, and strong faith in the leader's ability, combined together, make 'exit' 
action (ie., flight for another leadership candidate) unlikely when things go wrong. 
Instead, good relationships, enjoyed in close allegiance with the leader, may encourage 
loyalists to 'voice' suggestions for performance improvement without fear of 
punishment, although this depends much upon the personalities of the leaders. 
Besides, if one strongly supports the leader in a small group (such as in the NZLP 
caucus), that close allegiance sooner or later becomes common knowledge to all 
members including the leader and hislher rivals. Close association thus involves some 
risks in case of leadership change as the rival leader may well treat supporters of the 
former leader with suspicion, or even possible retribution such as denial of future 
promotion. This possibility is likely to make the caucus members face two options: 
either to stay neutral or align with a leadership candidate. If the latter option is chosen, 
one may have to make a total commitment to himlher. 
Non-committal support, in contrast, is assumed to be more unreliable than positive 
support. Hollander and Julian's research (1970, 1978) unfolded the vulnerability of 
elected leaders (as opposed to appointed leaders) who fail to achieve the expected goals, 
especially if their competence is rated highly at the time of election. Elections tend to 
increase expectations for success or demands on a leader's roles by electors (Hollander 
and Julian, 1970: 55). Uncommitted supporters base their leadership preference on 
potential leaders' perceived ability to handle specific situational and task demands at a 
given time. The cost of any failure to fulfil these particular, possibly inflated 
expectations can prove to be costly. Unlike loyalists, the patience of uncommitted 
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supporters is not great. Judgement of personal incompetence and failure at the given 
tasks means the leader is 'guilty' (Hollander and Julian, 1970: 53) 
From the leader-member-exchange (LMX) model perspective, the holders of non-
committal support are more likely to be 'outgroup' members as opposed to the 
beholders of positive support who may be 'ingroup' members. Hall and Lord 
contended that: 
Outgroup members, who are less likely to see themselves as similar to the leader, 
will attribute blame to the leader when negative events occur. Ingroup members, 
who see themselves as more similar to the leader, by contrast will be more likely to 
attribute ne?:ative outcomes externally, to chance or the situation. (Hall and Lord, 
1995: 280) 3 
The aforementioned Hirschman's 'exit', 'voice' and 'loyalty' framework also 
suggests the unreliability of uncommitted supporters' support for the leader. In her 
study of corporate employees' decisions to remain in firms, Kathleen Cannings (1992) 
subdivided the 'loyalty' option into two groups. One was 'attachment' (a strong desire 
to remain attached to the company) and the other was 'commitment' (devotion of time 
and energy to the pursuit of corporate goals). With attachment, people remain in the 
current organisation simply because the cost of 'exit' is too high. At the same time, 
they are not prepared to make productive contributions for the firm. Cannings asserted 
that in order to transform attachment to commitment, the firm needs to provide 
employees with both the ability and willingness to excise 'voice' to help the 
organisation achieve its goal (Cannings, 1992). 
Although the relationship between the party leader and MPs is not identical with a 
company-employee relationship, comparison is still useful. Being outgroup members, 
probably they cannot expect either good promotion prospects (a low barrier to exit) nor 
a sympathetic ear of the leader for their concern and ideas (a lack of ability to exercise 
voice). In either case, these groups ofMPs' support for the leader seems to be 
unreliable. 
The leadership vulnerability 
Based upon the above propositions of the reliability of support, this study further 
proposes that it is possible to evaluate the vulnerability of the leader based upon the 
composition of the caucus members at the time of his/her selection. As is to be 
described shortly, the rule stipulates that to become a leader of the New Zealand Labour 
Party, a successful candidate must have numerical support (a clear majority) of the 
53 In a similar vein, Calder also noted: 'It would seem very difficult to attribute leadership to someone 
whose goals run against one's own. On the other hand, the attribution of leadership would seem much 
easier if it facilitates attainment of one's goals' (1982: 202). 
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caucus. It seems apparent that if the new leader is selected by a slim majority, s/he is 
vulnerable to potential challenges. Nevertheless, even if the leader is selected with a 
comfortable majority, herlhis tenure is not automatically assumed secure. To determine 
the durability and vulnerability of the leadership, one needs to examine not the size of 
majority of hislher victory, but the composition of hislher support base. For instance, if 
one's support mainly consists of loyalists, her/his position is safe even if hislher 
winning majority is not large. On the other hand, if the support base contains a large 
portion of uncommitted supporters, the leadership vulnerability increases accordingly, 
despite herlhis possibly significant majority size. 
What leaders need to do to retain their leadership 
It seems fair to assume that every leader wishes to strengthen hislher position during 
her/his leadership. Whatever the leader hopes to achieve in the top position - personal 
gains or certain policy goals -secure leadership is a prerequisite. Without it, the 
effectiveness of the leadership is seriously compromised. 
In order to increase the stability of the leadership, the leader needs to increase the 
proportion of loyalists in the selectorate. As already noted, if the support base consists 
of a large proportion of uncommitted supporters (especially with a significant presence 
of opponents), hislher status as the leader is highly vulnerable. To accomplish the above 
goal, the leader needs to undertake three tasks simultaneously. While a) retaining 
loyalists' existing support, the leader needs to: b) convince uncommitted supporters that 
their reluctance is groundless and that slhe is a worthy leader; and finally c) convert 
opponents' opposition into support. 
But how can the leader accomplish these tasks? Upon choosing the leader, all 
members of the selectorate - regardless of their positions - have views of the leader. 
Supporters (both loyalists and uncommitted supporters) harbour expectations for the 
new leadership. Opponents and uncommitted supporters have concerns about her/his 
ability and suitability as the person at the helm. To retain existing support, the leader 
has to meet the supporters' expectations so that their faith in him/her can be reassured. 
With regard to the concerns, the leader has to make an effort to alleviate them if slhe 
expects the doubters to alter their views of her/him. 
Of course, these tasks can be achieved with varying degrees of difficulty. For 
example, retention of already solid support (by loyalists) is estimated to require less 
effort and time than convincing uncommitted supporters. The latter task should be 
easier than the converting of opponents into loyalists, which is assumed to be the most 
difficult of all. 
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Table 1-1 
Support/Supporter Types 
~ SUI2120rt tY12e SU12120rt reliability Leader's task Task difficulty 
Loyalists positive high retention not difficult 
Uncommitted non-committal moderatellow conviction (relatively) difficult 
Supporters 
Opponents (opposition) none converSIOn very difficult 
Apart from in-built difficulties, there are also several potential factors that may 
-
preclude the leader from achieving the goals of satisfying the expectations and 
eradicating the concerns. In order to respond correctly to the followers' expectations 
and concerns, the leader first needs to know exactly what they are. It is impossible for 
the leader to deliver if s/he does not know what the followers want or do not want. With 
regard to supporters' expected behaviour (prototypes), Maurer and his associates 
suggested: 
Effective political or other types of leaders indirectly pursue the content of these 
prototypes when they seek to learn the values, needs, and beliefs of subordinates 
or constituents. Leaders or potential leaders who ignore, or are unaware of, these 
important sources of information will likely not exemplify effective leadership in 
the eyes of their followers or constituents. (Maurer et.al.,1993: 973) 
Equally imperative for the leader is to possess a measure to monitor herlhis own 
performance, so that s/he can improve on the unsatisfactory areas of his/her own 
leadership. In Hollander's words: 'If the leader's self-perception is inaccurate with 
respect to the perceptions of others, the relationship is likely to be affected adversely' 
(Hollander,1992b: 50). Whether the leader can equip her/himself with such a 
measurement is an interesting question. 
It is also possible to argue that even if the leader knows what needs to be done to 
increase hislher durability, what s/he can actually do is restricted. In some cases, some 
tasks may contradict one another, therefore their full achievement may be impossible. 
For example, if the new leader's positive support and opposition are both formed 
around hislher ideological stances, the tasks of retaining support and converting the 
opposition are irreconcilable. 
Another important factor in determining the success (or failure) of the new leader in 
the above tasks is whether slhe is equipped with adequate skills (or abilities) and 
45 
orientations (or desires) to do so, as Harmel and Svasand have asserted (1993). In other 
words, even when the leader has absolute power and freedom to exercise that power, the 
actual range of actions s/he can choose from may be restricted by hislher personality 
(internal dispositions) .. 
The importance of the original support composition 
All these potential difficulties in fulfilling the followers' expectations and concerns 
highlights the importance of the original support composition - the constitution of the 
support base at the time of the leader's selection. If the leader is selected with a high 
proportion of loyalists in hislher support base, herlhis position should logically enjoy 
higher durability. On the other hand, if the leader's original support composition 
consists largely of uncommitted supporters whose commitment to the leader is less 
reliable, the leader's potential vulnerability increases accordingly. 
The importance of the original support may have indirect implications for leadership 
durability, too. If uncommitted supporters are a main component of the leader's initial 
support base which also includes a significant number of opponents, (at least) the 
internal management is expected to takes up a considerable amount of the leader's time 
and energy. This may preclude himlher from establishing himself/herself outside the 
selectorate (in public) - an accomplishment which may be the key to boosting hislher 
standing in the opinion polls. As earlier discussed, for uncommitted supporters, the 
performance of the party (monitored in the polls) is assumed to playa significant role in 
deciding their support for the leader. If these assumptions are accurate, a leader with a 
weak original support composition is doubly handicapped, facing greater vulnerability. 
Main propositions 
This study's main propositions are summarised in the following terms: 
PI There are two degrees of quality of support (positive and non-committal) for a 
political leader. The selectorate, however, can be classified into three groups 
according to their positions towards the leader (loyalists-holders of positive 
support, uncommitted supporters-holders of non-committal support, and 
opponents). 
P2 In order to make the leadership more secure, the leader needs to increase the 
proportion of the loyalists among the selectorate. However, the achievement of this 
task is hindered by institutional, practical, and personality reasons. 
P3 The leader's durability can be explained (and largely predicted) by the quality of 
support - based upon the composition of the support - which the leader receives on 
his/her selection - as distinct from herlhis numerical support. 
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Case studies 
Having reviewed previous literature and formed propositions, it seems necessary to 
justify the choice of the case studies, which are to test the propositions in an empirical 
manner. In particular, this choice needs to be justified in three respects, which are why 
a) New Zealand; b) the NZLP; and c) the1993 and 1996 crises, are selected. 
Why New Zealand? 
There is a clear advantage in this decision. Firstly, as already mentioned, the prototype-
candidate matching exercise may be more frequently observed in smaller selectorates. 
Like the two major parties in Australia54 , in New Zealand political parties with 
experiences of leadership changes55 , the selectors are MPs belonging to the respective 
parties. New Zealand _uses a unicameral system and the number of MPs in the House of 
Representatives is relatively small: until 1996 when the number was increased to 120 
with the introduction of a new electoral system, it had been gradually raised to 99. 
Accordingly, the caucus sizes are normally small enough to guarantee face-to-face 
contact between the leaders and followers. The largest caucus in New Zealand history 
was National's after the 1990 election with 67 MPs, which was still small enough to 
personally know the leader and potential leaders well. In addition, weekly caucus 
meetings provide a regular forum for MPs to attain first-hand observation and 
assessment of (potential) leaders' abilities and talents. 
Why the NZLP and why the 1993 and 1996 crises? 
Of the six political parties which secured representation in the New Zealand Parliament 
at the 1996 election, four political parties - National, Labour, the Alliance, and United-
had experienced leadership changes in their history. However, a closer examination 
reveals that Labour and National were the only parties qualified. 
The Alliance's only leadership change was temporary, caused by its inaugural leader, 
Jim Anderton's brief resignation from the post between 1994 and 199556 • United's 
leadership change was necessitated by the defeat of the founding leader, Clive 
Matthewson, at the 1996 election. The position was handed over to the only surviving 
MP of the party, Peter Dunne57 • The other two political parties, New Zealand First 
54 See, Weller (1994). 
55 This point is to be discussed shortly. 
56 During the period between 1994 and 1995, the party was led by Sandra Lee, the existing Deputy 
Leader. She voluntarily relinquished the position to accommodate Anderton's return. 
57 According to United's rules, '[t]he Parliamentary leader is chosen by the Parliamentary Caucus. In 
the event of there being only one MP, as at present, and a vacancy in the leadership occurring, the 
Party's Management Board makes the decision' (Dunne, 1999c). 
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(NZF) and ACT58 , have retained the same leaders ever since they entered Parliament59 . 
This leaves National and Labour the only possible candidates for recent case studies60 • 
Since their inception61 , both parties have had plenty of experience in changing their 
leaders. Eight leaders have led the National caucus while its traditional rival has selected 
11 leaders in its 83-year history. As far as the number of the leadership changes are 
concerned, both parties well qualify. Past leadership changes in the two parties are: 
58" NZF's founding leader, Winston Peters, was a former MP of National. After being practically 
expelled from the party, he resigned from Parliament and won his Tauranga seat at the subsequent by-
election in 1993 as an independent. Before the 1993 election, he formed NZF, which was to win seats 
the election. With regard to ACT, Richard Prebble was not the inaugural leader of the party. ACT was 
established as a political party in 1994 with a former Labour Finance Minister, Roger Douglas, as the 
leader. Prebble, Douglas' former Labour Cabinet colleague, succeeded his friend in 1996, before the 
election. 
59 During the 1996-1999 Parliamentary term, the number of political parties represented in Parliament 
increased by four. A former Alliance MP, Alamein Kopu, left the party and later formed Mana Wahine. 
Also from the Alliance, a compilation of five smaller parties, two Green Party MPs left the 
organisation to have a separate identity. Another Alliance MP, Frank Grover, also left the party to 
become the sole parliamentary representative of the Christian Heritage Party. Finally, five former NZF 
MPs led by Tau Henare set up their own political vehicle, Mauri Pacific. Although Mana Wahine and 
Mauri Pacific MPs' legal status was 'independents', these parties' respective leaders were Kopu and 
Henare. The two Green MPs, Jeanette Fitzsimons and Rod Donald, were/are sharing the co-leadership 
of the party. However, the leader of the Christian Heritage Party was not Grover, but Graham Capil!' a 
non-parliamentarian. At the 1999 election, all these splinter parties, except for the Greens, were 
defeated. In the current Parliament, the parties represented are: Labour, the Alliance, National, the 
Greens, United, and ACT. 
60 In recent New Zealand political history, there was another party represented in Parliament - Social 
Credit (between 1979 and 1987). (The party later re-named itself the New Zealand Democrat Party. 
Since 1996, it has been a part of the Alliance, with two MPs in Parliament.) When Social Democrat 
had its MP(s) in Parliament, it experienced one leadership change. However, this change did not take 
place between MPs. Instead, the then leader, Bruce Beetham, who by then had lost his Rangitikei seat, 
lost the top position at the party's 1986 annual conference. Although at the time, there was still a 
Social Credit MP in Parliament (Garry Knapp), the new leader was a non-MP. Knapp became the 
leader in 1988 after he had lost his seat at the 1987 election (Miller, 1989: 256-257). In April 1991, 
John Wright became the leader of the Democrat Party. He later entered Parliament as an Alliance MP 
at the 1996 election. 
61 The New Zealand National Party was officially formed in 1936, as a result of the merger of part of 
the United Party, the Democratic Party and the Reform Party. The United and Reform Party governed 
the country as a coalition 'National Government' from 1931 and 1935 (Gustafson, 1997a: 137). The 
Labour Party, on the other hand, was established in 1916. See Brown (1962). 
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Table 1-2 
Leadership changes of the New Zealand National and Labour Parties 
National Labour 
Leader Year Status Leader Year Status 
A. Hamilton 1936 Opposition H. Holland 1916 Opposition 
S. Holland 1940 Opposition Savage 1933 Opposition 
Holyoake 1957 Opposition Fraser 1940 Government 
Marshall 1972 Government Nash 1950 Opposition 
Muldoon 1974 Opposition Nordmeyer 1963 Opposition 
McLay 1984 Opposition Kirk 1966 Opposition 
Bolger 1986 Opposition Rowling 1974 Government 
Shipley 1997 Government Lange 1983 Opposition 
Palmer 1989 Government 
Moore 1990 Government 
Clark 1993 Opposition 
Perhaps it is party leaders' universal wish to serve their leadership undisturbed until 
their chosen time of retirement. However, in reality, this has been a lUxury which few 
leaders have ever enjoyed in New Zealand. Apart from four earlier Labour leaders who 
died in office (H. Holland, Savage, Fraser, and Kirk62), all past leaders of the two major 
parties relinquished the positions under (varying degrees of) pressure. Even those who 
stepped down for age/health-related reasons after lengthy services (S. Holland, 
Holyoake, and Nash) did so only reluctantll 3 after receiving unambiguous advice from 
their colleagues and party officials. 
For the majority of past leaders, pressures to vacate the top positions came in more 
forceful and unequivocal fonns, ie, coups or threats of them. In face of such adversity, 
past leaders reacted in various ways. Some leaders recognised the inevitability of their 
fate, following their unsuccessful effort to fend off challenges, and decided to step aside 
'voluntarily', in view of preserving the image of party unity (Row ling , Marsha1l64 , and 
Bolger65 ). Others refused to succumb to the pressures and resorted to caucus votes in 
vain, (Hamilton, Muldoon, McLay66, Nordmeyer, and Moore). Two other leaders 
became tired of infighting and surrendered the leadership, while a majority of their 
caucuses were believed to be still behind them (Lange and Palmer). 
Whatever their reactions, one pattern has become clear from history: modem 
leadership of National and Labour is likely to end as a direct result of coups or threats 
62 For Holland and Savage, see Gustafson (1986b). For the FraserlNash, NashINodmeyer successions, 
see Sinclair (1976). For the Nordmeyer/Kirk succession, see Dunmore (1972) and Eagles and James 
(1973). For the leadership change from Kir}c to Rowling, see Henderson (1981) and Bassett (1976). 
63 For Holland and Holyoake, see, Gustafson (1997b). For Fraser, see, Thorn (1952). 
64 See, Jackson (1978). 
65 See, Bolger, (1998), ppI2-20. 
66 For these National leaders, see, Gustafson (1986a). 
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of them. In more than two decades, all leadership changes of the two parties have taken 
place in such a manner without exception. 
Given this 'forced' leadership transition pattern being the norm, for proper 
understanding of leadership durability in New Zealand, a study of how leadership 
collapsed alone is not sufficient. Such a case study may provide insights into how and 
why it fails. However, it may not be able to contribute to our knowledge as to how and 
why leadership survives. In other words, in order to gain the entire picture of leadership 
durability and test the validity of this study's propositions, it is vital to examine 
leadership which successfully defended itself against an attempt to overthrow it as well. 
As Table 1-2 exhibits, leadership changes did not happen at a regular frequency. 
Although their frequency has increased in recent years - especially for the Labour Party 
- they are still rare events nevertheless. While every leadership has some critics within 
its ranks, internal frustration rarely develops beyond grumbling, posing no real threat to 
the leadership. In some instances, there were disgruntled individual (or a group of) MPs 
openly attacking the existing leadership, but they sorely lacked the support necessary to 
pose even a moderate risk of unseating the incumbents. Labour's John A Lee (against 
Savage) in the late 1930s, National's Derek Quigley (against Muldoon67 ) and Winston 
Peters (against Bolger68) in the late 1980s and early 1990s were among such examples. 
On other occasions, discontent with the leadership developed into discussions about a 
possible move against the incumbents without proceeding any further. This was 
because the conspirators abandoned the idea upon realising their slim chance of 
success69 
Even rarer than leadership changes are unsuccessful coup attempts on the leadership. 
When the incumbents are challenged, they normally do not survive. There is a very 
good reason for this: before launching an organised challenge against the existing 
leader, insurgents carefully ensure that they have sufficient numbers to succeed. If 
unsuccessful, a coup attempt makes the situation, which was presumably desperate, even 
worse. The internal divisions of the party are aggravated, and perhaps more importantly, 
are likely to become public knowledge through media exposure. The leader survives 
only as a 'lame-duck', with his/her authority and credibility severely damaged. This 
could only do harm to a party's electoral chances. On a personal level, rebel MPs may 
be subject to retaliation from the leader. As a consequence of their disloyalty, demotion 
in ranking and responsibilities (probably cabinet positions if the party is in government) 
67 See, Gustafson (1986a: 147-148). 
68 See, Hames (1995). 
69 One of such talks took place in the National caucus in 1989. A group of MPs led by the then 
Finance spokesperson, Ruth Richardson, contemplated challenging the leader, Jim Bolger. The move 
did not develop into anything more serious due to the lack of support. See, Hames (1995: 92-93). 
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may follow 70. In addition, if the party fares poorly at the next election, they may be held 
personally accountable not only by the leadership but also the caucus and party at large. 
For these reasons, a decision to challenge the leader is normally taken with every 
caution, as well as confidence of success. 
Since 1935, there have been only five known cases of unsuccessful leadership 
change attempts in the two major parties which were organised by a group of caucus 
dissenters, which then went to or went close to caucus votes. Of them, four took place in 
Labour and one in National. They are: 
Table 1-3 
Failed Leadership changes of the New Zealand National and Labour Parties 
Leader 
Muldoon 
National 
Year-
1980 
Status 
Government 
Leader 
Nash 
Rowling 
Lange 
Clark 
Labour 
Year 
1954 
1980 
1988-89 
1996 
Status 
Opposition 
Opposition 
Government 
Opposition 
While this study's propositions did not set specific conditions regarding their 
applicability, it seems wise to limit potential variables that may distort the findings. 
Included in such variables are: a) internal differences of mechanics (such as structure 
and leadership selection procedure) between parties; and b) the status of the party 
(whether it is in government or in opposition). This means that only one party is to be 
studied and that both a leadership change and an unsuccessful leadership coup had to 
occur while the party was in the same status. 
In deciding which cases should be studied, practical considerations also need to play 
a part. To conduct successful research, accurate reconstruction of the events 
surrounding the leadership changes and crises becomes crucial. Nevertheless, in New 
Zealand, there are not many comprehensive and detailed historical records of leadership 
changes/crises, either by academics or journalists. While the media tended to cover such 
events with strong interest, there is still not sufficient information available. This is 
70 Public criticisms of the leadership have claimed several well-known casualties in recent history. In 
1982, the 10th ranked Minister of Works and Development, Derek Quigley, resigned from his post after 
he had aired his disagreement with the Government's economic policy. Muldoon, who was the Prime 
minister as well as the Minister of Finance, gave him options of resigning or making a public 
apology. Quigley opted for the former. In 1988, Lange dismissed Richard Prebble as the Minister of 
State Owned Enterprises following the latter's public criticisms of him. Winston Peters suffered 
demotion twice during his time as a National MP. The first came in 1989 after a series of thinly veiled 
criticisms of Bolger's leadership. He slipped five spots in the ranking from eight (frontbench) to 13. 
Two years later, he was expelled from the Cabinet (Minister of Maori Affairs) by the same leader for 
attacking (amongst others) the National Government's economic policy. 
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particularly the case for the behaviour, thoughts, and feelings of caucus members, all of 
which hold the key to testing this study's propositions. 
Given this situation, personal interviews with MPs and those closely involved become 
vital. However, here lie difficulties. MPs tend to see leadership changes or challenges 
as sensitive issues, and consequently many are reluctant to discuss them. Leadership 
crises are often traumatising experiences, leaving emotional scars in caucuses. In 
addition, the image of party unity has been an important asset in a New Zealand election. 
In this light, helping to reconstruct a history of internal divisions and their analysis -
even if it is for academic purposes - may be seen by politicians as disadvantageous to 
their own interests. 
Not surprisingly, such reluctance intensifies if leadership changes/challenges were 
recent and those involved are still current colleagues. A study of older leadership crises 
is more likely to secure co-operation from MPs. But even there a problem exists - the 
accuracy of information they can provide. Human memories deteriorate as time passes, 
and recollections of leadership crises are no exceptions. A study of events that are more 
than, say, eight years old, could be problematic 71. 
After taking all the above points into consideration, this study is to examine the New 
Zealand Labour Party (NZLP) in opposition between 1990 and 1996 as case studies. 
The period covers one successful leadership change in 1993 from Moore to Clark and 
one failed attempt against Clark in 1996 as well as their lead-up periods. 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to outline the Parliamentary Labour Party 
(PLP) of New Zealand's leadership selection procedure 72. 
Rules and procedures of PLP leadership selection 
Since the first leader, Harry Holland, was elected in 1919, selection of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party (PLP) leadership has been the right exclusively enjoyed by caucus 
members. While the Extra-Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP) has no doubt influenced 
the outcomes of previous caucus decisions on the issue73 , it has had no formal say in the 
process. Traditionally the EPLP has been reluctant to formally recognise the position of 
the PLP leadership as a position of any significance, and this attitude is evident in the 
fact that the party's Constitution and Rules (NZLP, 1997) barely mentions the existence 
71 This, of course, varies with individuals. However, when an interview was attempted in 1997 with 
one former MP regarding the 1989 leadership change, s/he admitted that many of the crucial details were 
beyond his/her recollection. Some MPs also attested that even the 1993 leadership change, which was 
by then a five-year old event, was difficult to remember. 
72 For past leadership changes/crises, see Appendix 1. 
73 See, for example, Henderson (1981: 12,20, and 25). 
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of a parliamentary leadership74 (Jackson, 1992b). In fact, the selection procedure of the 
PLP leadership has no mention at all in the same document. 
Instead, the procedures and rules of the PLP leadership selection are stipulated in 
'Parliamentary Labour Party (Caucus) Rules'. Although the first leadership selection 
was held more than 80 years ago, the basic framework of the selection has remained 
virtually intact since. The method of selection that has been constantly used is 
'exhaustive ballot' by which a series of votes are cast with the candidate with the fewest 
votes to be eliminated from the contest each time until one contender (the eventual 
winner) has a clear majority of votes. 
Another aspect of the PLP leadership selection, which has not changed, is in terms of 
the requirement for leadership review. Of course, selection of new leaders has become 
necessary whenever the incumbent either died or resigned. However, in addition, since 
1939 the rule has demanded a PLP leader test his/her colleagues support for herlhim 
every three years at a caucus meeting (Sinclair, 1976: 293). However, the timing of such 
a periodical review has been altered twice during the PLP history. Initially, leadership 
was tested at the start of the parliamentary session that preceded a general election. At 
the 1964 Labour Conference, this was changed to have a leadership election at the last 
caucus meeting of the year which preceded a general election year (Milne, 1966: 144). 
This move was believed to provide a newly selected leader (if there was a leadership 
change) more time to establish himlherself before an election (Milne, 1966: 144). But 
this extra time was not considered sufficient for a new leader. In 1980, as part of an 
upgrading, updating and modernising process of the caucus rules, the timing of a regular 
leadership review was shifted to the first caucus of the year preceding the election year-
normally at the beginning of February. Jonathan Hunt, a veteran MP75 and former 
Senior Whip, explained the rationale behind this change in the following terms: 
The change was made because it was felt this would give any new leader and/or 
deputy leader76 at least 20 months to prepare for the following election and would 
also allow anyone defeated to consider his or her position before the selection 
processes were undertaken (Hunt, 1998). 
Despite the explicit provision of a once-in-every-Parliamentary term occasion for 
leadership review, however, there is no time for a Labour leader to relax. This is because 
the caucus rules allow Labour MPs to suspend the rules if such a motion is supported 
74 Rues and Constitution mentions the 'Leader of the Parliamentary Party' three times in the rules 
related to the party's Moderating Committee (Rule 263(b), 267(a), and 269), which is in charge of 
finalising the party list for an election. Also, the position of the 'Chairperson of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party' is mentioned in Rule 163 regarding the New Zealand Council. Jackson attributed the 
EPLP's obvious disinterest in the PLP leadership to the party being 'a group-based party denying a role 
for individual leadership other than by the President of the party organisation' (Jackson, 1991: 48). 
7S Hunt first entered Parliament in 1966 and is the longest serving MP in the current Parliament. 
76 Deputy leadership of the PLP is also subject to a regular review at the same time as leadership. 
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unanimously by those present at a given caucus meeting. This means that any MP can 
raise a leadership issue at any time if s/he so wishes. As Hunt explains: 
It has always been. the right of any caucus member to put down a motion relating 
to the caucus rules at any time. This, of course, includes the rule about selection 
of leader and deputy leader. Notice has to be given at least a week before (usually 
the caucus before) any such motion can be put. This is to enable anyone who is 
not present when the notice is given to be able to have time to get to the caucus (if 
necessary from overseas) (Hunt, 1998). 
Therefore, by international standards, leaders of the PLP are given surprisingly little 
protection. Or, in Weller's words, s/he is in 'open season'. Arnold Nordmeyer has 
been the only Labour leader who lost the leadership at a regular leadership review. The 
other leaders who lost their positions either directly or indirectly as a result of internal 
pressures/coups - Rowling, Lange, Palmer, and Moore - did so outside the scheduled 
time. Unlike the British Conservative Party, challengers are not required to have formal 
nominees and seconders, nor in fact, are they required to reveal their intentions of 
challenge beforehand. There are no rules equivalent to the British Conservatives' 
former 15% rule; for the NZLP, a mere overall majority of the total votes suffices for 
victory·77 In short, these low institutional barriers make incumbent PLP leaders 
extraordinarily vulnerable to potential challenges. After the 1996 failed leadership coup 
against Helen Clark, a former leadership contender of the British Labour Party, Bryan 
Gould, compared the NZLP with his former party in the following terms: 
If [British Labour Party Leader] Mr Blair's mind were occasionally to stray 
towards the plight of his New Zealand colleague, he would be astonished to learn 
how little protection she [Clark] is offered by her party's rules. The idea that a 
challenge could be mounted to the party leader at any time and without notice, 
simply because a handful of caucus members felt like trying their luck, would be 
regarded in Britain as laughable (Gould, 1996). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, previous studies of leadership durability have been surveyed. What has 
become clear is that neither conventional approaches - institutional, individual nor 
contextual- is equipped with the explanatory ability for cases such as the NZLP. Ithas 
been pointed out that the long overlooked fact of leadership - its retention being entirely 
dependent upon followers' continuous support - needs to be fully acknowledged and 
incorporated into a formal theory of leadership durability. In an attempt to meet this 
77 Since the first leadership contest in 1964, all the leadership votes have been battled between two 
candidates. The vote results, normally known only to the Whips, have not been publicly announced. 
The only exception to this rule was the 1993 contest, following which the victorious result was 
announced by the Clark camp. 
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challenge, this chapter has offered such an alternative framework in the form of 
propositions. 
The next task of this study is to test these propositions' validity in empirical studies. 
As the first case of two, the following three chapters examine Mike Moore's loss of 
leadership in 1993. 
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CHAPTER 3 
1993 leadership change overview: 1990 - 1993 
Introduction 
As already noted in Chapter 1, Moore won the leadership in September 1990 with an 
overwhelming majority. However, after just three years, he was deposed by a caucus 
vote. Before analysing Moore's leadership collapse (why it collapsed), it seems 
important to learn what happened during his leadership tenure. This chapter provides an 
overview and description of background events leading up to and including the 
development of the caucus' discontent with Moore's leadership, that resulted in the 
1993 leadership change. 
The 1990 General Election 
When Moore took over the leadership from Geoffrey Palmer in a desperate attempt to 
tum around the party's dismal popularity before the 1990 General Election, only fifty 
three days were left for him to accomplish the task. In the event, Labour still suffered 
the worst defeat in its party history, with its caucus size slashed from 57 to 29. Despite 
the magnitude of the election defeat, however, Moore's leadership largely escaped 
criticism. 
There was a view held by many of the surviving MPs that the leadership change was 
justified and that he saved about 10 seats which might have been lost under Palmer's 
leadership. For example, Helen Clark78 " who played a crucial role in the leadership 
change, said in early January 1991: ' .. .1 became more and more convinced that it was the 
right thing to do as the weeks went on, because you felt the campaign lift. What was 
important was that people felt there was another chance to have a go' (Stone, 1991). 
Elsewhere, Clark also said: 'It was a desperate move of course, but it worked. We won 
29 seats. It also solved the leadership question. Had the leadership not changed in 
September, a number of tactical questions would have arisen after the election, like 
would it have been fair to have a new leader immediately? We would have been a lame-
duck opposition with 19 members'79 (McLoughlin, 1991: 53). 
Nevertheless, this favourable view of Moore's achievement was not universally 
shared by the caucus members on his becoming the leader in September 1990. The 
manner in which Moore replaced Palmer provoked noticeable resentment at that time. 
78 Moore attests that Clark and Cullen were 'gracious enough' to admit to him personally 'that they 
would have lost their seats in 1990' if he had not taken over the leadership (Moore, 2000). 
79 Clark, however, changed her view on Moore's achievement. In an interview in 1995, she said: 'I 
don't think he (Palmer) would have done any worse (than Moore)' (Chisholm, 1995: C1). The reason 
why she changed her earlier view is unclear. 
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For instance, Ruth Dyson, the then President of the Labour PartlO, recollects strong 
feelings of unhappiness in the caucus at that time. 
I had to do a lot of.pacifying of people in our caucus, because they were very 
unhappy ... really unhappy ... that Geoffrey stood down .. [A] lot of people in our 
caucus saw it as very unfair to Geoffrey ... They thought that Mike Moore had 
deliberately undermined him in the media and within the Cabinet... Geoffrey had 
really strong loyalty to the party, and that was being abused (Dyson, interview, 
1998). 
This negative view was also translated into some people's interpretation of the 1990 
election result and Moore's allegedly positive impact on it. Richard Northey, a strong 
Palmer supporter and an MP who lost his seat in the election was amongst them. He 
notes: 
A leadership chal1ge would not make an unwinnable election any more winnable. 
I believe the change made no significant difference to the final election result. In 
my view the change in leadership and the departure of Palmer and Woollaston 
probably actually lost us the greenlliberal electorates of Waitakere and Lyttleton. 
The change ma~ have saved us the working class electorates of Papatoetoe and 
West Auckland 1. (Northey, 1998a) 
The new caucus 
Some antagonism towards Moore remained in the caucus when Labour returned to 
Parliament after the election. However, with the caucus size being nearly halved, despair 
and shock overwhelmed any negative feelings towards him. Moore reports the mood of 
the Labour caucus then in the following terms: 
[T]hey were stunned, defeated, demoralised. Some of them ... didn't want to come 
to Parliament at all. They were pathetic ... some of them just didn't believe it 
possible to win again, and they were broken. They were exhausted. (Moore, 
interview, 1998) 
Newcomers to the caucus were seven MPs82, the majority of whom later formed the core 
group supporting the 1993 leadership change. However, while some of them came in 
with doubts about his suitability as the leader, a leadership change was far from their 
80 The Party President attends weekly caucus meetings although they have no voting rights. 
81 Northey's view was shared by other members in the caucus. For example, Richard Prebble stated: 
' ... putting Mike in as leader certainly didn't help us' (McLoughlin, 1991: 53). Also, academics were 
unconvinced about to what extent, if at all, the new leader helped the party's fortune, although they 
generally agreed that the leadership change to Moore did not harm Labour's electoral chance. See, 
Jackson (1991) and Vowles and Aimer (1993: 193-196). 
82 They were: John Blincoe, Lianne Dalziel; George Hawkins; Pete Hodgson; Steve Maharey; Paul 
Swain; and Judith Tizard. 
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minds at this stage. Judith Tizard, who succeeded her father's seat83 of Panmure, 
attests: ' ... I don't think any of us came in saying, ''I'm going to get rid of Mike 
Moore". Certainly not' (Tizard, interview, 1998). In sum, in those early days, Moore 
enjoyed 'relative support' in the caucus (Anonymous, interview, 1998). Tizard adds: 
When we came in in 1990, the seven new MPs were very aware that we were 
coming into an existing group that was pretty shell-shocked. They had had six 
years in Government, and it had been a hellish time in some aspects and very 
exciting and constructive time in many other areas. I think most of us - well I 
certainly - when I came in in 1990, was determined to try to put other things aside 
and just get on with being the best Labour Party we could in Opposition, and I 
hoped in Government in 1993. (Tizard, interview, 1998) 
Due to the small size of the caucus, those newcomers found themselves thrown into 
the deep end straight away by being given heavy responsibilities, which would have gone 
to more seasoned veterans under normal circumstances. This experience presented 
those new intakes with great political opportunities as well as a very steep learning curve 
without the luxury of the normal 'apprenticeship'. As Steve Maharey notes: 
Because [we] didn't have many other people left in the party in front of [us] ... so, 
we were all spokespeople, had senior positions, had media profile much faster than 
most politicians had, simply because there was no-one else around. (Maharey, 
interview, 1998) 
This learning process was hastened even further by the zeal of the new National 
Government, led by its Finance Minister, Ruth Richardson, to extend the economic 
reform programme into Labour's sacred territories such as industrial relations84 • In 
Tizard's words: 'I think we came in very positively. I think then we went into hell'. 
She further describes her early days in Parliament: 
... there were only 29 of us - so we very quickly went into sort of full attack 
opposition mode, and we were expected to perform up to a very high level. And it 
was great working with all of those ex-Cabinet Ministers. Most of them were very 
generous with their time ... Working with people like Helen [Clark] and Michael 
Cullen and David Caygill, particularly for me, was one of the most interesting and 
exciting political periods I have ever had. It was the most extraordinarily high 
pressured apprenticeship on parliamentary performance and procedures, but it was 
also extraordinarily useful training. We had to come up to speed at a very quick 
rate on all sorts of issues. (Tizard, interview, 1998) 
Under Moore's leadership, the Labour opposition bounced back quickly. With the 
assistance of the National Government's record unpopularity, by April 1991 , Labour 
83 Bob Tizard, former Deputy Prime Minister in the third Labour Government (1972-75) and Cabinet 
Minister during the fourth Labour Government (1984-90) retired in 1990. 
84 See Richardson (1995), Chapter 5. 
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and Moore were registered as the most popular party and the most preferred Prime 
Minister respectively in some opinion polls such as One Network - Heylen Polls. In 
Parliament, the small caucus functioned as a highly effective team. This impressive 
turnaround led one journalist to ask in November 1991 in astonishment: 'Who would 
have expected the remnants of the parliamentary Labour Party to come back to life so 
soon with such zest?' (McLoughlin, 1991: 47) The same journalist commented on 
Moore's leadership: 'Despite the doubts, some of which remain, Mike Moore 
apparently does have what it takes' (McLoughlin, 1991: 47). 
The early signs of discontent 
After this favourable report, however, the situation changed somewhat. By mid 1992, 
although Labour still remained as the most popular political party in the country 
according to the opinion polls, Moore had surrendered the 'most preferred Prime 
Minister' status to a rebel Government MP, Winston Peters85 ,. The performance of the 
party in Parliament also deteriorated. The same journalist cited above revisited the 
Opposition party in December 1992 to report: 'Labour no longer has the edge in the 
House and it continues to arouse scant interest anywhere else. The small size of the 
Labour team is starting to tell' (McLoughlin, 1992: 58). Constant speculation on the 
security of his leadership, that was mostly circulated by the National Party, were also 
noted (McLoughlin, 1992: 57-59). 
Indeed, the discontent with Moore's leadership was growing within the caucus like a 
'slow burner' (Goulter, 1993e). David Caygill, who served Moore as the Finance 
Minister (1990) and finance spokesperson (1990-1991), describes the slow yet gradual 
erosion of support for Moore within the caucus during this period in the following 
terms: 
... after the 1990 election, I think Mike enjoyed a period of relative calm. I think 
his leadership was not in question for the first couple of years or so. It was only 
as the growing ... as the feeling grew that he was not sufficiently competent in a 
number of respects. (Caygill, interview, 1998) 
Mahareyagrees. He asserts that the later period of the 1990-1993 caucus was 
'dominated by questions about Mike's leadership', which laid a foundation for the 
future revolt against the leader. Thus, 'it [the 1993 leadership change] was not 
something that came out of the blue' (Maharey, interview, 1998). 
85 Peters was initially appointed as Minister of Maori Affairs in the fourth National Government in 
1990 only to be sacked from the position in October 1991 for his open criticism of the Government of 
which he was part. He was removed from the National caucus in October 1992, and denied his 
candidacy for his electorate, Tauranga, for the 1993 election in March 1993. He promptly resigned 
from Parliament and won the subsequent by-election held the following month. In July 1993, he 
formed his own political party, New Zealand First. 
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Michael Cullen contends that he was approached by some of his fellow caucus 
members regarding his interest in the leadership as early as 199186 (Cullen, interview, 
1998). He was not the only MP who received such an approach. David Lange 
recollected February 1992 as the first time he realised the possibility of a leadership 
change. At the two-day caucus meeting held in his electorate (Mangere) 'a small cluster 
of colleagues put it to me that Mangere should do more than provide the venue for the 
caucus meeting' (Lange, 1994: 70). In response to this approach, in early April 1992, 
Lange publicly expressed his renewed interest in the top position. The former Prime 
Minister was confident that he could make a better leader than the incumbent, although 
adding 'I'm not going to go and market myself' (Reid, 1992). Moore's response was 
blunt. 'He's a great guy with a lot to offer ... but the best advice he can give us is what 
not to do' (Reid, 1992: 53). The then Chief Whip, Jonathan Hunt, also dismisses the 
seriousness of the caucus discontent with Moore at this stage, by referring to the first 
caucus meeting in February 1992 when the leadership automatically came upJor review. 
When the ballot was called, no-one, no-one opposed the current leader or deputy 
leader, that was then Mike Moore and Helen Clark. There was no ballot at all. 
While David might have had people who had a few drinks chat to him and 
everything like that, even though I'm well aware of what you're talking about, I 
don't think at any stage there was a serious challenge that would have succeeded. 
(Hunt, interview, 1998) 
Another sign of disillusionment appeared before Christmas in 1992, shortly after the 
Wellington by-election87 in the form of 'grumbles' among some MPs (Edwards, 
1993a) in response to Moore's 'erratic' behaviour during the campaign for the by-
election. As is to be discussed more in detail in the next chapter, Moore's problem in 
this regard was nothing new. However, his unpredictability and poor sense of 
judgement exhibited in public during the 1992 Wellington by-election induced some 
MPs to seriously consider their leader's suitability to lead a major party. A political 
journalist, Ruth Laugesen, reported his behaviour at a press conference, held the day 
before the voting day, to which Moore brought a sledgehammer, claiming: ' .. .let's go to 
the Wellington Hospital, let's smash up the cash registers' in an effort presumably to 
highlight National's user-pay policy in health. Laugesen continued: 
The press conference, called to discuss health, blossomed into a stand-up 
routine which traversed the nature of karma ("I thought karma was a night club 
act"), [National Prime Minister] Jim Bolger's diction ("It's great after 43 years 
to find someone who can be condescending to [sic] about the English language") 
86 He said that he was not interested in moving against Moore (Cullen, interview, 1998). 
87 The by-election was caused by the resignation of the incumbent Labour MP, Fran Wilde, who had 
won the mayoralty of Wellington. The by-election was won by Labour with an increased majority 
(although with fewer votes due to the poor turnout). For detail, see Miller and Catt (1993). 
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and Wellington newspapers ("Let's not get into Wellington sewerage 
problems.") 
He failed to tell the assembled reporters anything new about health. (Laugesen, 
1993a) 
Laugesen went on to ask what some Labour MPs and Labour party officials (who were 
incensed by, in her words, 'their leader's ill-judged behaviour... the latest in a string of 
bizarre press conferences') had in mind: 'Was this the behaviour of a prime minister in 
waiting?' (Laugesen, 1993a) 
Although not personally worried about Moore's behaviour at that time, Maharey 
says he was aware of 'considerable debate through that by-election about Mike's 
leadership', which was 'fairly wide spread' both 'in caucus and outside' (Maharey, 
interview, 1998). Indeed, outside the caucus, Auckland Labour circles were reported to 
have held discussions regarding the possibility of ousting Moore (Laugesen, 1993d). 
Back in the caucus, concerned MPs approached Clark for a potential challenge to the 
leader (Edwards, 1993h). Clark, in preparation for a possible challenge against her 
leader, was reported to have softened her image by lengthening her hair and expanding 
her wardrobe (Laugesen, 1993a) to counter her austere, cold public image. 
As with the earlier approaches to Cullen and Lange in 1991, the rumoured threat 
failed to materialise. Labour's victory at the by-election, no doubt helped deflate the 
caucus frustration. As Hunt notes: 
I heard ... you heard talk. I mean [we] always hear talk in political circles, and 
particularly when you are not doing well in the polls and you hear more talk. 
Right? But after the Wellington by-election, which we had won, and that was 
regarded as a good result, there was no serious discussion. (Hunt, interview, 
1998) 
Moore's earlier survival- why? 
Apart from the favourable by-election outcome, at least two factors worked in Moore's 
favour. They are also crucial in understanding why Moore was not successfully 
challenged between 1990 and 1993 prior to the General Election. Firstly, there was no 
single alternative, behind whom the anti-Moore force could unite. Dyson and Caygill, 
for example, indicate that they would never have supported Lange as an alternative leader 
in early 1992 (Dyson, interview, 1998; Caygill, interview, 1998). With regard to the 
rumoured threat around the Wellington by-election in 1992, while Clark's name was 
mentioned as a potential contender, she was by no means a unanimous choice. It is 
unclear how seriously - if at all - Clark herself was interested in challenging her leader at 
this stage. Caygill approached the deputy leader sometime around that year, indicating 
his willingness to support her in case she decided to stand for the top position. In 
response, she made her unavailability clear at that stage (Caygill, interview, 1998). With 
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no alternative leader readily available, any coup attempt was destined to fail. In this 
context, when asked how seriously Moore's position was threatened in late 1992, 
Maharey replies: 
I don't think it was very serious at all because I don't think there was a serious 
alternative candidate ... I was pretty peripheral to that discussion, so although I 
may have known there was a serious candidate, but as part and a member of the 
caucus I wasn't aware of a serious alternative to Mike. (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
Secondly, despite the escalating disillusionment with Moore in the caucus, there 
never was sufficient will nor numbers to force a leadership change. For example, 
Maharey and Dyson, who were both Clark supporters in 1993, claim no involvement in 
the earlier grumbling. Dyson further explains that a serious leadership change was 
simply unthinkable for the caucus, which was severely suffering from the strain due to 
its small size. 
Before the 1993 election? No ... no. I think one of the reasons for that was that 
we had a really small caucus. A lot of people were incredibly over-worked, and it 
was a very demanding time for our caucus, from my understanding. And most of 
the caucus, I think, just couldn't have coped with something as traumatic as that. 
You need a bit of residual strength to go through a leadership change, and there 
was just none in our caucus. If you divide a really small group of people like that, 
you'd have major problems. (Dyson, interview, 1998) 
Another MP, Jack Elder, a loyal Moore supporter, is more blunt. 'I don't think they 
probably had the numbers by early 1993, and it wasn't until we had the election in 1993, 
that they had the clear numbers' (Elder, interview, 1998). Without a majority will to 
oust the incumbent, no challenge could be realistic. As Hunt, a seasoned political 
observer88 , puts it matter of factly, 'you have to have the numbers in order to mount a 
serious challenge' (Hunt, interview, 1998). 
Under these circumstances, Moore could afford to emphasise the benign nature of 
the caucus frustration in March 1993, when asked by a journalist about the state of his 
leadership. He then admitted that there was a sign of frustration typically associated 
with being Opposition MPs, but quickly dismissed its seriousness: 'Nobody is more 
frustrated than I am. The discipline we have shown in not producing promises and 
instant policies has a toll. You are not giving your troops anything to fight with ... We 
88 Hunt, who entered Parliament in 1966, is the longest serving incumbent Labour MP. He was said 
to have always accurately predicted the outcomes of the Labour votes that he had experienced (Clifton, 
2000a: 27). Given this record, he boasts: 'I reckon I could count. There are very few people who can 
in a political party, because they don't listen. In order to count, you've got to listen, and that's not 
being facile. I really mean that seriously. I can tell what the present score is in our caucus at the 
present time, exactly .... I may be wrong by one or two, but I would be almost exactly right' (Hunt, 
interview, 1998). 
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have sent people in to speak to pensioner meetings with no armour and no sword' 
(Edwards, 1993a). 
Moore's control weakens 
In July 1993, the National Party regained the lead in the TV3-Gallup poll from Labour 
(The Independent, 16 July 1993). This revival of Government popularity, which was 
believed a reflection of the improving economic conditions (Vowles et aI, 1995: Chapter 
4; Edlin, 1993) suggested that Labour's support had been 'soft', or as one journalist 
stated: 'Its [Labour's] leadership is popular only in that it is less unpopular than 
National's' (Riddell, 1992). This slipping popularity of the party and thus the 
diminishing of any chance of winning the Treasury bench at the 1993 election was 
worrying news for Moore. It had been widely speculated by the media that his future 
depended upon the election outcome (e.g., James, 1993e: 165 and McLoughlin, 1992: 
59). 
Moore's potential vulnerability was unexpectedly confirmed by one of his own 
colleagues. On 19 September an Australian interview TV programme, which was made 
two months earlier, was aired in New Zealand. In the programme, David Lange 
predicted that Moore's leadership would be in danger if Labour failed to win the 
election. The former leader named Clark as a likely successor89 • 
As the National Government tried to capitalise on this latest revelation of internal 
division, response from the Labour leadership was prompt. Moore disregarded the 
relevance of Lange's comments by describing the former leader as someone from the 
past. 'David Lange and Roger Douglas were both significant political figures in their 
day. They have had their day'. The annoyed Moore went further to imply that the 
former leader continued to make unnecessary noise because he was not engaged in any 
meaningful activities, adding that as a manager, Moore would find 'the creative role for 
him'. One of the roles suggested by Moore was to investigate the formation of a 
Pacific Parliament (The New Zealand Herald, 21 September 1993, Sec.l, p.5). 
Clark's stance on the top position 
Clark also played down Lange's comments: 'We're not speculating on what would 
happen, because we're planning to win' (Goulter, 1993a). However, at the same time, 
she admitted that any party that lost an election would reassess its position, although 
such a post-election re-evaluation would not inevitably lead to a leadership change. 'All 
senior figures would have a chance to reconsider their position, and I think everybody 
89 This was not the first time Lange sniped at Moore and Labour under his leadership. The former 
leader had used his fortnightly column in the Dominion to criticise Labour's stance on certain policy 
areas for some time. On 15 July 1993, Lange also told the Australian Institute of Company Directors 
that the National Party was likely to win the coming election. 
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will do that' (Laugesen, 1993b). What was interesting was that she did not categorically 
rule herself out as a potential candidate in case of a leadership change. Her given reason 
for hesitating to consider assuming the top job was not her loyalty to Moore - as 
expected from a deputy 'leader - but her concern about the long hours and pressure 
associated with the leader's position (Goulter, 1993b). 
The doubt about Clark's loyalty to Moore and speculation on her leadership 
ambition was again highlighted when she admitted in an interview with the Listener to 
having 'a few doubts' about her leader's trade policy ideas in early October. Asked 
about her leadership aspirations, her reply was far from a flat denial (Hubbard, 1993b: 
31). Clark's ambiguous stance was in a stark contrast to the straightforward declaration 
of loyalty made by the finance spokesperson, Michael Cullen, who was also tipped as a 
potential leadership contender (eg., The National Business Review, 24 September 1993, 
p.29). He stressed his satisfaction with Moore's leadership and asserted that he would 
be happy to support the leader's retention even in the case of Labour's election loss. 
Cullen also denied his own leadership ambition without a hint of hesitation (The New 
Zealand Herald, 22 September 1993, Sec.l, p.5). 
The growing discontent with Moore 
On 16 October, less than three weeks away from the polling date, another blow was 
delivered by Lange. In his campaign opening speech in his Mangere electorate, Lange 
criticised Labour's campaign style for ignoring the interests of its traditional supporters. 
More importantly, in the same speech he stated: 
If you are on a low or middle income and you are suddenly faced with serious 
illness or major accident or you are made redundant, a few dollars are not much 
use. 
I think of the man I met in this office who could not work because of his heart 
condition, who was on a two-year waiting list and who could not raise the $20,000 
his doctors told him he would need to get the operation done privately. 
Think of the people we know who have lost what took them years to build up 
when they lost their jobs. Think of the bright kids who come from low and 
middle-income families. Where are their parents going to find $12,000 for the 
last year of a physiotherapy course? 
The only answer to those problems is to fund the social services publicly and 
make them free to everybody. 
What I am saying is that progressive income tax is not a burden. For the great 
majority of the people it is the road to liberation. (The New Zealand Herald, 19 
October 1993, Sec. I, p.4) 
Lange did not call specifically for a tax system with a 'more progressive' nature than the 
existing one and technically his comments could be interpreted as an endorsement of the 
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tax system already in place90 , but this was not the way the media and the opposition 
parties saw them. Quickly seizing this latest opportunity, Bolger pointed out that 
Lange's comments were 'showing splits and divisions' in Labour over economic policy 
(Riddell, 1993a). Once again, the irritated Moore labelled the former Prime Minister an 
important person 'in the past' (Armstrong 1993b). 
Lange's comments had a devastating effect on Moore's campaign. It not only 
distracted the party from its planned attack against National's health policies, but also 
eroded Labour's credibility as the coherent, trustworthy alternative Government. In the 
previous weeks, Labour had been strenuously denying National's claim (eg., Clifton, 
1993a) that in order to finance its policies, Labour would have to raise taxes should it be 
elected as Government91 . As McGregor noted, 'Taxation was to develop as one of the 
critical issues for the Labour Party in the 1993 election campaign. It exposed policy 
fissures, highlighted personality divisions, revealed the fragility of the political ego and 
threatened to destabilise the presidential-style election campaign run by Moore' (1996b: 
127). 
Policy conflicts 
Labour's internal policy discrepancies were further unearthed within a mere three days. 
During their visit to the Wellington Chamber of Commerce on 19 October, Justice 
spokesperson David Caygill and Wellington Central MP Chris Laidlaw made comments 
on the Employment Contracts Act (ECA), which Labour promised to repeal92. Although 
confirming their intention to honour this election promise if elected, Caygill argued: 
'We think frankly the Employment Contracts Act has introduced a level of flexibility 
into wage bargaining'. Laidlaw agreed: 'Experience has shown there have been some 
elements of the Employment Contracts Act which are not as bad as maybe we thought 
they were'. The indication given in these comments was that whatever change the party 
intended to make to the controversial legislation, it would be minor. In Caygill's words, 
'We don't see the changes we propose to the Employment Contracts Act turning the 
90 Labour's finance spokesman, Michael Cullen was at pains to rationalise Lange's comments along 
this line. Nevertheless, when asked by reporters why he thought Lange made such comments, his reply 
was: 'You'll have to ask Mr Lange that. I have never been very good at psychology in that respect' 
(Armstrong, 1993b). It is important to note that Labour's 1993 election manifesto did not promise free 
health or free education which Lange argued be provided through the progressive tax system. See 
NZLP (1993). 
91 National's claim was so constant that Moore was forced to pledge in a televised leaders' debate that 
he would resign if his government increased GST to 17.5%. (The specificity of his pledge seemed 
peculiar as neither a GST increase to anything but the indicated rate or other forms of tax increases such 
as income tax was excluded.) He later said on the pledge: 'Of course it's not a stunt. Other than 
Yvonne (his wife), the thing I treasure the most is my seat in Parliament'. 'It's all I've got'. (The 
Press, 16 October 1993, p.3) 
92 The party manifesto stated: 'Industrial relations is one of the weapons used by the National 
Government to divide New Zealand. The Employment Contracts Act has been used to attack the wages 
and conditions of many workers' (NZLP, 1993c: 124). 
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clock back but we do see them introducing an element of fairness' (Edwards, 1993b). 
The two MPs' remarks were, in fact, not at variance with Labour's official position 
stated in the manifesto. What the party pledged in its manifesto was to replace the act 
with a 'fair and balanced industrial relations system' (NZLP, 1993c: 124). Labour 
aimed to redress the perceived imbalance of power between employers and employees in 
favour of the latter by introducing minimum wage protection for young workers, 
restoring statutory recognition to trade unions, requiring employers to bargain in good 
faith, and promoting collective bargaining. However, Labour made it clear that it would 
not restore compulsory unionism, blanket coverage and compulsory arbitration. In sum, 
the party's view was '[w]orkers and employers are equally important within the 
economy. Neither can succeed without the other' (NZLP, 1993c: 124). 
Nevertheless, Caygill and Laidlaw's reported comments drew quick criticisms from 
the Council of Trade Unions (CTU). Its Secretary, Angela Foulks, stressed: 'The 
changes proposed by Labour are fundamental, not minor or marginal. This analysis of 
the CTU is agreed with by the Employers Federation, which opposes the changes very 
vigorously for that very reason' (Edwards, 1993c). Foulks' position was confirmed by 
Clark, the spokesperson of Labour. Describing the ECA as 'odious' and 'disastrous' 
(Edwards, 1993b), the deputy leader denied that the ECA was not as bad as it was 
initially thought. 'It is not my view. The only reason the industrial relations system has 
continued to function at all with ridiculous legislation is because most people are decent. 
Not everyone rushed to use the exploitative opportunities there but the Act is a charter to 
exploit' (Edwards, 1993c). The two MPs whose comments initiated this turmoil also 
confirmed Clark's viewpoint. 'The changes which the Labour Government will make 
are not cosmetic and we did not describe them as such, nor did we praise the act' 
(Edwards, 1993c). Clark further wrote to the CTU reaffirming her party's intention that 
'[t]he replacement legislation will proceed immediately after the election of a Labour 
government and as a deputy prime minister I will personally ensure that it has the 
highest legislative priority' (Edwards, 1993d). 
In contrast to emphatic efforts from Clark (as well as Caygill and Laidlaw) to clarify 
the confusion over the ECA, Moore's endorsement was strangely absent. Despite the 
amount of media attention which this latest turmoil generated, and the party's clearly 
stated position over the act in the manifesto, Moore refused to confirm Labour's 
intention to repeal the ECA, allegedly for fear of upsetting big businesses93 (Rudman, 
1994). On 31 October, five days from the election day, Moore and Clark had a 'huge 
row' in the car on the way to a joint visit to a Petone factory where Clark planned to 
clarify the matter once and for all by releasing the party's industrial relations policy 
93 For example, see Dearnaley (l993a and 1993b) for the Employers' Federation's views on the ECA 
and Labour's position. 
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(Street, interview, 1998). Moore was unwilling to release the policy because, according 
to a newspaper report, he wanted to rewrite some aspects of it (Laugesen, 1993d). 
Clark's interest in the leadership 
The day after the argument, Moore called a final big press conference before the 
election. With the opinion polls unanimously predicting94 National's victory, the 
emphasis at the conference was on the unity of the Labour leadership team. Sitting 
between Clark and Michael Cullen, Moore paid a tribute to his colleagues for 'their 
friendships, the lessons we have learnt together over the last three years'. Grabbing 
Clark's arm several times during the conference, Moore praised his deputy's ability, as 
if all the speculation about an internal split and his leadership future were totally 
groundless. 'We actually like each other, we agree with [sic] a common purpose for this 
country' (Laugesen, 1993d). 
By this time, however, the differences between the two were irreconcilable. 
Following another change of hairdo, which had an effect in softening her cold and 
austere image95 (Ferguson, 1993), on 27 October Clark for the first time positively 
expressed her interest in Moore's job. While declaring her total support for Moore by 
saying: 'Any speculation to the contrary is totally wrong' (Stone, 1993c), when she was 
asked by reporters about her action in case of Moore's resignation after the election 
defeat, Clark stated: 'I would be interested. Why wouldn't I be? But I'd have to 
consider my options' (Goulter, 1993d). She also added that her decision to stand for 
the leadership position would depend upon the level of support she could attract within 
the caucus. 
I've watched people over the years seek the leadership and if one doesn't go into a 
leadership position with a lot of support behind one it is a very difficult and rocky 
road' (Stone, 1993c). 
She re-confirmed her readiness for the top job slightly more strongly only three days 
before the election. Asked about her leadership ambition, her reply was: 
It doesn't bum in my guts. If the opportunity came, yes of course I would do it 
but I wouldn't kill for it. (MacLennan, 1993) 
In the wake of this speculation about Clark's leadership ambition, Moore publicly 
adopted a seemingly relaxed, understanding attitude. He almost endorsed her 
credentials as a future leader - providing that her succession was necessitated by his 
94 For example, the Time-Morgan and TV3-Gallup polls released the day before the voting day both 
showed National's lead over Labour, by three and eight percent respectively. (Riddell, 1993b) 
95 Clark later explained her image change was to project an image externally which was closer to the 
impressions held by her close friends. (Goulter, 1993d) 
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voluntary resignation. 'Well, of course, Helen is a very talented person and why 
shouldn't she [stand for the position] if 1 decide to vacate the leadership?' 'I think 
she's terrific, 1 support her. People are realising how good she is and I've always 
known it'. His praise of Clark continued: 'She's great and I'm lucky to have her' 
(Munro, 1993a). Would he consider voluntary resignation so that his deputy could lead 
the party if Labour lost the election? 
Well, 1 don't believe we will lose and when 1 want to talk about jobs, growth, 
education, 1 think it's foolish to worry about myself. It is not about me. It never 
has been. (Herbert, 1993a) 
The increasing pressure on Moore 
Looking back at this period of time, Moore explains that in spite of his awareness of an 
organised movement to undermine his leadership, he had to put on a brave face and 
soldiered on in the crucial final days of the election campaign. 
1 heard rumours during the election campaign that people were cancelling 
meetings, that MPs were having meetings, instead of fighting the election, and they 
were meeting at people's houses, and cancelling meetings. Marginal MPs were 
saying where are these people? - they promised to come and see me. They were ... 
and what they were doing was a group of them ... ha (chuckle) ... they were good 
actually to be fair. .. 1 would go and speak in an electorate in their area, people 
would be impressed or whatever, and then they would send someone behind me to 
say: 'Oh, Mike is erratic. Mike Moore didn't write that speech' or whatever, you 
know. So, I'd build up the good will, and then they would come in and drop a 
bucket on me. And there was a group of them all the time moving around the 
country ... thinking about the leadership, not about the election. Andjoumalists 
asked me about it, and 1 just bluffed my way through, saying: 'No, that is not 
happening.' (Moore, interview, 1998) 
At the election (6 November), Labour's performance exceeded the common 
expectation. On election night, Labour won 46 seats (with 34.7% of the total votes) with 
National- 49 (35.2%); Alliance - 2 (18.3%), and New Zealand First - 2 (8.3%)96. As at 
least the results of three seats - Waitaki, Northern Maori, and Wellington-Karori - were 
still in question, it was not clear whether National could secure the outright majority. 
Probably encouraged by this unexpectedly better outcome for his own party, Moore 
made a highly emotive, almost victory speech. 'It will be a long night for [National 
Leader and Prime Minister] Mr Bolger and Miss Richardson, but it won't be as long 
and as cold a night as it has been for all the young people in this country since they were 
elected' , with a concluding comment in a victorious tone: 'Hang on. Help is on the 
way'. Later, he declared that National had no moral authority to govern the country, 
96 The final result after the special votes were counted was: National- 50 (35.0%); Labour - 45 
(34.7%); Alliance - 2 (18.2%); and NZ First - 2 (8.4%). The result of the Waitaki seat, that was won 
by Labour on the election night, was overturned, and held by National. 
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adding: 'We have power becau'se we have the largest percentage of votes' (Kilroy, 
1993b). He demanded constitutional option papers, presumably prepared by the Justice 
Department, the Attorney-General, and the Cabinet Office for Jim Bolger, be handed 
over to him (Smith, 1993). Later on the same night, however, he was less confident, 'it 
is totally improper and wrong of someone to argue that they have a moral or political 
authority at this moment' (Kilroy, 1993b). 
Unfortunately for Moore, his speech in front of live TV cameras was unfavourably 
compared with those made by his counterparts in the rival parties, Jim Bolger and Jim 
Anderton. These two leaders acted like statesmen, calling for calmness and guaranteeing 
a co-operative approach in Parliament. The promise of more co-operation seemed 
fittingly appropriate as the new MMP (Mixed Member Proportional) system, approved 
in the simultaneously held referendum as the new electoral mechanism from the 1996 
election, was presumed to require such an approach. In contrast, the aggressive and 
politicised tone chosen by Moore in his speech was widely perceived as ill-timed and 
misjudged97 • 
Due to the closeness of the election result, it initially appeared that at least for the 
foreseeable future the incumbent leader was safe98 • The atmosphere of the first Labour 
caucus meeting after the election held on 9 November was full of 'jubilation', according 
to one newspaper. 'There was a real crush in the caucus room, with plenty of kissing, 
hugging, and back-slapping' (Riddell, 1993d). The euphoria, however, disguised the 
strong discord felt by many caucus members. Two days before the caucus meeting, 
Lange made a stinging attack on Moore for his excessive personal influence on the 
party's election campaign (Lange, 1993a). The former leader was severely critical of: a) 
Labour's failure to distinguish itself from National by shying away from important, 
distinguishing issues for fear of upsetting the middle class; and b) the highly 
personalised election campaign. On both accounts, Lange held Moore responsible. 
Lange was by no means the only Labour MP holding such views of Moore. Strong 
feelings of dissatisfaction with Moore had been steadily building up for a while, but they 
were at boiling point in the post-election caucus. Tizard recalls: 'I was quite stunned by 
the anger in the caucus, in the first caucus. And I thought: "Hell, what's happening 
here?'" (Tizard, interview, 1998). A leadership change now looked very real. 
Moore's leadership was constantly discussed amongst many MPs and candidates as 
well as party members throughout the election campaign. His suitability as the leader 
and the question as to whether a leadership change was desirable in the future were often 
raised in their conversations. For example, Steve Maharey notes: 
97 For the contents of his speech, see Smith (1993). 
98 See Riddell (1993c) and Kilroy (l993b). 
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People certainly talked about the worries they had about what it would be like for 
him to be Prime Minister [and] what the party would be [like] and how it would 
work, who would be in Cabinet, all of those issues were buzzing right through the 
election campaign and caused a lot of instability because they were there. 
(Maharey, interview, 1998) 
In some cases, it is reported that a more direct approach than having general discussions 
was made to a few candidates during the campaign. For instance, Jill White, a new 
intake, contends that during the campaign one incumbent MP asked her about a 
preferred leader (White, interview, 1998). Another MP says at the height of the election 
campaign: 'A party activist from Christchurch came to visit me in my campaign 
headquarters in ***** on the pretext that he was coming down to do some canvassing, 
but in reality he mostly wanted to sound out whether I would support a move to change 
the leadership immediately after the election' (Anonymous, interview, 1998). 
Nevertheless, any suggestion of a large-scale, long-contrived anti-Moore campaign 
prior to the election has been vigorously denied by those in favour of a changEr. Ruth 
Dyson, who later ran the numbers for Clark (Street, interview, 1998), admits that there 
were lively and frequent discussions amongst the fellow new candidates about Moore's 
leadership problems during the election campaign. Yet, she maintains, it was far from an 
organised plot. 
You know, in the weeks leading into the election, people were saying, you know, 
how are we going to cope with the next three years, there isn't much more upfront 
discussion. And then, in the last few days leading into the election and on election 
night, particularly ... Mike's speech on election night really ... really unsettled a lot 
of people, making [them] very nervous about what was going to happen. A 
number of caucus members just said: 'Well, he has to go. We have to have a 
change of Leader.' (Dyson, interview, 1998) 
Another 1993 Clark supporter agrees: 
... my recollection is that we had discussed his erratic behaviour for quite some 
time leading up to the actual election. But in fact no decision to replace him as 
Leader occurred till after the election, that was when the final decision was made. 
(Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
99 Whether the anti-group was actively undermining Moore's leadership during the election campaign 
in view of a leadership challenge against him after the election was, and still is, contentious. Many 
Moore supporters firmly believe(d) that was the case. Caygill acknowledges the presence of strong 
resentment towards the leader before the election, which worked as a catalyst for the challenge in 1993. 
However, while having no knowledge of the coup movement before the election, he questions the 
feasibility of active undermining of the Party Leader during the election campaign. 'I don't think that 
people actively worked to undermine Mike. I think in fact it is hard to see how, in an election 
campaign, they really could do that without risking their own defeat' (Caygill, interview, 1998). 
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The emerging inevitability of a leadership change 
There is no doubt that some had reached the conclusion even long before the election 
that Moore was unsuitable to lead the Labour Party and needed to be replaced at some 
stage in the future. They, sometimes explicitly, expressed their convictions to others 
prior to and during the election campaign. As a result, they knew who else shared those 
views, which loosely formed a foundation for a coup. However, it was only after the 
election that a wider group (including Maryan Street) were contacted formally regarding 
their positions to discuss the leadership. Then, according to Steve Maharey, '[t]he 
question ... was seldom "should it happen?", it was "when will it happen?", "how will 
it happen?" ... those kind of things were in discussion' (Maharey, interview, 1998). 
As the level of criticism against Moore heightened, a question about the credibility of 
his leadership in relation to his leadership succession re-surfaced. The anti-Moore 
people often asked among themselves 'why Mike became Leader in the first place 
anyway.' To which the answer was: 'Well, who would have wanted to be Leader in 
1990? No-one but Mike'. Due to the circumstances of his leadership succession, 
which took place while the caucus majority still supported Palmer, the legitimacy of 
Moore's position came under question. 'So, he kind of came in without the kind of 
feeling that this is a person who people had said: "Yes [we] want you", in you come. I 
think that helped undermine him a bit' (Maharey, interview, 1998). 
Even after the core anti-Moore group recognised the inevitability of a leadership 
change, the transition of the frustration, felt by some MPs with Moore, into a coup 
organisation was by no means automatic. Between 1990 and 1993, the caucus left 
group provided a forum for discussion of the Moore leadership and Labour's policy 
direction under him. Although the majority of this group were now among the core 
coup supporters, one MP, Liz Tennet, decided to depart from it. She explains her 
decision in the following terms: 
I held some concerns on policy development under Mr Moore's leadership, but 
never on his leadership per se. I was working with the coup group on policy 
issues to ensure that Labour did not shift its thrust to the Right. 
Once I learnt that the extended agenda was to depose Mr Moore as leader, I 
was mortified, as I recognised Mr Moore was the most popular political leader in 
NZ at that time. As a result, I was never involved at any stage in any move to oust 
him as leader. (Tennet, 1998) 
Within the remaining group, a number of private meetings and telephone conferences 
were organised to further debate a potential challenge against Moore. 
Clark as the alternative 
Unfortunately for Moore, unlike the previous occasions in the past few years when his 
leadership became a discussion point, this time the anti-Moore group fulfilled two 
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crucial conditions for a successful leadership change, ie, political will (and numbers) to 
carry out a coup, and an alternative candidate in Helen Clark. Although the role which 
Clark played in the actual organisation of the leadership change after the election was 
described as 'not at all' by one of the key members (Dyson, interview, 1998)100, some 
of the group members were privately confident about her availability as a candidate if 
enough support for her was found in the caucus. 
Nevertheless, Clark was not an automatic, unanimous choice. For example, during 
the election campaign, Maharey was accused of plotting against Moore. The evidence 
put forward was his personal diary (which fell into the hands of another MP' s 
secretary) in which he drew 'a kind of a dream team for Labour' - an ideal Labour 
Cabinet line-up. According to Maharey, the list was innocently made up while he was 
waiting at an airport; 'a doodle of a pissed-off person', and was the result of the 
frustration he felt with Labour's campaign. The top position of the list went to Lange 
(Maharey, interview, 1-998). 
However, the former leader was not a preferred choice by many. As Street points 
out, his outspokenness was a factor which worked against him. 
Yes, there was an approach to bring back David ... People admired him 
enormously. And I'm personally extremely fond of David and remain very fond 
of him. But he had been too critical too often. (Street, interview, 1998) 
The finance spokesperson, Michael Cullen was another name mentioned in the 
debate although interestingly, Cullen asserts that he was not approached by anyone for 
the leadership position in 1993 (Cullen, interview, 1998). According to Dyson: 
The only real discussion that anyone had about [someone] other than Helen was 
Michael Cullen. Quite a few people discussed the option of Michael. .. But I 
think in the end, it just. .. didn't pick up any traction ... There wasn't a faction that 
100 To substantiate Dyson's assertion, Tizard says that she and Clark were holidaying in Fiji on the 
latter's suggestion for a week after the first caucus while crucial talks were held amongst the anti-Moore 
group. According to Tizard, Clark was concerned about Labour's performance at the election. 
However, she adds that apart from a daily fax containing general news, Clark was not engaged in any 
other communication, thus concluding: 'I saw no coordination. I mean she certainly was not running it 
[the coup)' (Tizard, interview, 1998). Exactly how deeply Clark was involved in the preliminary 
discussions of the leadership change prior to the election is unclear. Clark herself denied any knowledge 
of the coup before the election in a radio interview. She said: 'I don't think anybody could sensibly 
accuse me of anything less than total and full commitment to the return of a Labour Government in 
1993 ... I can assure you that I was full-time on the election campaign working for the election of the 
Labour Government with the leadership which it had had' (Morning Report, Radio New Zealand, 2 
December 1993). Yet, Maharey states: 'whilst I would regard myself as one of the people who 
probably was crucial to the change of leader, in the actual five days, there was obviously a lot of 
discussion that I was never part of over that longer lead-up period, otherwise, Helen wouldn't have been 
available to be leader. So, people must have done a lot of talking about who would take over, and 
whether she was the alternative, most of which was not something I was involved in' (Maharey, 
interview, 1998). 
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voted on it or anything like that, you know. It just didn't pick up enough support. 
(Dyson, interview, 1998) 
Why did Cullen fail to gain the nod? His position as a declared Moore supporter 
and his lack of enthusiasm to replace him (Cullen, interview, 1998) surely counted 
against him. Also, for some, Cullen was viewed not as well equipped for the top 
position as Clark in terms of his personality. One MP explains: 
.. .I've worked with Michael quite a lot and like him a lot, but I never... I've never 
really put him in the same league as Helen. He's not as focused ... not as single 
minded as Helen. He hasn't got the same sort of drive and I think you need an 
extraordinary drive to be the leader. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
After a while, the choice was naturally narrowed down to Clark. At a meeting held on 
9 November, following the first caucus meeting, although absent from the meeting, Clark 
sent a message to the pro-leadership change group in which she expressed her intention 
(for the first time for some attendees) to challenge Moore before Christmas. It was also 
agreed at the meeting that those MPs would lobby on behalf of the challenger (Lange, 
1993b). 
The timing of the challenge 
The timing of the leadership change (to take place before Christmas) was determined by 
the Clark supporters on four grounds. Firstly, while the Government's majority seemed 
shaky, a snap election was regarded as possible. Since the speculation of Moore's 
future had been around for a while, the Government may have tried to capitalise on 
Labour's increasing disarray. Also, the Clark camp was acutely aware of the presence 
of the Alliance, and the threat it could pose to Labour. Although the party's number of 
Parliamentary seats increased greatly, it was assisted by National's more dramatic loss 
of support and the systematic bias of the then electoral system which did not translate 
third parties' increased popUlarity into the seat allocation. In this sense, the real 
'winner' which emerged at the election was the minor parties including the Alliance 
(Levine and Roberts, 1994a: 142). The Clark supporters felt it necessary to establish a 
new leadership as soon as possible to counter this political force that was believed to be 
growing at the expense of Labour (Macpherson, 1994). In Clark's words: 
If we had waited until February next year then the Labour party would have 
drifted, unable to cope with the nonsense from the Alliance all year, still falling 
between two stools as we had been. (Kilroy, 1994) 
Secondly, the Clark supporters feared that if given sufficient time, Moore would have 
consolidated his position so that any leadership attempt would not have been feasible. 
Maharey, who respects Moore's energy and work capacity notes: 
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... if you leave someone like Mike who is a very good organiser to start off again, 
then he will immediately. He's a high performance person, he'll hit the ground 
running after Christmas with a program for the year, he'd have contacted people 
who had committed money, and that will mean anybody who's trying to start 
again will be unplugging lots of things, and would make it difficult for them. 
(Maharey, interview, 1998) 
Dyson was also concerned about the organisational impact of a leadership change . 
. . .if we left things as they were, then Mike would get all his office set up, get staff 
set up, they would be on contracts ... and that over the summer period, everyone 
would sort of get set back into their organisation mode with Mike as the leader, 
and that's quite difficult to ... it's much more unsettling to change, you know. It 
would [have] still happened in the same way, but it [would have disrupted] a lot 
more of Parliament if we [had] left it, like the staff changes ... if you remove a 
whole body of staff, which you do when you change leaders, it's very 
destabilising for people. (Dyson, interview, 1998) 
So, when they realised_that they had enough numbers on their side to topple the leader, 
'the consensus rapidly developed: "Well, it's not going to be easy, but do it...now'" 
(Maharey, interview, 1998). 
Thirdly, Clark's proponents thought that a change in early December would provide 
the new leadership with a timely break over Christmas, during which any disquietedness 
incurred by the challenge would have time to settle. With such a break, Clark should be 
able to start the new year with a clean slate. Dyson attests: 'So, we thought that if we 
did it before Christmas, then maybe over the Christmas and summer period, people 
would settle down when they came back with their few rifts healed, then they could get 
on with the job' (Dyson, interview, 1998). If the coup had been postponed until the 
beginning of 1994, it could have risked damaging the new leadership by allowing the 
impact of the potentially messy event to linger on for rest of the year. Clark explained: 
'I just think it would have got messier and messier. .. if it hadn't been resolved it would 
have become a running sore' (Kilroy, 1994) 
Fourthly, there was a rumour in the Labour caucus that in early 1994 the Cullen-
King team would challenge the Moore regime101 • Although the Clark supporters were 
unable to verify the rumour, to elect Clark as the leader, it was necessary to pre-empt any 
possible challenge with another candidate. For instance, one 1993 leadership change 
proponent comments: 'I did hear of that and yes that was a precipitating factor. .. in 
timing. Because the rumour was that they were contemplating something in February' 
(Anonymous, interview, 1998). 
101 Both Cullen and King denied their leadership ambitions at that time. Cullen says with laughter: 
'The only person I know who promoted that idea was one [political journalist] Chris Trotter who was 
totally wrong' (Cullen, interview, 1998). King is more vocal. 'Absolutely incorrect. I never... I'd 
never considered challenging Mike Moore for Leader, it didn't enter my head to challenge Mike Moore, 
it never entered my head that anyone else would challenge him, either' (King, interview, 1998), 
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It is important to stress that the decision on the timing, made by the core Clark 
supporters, surprised and in some cases raised eyebrows amongst other Clark 
sympathisers, when they were informed of the coup. Jill White says: 'I don't think I 
was aware until about that time [the second caucus meeting] that a leadership change 
was imminent although I had a pretty good feeling that there would be leadership change 
somewhere, you know, in the next two, three months perhaps' (White, interview, 1998). 
Caygill's response was even more cautious. When told of the planned leadership 
challenge, he warned the coup organisers: 
'I think that you're moving too quickly ... that Mike did not campaign well. He 
behaved badly in the immediate aftermath of the elections. There is not a lot of 
support for him either within the party or publicly. But don't underestimate his 
support, either. If you act too quickly, it will look bad. I think you ought to give 
him time. He's not likely to stand down on his own initiative. But it will look 
better if we act with less haste ... ' (Caygill, interview, 1998) 
The then Junior Whip,-Larry Sutherland, who himself predicted a coup 'somewhere 
around April' 1994, acknowledges that the timing was controversial. While carefully 
avoiding stating his own position at the time, he interprets why some disagreed on the 
virtue of the timing being so close to the election: 
... I would think that we had only just had an election. Yes, sometimes that is an 
opportune time to change a leader. But I guess ... their thinking was: 'Well, we 
need time to think. We need time to actually work out where we are going from 
here as the Labour Party caucus. If there is some dissatisfaction with Mike's 
leadership, then there should be an opportunity for this caucus to actually discuss 
that. And if there is ... if he is given an ultimatum ... opportunity with an ultimatum 
to change certain positions, or consider certain members of the caucus in terms of 
their standing of where they should be, then he should be given an ultimatum ... 
And if he finds that difficult, then he knows the ultimate situation is that he is 
going to face a leadership challenge'. That's a very nice way of it all ending. If 
you are going to have a leadership [change], that's the nicest way it could happen. 
The problem is that whilst there are people who probably thought that way, there 
are others who think that you always strike when the iron is hot, and the quicker 
you do something, the better.' (Sutherland, interview, 1998) 
Nevertheless, once these decisions were made, the momentum for a leadership 
change increased and the pressure quickly mounted on Moore. On 12 November, he 
faced the New Zealand Council, the ruling body of the NZLP, where he was questioned 
about his behaviour during the campaign. Moore explained his now well-known speech 
on election night in the following words. 
Other than one war whoop on election night by me where I was speaking to my 
people in the electorate and ignored the cameras - [all of] which I learned from 
again - we have displayed the stability, the maturity and security that is necessary. 
(Kilroy, 1993c) 
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Prior to the second caucus meeting on 23 November, more MPs had been contacted 
about the coming challenge. Richard Northey who made a return to Parliament at the 
1993 election after the three-year absence recollects: 
I first realised a leadership challenge was on at a meeting of centre and left Labour 
MPs the night before the second caucus meeting, after the 1993 election. We 
decided to use the review of the 1993 campaign, which was a major part of that 
caucus meeting agenda, to make pointed criticisms of aspects of the campaign, 
with the intention that this criticism would lead to an open review of the Party 
leadership at a subsequent caucus meeting. (Northey, 1998b) 
The agreed stnltegy for the next day was that about a dozen people would talk about 
their concerns about the leader to test the wider feelings at the caucus. If sympathetic 
feelings towards a leadership change were prevalent, then a formal approach would be 
made to Moore in person in an attempt to persuade him to step down voluntarily 
(Maharey, interview, 1998). 
Therefore, it was not surprising that the mood of the second caucus meeting, where 
Labour's election performance was discussed102 , was entirely different from the first. 
The rejoicing was replaced by criticisms directed at Moore. In his words: 
People were attacking me for running an overtly heterosexual campaign, for 
using helicopters. Nothing I had done was right. They did me over in more than 
two hours of organised speaking lists. (C. Moore, 1994) 
It was apparent that in addition to MPs, the party officials, who were also attending the 
meeting 1 03 , had lost faith in the leader. 
While attacks continued, I passed the general secretary a note, asking him to 
speak in the debate. He looked straight through me. When I finally called on him 
to speak on fund-raising, his response was to say that I had had too much 
authority in that area. (c. Moore, 1994) 
Despite Moore's surprise, the meeting did not go as planned for the Clark 
supporters, either. Although Maharey and Dalziel together with other members stood 
up and expressed their concerns and general views of the leader, some members who 
had promised to join them changed their minds at the meeting. Maharey is 
philosophical: 'Because politics is a tough game ... but only some people are tough, and 
a lot of the people who were tough in discussions outside the room weren't so brave 
inside it' (Maharey, interview, 1998). As a consequence of those members' hesitation, 
the caucus meeting was at best 'inconsequential', with Moore probably leaving the room 
102 Moore submitted to the caucus his report on the campaign and a planned strategy for the next three 
years in Parliament. See Moore (l993e). 
103 The Party General Secretary, together with the President, is allowed to attend weekly caucus 
meetings. Like the President, slhe has no voting rights. 
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'of the opinion that people had had a bit of an airing and it had all gone nowhere' 
(Maharey, interview, 1998). 
Nevertheless, the tension went up immediately within the caucus. Some MPs, who 
had not been involved in the previous discussions (thus likely to be Moore supporters), 
were astonished and angered at their colleagues' attack on Moore so shortly after the 
election. Within the pro-Clark group, there was also discontent. At a meeting held on 
the evening of the second caucus meeting, which was attended by the majority of the 
caucus, some concerns were expressed. For example, Maharey recalls: 
I said to-people: 'Look, in my opinion people didn't say what they believed [at the 
caucus meeting]. Maybe that's an indication that people are not committed. We 
can't change leaders if people are not committed. My feeling is that we put it off. 
That's it.' You know, I suppose I was reacting a bit to the fact that I had been one 
of the ones who had said things and felt a little kind of 'miffed' with people, well, 
not miffed, but a bit aware that other people hadn't (said anything)... And 
therefore you wonder about a kind of ability to see things through. (Maharey, 
interview, 1998) 
Such pessimism was overridden by the desire to see a leadership change. It was 
agreed that two MPs were to see Moore as delegates to convey their position: 'It's 
[your leadership is] not going to work. You should step down' (Maharey, interview, 
1998). 
The following day, 24 November, Maharey was asked by the concerned leader to 
clarify the intention of the previous day's caucus meeting. Assuming that the two 
delegates had already accomplished their given task, the MP for Palmerston North 
simply stated that things were 'wrong' and 'I think you should take it that there is a lot 
of dissatisfaction. People like me had voiced it.' (Maharey, interview, 1998). 
On 25 November, the news of a potential leadership challenge by Clark started 
circulating in the media. While initial reactions from Labour MPs were denial, they 
admitted that there were some rumblings within the caucus (The Dominion, 25 
November 1993, p.2). Moore's immediate response signalled that any challenge against 
him would be met with a determined fight. 'I want to remain leader and make Labour 
the major political force in this country. I have fought all my life for the interests of 
ordinary people and the country. I will continue to fight for what I believe in' (Riddell, 
1993e). 
The unfoldin~ of the coup 
On 26 November, Clark's challenge became official. In the absence of the Senior 
Whip, Jonathan Hunt, the newly elected Junior Whip, Larry Sutherland innocentlyl04 
104 Traditionally, Whips are expected to deny any knowledge of leadership challenge (Kilroy, 1993d). 
Sutherland looks back and recalls that it was: 'the worst possible time to take over as a Junior Whip' 
(Sutherland, interview, 1998). 
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admitted to the media that he had been formally informed that morning by an MP that 
there would be a challenge against Moore, although the exact timing of the challenge 
was not notified (Kilroy, 1993d). With some of the key supporters for the Clark camp 
being identified at the early stage (eg, Steve Maharey, Lianne Dalziel, Judith Tizard, Ruth 
Dyson and Party President, Maryan Stred 05), hostility quickly flared up. 
Despite persistent rumours about a leadership coup, Moore was rather unprepared 
when it actually materialised. Almost one year after the leadership change, he recalled: 
I'd spent a couple of weeks after the last election visiting all the frontline seats, 
starting negotiations with possible partners in coalitions, so I really didn't know 
what was going on and I was foolish enough to believe the assurances of some of 
the participants. (Kilroy, 1994) 
His feeling of surprise was soon replaced by despair and anger. The absence of a 
formal warning from the Clark camp aggravated the situation; the two delegates never 
arrived. 'That pain and division would not have existed had these people come to see me, 
or had a leadership challenge been done in the conventional, traditional wayl06' (Moore, 
1998). 
I was never formally informed. Still haven't been. Still waiting for the phone 
call... I thought there would be a challenge by ... at the end of the yearlO ,you 
know. That's the nature of politics. And Labour history and traditions is that you 
go and tell the person, you know ... When Bill Rowling was challenged, you go 
along and say, 'look we've got the numbers'. There's dignity in this. This is 
how you can go. This is where it lines up. But you had people who had never 
been sworn into Parliament... we had the biggest number of new MPs in 93 that 
we had ever had. Bigger than 1935, bigger than 1972. Somebody must have done 
something right [to enable so many newcomers elected into Parliament]. (Moore, 
interview, 1998) 
According to Moore, he was not just kept uninformed; some MPs who had closely 
worked with him deliberately lied about what was going on when questioned by the 
leader. They told him that there would be no challenge . 
... a couple of staff members ... whom I employed as staff ... were working for 
them .... you know one or some of them I'd helped get into Parliament. I said to 
one: 'I may not deserve your vote as a leader. But at least I deserve [honesty], 
seeing I've employed you for three years, helped you get a seat, made life easy for 
you, raised money for you, spoken for you, had you in my house. I may not 
lOS See Herbert (l993b). 
106 In 1994, Moore told a reporter: 'If they had sent someone 1 respected to tell me that it was time to 
go for the sake of myself and the party, 1 might have accepted it' (C. Moore, 1994). David Caygill, 
however, doubts that Moore's reaction would have been any different if the leadership challenge had 
taken place under different circumstances. 'I've known him longer than I've known Helen - 1 don't 
doubt that he would have fought vigorously no matter what. If the decision had been delayed until early 
next year, until 1994, it would still have been represented as a betrayal by his supporters and Mike 
would still have felt betrayed' (Caygill, interview, 1998). 
107 Elsewhere, he said: '1 was never aware of the full extent of the situation ... 1 assumed that this one 
would take place earlier this year [1994], (C. Moore, 1994). 
78 
deserve your vote, but at least 1 deserve to be told. If 1 do not deserve to be told, 1 
don't deserve to be lied to, and told it was not happening.' But they did. (Moore, 
interview, 1998) 
Even some Clark supporters felt incensed. Maharey, for example, referred to his two 
delegated colleagues' behaviour as 'unethical' . 
.. , 1 think probably Mike ... anybody in that position probably has reason to 
be .. .for feeling hurt about that. .. Instead of having some people come and say: 
'Now look, mate, time to go' , he was placed in a position of kind of hearing this 
second-hand, third-hand, through the media and so on. Which of course, I guess, 
made him defensive straight away, rather than being able to say to someone: 'OK, 
I'll thinILabout it.' or 'Yes, I'll go'. And, you know, those opportunities were 
almost not there. So, there was that vacuum 1 think which caused a problem at the 
beginning. (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
No matter how remote it could have been, any chance of an amicable and peaceful 
leadership transition was now lost. As one journalist put it, [w]hat might have been a 
surgical removal has turned into a bloody battle' (Laugesen, 1993e). The divisions 
between the two camps worsened severely. Hostility expressed by not only Moore but 
his supporters was clearly visible. For example, Annette King, a former Minister under 
the fourth Labour Governmene08 , recalls her reactions when she learned of the coup: 
[T]hey made a liar of me. 1 had campaigned that he [Moore] was the man that 
could be Prime Minister of New Zealand. 1 told voters that. 1 stood on the 
platform and said: 'This man should be the Prime Minister of New Zealand. 
Mike Moore will blah, blah.' And three weeks later, we had people in our caucus 
who had gone out saying: 'This man should be Leader' say: 'He is not good 
enough to be the Leader of the Opposition.' I felt it was a betrayal of the voters. I 
felt 1 had been made a liar, and 1 felt that I did not have enough reasons why we 
should change a leader a few weeks after an election. (King, interview, 1998) 
Moore's fight for survival 
Once the coup attempt was known, Moore promptly strengthened his resolve to fight off 
his deputy's challenge, despite knowing that he did not have the numbers to retain his 
position (Moore, interview, 1998109). 'There will be no resignation'. 'I won't give up 
without a fight' (Riddell, 1993f). Unlike Clark who jnitially declined to comment 
publicly on the leadership challenge and left the rallying to her supporters, Moore opted 
for an open, highly public fight. A press conference was hastily organised on 26 
November, where Moore, accompanied by his wife, Yvonne"o, initiated his counter-
attack against the coup. 
108 She was the Minister of Employment, Youth Affairs, Immigration as well as Minister assisting 
Prime Minister. 
109 Moore says that he realised his likely fate 'a week before' the caucus vote (Moore, interview, 
1998). 
110 Yvonne Moore, together with some of Moore's personal staff such as Clayton Cosgrove and Barry 
Ebert played a prominent role in Moore's fight to retain the leadership (Laugesen, 1993e). For Yvonne 
Moore's view on the coup against her husband, see Dekker and O'Leary (1993). 
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Moore's tactics were two-fold. Firstly, he attempted to present the challenge as a 
'classic, unfortunate misjudgment' caused by some MPs' negligence of what 'people' 
want. Thus, his advice was to 'get away from the intoxication and loneliness of 
Wellington' and consulftheir constituents (The Dominion, 27 November 1993, p.1). 
I just simply want the members of Parliament to visit clubs, go to the clubs, ask the 
people, and for new MPs to show some humility, not to launch new and glittering 
careers on the basis that we know best, and not to launch the new political system 
with the oldest trick' (The Dominion, 27 November 1993, p.1). 
This message, seemingly aimed at the new 1993 intake - many of them were reportedly 
either supporting Clark or wavering (The Dominion, 27 November 1993, p.1) - was 
synchronised by Moore's call to the public to express their support for him at their local 
Labour MPs' offices. His decision to directly appeal to the public over the heads of the 
caucus and the party hierarchy was both strategic and chosen out of necessity. As 
already noted, Moore fiad constantly enjoyed strong personal popularity, and his 
popular appeal was a distinct advantage over Clark who had been rated poorly in the 
polls. Also, no career minded politician can afford to be insensitive to the opinions 
expressed by their constituents Ill. The cost of doing so could be the loss of their seats 
at the next election. For a more practical reason, Moore had to go over the head of the 
party hierarchy because he simply did not have support there1l2 (this point is to be 
discussed more in detail in the next chapter). 
The second tactic Moore employed was to portray the challenge as an act of 
treachery against the selfless leader who had been working hard for Labour values. In 
order to mobilise his 'grass roots' popular support, he explained the whole event in 
simplistic, almost hero versus villain terms 113. Moore argued that he was not fighting 
for himself, he was defending the ideals of the Labour Party from disrespectful, 
untrustworthy individuals. 'Ideological issues and matters of great principle are 
involved. This is not merely a battle of personalities' (Herbert, 1993b). 'It is deep ... it 
is a battle about the philosophy and direction of the Labour Party' (Gardner, 1993). An 
extra effort was made to discredit the personal integrity of the coup organisers and to 
condemn the way they were conducting the challenge. 'It is the first time in the history 
of the Labour movement that people have been unable to look you in the eye and front.' 
'The quality I admire is courage, frankness. If people can't embrace that, what kind of 
111 Moore was reported to have spoken to newly elected members and their local party people to 
remind them that they owed him their electoral success (Armstrong, 1993c). 
112 A former National Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, used the same tactic when his leadership 
came under threat in 1980. At that time, like Moore in 1993, Muldoon was enjoying wider and more 
reliable support outside the caucus than inside it (Gustafson, 1997c). 
113 This point was well exemplified by a comment made by Yvonne Moore, who actively helped her 
husband's bid to retain the leadership. Talking about the people in the Clark camp, she said: 'If they 
were aUditioning for the role of Judas in Jesus Christ Superstar they would be sure to get it' (Drinnan, 
1993). 
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party is that?' 'I am angry that colleagues would not look me in the face. These are not 
the values of New Zealand' (Armstrong, 1993c). Moore stressed the 'non-
representative' character of the Clark supporters. He described them as a group that 
'represents nobody', a group which 'go out to dinner together and think the country is 
the people they drink with' (Drinnan, 1993). 
As a reference to the university-educated, liberal and middle-class backgrounds of 
many of the Clark supporters, the term 'Chardonnay socialists' was frequently used by 
Moore, which contrasted with his own, humble, working-class background. Combined 
with the claim that the coup organisers - including both MPs and party officials, Street 
and Party Secretary, Tony Timms - who were lobbying against Moore during the 
election campaign while he was working for the party, Moore effectively created the 
image of the leadership challenge as having being orchestrated in a cunning manner by 
cold-blooded plotters. 
If they had spent more time building up the Labour Party rather than lobbying and 
giving 'Chardonnay' parties then we might have been in government now. 
(Underhill, 1993: AI). 
Also repeatedly emphasised was the fact that his phone calls and fax messages to 
Clark asking her to contact him had not been returned. 'It's a great way to start - in 
hiding. This is not the way to launch a career which is supposed to end in Premier 
House [the Prime Minister's residence], (Armstrong, 1993c). He suggested that he still 
remained open to public reconciliation with the Clark camp. Such a reconciliation was 
to be followed by the caucus decision on the leadership (Frinnan, 1993) although it was 
highly questionable whether any reconciliation, satisfactory to both parties, was 
realistically achievable. 'Call me, ring me collect, my number has not changed' 114 
(Drinnan, 1993). 
Moore's strategy produced mixed results. On the one hand, it provoked a 
groundswell of sympathy for him from the general public. According to Yvonne 
Moore's estimate, between 30,000 and 40,000 people contacted him, plus there were 
3,000 or 4,000 telephone messages in support for the threatened leader (Dekker and 
O'Leary, 1993). A similar response was reaching the other Labour MPs across the 
country; many local electorate offices reported being flooded with calls overwhelmingly 
supporting Moore. For example, Jack Elder describes the levels of support which he 
canvassed for two leadership contenders around this time in the following terms. 
I had listened to my Electorate Committee. Like most MPs, my Electorate 
Committee was absolutely, rabidly, pro-Mike and anti-Helen. I had soundings 
through our membership, people contacting my office ... there were about three or 
114 In response to this call, Clark was reported to have said that she had spoken to Moore twice on 17 
and 18 November regarding the leadership challenge. Moore denied this, maintaining that their 
discussions only concerned the agenda for the next caucus meetings (Edwards, 1993g). 
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four different ways that people let me know what their opinion was, and the rough 
score I kept was something like 303 for Mike and 3 for Helen. And I'm quite 
serious. It was of that nature. Now I'm quite serious, it was of that nature, now, 
given the nature of the contest, you would expect it to be one-sided. But that 
wasn't one-sided. That was a whitewash in anyone's language. I had absolutely 
no doubt what the public reaction would bellS. (Elder, interview, 1998) 
Given this huge public backlash, the Moore camp claimed that a sufficient number of 
wavering MPs had switched sides to consolidate Moore's position in the caucus 
(Herbert, 1993c; Rentoul and Bums, 1993). In a radio interview on 26 November, asked 
whether he had the numbers in the caucus, Moore's reply was swift and straightforward: 
'I believe so, of course'. In fact, his confidence was such that he even promised to 
support another leader if the caucus chose to depose him (Manring Report, Radio New 
Zealand, 26 November 1993). To boost the leader's confidence further, three Maori 
MPs (peter Tapsell, Whetu Terikatene-Sullivan, Koro Wetere), Geoff Braybrooke, and a 
first term MP, Damien 0' Connor publicly declared their support for the leader. 
The Clark camp's counterattack 
On the other hand, Moore's strategy to mount personal attacks on the key Clark 
supporters while portraying himself as an innocent victim agitated some members I 16. 
Clark, coming out of a self-imposed silence on 27 Novemberll ?, condemned the 
leader's behaviour as evidence of his problems, because of which many caucus 
members were wanting him to be replaced (Edwards, 1993g). In fact, it was suggested 
(contrary to the Moore supporters' claim) by her camp that some wavering MPs were 
converted in favour of the challenger, due to Moore's manner of public and ugly 
counter-attackll8 . His readiness to defend his position even at the potential cost of 
severely damaging the party gave some substance to Clark's claim that under his 
leadership: 'I don't think the party has been coming first' (Edwards, 1993g). Dyson 
affirms: 
115 Also, see Mackenzie (1993a). 
116 Some members of the public picketed outside two of the prominent Clark supporters' house with 
placards linking the coup to their alleged sexuality. Moore distanced himself from those activities. In 
his autobiography, he mentioned the rude behaviour of some National Party supporters which he and 
his wife had to endure on the night of the 1975 election (at which he was defeated). Then he wrote: 'I 
was staggered by the depth of their hatred and determined then that if I got back I would never allow my 
supporters to be as ugly, rude or threatening' (Moore, 1993b: 50) 
117 From this day until the caucus vote on 1 December, the fight between Moore and Clark was a very 
public affair. Clark appeared on talkback radio, television news, current affairs programme and 
contacted reporters. Moore too continued his public campaign. The day before the caucus vote, he 
returned to a shoe factory at which he had been warmly received during his election campaign visit. 
(Munro, 1993b). 
118 A newly selected MP and Clark supporter, Janet Mackey, for example stated: 'All the people I 
have talked to have been level-headed. Really it is only Mike Moore who is playing the political 
game' (The Otago Daily Times, 1 December 1993, pA). 
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I don't think anyone anticipated the venom of Mike's response in the campaign 
that he ran. I think most of us were just astonished that someone who professed 
so much loyalty to the party could be so destructive. (Dyson, interview, 1998) 
Clark also rejected Moore's self-portrayal as 'the sole repository of Labour values', 
emphasising that although not known for showing her emotion publicly, she too cared 
about the plight of the disadvantaged (Herbert, 1993c). 
The Moore camp's determination to fight to the bitter end provoked an unusual 
reaction from the Party President, who was conventionally supposed to stand by the 
incumbent leaders. On 27 November, Street wrote a letter to Moore 1 19 , in which she 
advised him to-step down voluntarily for the sake of the party. In the letter, 
I paid tribute to him for the things he had achieved, and then I was brutally honest 
with him and told him that I didn't think he was the person to take us through into 
MMP ... (Street, interview, 1998) 
Street also clarified her position on the issue publicly through the media . 
... I made that clear in a radio interview at one point during the leadership struggle 
in November 93. I made that clear, and I said that: 'Look, I have to work with 
whomever the caucus elects. I don't have a vote in this. But, my view was that for 
the benefit of the party, Mike should not be the leader any more'. So in that 
sense, I was still acting within my remit as President of the party, doing what I 
thought was necessary to protect the party's interest. (Street, interview, 1998) 
On reflection, Street admits, 'it could be argued that lover-stepped my role as President, 
because a President has to live with, work with whomever - because of our rules-
whomever the caucus elects as the leader; the President has to work with them' . 
However, she, by this stage convinced of Clark's victory, felt that Moore's angry and 
desperate response was so detrimental to the party that she was left with no choice but 
resort to public disassociation from himI20 . 
... unlike his predecessors, he didn't stand down. David [Lange] stood down. 
Geoffrey [Palmer] stood down. Even though they were being strong-armed from 
behind, they stood down. They didn't... for the sake of the party, they didn't take 
it to a fight. Well, Mike did. He took it to a fight and damaged the party hugely 
in the process. He would argue that those of us who toppled him did the damage. 
But, when the writing was on the wall, and the caucus numbers are not going your 
119 Street also sent a copy of the letter to Clark. An angry Moore responded to the letter by 
threatening to release it to the media unless she agreed to do so herself. The then President refused to 
succumb to the threat, believing that the letter was good and that its public release would only reflect 
badly on the leader. Moore never did carry out this threat. (Street, interview, 1998) 
120 So, why did Moore decide to continue fighting, if he knew that he did not have sufficient support to 
retain his position? Moore's reply to this question is: 'Of course colleagues would have wanted me to 
stand down without a fight, they had fought by "talking abuse around the Gallery" and denigrating me. 
lt's the old story, one side wants to fight and then hopes the other side doesn't fight back. I fought 
because that is my nature. I know nothing else other than fighting, which is, I know, a weakness'. 'I 
did fight to the last minute. 1 fought possibly in an inadequate way, but if it was good enough for 
them to go on TV explaining my appalling weaknesses, which were apparent to everyone, surely 1 
should have defended myself.' (Moore, 1998) 
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way, what is the point in fighting to the death? What do you gain for the party? 
And clearly, in fact, he gained nothing for the party. (Street, interview, 1998) 
Another consequence of Moore's public fight-back was that it compelled some Clark 
supporters to publicly jUstify the necessity of the leadership change. This was done on 
several accounts. Firstly, it was emphasised that a leadership challenge was a legitimate 
right of the Labour Party. Therefore, labelling it as some form of treacherous act simply 
ignored this fact. As Clark put it: 
I do not intend either to engage in a slanging match with Mr Moore. I call on him 
to respect the constitutional right of the Labour caucus to determine who should 
lead it. tRentoul, 1993a) 
Secondly, problems with Moore's leadership were elaborated on by the Clark 
supporters. Probably the most stinging criticism of Moore in this regard came from 
Lange. In his letter sent to eight caucus members, he indicated that the leader lacked 
both the temperament and judgement required by the job. He went on to say: 
He campaigned as if the party were his property. His egocentric manner 
alienated many quite needlessly. He now denigrates the very people whom he is 
supposed to lead. Mike's response to a likely challenge suggests he would rather 
see the party wrecked than allowing [sic] members of the caucus to determine the 
leadership. (Rentoul, 1993a) 
Thirdly, Moore's failure to distinguish Labour's policy position clearly as an 
alternative to National in the election was again pointed out. Examples of the leader 
deliberately having tried to 'fudge' certain critical issues such as the industrial relations 
policy were provided by both Clark (Rentoul, 1993b) and the CTU (Herbert, 1993d). 
The former stated: 
The argument is really about social democracy versus conservatism. I have a very 
clear commitment to equality of opportunity, and I believe that poverty - straight, 
old-fashioned povertl- is something we were not able to campaign on effectively 
during the election12 . (Underhill, 1993: A1)122 
121 Several years later, Moore angrily denies that some of his policy views were induced by the fear of 
upsetting business - a view held by some Clark supporters. Moore was particularly incensed by 
Clark's claim regarding poverty. 'To say you don't care ... about poverty is a bit rich coming from 
middle class people who have never been poor themselves. I KNOW about bloody poverty (see 
Chapter 1). They don't. It's not for me a technical theory, you know.' 'When they said [they] are 
tackling poverty, what did they mean by that? Their answer to poverty is to increase taxes and increase 
benefits. Yes, I didn't say we would increase benefits back to the pre-level. No, I would not say that'. 
(Moore, interview, 1998) 
122 As seen, Moore also indicated that the leadership challenge was not about personalities but the 
policy direction of the party. He asserted: 'There are strong ideological positions between myself and 
Helen Clark' (Edwards, 1993e). However, unlike Clark, Moore did not clarify their ideological 
differences. 
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The CTU, with no voting power within the caucus123 , changed its initial stance of 
'staying out of the leadership struggle' (Edwards, 1993g) to side with Clark. Its 
president, Ken Douglas, reportedly advised Moore over the telephone to resign 
voluntarily (Herbert, 1993d). 
It was also along this line that Clark's challenge against the incumbent, who had 
increased the number of Labour seats by an impressive 16 and its votes by 25,878, and 
nearly won the election was rationalised. Not surprisingly, the Clark camp's emphasis 
was not on the number of the seats the party had gained, but on the percentage of the 
vote it had received at the election. In comparison to the 1990 election result, the party 
actually lost its share of the poll (from 35.1 % to 34.7%). Since it was the percentage of 
the overall vote that would determine each political party's share of seats under MMP, 
this trend was alarming. Clark said on the radio: 'The plain, brutal fact is that Labour 
lost the election and it lost the election with a smaller proportion of the vote than the time 
before' (Orsman, 1993b). The cause of the problem was, in Clark's supporters' view, 
indistinguishable differences between Labour and National policies, that in tum gave the 
Alliance a serious electoral advantage. The key to solving this problem was policy 
differentiation from National, and the Clark supporters saw it as impossible without 
displacing Moore. 
The deputy leadership candidates 
Around this time, candidates for the deputy leadership started to emerge. A former 
Finance Minister in the fourth Labour Government, David Caygill made himself 
available as a candidate for the No.2 position providing Clark won the top job. While 
himself refusing to comment publicly on his position, he made his support for the 
challenger unequivocal to fellow Clark supporters. 
Another candidate for the deputy leadership was a Moore supporter, Michael 
Cullen 1 24. Generally regarded as more left leaning than Caygill, he had ideological 
appeal to some Clark supporters. In fact, according to Dyson, this entailed 'a lot of very 
serious debate' within the group125 (Dyson, interview, 1998). While some felt quite 
comfortable with Caygill as Clark's leadership partner126 , the choice was not easy for 
others. As Dyson puts it; 
123 Nevertheless, trade unions still have strong ties with the Labour Party. For example, the Service 
Workers' Union had four former officials as MPs between 1993 and 1996. See Young (1993). 
124 Also Steve Maharey's name was entertained by some Clark supporters. But without his own 
interest, his name was not given serious considerations (Maharey, interview, 1998). 
125 Another Clark supporter who endorsed Cullen as a candidate for the Deputy Leadership, was David 
Lange. In his letter to eight MPs, he named the finance spokesperson as Clark's ideal running mate, 
who could bridge the two Clark camps and 'save the party from bleeding' (Morning Report, Radio New 
Zealand, 30 November 1993) 
126 For example, Northey describes Caygill as a 'very good thinker and a person of integrity' (Northey, 
interview, 1998). Maharey explains his decision to support him as: 'David was clear, you know, that 
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It was a very hard choice because I think all of us really like Michael. .. Michael's 
been part of our group, you know. He's always seen as being on the left of the 
party. He always stood up to Richard Prebble and Roger Douglas. He's really 
admired by the left in the caucus ... But I couldn't support Michael, because he 
didn't support Helen. And I said that the deputy has to support the leader. That 
is the first criteria, so I couldn't vote for Michael. But that was really horrible, 
even though I like Caygill. I would have liked Michael as the deputy leader, but I 
voted for Caygill. (Dyson, interview, 1998) 
Cullen himself knew that supporting Moore was costing his chance of winning the 
second place. 
I mean, basically, if I had promised to vote for Helen, I would have been the 
deputy leader. I was told that before the vote. 'Why aren't you voting for Helen? 
Because if you did, I would vote for you.' I was trying to explain that was a 
matter of both honour and judgement... (Cullen, interview, 1998) 
In the end, both Clark-and Moore supporters decided not to have any 'tickets' arranged, 
and let individuals vote whichever candidate they felt suitable, which allowed 'cross-
voting' (Dyson, interview, 1998). 
Final days and the trauma of the infighting 
In the meantime, the animosity between the two camps continued to intensify in the final 
days. The level of mistrust between them was so high that' [p ]eople started to feel 
whatever was said, something else was meant'. 'People were talking, groaning, and 
mumbling, it built up the hurt. Then when it actually happened in the way it did, it 
reinforced all those beliefs that this has been a long-running awful thing' (Maharey, 
interview, 1998). Being forced to choose a side cost some personal friendships in the 
process . 
... perhaps ideologically [those] I was closest to were the people I voted against. 
And some of the people that I was voting with were people I wasn't so very 
ideologically close to. I had to choose between friends. Both Mike and Helen 
were friends of mine. Neither has ever been a personal enemy, Helen, particularly 
- never been a personal enemy of mine in the caucus. We had always been quite 
close in terms of our attitudes, in our reactions to events as they unfolded in the 
1980s and early 1990s. So, that was a terribly difficult time to have to make that 
choice, to go through a change which I thought was extraordinarily badly timed. 
(Cullen, interview, 1998) 
Even for a newcomer, the experience was traumatic. Referring to those days as an 
'extremely difficult time', Rick Barker likens his experience to a tragic accident: 
his role was to support her. So, he was a very convincing option, and I like him enormously. He has 
huge ability. So, I felt entirely comfortable he was the right sort of Deputy ... ' (Maharey, interview, 
1998). 
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.. .it's almost impossible to describe to people accurately what goes on and 
emotions and so on. I mean you can be told about things, but it's like being in a 
tenible train accident, and then describing it to your friends what the events were 
like. Yes, they could have some appreciation of it, but they will never ever see it, 
like the victim wo,-!ld. (Barker, interview, 1998) 
The growing pressure and tension in the final days before the third caucus meeting 
started taking its toll, too. Some Clark supporters started to reconsider their decisions. 
Street remembers one telephone conference, 
where [an MP] said: 'Folks, I have to say I can't go through with this. This is too 
hard. I can't do it.' And we said: 'Get off the line then ****. Get off the line. 
Hang up:' We waited till we heard the little beep that told us that he had finished -
he'd hung up. (Street, interview, 1998) 
Maharey believes that the pressure to bear was greater for those who had been 
Parliamentary colleagues of Moore than for the newcomers. He describes the 
horrendous final days In the following terms. 
There were some people who had been in the party for longer than them 
(newcomers), who were the waverers. People who had been inside the 
Parliamentary wing, who were grumbling, moaning and groaning, and who backed 
off during that process. Because it was a hard process, you needed a fair amount 
of intestinal fortitude to make it through those five days. People who are outside 
of politics often wonder... 'What do you mean it [being a politician] is stressful?' 
Well, it was. A lot of people became ill during those five days, you know, literally 
- sick. Had to go to doctor, get stuff done to them, and so on, because the stress 
was huge. And those people came to caucus ... I had a person in my room just 
prior to the caucus, sobbing - a man. (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
Indeed, the level of stress was such that some MPs succumbed to the pressure from the 
Moore camp. 
The stress just got to them, an hour before the caucus, and they spent an hour 
before the caucus largely crying on -literally - on people's shoulders around the 
building including mine, and then later they changed their minds. The stress was 
huge. (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
Moore's choice 
Although many predicted before the 1 December caucus meeting that the challenger had 
secured enough support to topple the incumbent (eg, Munro, 1993b; Herbert, 1993d), 
Moore's fate was far from sealed. The caucus rules allow any of its members to put 
down a motion in relation to the caucus rules (including the leadership selection) if a 
notice of that intention is given in advance of at least one week. Then whether that 
motion (in this case whether there should be a leadership contest) is carried or not is 
determined by a vote at a following caucus meeting (Hunt, 1998). If the motion is 
carried, then there will be another vote, this time on who should be the (new) leader. 
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The Senior Whip, Jonathan Hunt, who flew back from his shortened trip to Australia 
on hearing the coup, quickly realised that not enough caucus members were keen to 
carry the first motion. The majority of the caucus members were still wary of the 
negative impact on the party of having a leadership change so soon after an election 
which Labour nearly won. As Hunt puts it, 'I thought there was by no means a majority 
for having a ballot at that moment. It could come up six months down the track, it could 
come up a year down the track, could come up three months down the track, but it 
didn't' (Hunt, interview, 1998). 
What he also realised was that in case the motion was carried, Moore would most 
certainly lose the leadership in the second vote. Hunt duly offered the leader his 
analysis. 'I advised Mike Moore beforehand that there were going to be two questions. 
And I told him the outcome of the second question wasn't necessarily [connected to]the 
outcome of the first question'. Being confident about his estimate, Hunt actually recited 
his advice three times fo Moore including one five minutes before the third caucus 
meeting. Then ' ... I said to him: "If you have a ballot on whether or not there should 
be a leadership challenge in a week's time, then you will win that motion". But I said: 
"If that motion comes up and is decided immediately, then you have a chance of 
losing'" (Hunt, interview, 1998). 
The vote 
On 1 December, the crucial caucus meeting went ahead as scheduled at 10:00 am. At 
the meeting, Lange, who earlier escorted Clark into the caucus room, moved a motion on 
the leadership. Before Hunt, the chairperson of the meeting, distributed papers with the 
words, 'Yes' and 'No' on them to the caucus members, something unexpected 
happened. Against Hunt's repeated advice, Moore seconded Lange's motion. Hunt 
recalls: 'I was just absolutely flabbergasted'. And because it was the leader himself 
who seconded the motion, 'there was no objection to holding a ballot there right at that 
moment' (Hunt interview, 1998). Hunt then invited anyone interested in the leadership 
to stand up. Moore and Clark did so. Then the caucus members were handed over 
papers with the two candidates' names printed on them127 to cast their votes. 
Why did Moore ignore Hunt's advice and risked ending his leadership, when the 
challenge could have been avoided? Moore provides two reasons. Firstly, he could not 
place faith in the judgement of Hunt, who was well known as a close personal friend of 
Clark128 • 
Jonathan ... see Jonathan was Chief Whip. His job is to advise the leader. He 
never advised me that there was, and I asked him, whether there was a challenge on 
127 This may suggest that Hunt was not totally unprepared for Moore's decision to ignore his advice. 
128 See, Ralston (1994), especially page 64. 
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until the last week, because he's a Clark supporter129 • He's saying that to you to 
pretend that he was an impartial Senior Whip doing his job. But he was ... his job 
as Senior Whip was to tell you what was happenin~ in the party. And he 
disappeared overseas so that he couldn't be found1 0. He did say something like 
that. But he didn't say ... no, he didn't. He's sat there feeling sorry for himself: 
'Qh, I don't know what to do.' (Moore, interview, 1998) 
Secondly, Moore contends that he wanted to put an end to the brutal, full-scale 
infighting within the caucus. 
I moved it because I knew she had the numbers. I wanted it to be over. I think it 
was in the interest of the Labour Party if we settled it. We were bleeding in the 
publiG mind, you know. It looked terrible for all of us. And I wanted to do the 
right thing for the party, even then. (Moore, interview, 1998) 
Hunt provides another possible explanation. In his view, Moore miscalculated his 
chance of winning the second ballot, assuming that enough of the 1993 intake would 
support him out of a Stmse of gratitude for winning them seats (Hunt, interview, 1998). 
Whatever Moore's reasons were, the vote was cast. The result was decisive: Clark-
26 and Moore-19. At the age of 43, Clark became the first female to lead a major 
political party in New Zealand political history. The deputy leader's position was 
fought between Caygill and Michael Cullen, as predicted. The result for this position 
was much closer; only two votes separated the contenders: Caygill-23 and Cullen-21131. 
Considering the depth of the animosity both inside and outside the caucus, the task lying 
ahead of the new leadership team - healing the division and uniting the party once again 
- seemed formidable. King's following comments on the state of the caucus after the 
leadership change well illustrate the seriousness of the divisions between the two camps, 
which Clark (and Caygill) now had to amend. 
I mean, people were really bruised in that leadership change. There was ... it was 
even difficult to talk about it. It was really like a death process, if you like. There 
was, you know, the anger: 'Why are they doing this?' 'Why did they do this?' 
and then the sort of sorrow of it. I mean, I was incredibly moved by it. I mean, I 
was very upset by the whole experience. You know, from being really angry about 
it, to being very, very depressed about what happened. And I think probably a lot 
of people felt like I did ... (King, interview, 1998) 
129 Hunt disputes the claim that he was not impartial in his job as Senior Whip. He argues that' [t]he 
job of Senior Whip is tell the leader whenever anything is happening so that the leader does not in any 
way get surprised' and that he never failed to do so. Hunt adds that as Clark respected his position and 
obligation, she did not consult him on the leadership until she rang him while he was in Australia. 
Hunt immediately contacted Moore about what he was just informed (Hunt, interview, 1998). 
130 According to the former Senior Whip, he was in Sydney for three days in order to attend a long 
standing personal engagement. It was during this visit - not prior to it - when he first heard of Clark's 
challenge. (Hunt, interview, 1998) 
131 The discrepancy between the total votes for the leadership (45) and deputy leadership (44) was 
caused by the absence of Judy Keall. She was reportedly too shocked at Moore's loss to participate in 
the following ballot for the No.2 role. (Hunt, interview, 1998) 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has covered the events and background of the 1993 leadership change. 
With this background information, the next two chapters attempt to analyse the cause of 
Moore's leadership derriise. Special emphasis is placed upon whether such an attempt 
can be successful within the proposed framework. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Moore leadership: expectations and concerns 
Introduction 
Having learned the overall history of the development of the discontent with Moore's 
leadership, the next task is to address two key questions for this study, which are: 
a) Why and how did the Moore leadership collapse?; and 
b) Can the collapse be explained within the framework suggested in Chapter 2? 
It has been proposed in Chapter 2 that in order to secure the leadership, a new leader 
has to: 1) retain loyalists' support; 1) consolidate uncommitted supporters' support by 
removing their doubts about himlher; and 3) convert the opponents' opposition to 
support. 
Although ideally a leader will strive to achieve all these three tasks, it is highly 
unlikely. In reality, s/he is more likely to achieve only a few tasks, and will be forced to 
concentrate on some at the expense of others. The vulnerability of the leadership is 
dependent on factors such as: A) the composition and relative strength of support; B) 
each group's expectations and concerns of the leader; and C) the leader's ability to meet 
those expectations and deal with their concerns. 
Analysis of Moore's leadership demise is conducted over two chapters. This chapter 
- the first part of the analysis - is divided into three sections. The first section sets the 
scene by identifying four factors surrounding his leadership in 1990, all crucial to the 
propositions of this study. They are: a) Moore's original support composition; b) his 
supporters' expectations; c) his opponents' concerns; and finally d) Moore's strategic 
decisions. The second section examines how he attempted to meet the expectations, 
while the last section analyses how he handled the concerns. The latter two sections also 
evaluate how (un)successful his attempts were in each regard, and how his perfonnance 
impacted on his support base. 
Section A 
a) Moore's initial support composition 
Moore's appointment in 1990 
A crucial factor in analysing Moore's leadership durability is the fact that the real 
strength of his support was never fully tested until the 1993 leadership vote. When the 
leadership position was vacated by David Lange in August 1989, Moore and Geoffrey 
Palmer contested for the position. The result was a comprehensive victory for Palmer. 
Margaret Austin, the then Chief Whip who counted the votes, recollects the result: 
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... there was no question at all that Mike Moore did not have support in Caucus, 
and the vote reflected that. Now, I am not going to tell you what the vote was 
because as Whip I was the only person who actually counted the vote. But I can 
tell you quite bluntly that the vote for Geoffrey Palmer was overwhelming. 
(Austin, interview, 1997) 
When Palmer resigned from the leadership in September 1990, his decision was 
primarily influenced by the views expressed by the Cabinet Ministers at the Cabinet 
meeting on 3 September 1990. The numbers of Cabinet Ministers supporting Palmer 
and Moore were, according to Austin (who was by then a Cabinet Minister), seven and 
thirteen, respectively (Austin, interview, 1997). Prior to Palmer's resignation, one 
political obserVer estimated Moore's chance of becoming the leader in the following 
words132: 'Moore now lacks a political base either in the caucus, where at best he could 
command a dozen votes, or the party at large' (James, 1990: 84). Asked whether 
Moore's ultimate success in 1990 reflected increased confidence in Moore's leadership 
ability within the PLP; Austin's reply is dismissive: 
No, I don't think that's true at all. There were other factors which led to the 
changes. And they were that members of Cabinet started to get total jitters about 
the outcome of the 1990 election, and everything that went on during 1990 was 
coloured by the increasing realisation that the 1990 election result was going to be 
demolition of the Labour Government. Politicians are pretty ego-centred - Cabinet 
Ministers even more - and by the time you got to mid 1990, the writing was on the 
wall that the Government was on its way out. And that had a significant effect on 
people's confidence levels, and they would clutch at any straw at all which might 
change their fortunes. So, that puts a different complexion on it all together. 
(Austin, interview, 1997) 
In other words, the 1990 leadership change was induced by a majority of the Cabinet 
Ministers' (and some backbenchers' who assisted Moore's campaign to undermine 
Palmer) 'panic-driven self-interest' to preserve their seats (EunsonJ33 , 1990). Their 
reason for supporting Moore revolved around his great popularity with the public. No 
other factors came into consideration. To illustrate this point, when asked whether 
Moore was considered superior to Palmer as a leader in any other area at the time, Phil 
Goff, one of the former Moore-backing Cabinet Ministers, replies: 
No. I had a lot of respect for Geoffrey Palmer as an individual and as a 
Parliamentarian. But we had reached the point by mid 1990, if not before, where it 
was clear that while Geoffrey had considerable skills in the area of practical 
application as a Minister, he did not have the popular appeal that was likely to 
prevent a landslide victory for the National Party in that year. I wasn't totally 
convinced at the time that whoever we had up as leader was going to prevent such 
an electoral outcome, but I thought there was a greater chance under the leadership 
of Mike Moore that we would recover more ground than what was likely to occur 
with Geoffrey. Mike had a popular appeal, particularly to a section of the 
132 He predicted that Moore would challenge Palmer after the election. (James, 1990: 84) 
133 Eunson was a former Parliamentary journalist, and served Palmer as a communications consultant 
for seven weeks until Palmer resigned. 
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electorate that was maybe termed 'traditional Labour' that had become somewhat 
alienated from the Labour Government, and there was some possibility that he 
could win that support back. And I think the change in leadership was 
predominantly around that factor, it was comparing the political skills of the two 
leaders. And Mike's political skills were certainly more pronounced in his ability 
to communicate arid to potentially win back the support that Labour had been 
losing. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
What becomes clear from these pictures is that there was little positive support for 
Moore134 , based upon his overall leadership ability. This was highlighted by the 
number of votes not cast for him in the 1990 leadership contest, that was fought between 
Moore and a backbencher, Richard Northey. Northey, in the event, attracted between 11 
(19.30% of the whole caucus) and 19 (33.33%) votes (Northey, 1998a). In addition, 
there were some informal votes 135. 
These figures are rather astonishing. It is important to remember the circumstances 
under which the 1990 leadership vote took place. When the incumbent Prime Minister, 
Geoffrey Palmer, succumbed to the pressure to resign, he was still commanding the 
majority support within the caucus at large. As Northey was never considered (even by 
himself) a serious contender, the leadership ballot was more or less a vote of confidence 
in Moore. This point was also emphasised by Northey's reason for standing. He 
explained why he 'had to' make himself available for the race as follows: 
I thought I had no chance at all of winning the leadership vote. I stood not to win 
but give people a positive alternative to voting for Mike Moore for those people in 
the caucus: 
(a) who wanted to protest at there being a leadership change at that time; 
(b) who wanted to protest at Mike Moore's undermining tactics against Geoffrey 
Palmer, his temperament, or deficiencies in his leadership ability. 
(c) who wanted to support someone other than Mike Moore 136 • (Northey, 1998a) 
Since the General Election was only seven weeks away, presenting a united front 
behind the new leader was crucial for the party's electoral fortune, although the vote 
result was not to be released publicly. Even amongst those who supported Moore in the 
leadership change there were doubts about his overall leadership ability, apart from his 
undeniable electoral appeal. Some of the Moore supporting Cabinet Ministers were said 
to be 'half-hearted about it [leadership change], but nonetheless leaned that way because 
they believed he would be the "circuit breaker" Labour needed' (Eunson, 1990) for the 
coming election. 
134 On the other hand, that a number of the Cabinet and caucus members decided to adhere to Palmer 
even though they were thought to benefit from the leadership change indicates the presence of positive 
support for him. 
l35 Keith Eunson asserted that Northey received 11 votes and there were 5 informals (Eunson, 1990). 
136 Northey says that he would not have stood if any of the following had stood: Palmer, Cay gill, 
Clark, Cullen, King, Goff, Marshall, Lange, Matthewson and Rodger (in rough order of his preference). 
He adds that in their absence, he thought that he would have made a better leader than Moore. 
(Northey, 1998a) 
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Almost exclusive concentration on Moore's vote winning power as the support 
criterion suggests a vulnerability in his leadership. Support based upon a leader's one 
particular skill to tackle a specific task (i.e., winning an election or minimising the 
magnitude of the loss) alone did not show the supporters' substantive confidence in the 
leader. Moreover, whether such support could be sustained beyond that task is highly 
questionable. 
Moore's leadership extended across three different periods of caucus, namely: 1987-
1990 (during which he was elected as the leader); 1990-1993 (during which he served as 
the leader); and 1993-1996 (which saw him dismissed as the leader). The longest 
period of his leadership was spent with the middle group, and it is this 1990-1993 
caucus where the core of the anti-Moore force, which played a prominent role as the 
catalyst for Moore's 1993 demise, was formed. After the 1993 election, the second 
caucus group returned almost intact - with the exceptions of Bruce Gregory, Richard 
Prebble, Chris Laidlaw, and Sonja Davies137 • To comprehend Moore's leadership 
demise, it is crucial to examine his support composition in the second caucus (1990-
1993) shortly after the 1990 election. 
The distribution of the 29 MPs including seven new members appeared to be as 
follows 138 : 
Loyalists: Braybrooke, Elder, Moore, Robertson 
Uncommitted supporters: Austin, Blincoe, Clark, Cullen, Dalziel, Dunne, Gregory, 
Hawkins, Hodgson, Hunt, Maharey, Matthewson, Prebble, 
Sutherland, Swain, Tapsell, Tennet, Tirikatene-Sullivan, Tizard, 
Wetere, Wilde 
Opponents Caygill, Kelly, Lange, Davies 
The 1990 election loss did not immediately have any significant effect on Moore's 
overall support composition. If anything, it may have worked in his favour. Although a 
few loyal Moore supporters or enthusiastic Moore promoters in the 1990 leadership 
change such as Bill Jeffries (former Minister of Justice) and Peter Neilson (former 
Minister of Revenue) were defeated, more Moore opponents like Northey, Palmer, 
Philip Woollaston (former Minister of Conservation), Jenny Kirk, Russell Marshall 
(former Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Peter Simpson either retired or lost their seats. 
The new 1990 intake, which played a pivotal role in ousting Moore three years later, 
137 Bruce Gregory, Richard Prebble, and Chris Laidlaw lost their seats to Tau Henare (NZF), Sandra 
Lee (Alliance), and Pauline Gardiner (National), respectively. Davies retired and was succeeded by 
Trevor Mallard. 
138 It is important to emphasise again that support compositions which appear in this study need to be 
treated with caution as they may not be entirely accurate. 
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possessed little knowledge about him at this stage, and were willing to support his 
leadership in the meantime. 
Expectations and concerns 
This study has suggested that successful leaders must effectively respond both to the 
expectations of caucus members (by satisfying them) and their concerns (by mitigating 
them). Failure at either task inevitably contributes to leadership vulnerability. 
As will be discused shortly, the third caucus group, (1993-1996), especially the 1993 
new intake, was important in the sense that it tipped the balance in Clark's favour. Yet, 
as the leadershlp change took place within two months of the 1993 General Election 
defeat, Moore was not given much time to respond to this group's expectations and -
more crucially - concerns. During this short period, only two caucus meetings were 
held. One could not possibly conclude that Moore had failed to meet their expectations 
or form strong enough-concerns to believe that he should be replaced from such brief 
formal encounters. Thus the real questions are: whether the concerns of the 1993 intake 
were the same as those held by the 1990-1993 group; and how did the 1993 intake form 
those concerns? Before these questions are addressed in the next chapter, this section 
examines the expectations and concerns held by the first two caucus groups and how 
Moore responded to them. 
b. Supporters' expectations 
Elective: Winning the 1990 election/minimising the magnitude of the election defeat 
As already noted, upon his selection, the primary expectations of Moore were elective: if 
not to win the 1990 election, at least to minimise the impact of defeat by saving still 
salvageable seats. In deciding to support him, the Moore proponents did not give any 
consideration to his suitability (or lack thereof) for the party's obvious task after 
Labour's likely election loss: re-building the party. Goff remembers his position in 
1990 and says: 
I had known Mike for a long time, I'd known Mike Moore since 1969. And I 
thought that he had considerable skills generally, but the predominant factor that 
we were looking at was in terms of the election campaign in that year rather than 
beyond 1990 ... I don't think huge consideration was given to the re-building 
phase at that point. .. It was the immediate rather than longer term that we're 
looking at. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
Expectations within the new caucus 
Once the election was over, a new set of expectations was formed. Those expectations 
were three-fold, in line with Jackson's (and to a lesser extent, Stark's) leadership 
(de)selection criteria (Chapter 2), ie., a) unity, b) policy, and c) elective. They were: 
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A. Unity expectation: restore trust of the Extra-Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP) 
B. Policy expectation: re-establish Labour's identity as a centre-left party 
C. Elective expectation: lead the party to victory at the 1993 election 
As the leader of a major opposition party, Moore's ultimate responsibility (and the 
caucus' natural expectation of him) was to ensure a victory for the party at the next 
election in three years. Nevertheless, having being so convincingly rejected by the voters 
at the 1990 election, the possibility of achieving that goal seemed rather remote. 
Given this grim prospect, first and foremost, Moore was expected to lead a process 
of re-construction of the party's credibility so that it could hopefully be considered as 
an alternative government again in the future. This task primarily involved restoration of 
party unity and re-establishment (or re-claiming) of the party's identity. 
Over the previous six years, the working relationship between the PLP and the EPLP 
had seriously eroded13-9. As the supplier of candidates and other necessary support -
both financial and personnel - at an election time, regaining the EPLP' s trust and co-
operation was crucial for the PLP's future. In order to accomplish this, the PLP had to 
demonstrate that it had learnt a lesson from past mistakes. The ambitious and radical 
economic reform programs implemented under the fourth Labour Government (Boston 
and Holland, 1987; Holland and Boston, 1990) isolated many Labour supporters both 
for their contents and the lack of consultation in their making (Dyson, 1991). Indeed, 
Labour's massive election defeat was widely interpreted as the voters' rejection of those 
right-wing economic policies (Vowles and Aimer, 1993: 76). Therefore, if the PLP 
hoped to convince its lost supporters and dismayed remaining party members that it 
deserved another chance at governance, separation from its past, and presentation of a 
fresh set of policies, was considered essential. Those new policies needed not only to 
reflect the views of the EPLP, but also to ensure the EPLP was involved in their 
making140. 
The caucus members almost universally supported such a strategy which was 
understood to entail policy review. The real question was to what extent the 'new' 
Labour policies should move away from those of the 1984-1990 period. The rift Moore 
needed to amend existed not only between the PLP and EPLP, but also within the PLP. 
Some former Cabinet Ministers such as Margaret Austin, Richard Prebble, David 
139 A former President (1884-1987), Margaret Wilson's account (1989) provides an insider's view on 
the strained relationship between the two bodies. 
140 Frustrated with the lack of consultation by the PLP in the policy making process, the EPLP had 
set up ten Policy Committees after the 1988 Party Conference. The aim of this exercise was to ensure: 
1) the Government policies to remain in line with to the Party Manifesto; and 2) sufficient consultation 
take place if the Government policies needed to depart from the Manifesto. The effectiveness of this 
invention turned out to be, however, limited. See, Debnam (1992). 
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Caygill, Clive Matthewson, and Peter Dunne had reservations about the total disowning 
of the policies of the previous six years141. 
At the same time, a number of the surviving caucus members were less enthusiastic 
about the merits of the reforms. In addition, the majority of the new 1990 intake were 
clearly identified as left and were critical of the fourth Labour Government's 
achievements. Not surprisingly, these groups were eager to see the party distance itself 
from this period and re-establish itself as a centre-left party. For example, Judith Tizard 
lists 'to some extent reclaiming what I understood the Labour Party to be' as her reason 
for standing for Parliament (Tizard, interview, 1998). Her fellow new MP, Steve 
Maharey, alsosays that he entered national politics as a reaction to what the Government 
did. 
When I watched Roger Douglas I thought he wrecked this party and Trevor [de 
Clean142] helped him and I came into politics, really, for that idealistic notion that I 
want to be part of a new kind of social democracy (Maharey, interview, 1998). 
Another 1990 intake, Lianne Dalziel echoed Maharey' s view in her interview in 1991: 
'Labour would have to change, that it would change and it would be good to be part of 
that' (Hubbard, 1991: 26). 
To formulate policies that would satisfy all the MPs without alienating anyone was 
by no means a small task. Indeed, a political reporter described Moore's task as 
'daunting', adding that his leadership would ultimately depend on his success or failure 
in accomplishing it: 
Mr Moore did not have long enough in his two months last year to show 
whether as Prime Minister he could lead Labour and run the country. But he did 
show he was unable to tum around Labour's unpopularity and so win the election. 
He now has to show he has the capacity to lead Labour in Opposition. If he does 
then he will lead Labour into the 1993 election; if he does not then leadership 
challenges against him will emerge. (Riddell, 1991) 
c. Concerns 
Even prior to the 1990 leadership change, there were strong concerns about Moore's 
leadership ability within the caucus. Together with his strengths, his weaknesses were 
commonly known to the Labour MPs. Those concerns were most explicitly expressed 
by Northey's candidacy for the 1990 leadership contest. He explains why he judged 
Moore as being unsuitable as the leader of the Labour Party at the time. 
141 A number of proponents of Rogernomics had either retired (eg., Roger Douglas, Trevor de Cleene, 
and Michael Bassett) or were defeated (eg., Phil Goff, Peter Neilson, David Butcher, Bill Sutton, Ralph 
Maxwell, and Ken Shirley) at the 1990 election. 
142 Trevor de Cleen was former Minister of Revenue and MP for Palmerston North. Maharey 
succeeded his seat on his retirement. 
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I did not then, nor subsequently in 1993 or 1996 believe that Mike Moore had the 
temperament in particular, and skills and beliefs to some extent, to be the Leader of 
the Labour Party or Prime Minister. 
His behaviour in public and even more so in private was sometimes erratic, 
irrational, sometimes lacking in any apparent basis in principle, concerned with 
television image of an action or policy rather than any real principle benefits it 
would have for people. Although unquestionably personally popular with the 
public, he was at severe risk of taking actions, making colourful comments, or 
making decisions on policy, or personalities that would be harmful for the 
country; for the Party; for the pursuit of good Labour policies or principles; or 
even for Labour's electoral support in the long term. (Northey, 1998a) 
Like the expectations, the concerns about the Moore leadership, shared by a number 
of caucus members, fell into (two of) the general leadership (de)selection criteria 
suggested by Jackson. They were: 
Unity concern: 
Policy concern: 
-his tendency to dominate - an obstacle to run a unified caucus 
his erratic behaviour - hindrance to formulating and presenting 
agreed policy 
In relation to the first concern, his open and long held ambition for the leadership143 
and his involvement in attempts to undermine two respected incumbent leaders (Row ling 
and Palmer) also gave him a reputation as a 'Machiavellian'144 (Beach, 1990). Such a 
perception did not help a new party leader who needed to command trust among his 
followers and run a unified caucus. After all, if one is not prepared to provide others 
with loyalty, how can slhe ask for it from others? Can slhe persuade herlhis followers to 
unite under hislher leadership? 
Moore was well aware of how he was perceived by his colleagues in this regard 
(Moore, 1993b: 26). The self-professed self-promoter (Hubbard, 1989) emphasised the 
value of loyalty (Campbell, 1988: 19) and honesty (Hubbard, 1989); he insisted that his 
conduct stayed within the rules: 'There are things you won't do' (Beach, 1990). 
According to Moore, his involvement in ousting a former Labour Leader, Bill Rowling 
was the right thing to do for the party despite his personal reluctance. 'The hardest 
thing to do in politics is shooting the wounded. Nobody particularly likes putting the 
family pet down' (Hubbard, 1989). Regarding Palmer's demise, he maintained that he 
played no part in it. Furthermore, he stated that he had said 'go away' to his colleagues 
who encouraged him to challenge Palmer (McMillan, 1993: 35). When he eventually 
143 For example, in 1985, asked whether he saw himself as a future leader of the Labour Party, he 
replied: 'Sometimes. Sometimes I'm glad I'm not' (O'Sullivan, 1985: 58). In 1989, he contended that 
he was capable of doing the job as Prime Minister while adding that Lange - the then leader - was the 
best person for the job 'at the moment' (Hubbard, 1989). See also Moore (1993b). 
144 Interestingly, Moore himself once used a quote from Machiavelli in his denial of the rumour 
regarding his unsuccessful challenge against Lange. See Campbell (1988: 19). 
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agreed to make himself available for a leadership challenge, he claims, once again the 
decision was made in the party's interest. 
It would've been smarter and better for me had I not taken the leadership. I know 
that. That's why, you know, I really didn't want to do it; I did this really as an act 
of sacrifice for the party ... 
[If he had not taken over the leadership] twelve MPs - that's all we would have 
ended up with. At that point, we would have been under threat of being eclipsed 
by the Alliance and NewLabour. And there would not have been a party. We 
would have been out for twenty years. My judgement was if I could do well to 
keep us around thirty seats - not twelve, fifteen seats - we would have been in this 
position 10 come back within three, six years. (Moore, interview, 1998) 
Goff confirms that Moore was not 'the mover and shaker in the leadership change', 
although he questions the extent of the former leader's alleged reluctance to accept the 
top position. 
He had clearly indicated to colleagues that if he was called upon to do it, he was 
willing to do it. I'm not sure that I'd go much beyond that. Mike, like most 
people in politics, was ambitious, but if he had been looking narrowly at his 
ambition, he might have decided that it was better to be there to pick up the pieces 
afterwards than to assume the leadership beforehand. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
Moore's 'reluctant' involvement in the 1990 leadership change has been more 
vigorously disputed by his former deputy, Helen Clark, an instrumental figure in the 
1990 leadership change. 'The blushing bride? Come on!' (Rentoul, 1993bI45). 
Bill Ralston, a former journalist with TV3, also contends that Moore's' "spin 
doctor", adviser, and confidante', Graeme Coleman initiated and carried out a 
destabilisation campaign of Palmer's leadership by 'passing on as much gossip, 
innuendo and adverse information to selected members of the media as he could' which 
included 'the results of a leadership poll allegedly taken by Labour's pollsters which 
purported to show Labour stood a better chance of winning with Moore at the helm than 
Palmer,146 (Ralston, 1997). Although it was possible that Moore's staff was working 
on his behalf without his knowledge or approval, it seemed unlikely. 
Even some of Moore's strong backers were concerned with Moore's leadership 
ability. For example, Clark, was also reported as having expressed her concerns over 
Moore's 'superficiality and the Churchill-type stance he was taking in his attempt to 
become the leader of the Labour Party' before Palmer's resignation (The Press, 11 
145 See also, Ralston (1994: 62) and Lange (1993d). 
146 Regarding the role he unintentionally played in the leadership change, Ralston comments: 'I 
suspect I helped Coleman and Moore's cause by running a story ... sourced from Coleman, of the 
impending coup, Palmer's imminent demise and Moore's equally imminent success. Although only I 
and Riddell in the Press were the sole two journalists running the speculation (the other media 
universally ignored it or ran denials from the Palmer camp) the story on TV3 probably caused more 
pressure on the Prime Minister's position ana may have persuaded one or two laggardly supporters to 
finally jump on the Moore bandwagon. (Ralston, 1997) 
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September 1990, p.6). Although this report was denied by Clark herself on the 
following da/ 47 , there was evidence to suggest that she had doubts over the new leader. 
With regard to the second concern, in general, he was viewed as lacking discipline in 
terms of organisational thinking and behaviour. He was noted for leaping from one idea 
to another without paying much attention to the consistency between them148 (Hubbard, 
1989). His erratic tendency and ill-judgement came under question as well. In July 
1990, two months before he became Prime Minister, one journalist wrote: 
... Moore has raised eyebrows by his frenetic pace, confusing activity, promising 
action which there is no back-up to provide. Occasional lapses of judgement such 
as inappropriate jokes have at times bewildered foreign hosts. (Beach, 1990) 
He was generally regarded as a successful and effective Minister of Overseas Trade, 
the position in which he excelled with many innovative initiatives and ideas 149. However, 
at the same time, he was seen by the caucus members to have a difficulty in controlling 
these dispositions and impulses. The deficient control was believed to lead him to 
inconsistency and occasional misjudgment. For example, asked to name the strengths 
and weaknesses of Moore as a leader, Lange says: 
His strengths are his vigour, his commitment and his energy; and his weaknesses 
are his lack of judgement and his lack of perception and failure to get relativities 
into perspective. He's a person I'd almost describe as like a pinball machine 
wired by a colour blind electrician, so that you cannot know where you stand in 
any order of things. That is not to be vicious to him. I don't feel vicious towards 
him. Ijust feel that he is a person who is very, very dynamic in politics but [who] 
lacks some sort of integration if! can put it that way. (Lange, interview, 1996) 
Even one of his loyal supporters admits to his problem in this regard. 
Michael has ten ideas a day. Eight are hopeless. One is reasonable. But one a 
day is absolutely brilliant. Now the trick is picking that one brilliant creative idea 
that he comes up with. (Braybrooke, interview, 1998) 
Phil Goff, another Moore supporter, agrees: 
Mike's strengths lie in his experience in politics over a long period of time. His 
ability to think laterally and his ability to appeal to a section of the electorate that a 
147 Interestingly, Clark did not directly deny her reported comments. She claimed that the meeting 
with Jim Anderton, who reported the comments on a TV interview show, was of so little significance 
that she could 'scarcely recollect' the topics of the conversation. She added: 'To suggest I spent half an 
hour running down a senior colleague is utter fantasy'. (The Press, 12 September 1990, p.2) 
148 When this was pointed out to him as a problem in 1985, Moore attributed it to his having been in 
Opposition. 'Yeah, I've got ideas. That's one of the problems of Opposition, however, you get bored 
with ideas 'cos you can't do anything about them. So you spit them out by the minute. It's also a 
fact that in opposition you're judged by the headlines and the space you can get in the media' 
(O'Sullivan, 1985: 57). 
149 For example, his former colleague, Roger Douglas, wrote on Moore during his Minister days: 'He 
has more ideas a minute than anyone else I've ever known; more than he can get down on paper and 
into a framework so people can get to work on them' (Douglas, 1987: 134). 
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more academic looking Labour Party might have had less attraction to. I suppose 
his weakness in that sense was that he was regarded as a less consistent leader 
than Helen Clark. His track was less predictable. Mike is one of the few people 1 
know that reads really widely and can come up with ideas that have a flash of 
brilliance about them. He can think and come up with new ideas in a way that is 
uncommon in politics. The difficulty is that some of those ideas at least have to be 
tested against their practicability and those that cast their vote against Mike would 
have seen that as a weakness in his leadership style. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
Naturally, there were concerns whether his characteristics were appropriate for the 
leadership role. One former Cabinet Minister who backed Moore in the 1990 
leadership change, refers to him as 'a sort of erratic genius'. Slhe also acknowledges 
herlhis awareness of the new leader's shortcomings upon his election, although slhe was 
prepared to overlook them for the new leader's popular appeal. 
When 1 was part of the Cabinet when we made Mike Moore Leader in 1990, not 
long before the 1990 election, and 1 knew at that time that life would never be dull 
with him as the leader ... you ... knew ... with Mike Moore as the leader you 
always woke up feeling worried because you didn't know what he might have 
told the media over night. So you'd tend to wake up and tum the radio on at six 
0' clock in the morning to find out what Mike Moore had announced over night, 
and you just hoped that it was something that we knew about... He is an intuitive 
politician, and he sometimes acts and speaks out before he's reflected fully, and 
certainly before he's consulted fully. That's part of his nature ... some people had 
a lot of difficulty with that. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
Those concerns were not confined to experienced MPs who had worked with Moore. 
They were shared by some newcomers who had had, at best, limited contact with him. 
For instance, one 1990 intake says that those with history as party activists were aware 
of the leader's strengths as well as weaknesses on entering Parliament (Tizard, interview, 
1998). Another new MP with limited prior party experiences had a memorable yet 
unpleasant early encounter with Moore which increased her 'policy' concerns about his 
leadership. When slhe attended a leaders' debate during the 1990 election campaign as 
a candidate, slhe heard the Labour leader promising that his government would take a 
tough stance on beneficiaries. 
Then 1 thought, 'Hello? This was not in the policy that I got' , you know. .. I 
didn't recall anyone discussing that kind of attack on people on benefits. And I 
spoke to him sometime afterwards, and said: 'Why did you do that?' And he said 
because they had polled public opinion and that it was popular to say that, and that 
made me very angry. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
For someone who expected a Labour leader to have 'heart to feel the issues and the 
mind to deliver on them', Moore's populist attitude did not come across well. Not 
surprisingly, as a result, 'I had my doubts right from the outset' (Anonymous, interview, 
1998). Nevertheless, despite such suspicion, those MPs were prepared to reserve their 
judgement and give Moore a fair chance to prove himself. In other words, at this stage, 
they were content to be uncommitted supporters. As Tizard attests: 
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... I had watched leaders develop and ... most leaders expand into the role .. I mean 
the role is undefined, and you just watch these people who you'd have doubts 
about over of all sorts of things you'd have heard of. And all of sudden you 
think, 'Oh, good God, I didn't know he or she could do that'. And it is one of the 
most extraordinary opportunities and I hoped that Mike would expand into the 
job. (Tizard, interview, 1998) 
d. Moore's strategic decision 
On becoming the leader, Moore knew that his support base was not solid, a large portion 
of it consisted of uncommitted supporters with varying degrees of suspicions over his 
suitability as tl~e leader. The number of the loyalists was too small to fall back on, and 
those loyalists were not in influential positions within the caucus. 
Given this vulnerable support composition, Moore had little choice. His prime 
objective was to convince the uncommitted supporters and convert the opponents by 
successfully demonstrating that he was the right person to lead the party in those new 
-
circumstances. What made his decision less complicated was the unanimous consensus 
inside and outside the caucus over the expectations - the necessity to restore party unity 
and win the 1993 election. Although the extent to which the PLP should divorce itself 
from the past policy record could be potentially contentious, everybody agreed that such 
re-positioning of the party was necessary. The nature of the concerns too was uniform, 
and there was no potential conflict between meeting the expectations and alleviating the 
concerns. What he had to do was succeed in both tasks. 
Section B: Meeting the expectations 
When he returned to Parliament as the Leader of the Opposition after the 1990 election, 
he was aware of what his caucus colleagues were expecting of him and was eager to 
tackle them. At the 1991 Annual Conference, he said that he had set himself two goals 
at the end of the previous year. Those two goals paralleled the caucus expectations. The 
first goal was 'to start the rebuilding of the Parliamentary Labour Party's links with the 
Party and people of New Zealand'. The second goal was 'by the end of the year to have 
the public believe we could win the 1993 election' (NZLP, 1991a: 29). 
Before the process of party re-building commenced, first of all, the 'mistakes' of the 
past needed to be properly acknowledged. At the 1990 Annual Party Conference held 
between 9-11 November, a mere two weeks after the election, Moore accepted 'the 
responsibility for the past' despite having being the leader for just nine weeks. 
Although he described 'most of' the fourth Labour Government's achievement as 
'good', he admitted there were lessons to be learnt as well. Moore argued that the party 
should have differences, not divisions within. The PLP and EPLP must work together. 
There must be only one Labour Party. Surely that's the lesson we've learnt. We 
cannot go into elections arm-wrestling with each other' (NZLP, 1990: 24). Implicitly 
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acknowledging that the divisions between PLP and EPLP was caused by the latter's 
isolation from the policy making process by the former, the leader repeatedly promised 
that the party would 'listen,15°(NZLP, 1990: 24). 
Moore tackled his promise seriously. He attempted to set up a joint committee 
structure between the EPLP and PLP to discuss policy matters. He actively attended 
conferences, only missing two regional ones during his more than three year leadership 
tenure (Moore, interview, 1998). Among his efforts, most importantly the 'Labour 
Listens' campaign was launched in January 1991, modelled on similar campaigns in 
Britain and Australia. A special committee (called the Bowen Committee) was set up to 
carry out this campaign, and its membership included representatives from the caucus, 
New Zealand Council, Policy Council, Research Unit, the Affiliates, and the Leader's 
Office. From the caucus, two new MPs, Steve Maharey and Paul Swain volunteered to 
run the campaign (James, 1993d: 76). The campaign was designed to consist of three 
phases. The first phase, 'Aims and Values' , involved extensive consultation at Regional 
Conferences and Electorate Committee meetings. Individual party members were also 
invited to make written comments on issues (NZLP, 1991b: 5). The purpose of this 
'democratisation' of the policy making process was to set a framework within which 
everyone 'can all meet and work together' (NZLP, 1991b: 7). This common platform 
was seen as a vital first step to resolve 'the legacy of political differences in the Party 
over the last six years' (NZLP, 1991a: 31) before more detailed interim policies were 
developed in the second phase of the campaign (entitled 'Moving Ahead') in the 1991-
1992 period. The campaign was to be concluded in the final phase, 'Towards 2000', 
that would produce the 1993 election manifesto (NZLP, 1991a: 6). The end product was 
expected to clearly mark a new policy direction, distinctive from the 1984-1990 period. 
After all, at the 1991 Party Conference, Moore declared: 
Monetarism is over. Rogemomics has had its day and though its day was 
important and historically necessary, it's now a new day, a new dawn and New 
Zealand must move on. (NZLP, 1991 a: 27) I 
Despite the efforts described above, however, the divisions between the EPLP-PLP 
were not fully amended, nor was Labour able to re-claim its status as a centre-left party. 
In the case of the former expectation, open antagonism and disagreement between the 
EPLP and PLP as a whole disappeared. Nevertheless, they were replaced by the hostile 
relationship between the EPLP (especially party officials) and Moore himself (and the 
Office of the Leader of the Opposition) which was supposed to lead the healing process. 
150 In his speech, Moore did not identify 'to whom' he thought the party should listen. 
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A. Unity expectation: restoring the EPLP's trust 
Between 1990 and 1991, it appears that a relatively civilised relationship existed between 
the leader and the party officials. Moore started his speech at the 1991 Annual 
Conference with the following words: 
I want firstly to thank Ruth [Dyson - the then President], Tony Timms [the then 
General Secretary] and our Head Office staff for their work and commitment in 
keeping hope alive and our Party sustained over the past most difficult year... 
(NZLP, 1991a: 24) 
Dyson, in n~tuID, urged her fellow Labour members to assist the leader and his team: 
'We should support Mike Moore and the Labour Caucus for their loyalty to our 
rebuilding process' (NZLP, 1991a: 33). The amicable relationship was captured by the 
party's annual report on 'Parliamentary - Party Relationships' which stated: 'There has 
been an excellent relationship between Head Office and the Leader's Office' (NZLP, 
1991a: 7). 
A year later, however, the situation was different. There was not a single mention of, 
let alone words of gratitude to, the Head Office in Moore's speech at the 1992 Annual 
Conference. Similarly, Dyson completely ignored the PLP leader in her speech. The 
report on 'Parliamentary - Party Relationships' this year just dryly narrated the 
interaction between the two bodiesl51 . 
Indeed, the relationship between Moore (plus his office) and the party hierarchy 
(especially Ruth Dyson and Tony Timms) deteriorated during this period. Dyson, who 
did not support Moore's leadership bid in 1990, describes her working relationship 
during her Presidency as 'reasonable', neither 'ever brilliant' nor 'terribly bad'. Yet, 
she admits that they 'didn't work closely together' (Dyson, interview, 1998). Her view 
is strongly refuted by Moore, who still shows clear resentment towards the former 
President. With regard to the cold reception at the 1992 party conference, the former 
leader indicates that it was a usual occurrence. 
In three years, of annual conference and regional conferences, Ruth Dyson as the 
Party President not once introduced me and say anything good or supportive. 
She'd say: 'This is the Labour Party Leader' and sit down, and I was standing 
like a complete dick. (laugh). Terrible! !152 (Moore, interview, 1998) 
151 The phrase: 'There has been an excellent relationship between Head Office and the Leaders Office' 
returned in the Party's 1994 Annual Conference report, the first report under Clark's leadership (NZLP, 
1994: 11). The report of the 1993 Annual Congress did not contain a report on the relationship 
between the head office and PLP. Dyson says: 'It wasn't any deliberate decision not to acknowledge 
him' at the 1992 conference (Dyson, interview, 1998). 
152 Moore adds that he 'had to get Helen [Clark] to say something supportive to warm up the audience 
and she did because she is a professional' (Moore, 2000). 
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The Tamaki by-election campaign in February 1992, was another occasion on which 
Moore recognised the seriousness of the dysfunctional relationship between him and the 
party officials. 
The Tamaki by-election was a bloody joke. Yvonne [his wife] and 1 personally 
out of our own pockets paid for signs, we got speaking systems up with 20 ... 10 
people up from Christchurch to run it, we rented a house. We got cars, cell-
phones, fax machines. We put... Yvonne and 1 personally out of own pocket paid 
for that. Because people wouldn't work. Some said they would rather the 
Alliance won the seat. .. 
They said: 'You don't put a sign up'. Christ, I'm putting the bloody signs in 
the by-election. And we did the street comer meetings. And 1 got so angry ... 1 did 
a street comer meeting outside the Labour Party Headquarters in Tamaki. And the 
President and Secretary of the party wouldn't even walk out of the room and stand 
on the side of the road. And ... Helen Clark will verify this - that we and Yvonne 
and 1 were up there [in] Tamaki, they were all sitting there, 1 said 'You watch this.' 
and we walked in the room ... they were all sitting there, doing nothing. [When I 
said to them]: 'See you later. I'm going back to Christchurch. See you in the 
morning. Bye-bye', they wouldn't even look up to say 'good-bye'. (Moore, 
interview, 1998) 
Moore stresses that during his leadership, he was consciously trying to 'modernise' 
the Labour Party. 'I tried very hard. I'll take a lot of criticism but 1 did everything 1 
could to try to re-organise the party, to modernise it' (Moore, interview, 1998). Included 
in his efforts to broaden the party's appeal were: opening up internal committee 
systems; organising international seminars in an attempt to re-build the party 
intellectually; arranging tickets for the Party Executives for balanced and broad 
representation; initiating constitutional changes; and personally recruiting 'outstanding 
sports people, top unionists, top New Zealand citizens' with sympathetic views of 
Labour as potential candidates for the 1993 General Election. Moore argues he had to 
embark on so many projects because: 'the truth of the matter is there wasn't a Labour 
Party. There were hardly any members. They had aboutthree organisers - all of whom 
were factional' (Moore, interview, 1998). 
Despite his obvious vigour, Moore's achievement was mixed. Although he 
accomplished some success, almost all his initiatives were met with stem objections 
from the party hierarchy; Moore's series of party 'modernisation' attempts were 
interpreted by this group as an effort to by-pass the party structure and formal 
procedure in order to gain personal control over the party. And they were accordingly 
treated as such. For example, on 2-3 April 1993 Moore organised the Waipuna 
Seminar to which he invited renowned 'opinion leaders' from overseas as well as New 
Zealand153 . This initiative, designed to counter 'a poverty of intellectual ideas' that New 
153 See Moore (l993d). Apart from this edited (by Moore himself) collection of transcripts, a video of 
the seminar was also released for sale. 
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Zealand was facing and to challenge the extremist monetarists at the 'highest level' 
(Moore, 1993d), failed to generate the party hierarchy's enthusiasm or support. 
Most executive members boycotted the seminar, wouldn't even come, just to make 
it fail. We had organisers in Auckland [who] wouldn't even put out any leaflets 
for meetings, or chairs for me. (Moore, interview, 1998) 
Regarding the elections of the Party Executives, Moore claims that 'the left-wing 
activists' reneged on their prior agreement on ticket arrangement and signed up 'a whole 
lot of new members of trade unions that didn't exist' to select their own candidates with 
newly boosteclyoting power at conferences. As a result, former MP candidates such as 
Annette King and Anne Collins were either defeated or blocked. 'My problem was with 
the left-wing activists, and they would do everything they could to unnerve me. I don't 
want to sound bitter, but that's what happened' (Moore, interview, 1998). 
Moore's parliamentary candidate recruitment drive was equally contentious. 
Moore's personal invitation to individuals whom Moore saw appropriate to join the 
party in the hope that they might want to stand for Parliament in two years time (Moore, 
interview, 1998), was seen as a direct threat to the party's long held prerogative of 
candidate selection154 . Considering the fact that it is caucus members who determine a 
leader's fate, whatever Moore's real intention was, his attempt to hand-pick candidates 
through personal contacts was suspected by the party officials as his undertaking to 
consolidate his future leadership. After the recent experience with the fourth Labour 
Government, which implemented controversial policies, disregarding the EPLP' swishes, 
the party hierarchy had no wish to repeat the same mistake. 
At the 1993 Party Conference, Dyson, who was to seek a nomination in the Lyttleton 
electorate for the coming election, stepped down from the presidency. She was replaced 
by Maryan Street who convincingly beat Moore's Research Adviser, Lloyd Falck in a 
vote. A self-described 'feminist socialist of the reforming mould, not of the radical 
mould' (Bradley, 1993) intended to improve the strained relationship between Moore 
and the Head Office. Street says: 
I did work hard at that relationship. Because it had become completely and utterly 
dysfunctional. Ruth and Mike could hardly bear to be in the same room with each 
other. They had very little respect for each other. And it was dysfunctional, it was 
paralysing the party operations. I determined that I would improve that 
relationship because it was really important that the party organisation and PLP 
get on. Mike was very suspicious of me to start with because I was a very close 
friend of Ruth. But it didn't take him long to see that I was genuine in my efforts 
to repair that relationship and restore a little bit of stability to the internal workings 
of the party. (Street, interview, 1998) 
154 It is important to note that the party hierarchy has not always had their favoured candidates selected. 
The Party Rule guarantees three members representative of the ruling body of the party, the New 
Zealand Council. But whether they have the majority voice in a whole selection panel is determined by 
the size of electorate branch membership concerned. (For detail, see Sheppard, 1998). 
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Street maintains that she repaired the working relationship 'substantially' in her first six 
months as the President and that they 'got on very well' (Street, interview, 1998). 
Moore agrees with Street - almost. 'Well, it [the relationship between the two figures] 
started off quite good [sic], because anything was better than Ruth Dyson' (Moore, 
interview, 1998). 
Nevertheless, the improved relationship faced problems when he tried to proceed with 
his modernisation programme. 
I tried to_get change out and she resisted change. I wanted to re-structure the party 
organisation, change the way that unions were involved, change the basis of voting 
inside the conference - and once you started attacking what was her power base, 
where she got her votes and her team from, change the system of what we selected 
our candidates from, so that next time we would have top candidates - that's when 
it fell to pieces. And as soon as I pushed the envelope for a fundamental change 
to modernise the Labour Party as they did in Britain, it was a shit sandwich. 
And ... they felt tfireatened. (Moore, interview, 1998) 
From Street's viewpoint, the relationship did not suffer until after the election when 
she came out openly supporting Clark (Street, interview, 1998). In fact, when Moore 
controversially wanted to establish a centralised computer system for the election 
campaign, it was she who went around and persuaded reluctant and suspicious party 
members to co-operate. 
There were some real tensions between the Leader's Office and the party because 
Mike was very keen on setting up a computer system to monitor... our canvassing, 
and to generate our targets for election day ... a computer system that required a 
degree of nationwide discipline on the part of the party ... and theoretically, it was 
a very good one. What it needed was to be modified to meet some of the realities 
of organising in particular electorates. So the local people, and the party people -
are the people that I talked to mostly - and I knew them a lot better than Mike 
did ... they had trouble with this dictatorial attitude from Wellington: 'You will give 
us this information by Saturday morning. And you will do this' ... So, it was the 
way it was administered that was very alienating for lots of people. In fact, I had 
to go around the party and persuade people to opt in ... For thirty marginal seats 
we wanted these computers set up. 
And I had to go around the country and 'bang heads' and say: 'Please. Come on. 
Please opt into this. You're making things so difficult at the centre for me by not 
opting into this computer thing'. So several of the electorates opted into Mike's 
computer system simply because I had asked them. (Street, interview, 1998) 
Mike Moore Supporters Club 
Nevertheless, Moore's distrust in the party hierarchy at large remained, and it was most 
clearly exhibited during the election campaign, especially in his decision to set up the 
Mike Moore Supporters Club (MMSC) as an independent vehicle outside the EPLP. 
He needed to assemble a team around him upon whom he could rely. His feeling 
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towards the party officials in this regard was expressed in a TV interview in the 
following terms: 
Oh, there was no doubt that the President of the time was unsupportive, and not 
really in touch with reality. I can never forget the fund raising proposals put up by 
Maryan Street in which we were going to raise $100,000 out of Glenda Jackson 
[who was a guest speaker at the 1993 Congress], $50,000 out of [entertainers] 
Topp Twins' concerts ... and $50,000 from gay business people. I knew that was 
never going to be a starter. You can hardly run a campaign based on that awesome 
financial analysis of fund raising. (Assignment, 20 June 1996, TV1, 7 :30pm) 
The MMSC was officially established as a limited liability company in November 
1992 with Clayton Cosgrove, Moore's senior adviser and confidante, as its managing 
director (Harris, 1993b). The main purpose of the MMSC was: 
1) To boost the Labour Party support in the electorate and raise the campaign funds. It 
targeted the people who: a) did not want to join a political party; and b) did not like 
the Labour Party but liked Moore as a leader and politician (Cosgrove, interview, 
1996). Moore says that 'there were business people who would not give money to 
the Labour Party but would give it to me'. 'Now, I was raising 90% of the money. 
That was coming to me.' He adds that he was an acceptable face to business, unlike 
some party officials who would have lost votes in that community, because they say 
'things that were stupid' (Moore, interview, 1998). 
The other purposes of this separate organisation, explained by Moore are: 
2) To achieve the transparency of the campaign funds. Moore argues: 'In previous 
campaigns, there were secret leaders' accounts that didn't go through the party. I 
thought that was wrong'. 'I wasn't going to do what other leaders had done, 'cos I 
am very honest and very clean. I don't want the kind of scandals that had happened 
in the past. Every dollar went through there [to the party].' As a result, '[e]very 
penny was accountable' and 'transparent' (Moore, interview, 1998). 
3) To gain tax advantages. 'There were ... tax reasons for [which] we did it.' 'In terms 
of running books, or printing and publishing, we would get back our tax and do 
things at losses'. Also, 'when you make bookings you get the place and fees for 
advertising, you get the discount back and all that' (Moore, interview, 1998). 
4) To run a 'competent' campaign. After experiencing campaign funds shortage 
problems during the 1990 election campaign 1 55 , he was determined to be 'in charge' 
and have 'people who could do things' second time around. In his view, 'the Head 
Office were incompetent'. (Moore, interview, 1998). 
155 He recalls: 'I remember doing the last TV, face-to-face ... interview. And we could only afford the 
camera for 15 minutes, and 1 had to go straight to the camera for 10 minutes, and they had to take the 
camera away because we never had the money to finish it.' (Moore, interview, 1998) 
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In the election campaign, the MMSC played a vital role. It published books written 
by Moore including his re-edited autobiography as well as the party's official 
manifesto. It also received donations, particularly from businesses (Mackey, 1993b) 
and later channelled funds to the party. A former executive of the MMSC says that the 
club provided the necessary funds for the election campaign which the party had no 
ability to raise itself (Cosgrove, interview, 1996). As claimed by Moore above, the 
MMSC is reported to have made a large donation - 90% of Labour's whole campaign 
fund - without which the party could not have published the manifesto. The club also 
controlled a computer system, that was charged out to candidates in marginal seats at 
$2,500 a time to use (Orsman, 1993a). Although, the party was said to have total access 
to the computerised canvassing data (Harris, 1993b), the leader remained as the only 
holder of its master copy. 
Not surprisingly, the party officials saw the MMSC as a challenge to the existing 
party organisation and as an illegitimate power base for the leader156 • The idea of 
creating a 'party within a party' was feared and resented15 ? (Sheppard, 1998) as it 
would provide the club (and ultimately Moore himself) with significant influence over 
the future candidate selection. In fact, Maryan Street argues that Moore's decision to 
set up this separate organisation was the turning point for many party members . 
.. . as soon as he did that, he undermined his own support base in the party, because 
the Labour Party will be incredibly loyal to its leader as long as that leader 
recognises that she or he is completely dependent on those people to get the work 
done. So as long as there is an acknowledgment of an inter-dependent 
relationship, then party members will be incredibly loyal to their leader. But the 
setting up of the Mike Moore Supporters Club broke that unspoken agreement, 
really, with the party membership. Suddenly it looked self-aggrandising, it looked 
as if Mike was out for Mike, not for Labour. And Mike defends that absolutely 
and says that: 'Well, I was out for me because that was good for Labour. I was 
very popular in the polls therefore it was good for Labour'. But what he didn't do 
was acknowledge the culture of the people who belonged to the Labour Party. So 
in that sense he broke the bond with the party membership. (Street, interview, 
1998) 
Moore repeatedly argues that to prove the transparency of the MMSC, he invited 
Street and Tony Timms to take up its directors' positions (Moore, interview, 1998). He 
also demanded the MMSC to be officially affiliated with the party, giving it a formal 
156 Some of these concerns may have not been totally groundless. After being deposed as the leader, 
Moore showed willingness to use the canvassing data for his future political activities which included a 
possibility of setting up his own party (Edwards, 1993i). Sheppard was more certain. He wrote: 
'Aware that he was isolated within the party hierarchy, Moore had attempted to forge a power base of 
his own through the creation of the Mike Moore Supporters' Club (MMSC) ... ' (Sheppard, 1998: 216). 
157 Considering the strong feeling of resentment felt by the EPLP officials towards the MMSC, it was 
ironic that an idea of having 'the Supporters Club' at every electorate for those 'who want to give their 
commitment to Labour's policies and election as Government, but who do not want the responsibilities 
and rights of full membership' was aired by Ruth Dyson, the then President at the 1992 Annual 
Conference (NZLP, 1992a: 4) 
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status similar to that of trade unions so that every branch of the party could have the 
MMSC members (Small, 1993b). Both requests were turned down. With regard to the 
latter request, Street explains: 
Mike asked for the Mike Moore Supporters Club to be affiliated to the Labour 
Party. Now, we rejected that because we didn't believe the thing should have 
existed in the first place. And that it wasn't a legitimate organ for the party. What 
if Mike stopped being the leader, and we were left with this Mike Moore 
Supporters Club as an affiliate to the Labour Party? How could we justify having 
a supporters club for an individual affiliated to the Labour Party which is a 
collective organisation? (Street, interview, 1998) 
After going through such a problematic working relationship, by the time of the 1993 
leadership coup, Street had developed a negative view of the leader with whom she was 
originally determined to work constructively. When Labour lost the election on 6 
November, she was in the firm belief that a leadership change, especially to Clark, was 
necessary as well as inevitable158 . 
I thought Helen would be Leader one day. But I didn't have a time frame on her 
at that point. I didn't know it was going to happen so quickly. But I was keen for 
it to happen during the time of my presidency. That was for sure. I thought that I 
would be a President who would help that happen. But that's only because I 
didn't expect Mike to stay on past two elections if we lost. (Street, interview, 
1998) 
It is important to remember that no matter how bad the relationship between the two 
offices was, the fact is that the Head Office does not directly choose the leader of the 
PLP. What is of interest, therefore, is how the troublesome relationship affected the 
caucus members' views of their leader. The antagonism between the two offices was 
well known in the caucus. Many MPs initially held both parties responsible for the 
diabolical relationship, as Caygill says of Dyson and Moore: 'On both sides, the 
relationship didn't work. Ruth didn't get on with Mike and Mike didn't get on with 
Ruth. And I blame both of them and ... at that time, neither tried very hard to make the 
relationship work' (Caygill, interview, 1996). Yet, when Moore continued to have 
problems with Dyson's successor, it enhanced the view that the leader had a problem in 
maintaining constructive working relationships with the EPLP officials. The manner in 
which Moore handled the problem also strengthened MPs' doubts over him. Caygill 
notes: 
158 Even to date, Street and Moore find themselves in public disagreement. For example, see Street 
(1997a) and Moore (1997). Contrary to the view held by some (including Moore), Street argues that 
hostility did not emerge until after the election and that the relationship deteriorated when Moore was 
reprimanded by his caucus colleagues for his constant attack on his successor after the 1993 leadership 
change. Then, according to Street, the former leader re-directed his criticism and frustration at her 
because: 'he could no longer target Helen, because his colleagues wouldn't tolerate it, he targeted me for 
negative pUblicity. And he did that quite skilfully. And there was a greater tolerance for that amongst 
his colleagues, because Presidents come and Presidents go' (Street, interview, 1998). 
llO 
There were people who had just given up on [Moore]. He would talk often at 
caucus in disparaging terms about the party organisation, which seemed to me to 
be foolish, unhelpful... just a bad thing for a leader to do. A sign of weakness. 
And it happened al! the time. (Caygill, interview, 1996) 
Also, during the election campaign, MPs and candidates were more closely in touch 
with the party officials and members, and thus likely to be influenced in their opinions 
of the leader. His troublesome relationship with the EPLP, especially in relation to the 
MM.SC, raised some concerns among MPs. Judith Tizard, for example, recalls being 
asked to write cheques to the MM.SC, without knowing the identity or purpose of the 
organisation. The MMSC intensified the concerns of those already apprehensive about 
his behaviour and judgement. 
And ... things like the Mike Moore Supporters Club, you know, indicated a deep 
suspicion [in] the party ... I believe in an inclusive party, you work with what 
you've got. We'-re all volunteers in the end. So, you know, there is no point in 
making enemies when you don't need to, and I found, you know, things like the 
Mike More Supporters Club stuff really difficult to deal with because I'm also 
very unhappy with the party becoming a personal vehicle. (Tizard, interview, 
1998) 
Instead of trying to work constructively with it, the leader was seen as avoiding the 
EPLP. Tizard continues: 'I'm sure the Mike Moore Supporters Club and the way the 
Leader's Office was used during the election campaign were an attempt to bypass the 
party' (Tizard, interview, 1998). Even Moore sympathisers agree that establishing the 
MM.SC, although it was understandable somewhat in their view, was not a smart 
decision . 
... there was always some concern about the Mike Moore Supporters Club in that 
it seemed to be a parallel structure to the party structure. Mike is a very sort of 
personal politician, and I think he felt the need for that kind of structure because of 
difficulties with the Labour Party's structure itself. Probably it's not unfair to say 
that some people in the Labour Party weren't always focused upon supporting 
Mike and winning victory, but were involved in other activities. Nevertheless, I 
personally don't think that the Mike Moore Supporters Club structure was a wise 
move. (Cullen, interview, 1998) 
In sum, Moore was not judged by his caucus colleagues as successful in fulfilling 
the first expectation. Under his leadership, the PLP could not restore the trust and 
confidence of the EPLP as expected. In a sense, the situation was worse than before. 
Unlike the previous six years, the hostility and antagonism of the EPLP (especially the 
party hierarchy) was centred around the leader himself, while the PLP as a whole 
managed to escape any criticism from the party organisation. Worse still, as the cause 
of the deteriorating relationship was linked to Moore's own series of initiatives (such as 
the establishment of the MMSC), he was more likely to be held accountable for not only 
failing to accomplish the task but also for single-handedly aggravating the problem. 
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B. Policy expectation: re-establishing the party's identity as a centre-left party 
Apart from restoration of the EPLP and PLP relationship, the 'Labour Listens' 
campaign aimed to fomiulate the policy basis for the party's new identity in the post-
Rogernomics era. The framework proposed by the 'Aims and Values' report and duly 
approved at the 1991 Party Conference was 'firmly rooted in the Labour tradition' 
(NZLP, 1991b:5). This was most evident in the three key areas identified as the focus 
of its social policy: 
* 
* 
* 
Ari- end to poverty in New Zealand 
This will be difficult to achieve, but Labour is determined to work toward this 
goal. 
Fairness 
This will require the distribution of wealth, and a commitment to overcoming 
inequality and injustice in society. 
Enabling people and communities to live independent and fulfilling 
lives. 
Labour is determined to increase opportunities so that people can participate 
and contribute more fully to New Zealand society. (NZLP, 1991b: 9) 
To accomplish the above aims, abolishing the Employment Contracts Act (ECA), 
public provision of health, education, housing and early childhood services, a fair, 
efficient and progressive taxation system were all called for in the report (NZLP, 1991b: 
10-11). In terms of the economic policy, the report basically endorsed the' co-operati ve, 
negotiated economy' model advocated by Moore at the previous conference (NZLP, 
1990: 25). The model accepted the open and international economy with competitive 
exchange rates and low inflation as the cornerstone, while assigning the government a 
'conductor' role through which the efforts of individual businesses could be 
'harmonised'. Labour was aiming to strike the right balance between 'what the market 
and those operating in it can do for themselves, and the role of government in promoting 
long term growth and job creation, improving competitiveness and harnessing new 
technologies'. The economic growth was not regarded as an end in itself. It was to 
'create real prosperity, distribute wealth fairly and create jobs' (NZLP, 1991b: 12). The 
key to achieve all these goals was a 'new partnership' the government would form with 
business, trade unions, and the communities (NZLP, 1991b: 13). 
The basic stance and directions established in the 'Aims and Values' report were 
continued through the second stage of the 'Labour Listens' campaign. By the time 
more detailed policies were discussed at the regional conferences in autumn 1992, 
according to a political journalist, 'the controversialists and controversy had vanished' 
from the party. The policy paper, Moving Ahead was adopted without significant 
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objection at the Annual Conference held on 4-6 September (James, 1993d: 77). The 
final policies for the election year - Labour's 1993 election manifesto, Jobs. Growth. 
Health., and four more specific, detailed policies released preceding the manifesto (Let's 
Get New Zealand Working Again (policies for jobs); Labour's Plan/or Economic 
Growth and Jobs (economic policies); Labour's Plan/or a Fairer New Zealand (social 
policies); and Labour's Plan/or the Environment (environmental policies» - were more 
or less based upon the results of the three-year campaign 1 59. 
Like restoration of the EPLP' s trust, the 'Labour Listens' campaign and the 
following policy formulation process failed to produce the desired result - elimination 
of policy differences in the caucus. Thanks to the 'Labour Listens' campaign, these 
differences were not so evident in the first two years of Moore's leadership. The basic 
framework formulated through the campaign was no more than a general indication of 
Labour's future intent and was agreed upon by the caucus. But, when more detailed 
policies were formed as the 1993 election approached, these differences started to 
develop into divisions. 
Details were not the only potential cause of contentions. At a more fundamental 
level, some MPs started to question what and whom Labour was standing for under 
Moore's leadership. The caucus left had long argued that the party needed to regain its 
traditional support base, which was lost during its fourth Labour Government years. 
However, they became increasingly sceptical about the leader's commitment to this task. 
From the beginning, he insisted that Labour needed to attract voters beyond its 
traditional supporters. As early as at the 1990 Party Conference, Moore stated: 
Of course we stand for the sick unable to help themselves, the aged, lonely and 
vulnerable, the young eager to learn, women at home and in the workplace, the 
homeless, the jobless, those who dream and work for a safer, greener, more just, 
kinder New Zealand. 
But that coalition is still too small to win those key seats. We must think today 
of the Hamilton Easts, the Birkenheads. 
We need those seats so we can help those for whom only Labour thinks and 
works. 
We must stand beside and for the battlers who struggle to improve their 
conditions and opportunities. 
Those battlers, living alone, trying to give their kids - who are under threat - a 
fair go. 
Those battlers on low incomes, doing part-time work to get some carpet or a bit 
extra for their homes who could lose penal and overtime rates. (NZLP, 1990: 25) 
Initially, as seen in the above speech, how the new constituent that Moore sought to 
lure was different from the traditional Labour supporters was unclear. In 1990 
McRobie described the Birkenhead and Hamilton East electorates as 'moderately 
affluent' (McRobie, 1990: 140) and 'a substantially middle income electorate' 
159 For detailed analysis of Labour's policies, see James (l993d and 1993f) and McLeay (1994). 
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(McRobie, 1990: 147), respectively. Yet, Moore's above illustration of 'battlers' had a 
distinctive impression of those of the working class. 
As time went on, Moore's intention became clearer - Labour should appeal to the 
middle class. At the 1991 Annual Conference, he argued: 'Labour will work to reclaim 
the middle ground in New Zealand' (NZLP, 1991a: 28). He also said: 'We still have to 
win over the middle income earner who now feels betrayed by National and wants to 
know what Labour would do in Government' (NZLP, 1991a: 29). What was more 
important was that Labour's main constituent in Moore's mind appeared to have shifted 
to this group. What was once considered a necessary supplement to the main 
'coalition' forc-winning an election had significantly increased its prominence. In 
September 1992, Moore claimed that Labour's 'hearts beat for those who are at the 
bottom, for those who struggle'(Thomas, 1992). But in the same month, Moore told the 
1992 Annual Conference: 'These middle, hardworking New Zealanders, the panelbeater, 
the nurse, the shopkeeper, they are our people' (NZLP, 1992a: 99). 
This increasing importance of the middle class continued into the election year. At 
the 1993 Annual Congress, Moore identified '[s]truggling middle aged and middle class 
New Zealanders' as Labour's target constituent: 'The issue is what can a Labour 
Government do for the 40-somethings?' (NZLP, 1993: 21-22) Not surprisingly, when 
the party's official targeted electorate was defined at the beginning of the election 
campaign in fictional characters 'Ken' and 'Marion', it was not 'those who are at the 
bottom'. Rather, they were the middle-class couple, characterised as 'not so rich that 
they do not have to care but not so poor that they could apply for any state assistance' 
(Stone, 1993a). More specifically, Ken - representing the male target group - was 
described as someone who 'believes that there is an economic recovery but does not 
necessarily accept that Labour has changed its ways from the 1984-90 term in office' 
whereas Marion - the female target group representative - was a described as 'anxious 
about the prospects for her children, worrying about their education, work prospects and 
health'. Marion also had concerns in the law and order issues (Stone, 1993a). 
Those swinging voters (National supporters in 1990 but undecided in 1993) might 
be suggested by the polling data as vital for Labour victory. Yet, by officially identifying 
this group as Labour's targeted group and by asking the candidates to be mindful of 
them during the campaign (Stone, 1993b), Moore unwittingly led his doubters to 
suspect that the leader was deviating from its traditional constituency and its interests. 
Such suspicion intensified with Moore's position in certain policy areas, too. His 
intention carne into question especially in two areas, namely, the tax policy and industrial 
relations policy. 
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With strong opponents such as Dunne160 and proponents like Lange both contained 
within the caucus, any tax increase was guaranteed to be controversial. This was one of 
the issues, which, in Lange's words, 'if the leadership forces debate on', 'the guns will 
be turned inwards' (Lange, 1991b). One journalist reported that out of fear of upsetting 
the middle-income voters and of causing caucus disunity, Moore was trying to avoid 
settling the issue altogether161 (Kilroy, 1993e). Richard Prebble described how Moore 
diverted attention away from contentious and dividing issues at caucus meetings for the 
sake of party unity: 
Mike says 'Hang on a minute, let's look instead at what Labour voters are asking 
us most about, striking people in their own lives - health charges, education, and so 
on'. (Laugesen, 1993a) 
Looking back at this period, Moore concedes that the task of coming up with a new set 
of policies without risking party unity was more than a difficult task. 'There were 
differences that perhaps were irreconcilable ... I tried to keep them [both right-wing and 
left-wing] together. It was very hard work ... possibly impossible?' (Moore, interview, 
1998). 
Probably as a reflection of this situation in the caucus, Labour's economic policy in 
the 1993 manifesto offered a wide range of un-costed proposals which created a 'soft' 
and 'extremely flexible agenda' (Small and Harris, 1993b) so that varying views of the 
caucus members could be accommodated162 • Throughout the 1993 election campaign, 
Labour had to fight off National's constant claim that it would have to raise tax to 
finance its policy promises. Despite some expensive promises such as abolishing 
community service cards and removal of hospital part charges, Moore strenuously 
denied that a tax increase would be necessary. His argument was that the party would 
obtain sufficient revenue through a broadened tax base accomplished by an estimated 4-
5% economic growth. Asked what the party would do should such a growth rate be not 
achieved, the finance spokesperson, Michael Cullen said that 'we will revisit and 
reschedule the spending path' (Small and Harris, 1993a). 
Moore was also ambiguous about his stance on the industrial relations policy, or 
more specifically the Employment Contracts Act (ECA). Although a return to 
compulsory unionism was ruled out as early as in May 1991 (Collins, 1991), Labour, 
led by the spokesperson in this area, Clark, was constantly adamant about the repeal of 
the act. Moore never openly challenged this stance. At the Annual Conferences in 1992 
and 1993, Moore asserted: 'The Employment Contracts Act will go. It is an act of 
160 See, for example, Hunt (1992) and 'Target 'middle-income' vote', The Evening Post, 15 April 
1992, p.29. 
161 Moore strongly rebuts this (Moore, 2000). 
162 As a result, the accuracy of the costing of Labour's election promises came under attack from 
National. See, Small and Harris (1993a). 
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malice' (NZLP, 1992a: 98; 1993a: 20). In 1992, he went further to say: 'The piece of 
legislation has meant the rich get richer, the poor get poorer, and the middle hardworking 
family stands on a trapdoor' (NZLP, 1992a: 98). 
However, how seriously he considered the ECA 'an act of malice' was unclear. In 
his book, Fighting for New Zealand, published in 1993, he criticised the ECA for having 
brought workers' wages down. At the same time, throughout the book, he praised 
companies which had benefited from the labour market deregulation brought about by 
the act. For example, he wrote: 'It's amazing that successful private companies, like 
Lion Nathan or Fortex, are more democratic, seek more advice and involvement from 
their workforce than do publicly-owned corporations' (Moore, 1993a: 91). He was also 
benevolent towards the Chief Executive of Lion Nathan, Doug Myers, and his 
achievement: 'Douglas Myers took over the remnants of the Bond empire and now Lion 
Nathan is one of the biggest brewers in the Southern Hemisphere. It returns to New 
Zealand profits of thousands of shareholders, giving security, guaranteeing jobs at home, 
lifting our technology and enhancing our competitiveness 1 63 , (Moore, 1993a: 30). 
The problem of such open praise is that Myers was also the then Chairperson of the 
New Zealand Business Roundtable, which had been a strong advocate for labour market 
deregulations164 • Myers himself was reported to have described the ECA as an 
unqualified success and the single greatest breakthrough in New Zealand's economic 
reform programme (Field, 1992). Naturally, Moore's behaviour - calling the ECA 'an 
act of malice' while expressing admiration for individuals and companies which were 
enshrining the very act - was seen as inconsistent, and it raised doubts over his 
commitment to Labour's pledge to repeal the act. These doubts were ultimately 
confirmed by his refusal to join Clark in a factory visit in order to clear the confusion 
over the party's stance on the ECA towards the end of the 1993 election campaign (see 
Chapter 3). 
Although his stance was generally supported by the moderate/right group of the 
caucus, Moore was subject to criticism by the increasingly impatient caucus left. They 
argued that his concentration on the middle class voters left the traditional Labour 
support base to the Alliance to capture, and that it ultimately cost Labour the election. 
During her challenge, Clark said that Labour had to fight throughout the campaign the 
'allegations from the Alliance that there were no substantial differences between the 
[National and Labour] parties and that therefore the electorate might as well vote for who 
they really wanted, which was an invitation to vote Alliance' (Orsman, 1993b). 
163 How Myers regarded Moore was unclear. Nevertheless, Myers said in 1998: 'Labour still seems to 
hanker after national plans, "accords" with "social partners" and "industry policies" that were abandoned 
years ago in most other countries' (Herbert, 1998). Of course, 'accords' and 'social partners' were the 
central elements of Moore's policy views. 
164 See The New Zealand Business Roundtable (1996), Chapter 4. 
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Probably Moore's success (or failure) to satisfy the caucus expectation for re-
establishing the party's identity as a centre-left party was most closely scrutinised by the 
caucus left in his willingness to separate the party from the recent, troubled past. 
According to one former Cabinet Minister, Moore was sympathetic towards 
Rogernomics although he had 'many disagreements with David [Lange] and Roger 
[Douglas]' in those days (Caygill, interview, 1998). Or, in Lange's words, 
He was not in any way a 'position taker' against Roger. In fact he was quite the 
reverse ... it would be wrong to say that he fought any sort of a battle against 
developments at the time. Most battles were fought in his absence overseas. 
(Lange, illterview, 1996) 
However, due to his prominence in the contentious Government as the third ranked 
Minister and later the Prime Minister, Moore tended to be seen by his newer, 'post-
Rogernomics', opponents as a part of 'where Labour went wrong under Richard 
Prebble and Sir Roger Douglasl6S ' (Braybrooke, interview, 1998). Moore agrees: 
They came in with the purpose that everything the Labour Government did was 
wrong. I personified what was wrong. They were going to change it. (Moore, 
interview, 1998) 
His unwillingness to make a clean break from the 1984-1990 era certainly enhances 
such a view and turned many newer MPs against him. As Caygill puts it: 
... most of the people who were elected after 1990 or in 1990 or in 1993 - the two 
intakes - were relatively unsympathetic to what had happened between 84 and 90. 
You know, they thought that that period was either a mistake or at least responsible 
for the party's defeat in 1990. And by 1993, they thought that period ... events of 
the period were still a burden that the Labour Party was having to carry. (Caygill, 
interview, 1998) 
Indeed one of the 1993 intake believed that an apology for some actions taken by the 
fourth Labour Government was essential for the party's identity re-building process. 
I mean, Helen said it. Mike Moore never said it. He went to the first conference 
after 1990 and said that time for it was over. That was kind of like not saying: 
'I'm actually really sorry about the way some things turned out.' I actually feel 
like that we should apologise when we get things wrong. I mean not everything. 
We don't have to apologise for the whole of the 80s, but what we do have to do is 
apologise for some of the consequences which are quite horrific for a lot of 
people. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
165 Roger Douglas and Richard Prebble are two of the most controversial figures in the fourth Labour 
Government, mainly for their free market orientations and their dogmatic approach. One Labour MP 
says that the latter's election defeat in 1993 was 'almost a cause of celebration' (Tizard, interview, 
1998). The pair left the Labour Party to form a new political vehicle, the Association of Consumers 
and Tax Payers (ACT), in 1994 to pursue their political visions. 
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The problem for Moore was that those who shared this MP's sentiments in the caucus 
were on the increase. 
Although not mentioned by the Moore opponents as an important variable for the 
1993 leadership change; Moore and his supporters have claimed that the former leader 
was ousted partly because of his conservatism (or political incorrectness in his words) 
on moral issues, that were vital to the influential group of the Labour Party and the 
newer, left-leaning MPs. The caucus left, who were generally supported by trade 
unionists and feminists on their selections (Sheppard, 1998) as well as central figures in 
the party Head Office tended to have more liberal views on those issues. A Mike Moore 
loyalist, Jack Elder, who refers to this group as 'trendy liberals', argues that the 1993 
leadership battle was about 'political philosophy in the end' (Elder, interview, 1998). 
Apart from Moore's sympathy towards Rogernomics, Elder points to the importance of 
the role which moral issues played in the coup. 
Mike represented a point of view of Labour politics which the trendy liberals in 
the Labour Party didn't like. They're not... they are not traditional Labour people. 
They're trendy liberals basically. They are a different animal, and they saw Mike 
as old-fashioned, conservative ... I mean conservative with a whole lot of things 
they're liberal about... He's actually very liberal about some issues, and he has 
stood up to be counted on issues that they wouldn't dream of standing up to be 
counted on . 
... I mean, if you're interested in feminist issues, for instance, that's just an 
example, he'd be the very last person you'd have as a leader (laugh). As the night 
follows the day. He was not that sort of person. And likewise ... if you've got a 
deep and abiding interest in issues concerning the rights of sexual minorities and 
anything like that, although he's liberal on those things, he ... didn't have the right 
credentials. (Elder, interview, 1998) 
Moore as the policy maker - was he responsible for Labour's policies? 
One point needs clarification here. The Moore opponents' claim that he failed to satisfy 
their expectations to re-establish the party's centre-left identity implies that he had 
substantial control over the party policies. But is such an implication accurate? 
According to the party's rules, all Labour Party policies have to go through a 
required process including Policy Committees, regional and national annual conferences 
before they are finally approved by the Policy Council to become the manifesto. And 
the 1993 election manifesto was no exception. Constitutionally, the leader had no 
special prerogative over official policies. In theory, thus, any dissatisfaction with 
Labour's policies should be directed to all the parties involved in the policy making 
process, not solely to the leader. 
Not surprisingly, the anti-Moore MPs expressed general satisfaction with the 1993 
party policies in the main. Instead, their frustration was focused upon Moore's 
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personal dealings with them. In spite of the constitutional arrangement, in reality, the 
PLP leaders always enjoy some discretion in policy making. As Street notes: 
... leaders are always very persuasive and powerful. There is no doubt about that. 
... There is always· going to be an imbalance of power there and the leader is going 
to exert a disproportionate amount of power. (Street, interview, 1998) 
In comparison to previous leaders, Moore was inclined to use his discretion more freely. 
As David Caygill, a former finance spokesperson between 1990 and 1991, comments: 
I didn't think that Mike had the grasp of policy that was necessary in a competent 
leader. L felt that he often made things up on the spot. A good leader sometimes 
has to do that; David Lange certainly did it on more than one occasion. But Mike 
did it all the time, and this was unsettling and worrying, certainly to me as ... 
somebody who had been the finance spokesperson in the party. (Caygill, 
interview, 1998) 
Moore was also keen to use his power over the manifesto. Street attests that the 
former leader attempted to include his own 'off-the-wall' ideas in it (Street, interview, 
1998). It is also pointed out that the Policy Council occasionally had to agree to 
consider some of Moore's proposals at a late stage of policy making process only 
because of his status as the leader (Northey, interview, 1998). 
Moore's personal influence was observed in his presentation of the already set 
official policies during the election campaign, too. The anti-Moore group's particular 
concern related to his unWillingness to vigorously promote or adhere to the official party 
policies, through which he could set/control the general tone of the party's policy 
direction. To publicly disagree with the leader could have only damaged the party. 
Hence the frustration of Clark and her supporters over their inability to tackle the 
poverty issue more openly (Campbell, 1994a) 
Moore's reluctance to endorse the party policy on the ECA during the election 
campaign was another example where the leader exerted his discretion. Street also 
recalls the leader's objection to the release of another potentially controversial policy, the 
Pacific Island policy: 
I said: 'Come on. It's done. Let's get it out.' and Mike said: 'That's for family 
consumption only. Put it out in the Labour Party but we are not going to have a 
public release of the policy. We are not going to publicise it'. Because he 
thought... it would alienate red-necks, you know, and we wanted votes of red-
necks as well ... well, he did. And I was horrified, just horrified at that - that Mike 
was going to manipulate the manifesto. (Street, interview, 1998) 
Also, according to Street, Moore did not want to publicise certain policies in the 
approved, detailed manifesto. Moore did not want to 'upset anybody' or 'mark us out 
anywhere'. As a result, the party published a manifesto which was 'a series of bullet 
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points that were key points about policy' and 'not terribly detailed'. She further 
asserts: 
Mike wasn't interested in the minutiae of policy. He wanted to be able to make 
broad brush statements. He wanted to be able to say: 'Under Labour, things will 
be better.' That's about as detailed as Mike ever wanted to get about anything. 
(Street, interview, 1998) 
The implication given by such approaches was that 'if we fudged issues, then people 
could interpret it how they liked' (Dyson, interview, 1998). Not surprisingly, such an 
ambiguous policy stance by the leader was seen by many - especially left-leaning - MPs 
as disingenuous, seriously damaging the party's credibility as a centre-left p arty 1 66. 
Clark recollected the frustration she and Cullen167 experienced with the leader in relation 
to the tax policy during the election campaign: 
It [the 1993 manifesto] simply wasn't budgeted ... We were totally locked into a 
manifesto that was not costed and that no-one could deliver on. Mike [Moore] 
never faced up to the fact that more social spending means more government 
spending or facing up to a deficit. 
So, instead, he said we would not put up taxes - and nobody believed him ... 
Michael Cullen and I wanted him to come clean and say there'd have to be 
increases for those on $70,000-plus, but Mike wouldn't hear of it168 . (McManus, 
1994) 
Maharey indicates that such lack of clarity was counterproductive to Labour's image as 
a credible alternative government. 
How we came out of the 1990 election - obviously thrashed because people didn't 
like what we stood for, obviously.... . I think a lot of people were very keen to 
know what we stood for and it was left wing ... And so, that lack of clarity, I think, 
caused a lot of people concern that maybe we would stumble into government 
again... And there would be a return to where we were in the 1990' s - and just 
pick up where we left off. And that I don't think was acceptable to the trade union 
movement obviously, and also to a range of other constituencies that supported 
Labour. So, that lack of clarity was a real problem, given that context. (Maharey, 
interview, 1998). 
166 In February 1992, Lange warned: 'The hard lesson of the recent past is that politicians may be 
actors but they can't be imposters' (Lange, 1992) 
167 Interestingly, before the election, Cullen refused to follow his leader and to categorically deny any 
potential tax raise if Labour became the Government. He said that no finance minister could honestly 
rule out such possibilities (Kilroy, 1993a). 
168 When Moore learnt of Clark's attack on his policy stance after the election, he was 'very surprised.' 
He insists that his former deputy never expressed her disagreement on final policy positions before the 
election either publicly or privately (Moore, interview, 1998). Hunt agrees that there was no policy 
disagreement between the two. 'No, I don't think so at all because they talked everyday about these 
things [policy issues], and I was usually part of the discussions, and involved in the Strategy 
Committee and that sort of thing. I don't actually think that [policy disagreement] was of very great 
importance at all' (Hunt, interview, 1998). Cullen, however, admits that there was some disagreement. 
'[I]t's probably fair to say that Mike was keen to downplay certain things like industrial relations 
legislation changes, where some of us would perhaps have promoted those rather more strongly. So, 
yes, there were some differences of opinion in that regard. On those sorts of issues, my opinions 
would have been rather closer to Helen's than they were to Mike's' (Cullen, interview, 1998). 
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Lange concurred and blamed Moore's personal handling of policy issues for Labour's 
election loss. After the election the former leader wrote: 
The voters had no reason to believe in that critical difference between the 
parties which induces a determined vote for change. 
Where there was a difference, it was fudged. 
In my electorate, for instance, many people would have been liberated by the 
news that Labour intended to put state house rents on an income-related basis. 
But it was a contingent promise, possibly to be implemented, and rarely mentioned 
by the leadership in case it frightened the middle classes. (Lange, 1993a) 
Lange concluaed his analysis in the following words: 
I don't know when the next election will be held, but I want the Labour Party to 
contest it. 
If we'd fought last Saturday's, we'd be a majority government now. (Lange, 
1993a) 
In his critics' view, Moore's failure at the second expectation was clear. Some of the 
earlier uncommitted supporters such as Maharey, Dalziel, Hodgson, and Blincoe were 
now firmly against him. In their judgement, as Street notes, the more distinctive and 
detailed Labour policy they hoped for 'was not going to come under him' (Street, 
interview, 1998). 
Moore's failure in both achieving unity between the EPLP and in re-establishing the 
party's renewed political identity meant that his leadership was increasingly dependent 
upon his success in realising the other expectation - winning the 1993 election. Moore 
himself was aware that the anti-Moore feeling was rising, and that the party officials, in 
particular, had been strengthening their position through the candidate selection 
procedure (this point will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5). Two and half years 
after he lost the leadership, Moore commented, 'I knew that. My chance of holding the 
leadership was to win the election' (Assignment, 20 June 1996, TV1, 7:30pm). 
C. Elective expectation: winning the 1993 election 
The chance of fulfilling the third expectation of the Moore leadership - winning the 
1993 election - appeared slim when the PLP returned to Parliament after the 1990 
election. However, according to the Heylen-One Network News polls, by April 1991 
Labour was the most popular political party. Although from this point onwards the 
party's popularity fluctuated and occasionally slipped behind either the Alliance or 
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National, Labour led the popularity contests during most of Moore's leadership 
period169. 
Even at the personal level, Moore performed reasonably well. Although he trailed a 
former National Minister, Winston Peters, for most of the 1992-1993 period in the 
Heylen-One Network News' 'most preferred Prime Minister' polls in which 
respondents were asked to name their preferred politician for PM, he constantly 
outranked Jim Bolger170. 
Considering his high personal popularity, it came as no surprise that Moore saw 
himself as a key factor for winning the coming election. Knowing that his survival was 
solely based on winning the election and that he was not enjoying the confidence of the 
EPLP officials, Moore was reported to have taken on extra staff on short-term contracts 
and put extra resources into the campaign, which eventually used up most of the annual 
$1.4 million budget allocated for the Office of the Leader of the Opposition (Orsman, 
1993d). Also, as part of this effort, the already mentioned MMSC was established. 
Maharey notes: 
I think Mike understood that the election was a big one for him. He had to win it 
if he wanted to stay as Leader because Labour tends to be pretty ruthless on its 
leaders historically, and I think he understood this was the opportunity for him to 
become Prime Minister or there would be potential for a change of Leader. And 
he had pretty well positioned himself with people in the Leader's Office and a 
small group of people who'd supported him. And essentially he was going for 
broke to see if he could win. (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
The turnaround for Labour and Moore's fortunes came in July 1993 when the then 
independent MP, Winston Peters, established his own political vehicle, New Zealand 
First. This formation of a populist party (Miller, 1997) was believed to have cost 
Labour's popularity by taking away anti-Government votes away from it (Small, 1993a). 
169 The results of the opinion polls and Labour's positions during Moore's leadership tenure varied 
from one research organisation to another. The Heylen-One Network News polls showed that between 
July 1991 and August 1993 Labour was over taken by another party only once (by the Alliance at the 
end of 1991), whereas the results of the National Business Review commissioned opinion polls 
pictured the contest being much more competitive. Between November 1991 and August 1993, Labour 
surrendered the top position several times to both National and the Alliance. Both polls, however, 
registered National's lead over Labour after August 1993. 
170 Similarly, the National Business Review (NBR) commissioned polls constantly showed that 
Moore was enjoying higher performance satisfaction ratings than his counterpart in the National Party, 
whose satisfaction ratings never exceeded those of dissatisfaction. His personal popularity was obvious 
in the NBR-Consultus poll result on the four party leaders (Moore, Bolger, Peters, and Jim Anderton), 
released in late October 1993 (NBR, 29 October 1993, p4). In the poll, the Labour leader topped three 
sections, which asked the respondents: 1) which leader was most in touch with and understood ordinary 
New Zealanders; 2) who would provide the strongest and most effective leadership (tied with Peters at 
23 per cent); and 3) which leader was the most decent and likeable man. He came second and third in 
the other two sections, that asked which leader had the best policies for the country's future (Bolger 
came first), and who was most likely to keep his promise (Anderton and Peters equal first), 
respectively. 
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Evaluation of the election result 
There were two completely different views of Moore's performance in terms of the third 
expectation in the caucus. Some members - mostly Moore sympathisers - considered 
the result satisfactory. (This point will be discussed in the next chapter.) Others - the 
Moore opponents - strongly disagreed. While stressing that she did not hold Moore 
personally responsible for the result, Dyson comments: 
I thought it was terrible ... We didn't nearly win it. National nearly lost it. Our 
vote didn't increase at all. In 1990, we were the most hated Government in New 
Zealand-history. We got annihilated. Three years of re-building and we did about 
the same. It's not a good result. (Dyson, interview, 1998) 
As far as his critics were concerned, three factors worked against Moore. Firstly, as 
already noted, he was seen by his opponents as responsible for preventing Labour from 
effectively distinguishing itself from National in policy terms, which they believed to be 
a major contributing factor to it's election defeat. 
Secondly, Labour's campaign was regarded as highly personalised by the leader in 
terms of its contents and organisation (i.e., the MMSC). The risk of taking such an 
approach is that people would naturally expect him to take personal responsibility for 
the result! 7! . 
Thirdly, the 1993 election was Moore's second election loss in a row as the leader. 
Although he led the party for only several weeks before the 1990 election, it was 
nevertheless lost under his leadership. As Caygill notes, his 'self-sacrificial' decision to 
become the leader in 1990 gave some legitimacy to the questioning of Moore's 
entitlement to lead the party to election victory in 1996, based upon his track record . 
.. .it's a little unfair to say that Mike had two chances, because one wouldn't really 
regard 1990 as a fair chance. Mind you, he accepted the leadership in that 
election, and in that sense, he must be said to have taken his chance. Not many 
leaders get three elections before they are successful. That's what Mike was 
asking. (Caygill, interview, 1998) 
Street agrees: 
The rule of thumb in the Labour Party is that you get two shots at an election. 
And if you lose both of them, it's time for a change... The rule of thumb is ... 
usually was that you get... you get one chance at leading into an election and 
losing and you get... if you have the support of your colleagues, you'll get a 
second chance just to show that there might have been some factors that were 
171 Moore publicly accepted the responsibility for the election, while furiously rejecting his opponents' 
interpretation of the election outcome for Labour and his personal responsibility for it. '[O]f course, I 
accept the responsibility. And of course there are things we ought to do better. But I do not accept the 
logic of David Lange and others. I just can't accept that' (Morning Report, Radio New Zealand, 26 
November 1993) 
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running against you that were beyond your control in your first election. (Street, 
interview, 1998) 
The impact of failing to fulfil the expectations 
It has been documented that under the Moore leadership, Labour's divisions were not 
fully resolved. His relationships with the party officials, most notably Ruth Dyson, and 
Tony Timms (and later Maryan Street) deteriorated significantly to the point at which 
they were not reconcilable. In particular, his decision to set up the MMSC for the 
election campaign was regarded by many as his effort to bypass and disregard the 
legitimate extra-Parliamentary organisation. At the same time, Moore was seen as 
impeding Labour's process of re-establishing itself as a credible centre-left party by 
obscuring some key policies during the election campaign. 
Moore's failure to satisfy those expectations appear to affect the positions of the 
caucus left (including Clark) - specifically the majority of the 1990 new intake. The 
latter group came into -national politics in response to the policies of the fourth Labour 
Government. They were motivated to restore healthy respect for the EPLP within the 
PLP, and to return the party to its traditional values. After three years, and with the 1993 
election looming, those 1990 'uncommitted supporters' were opposing Moore. As far 
as this group was concerned, when Labour lost the election, a leadership change was 
inevitable. Then, as one Moore opponent notes: ' ... we were confronted with "Do we 
want another three years with Mike as the Leader of the Opposition?" And the answer 
was "No'" (Anonymous, interview, 1998). 
Although Moore's failure to deliver on the expectations was a significant factor in 
his demise, it alone cannot fully explain why he lost the leadership. Now, we examine 
how he handles the concerns. 
Section C: Dealing with the concerns 
Upon returning to Parliament after the 1990 election, Moore was well aware of his 
colleagues' concerns over his leadership style. 
A. Policy concern: erratic behaviour 
To counter his inconsistent and impulsive nature and prove his opponents' concerns 
groundless, Moore constantly emphasised 'discipline' - not only for himself but also 
for the entire party. In Fighting for New Zealand, he wrote: 'The lesson I have learnt is 
that good government is made in opposition. The discipline, respect, integrity and 
purpose you show in opposition prepares you to exercise power properly' (Moore, 
1993a: 191). As a sign of discipline, he openly declared that he would not make 
expensive, extravagant promises, saying 'it takes discipline and iron will not to say what 
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people want to hear' (McLoughlin, 1992: 60). After becoming the leader of the Labour 
Party in 1990, he had referred to himself as the least promising politician 'New Zealand 
had ever seen' (Moore, 1993c: 120). He said: 'I was determined, no matter the 
pressure, that I would resist the political urge for the easy line' (Moore, 1993a: 190). 
'You can get elected on false poll-driven promises, you can win the Beehive. But what 
then? You are perpetually under siege, you lose any pretence to leadership and moral 
authority. If the people's expectations are raised too high, then crash down, obviously 
they lose faith' (Moore, 1993c: 120). 
It is doubtful whether his effort produced the intended results for Moore. Despite 
his self-restraint, he was still regarded by his colleagues as a 'populist' who liked to 
make policies based on their popular appeal without undergoing a proper consultation 
process. In addition, Moore also failed to curtail his impulsive behaviour, which was 
occasionally displayed in the public (Northey, 1998a). This led the caucus members 
and party officials to question his consistency; he had been demanding self-discipline, 
from his colleagues, but was he exercising it himself? Asked to describe Moore's 
leadership style, one of the 1990 new intake, simply replies, 'erratic'. Her/his following 
comment is representative of the prevalent feelings in the caucus during the 1990-1993 
period . 
... whenever he went on TV, I would hold my breath because I had absolutely no 
idea whether he was going to be brilliant or stupid. That was the trouble. That's 
why I say erratic is his strongest feature ... [T]here were occasions of sheer 
brilliance, but there were other occasions where he just came across as an idiot. 
That was always my sense right throughout that period. It's that he was unreliable 
in that regard; you didn't know whether he was going to come out as absolute 
gem or something so stupid... (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
As James pointed out (1993e: 163-165), Moore was a man of many paradoxes. 
Paradoxes create inconsistency, and inconsistency had been certainly a characteristic of 
his behaviour. In 1989, Hubbard wrote: 
Inconsistency is prime among the accusations made against Moore. His critics 
say he is so captivated by his own slogans that he fails to notice that some of them 
contradict each other. (Hubbard, 1989) 
One of his books published prior to the 1993 election provided a good example. In it, 
he wrote: 'Catchy advertising slogans may help win the Treasury benches, but then 
what?' (Moore, 1993a: 16). Despite these words, the book contained many such 
slogans (such as 'reinventing' and 'renewal'). 
In response to these problems, Moore was reported to have consciously tried to 
monitor his behaviour when he had to explain or discuss ideas and policies to the media 
and public. He reduced his appearances on the media, and attempted not to leap from 
one obscure topic to another without any logical linkage between them. One political 
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reporter noted that during her interview with the Labour leader in March 1993, he 
repeatedly checked himself 'from launching into free association, muttering to himself 
"I've got to keep away from the stuff that worries people'" (Laugesen, 1993a). 
The real test came wh'en the election campaign went into full swing. Since the 
election campaign was designed around the leader's personality, his public and media 
exposure (and thus the risk of disclosing his problems) significantly increased. As the 
party's 'most potent weapon but potentially its biggest weaknesses' (Rapson, 1993), 
Moore was required to practice discipline more strictly than ever. 
The result of his effort was mixed. One journalist noticed some improvement: 'he 
has begun to get a grip on himself' (James, 1993e: 164). On 19 October Moore 
himself boasted that Labour was campaigning 'to govern not just to win'. He admitted 
that the campaign was not as newsworthy as those of other parties', but he said that it 
was 'disciplined' and showing real courage 1 72 . However, his behaviour was not totally 
under control. The then political editor of The Evening Post, John Goulter, who 
accompanied Moore on the campaign trail, reported: 
The speech finished, then comes a phrase that is a warning signal to anyone 
who has seen Moore perform. "There's just one more thing I'd like to say". 
This is when notorious Moore rambles begin, the streams of heartfelt but often 
incoherent ideas. (Goulter, 1993c) 
The discipline meant fewer improvisations from Moore, but most importantly it 
applied to policies and promises (Rapson, 1993). Moore personally regarded political 
confidence as the most pivotal issue in the current politics: 'The biggest problem I face 
is regaining the confidence of the people and trust in our system,1?3 (Moore, 1993c: 
128). People's confidence in the idea of government was lost, Moore argued, because 
the past governments had been elected on 'poll-driven promises, promises made to win 
an election, not to govern a country' (Moore, 1993a: 189-190). Hence, as already 
mentioned, Moore's decision to become 'the least promising politician New Zealand 
had ever seen' . 
However, the idea of 'the least promising politician' posed a problem. By 'the least 
promising', Moore appeared to mean two things, both of which were problematic. 
Firstly, he seemed to indicate that he would not promise things that he could not keep as 
the Prime Minister. According to this definition, if he was the least promising politician, 
172 See' 'Discipline' behind low-key approach', The New Zealand Herald, 19 October 1993, Sec.l, 
p.5. 
173 People's trust in him seems to have important significance to Moore as a person. 'The politicians 
I most admire ... all owed their success to an affectionate and trusting relationship between their 
personal power and the people' (Moore, 1993c: 124). The confidence issue almost became his personal 
mission. 'If I can build new confidence in the idea of government and renew the belief that people can 
influence their neighbourhood and nation with new ideas based on old values of civic engagement and 
democratic involvement, then I will have served my historic purpose' (Moore, 1993a: 191-192). 
126 
it would mean that he would accomplish the least, make the smallest differences to the 
existing situation. His intention of making the Labour Opposition 'pr[ 0 ]pose and 
prepare' instead of just 'oppose and depose' (Moore, 1993a: 16) might be noble, but 
how could Labour expect those who wanted a change of government to vote for it when 
it was (implicitly) admitting little difference would be made under the Labour 
Government? 
Secondly, he appeared to mean that he would restrict policy areas in which he would 
make any commitment, leaving the other areas obligation free. Moore stated during the 
election campaign: 'You can't break words you haven't given' (Goulter, 1993c). An 
implication of this definition was that as few promises as possible should be made so 
that the government could maximise its leverage without fear of being held responsible 
by the voter. What follows this logic is that where promises had to be made, they 
should be kept vague and general so various interpretations would be possible174 • It was 
this second definition tllat appeared to become more dominant as the election 
approached175. Moore's unwillingness or inability to clarify several vital issues left the 
further impression that he could not do so due to the lack of consistency or adherence. 
Overall, witnessing their leader struggling to handle policy issues did not give much 
confidence to some caucus members who were already suspicious of his character; if he 
was not equipped with the discipline to cope with demands as the Leader of the 
Opposition, how could he handle those as the Prime Minister? (Blincoe, interview, 1997) 
The election campaign 
Moore's 'erratic' tendency was most evidently displayed on election night, especially in 
the speech, which he himself admitted was 'the worst election night speech in history' 
(Moore, 1995) and came as a confirmation of what his doubters had long been worried 
about. His performance signified his erratic nature and inclination to be a poor-judge-
this time of both the election result and the public mood (Levine and Roberts, 1994b: 
65) 176. In the wake of the leadership challenge, Moore explained his behaviour on 
election night as follows: 
174 It is hard to imagine how this definition of 'the least promising politician' could increase public 
confidence in politics and politicians. Issuing a bad cheque (not keeping election promises made) 
damages one's credibility. But asking for a blank cheque (asking voters to vote for him/her while 
making vague promises) cannot restore his/her reputation. 
175 The then Service Workers' Union national secretary, Mark Gosche certainly had this view. He said 
in 1994: 'That was really the crunch for us. It worried us that we had a leader who was backing away 
from the policies Labour was absolutely emphatic on. We wanted a leader who carried our policy. We 
were sick of 10 years of the parliamentary wing doing as it pleased, and the party being told to get 
stuffed' (Rudman, 1994). 
176 Some caucus members are more sympathetic towards Moore. For example, Cullen says: ' ... the 
election night speech, I think ... far too much has been made of that. I think what's got to be 
recognised is that the moment when Mike gave that speech, he had reason to believe, on the basis of 
the information he had just been given, that we could ... we were still going to win that election ... It 
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Of course I made mistakes. And I will make them again. But I will make them in 
the spirit of generosity. I'll not make them behind closed doors. Of course, I 
make mistakes. Who hasn't? (Morning Report, Radio New Zealand, 26 
November 1993) . 
Although the controversial speech did not initiate the move towards a leadership 
change, it certainly hastened it, by heightening the opponents' concerns that had been 
accumulating over his leadership tenure: he was too unreliable and inconsistent to hold 
the position to represent the party and its policy positions. 
I know tfiat Mike always used to get up and say: 'I couldn't have lost the election 
on the election night. People had already cast their votes', you know. And we 
were going, 'Yes, we know, but it showed again what you were capable of doing' , 
you know. And there it all was on public television, the most embarrassing sort of 
performance that I had ever seen. And so it was really at that point that the 
decision finally - 'Well, actually we need to do something about this' had to 
happen. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
MMP 
After the 1993 election, there was a new factor which exacerbated the opponents' 
concern: the arrival of MMP endorsed by the referendum. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
under the new proportional representation system, it was widely recognised that political 
parties would need to 'brand' themselves clearly by offering distinguishable policy 
identities. In this light, Moore's instinct to 'blur the message, not clarify it, in the 
interest of claiming the fuzzy middle ground' (the instinct well displayed during the 
election campaign) was labelled as 'old-fashioned' (Campbell, 1993a: 38) and 
belonging to the FPP era. 
B. Unity concern: tendency to dominate 
The second problem regarding his leadership style that Moore had to deal with was his 
tendency to dominate and alienate people, which was regarded by his opponents as a 
threat to party (and, more specifically C£lUCUS) unity. James described: ' ... an arrogant 
Moore who knows it all, who has brought the management of policy and campaigning 
largely into his own office under his idiosyncratic personal jurisdiction and who 
infuriates people by talking down to them, cutting them out of the action or riding over 
them' (James, 1993e: 165). 
Another aspect of his dominant leadership style that Moore had to monitor closely 
was his inclination to be 'exclusive' - categorising people with whom he worked 
was a rapidly changing situation during that evening; depended on how updated we were with certain 
bits of news, or how we thought about what the outcome was going to be. And also, I think, it was 
not unnatural to think that the Alliance wouldn't rush quite so quickly to shore-up the National 
Government as it did on the night of the next day' (Cullen, interview, 1998). 
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closely into the 'in-group' and treating 'out-group' differently. This behaviour 
appeared to be linked to Moore's dispositions that was described by James in the 
following terms: 
... there is also the humble, ready-to-blush, childlike, unsure and uncertain Moore, 
a quality which can spill over into something approaching an inferiority complex 
that critics have to handle carefully lest he sees plots and putdowns (James, 1993e: 
165). 
Whether it was his inferiority complex or not, Moore was certainly conscious of his 
lack of formal education. He confessed in 1991, 'I would be a better person if I knew 
law. If 1'd done a degree, my job would be easier. I have to work harder because I 
don't have that training. If 1'd had a decent degree it would still have taken me all this 
time to [become the leader] but I could have done more' (McLoughlin, 1991: 48). This 
consciousness occasionally manifested itself in his attitude towards others. Caygill 
looks back at his expeiience: 
He would show that blind spot, if you like, in his relationship and reaction to 
officials. He'd throw off at officials sometimes. With some ofthem ... to their 
face. Often behind their backs. For example, he would talk about diplomats as if 
they were all well-educated - as most are - almost as though he had a sensitivity 
about his own lack of education. You can understand why he might. But I think 
that it is more than just a blind spot or sensitivity and almost a weakness in his 
character that he feels uncomfortable dealing with people who are rational. 
(Caygill, interview, 1996) 
Did Moore treat his 'rational' colleagues in a similar manner? 'Yes, absolutely. I see it 
in his attitude to me, his attitude to Helen ... [and in] the way he would react to some 
debates' 177 (Caygill, interview, 1996). 
Moore himself acknowledges that there was a problem. 'I was accused of being a 
dictator and trying to dominate and bully them ... well, it's a bit true. I did try to bully 
them, you know' (Moore, interview, 1998). 
177 Interestingly, two of Labour's 'intellectuals', Michael Cullen (who was a former history senior 
lecturer with a Ph.D.) and Steve Maharey (who was a former sociology senior lecturer) deny that Moore 
treated them with suspicion. Cullen attests that he enjoyed a good working relationship with the 
former leader, adding: 'I've always respected Mike's insights and intellect' (Cullen, interview, 1998). 
Maharey says: 'Dismiss people with education? I don't know. I've never felt that problem. I think he 
often felt that people like me who had formal qualifications and came out of university should have 
come up with more than we did, you know: "Why am I an ideas person, you've got formal 
qualifications ... How come you don't come up with more?''' (Maharey, interview, 1998) A key to an 
understanding of this puzzle seems to be 'trust'. The difference between, say, Clark and Cullen was the 
absence or presence of trust between them and Moore. Moore seemed to have problems with people 
who disagreed with, and consequently distrusted him (this point will be discussed shortly). 'Rational' 
people tended to find themselves in Moore's 'out-group' not because of their rationality, but because 
they were more likely to question his behaviour and judgement, which could be seen as threat to his 
self-confidence. As discussed in the next chapter, the 'in-group' people who enjoyed Moore's trust were 
mostly those who were directly employed by (thus less likely to challenge) him. 
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During his leadership, Moore attempted to counter these problems through 'winning 
people's affection, winning in the opinion polls, and driving them ahead with ideas' 
(Moore, interview, 1998). For 'winning affection', Moore stressed his leadership style 
as being 'inclusive', especially in terms of policy formulation (Harris, 1993a). Moore 
said: 'You cannot expect people to be loyal to decisions they had no part in making' 
(Herbert, 1993a). Also, as a prolific reader of books 178 on management, he had clear 
ideas as to what constitutes good leadership: 
It's about coaching, about getting the best out of people, about getting the average 
to feel good about themselves, about selecting the right people for the right jobs ... 
management in opposition is about morale. (McLoughlin, 1991) 
True leadership is not about the belligerent imposition of fixed views but 
extending solutions so that the people are involved and committed to the result 
(Moore, 1993a: 53) 
You cannot conscript the people. You must inspire and enlist them. (Moore, 
1993a: 192) 
In practice, between 1990 and 1993 Moore arranged weekly meetings for 
consultation with caucus members including the new intake. He also boldly allocated 
significantly important responsibilities to the seven new caucus members (see Chapter 
3). Looking back, Moore insists that new MPs had never been treated in such a manner. 
In addition, he ensured that each new member be allocated question time in 
parliamentary debate (Moore, interview, 1998). 
Lange attests that Moore was successful as an 'inclusive' leader during 'the bulk of 
the time' between 1990 and 1993: 'He always tries to be inclusive179 • And he's often 
rejected because of that you know. But you could never criticise him for being some 
sort of distant person. He is a very inclusive operator' (Lange, interview, 1996). Austin 
agrees, 'he was always consultative' (Austin, interview, 1996). Judith Tizard 
remembers, as a new MP, when she was asked by Moore directly: 'What will you judge 
my leadership by?' To which she answered: 'I'll judge you by how you treat your 
friends and enemies in the caucus, and what shape we're in after the next election' 
(Tizard, interview, 1998). The leader was obviously eager to be judged well. 
178 Moore once boasted in an interview that he privately owned 'one of the great libraries on earth'. In 
the same interview, he also stated: 'I read everyday. 1 would chew up a couple of books a week, easy, 
and if I'm going away for a long weekend I'll take five or six books. I read both to be informed and for 
entertainment' (McMillan, 1993: 66). However, one journalist questioned how much information the 
former leader actually absorbs from the reading. 'His intellectual hunger and passion for trading ideas is 
boundless. What he flings back out, eyes blazing, veers between rare insight and incomprehensive 
babble. At times he seems only to have retained slogans from his reading, skittering across the surface' 
(Laugesen, 1993a) 
179 Moore's effort was not universally recognised though. When asked about his trying to be 
inclusive, one MP says: 'Yeah? Oh, that's interesting. I failed to notice it' (Anonymous, interview, 
1998). 
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... sometimes, you know, particularly that first year, you'd come into your office 
and there might be a note saying: 'Where the hell are you? You know, 'I came to 
visit...regards, Mike'. So he was making an effort to keep in touch with those of 
us. (Tizard, interviyw, 1998) 
In the debating chamber, he was often seen personally congratulating his colleagues 
after good speeches or sharing jokes with backbenchers. He also won praise from other 
MPs for successfully motivating his fellow members (Laugesen, 1993a). In September 
1992, Moore boasted of what had been achieved in the PLP under his leadership: 'We 
are now truly inclusive and consensus building in the way we do things' (NZLP, 1992a: 
102). 
Moore's personal staff also praise his leadership style. Clayton Cosgrove, for 
example, says: 
The thing you've got to understand is a lot of those people who were employed by 
Mike became close friends because that was just the nature of the man. . .. Most 
of the people who work with him like him. He is a person who treats his staff and 
those around him - caucus colleagues - very we11180. (Cosgrove, interview, 1996). 
A political journalist also acknowledged that Moore had a soft side: 'This Moore is 
effusive, tactile, as if craving warmth and affection, certainly offering it'181 (James, 
1993e: 164). 
However, he did not over-alleviate his dominant tendency by being 'inclusive'. Or, 
perhaps more accurately, he did not see the necessity to do so. As a leader, there was a 
limit to how 'inclusive' one should be. He talked about prime ministership, to which he 
was clearly aspiring: 'Prime Ministers have to know what they want and be prepared to 
trust their own judgement'. He continued: 
I find it tragic to watch people I admire - all sorts of people from all parties -
who change; who no longer trust themselves and have to seek consultants on every 
little issue. They weren't elected because of their consultants but because of their 
general views of life. (McMillan, 1993: 23) 
Lange says: 
He's a sort of Saddam Hussein of NZ politics in the sense that 'This is what I 
want to do.' And I mean that's an admirable feature, he's not a namby pamby 
180 Cosgrove's loyalty and commitment to Moore became evident once again in his involvement in 
discussions about setting up a break-away 'centre' political party around the former Labour leader in 
1995 (Laws, 1998: 289). 
181 Even some strong Clark supporters agree that Moore could be generous and personally supportive. 
Judith Tizard recalls her experience during the election campaign. '1 was diagnosed as having a major 
cancer in June 93, and had an operation, major operation a month later. Mike was very kind 
personally. He gave us very useful advice about how to deal with the media and political aspects of 
being seriously ill. Of course, he had been through similar himself. And obviously, he regretted the 
way he had dealt with it at the time. And 1 mean, I was very grateful for that, and [he] said: 'Take 
whatever time you need".' (Tizard, interview, 1998) 
131 
'giving in' fellow. He decides what he'd like. And he therefore is of the old 
school of politics. He is the 'first past the post' where if you win you dance on 
someone else's body; and you don't give them the kiss of life you give them the 
kiss of death. That's what Mike is, the old Labour politician. (Lange, interview, 
1996) 
The knowledge of what he wanted and the trust in his own judgement often made 
him impatient. One Labour MP reportedly said, '[h]e'll have an idea and want it 
implemented immediately with no analysis of it' (Laugesen, 1993f). Moore's loyal 
supporter and personal friend, Geoff Braybrooke, acknowledges that this caused a 
problem for some. '[Does he] antagonise people? Of course he does. Because they 
don't always go with what he thinks is right' (Braybrooke, interview, 1998). Caygill is 
one MP who found him in such a light, 'He would issue orders ... he would be 
"peremptory" would issue commands' (Caygill, interview, 1996). Tizard agrees: 
And I feel that he didn't allow other people to actually say what they were 
thinking. He often assumed that he knew what your views were. He's not a 
terribly good consulter, not a very good listener actually. And that's a huge 
problem. (Tizard, interview, 1998) 
When he was presented with opposing views, Moore did not react well, either. 
[H]e would literally tum away often if he disagreed with you. He just..., you 
know, he loved swinging chairs ... If he disagreed with you, he'd turn around like 
that. And you'd still be talking. And you know, you just [think there is] no point 
in saying whatever it was. (Tizard, interview, 1998) 
Ruth Dyson has a similar view. 
He's quite aggressive in the way he responds. He's quite insulting to people who 
had different views. And I don't think that's a constructive way for a leader to 
operate. (Dyson, interview, 1998) 
This kind of belief and behaviour inevitably led to personality clashes with those with 
whom he needed to work closely. As already noted, his relationship with party officials 
such as Dyson and Timms collapsed. Similarly, his relationship with some of his 
Parliamentary colleagues including Clark deteriorated severely. Moore's distrust in 
those people who expressed opposition against him and his views steadily grew. 
Moore must have known that he needed to be careful. He himself acknowledged: 
'There's a fine line between leadership and bullying, being decisive and being arrogant' 
(Moore, 1993a). This is another illustration of his paradoxical character. 
The 1993 Election and Moore's behavioural change 
The 1993 election and the real prospect of winning it brought Moore to a crucial turning 
point. Once the election was in sight, his behaviour started to change and his 
suppressed dominant tendency began to resurface more frequently. Lange comments, 
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'about, I would say, halfway through 1993 we suddenly started to see the rise of the 
personality cult ... and then you saw the exclusive Mike' (Lange, interview, 1996). 
What brought about this sudden change? According to Lange, it was his 
'recklessness and driving ambition. Mike really wanted to be PM again. He came 
really close to being a PM again (Lange, interview, 1996)'. Strongly rebutting Lange's 
view, Moore provides another explanation. He claims that he had to abandon the 
inclusive approach because some caucus MPs were deliberately trying to undermine his 
leadership . 
... the caucus met on the Thursday, and they [his critics] would meet on 
Wednesday night... frequently in David Lange's office and they would work out 
next day how to unnerve me at the caucus meeting, points of order, difficult 
subjects, leaking ... leaking all the time. Anything, any papers that went into caucus 
went to the newspapers. And it became a nightmare, and some of them, while I 
was speaking in Parliament, would start rustling paper, pretending they were 
asleep, yawning, just to make life difficult. (Moore, interview, 1998) 
Another factor which induced his behavioural change was his deteriorating 
relationship with the party officials, which has been already noted. With his leadership 
solely dependent on winning the election and having no trust in their willingness in 
assisting him to achieve it, Moore opted to run a highly personalised campaign, assisted 
by the MMSC. For example, in Fighting for New Zealand (which was published prior 
to the election), he talked about Labour's election campaign as if it had been his 
personal project: 'Mine is not just a campaign. It is a crusade, and a mission for a better 
future for New Zealand and New Zealanders' (Moore, 1993a: 16, emphasis added). 
Backed up by the high rating of his personal popularity, Moore utilised himself fully, 
by letting himself and his photogenic wife, Yvonne, feature widely in the campaign 
materials182 • For example, Labour's campaign billboards was described as 'bearing his 
face, his name and nothing else' (Armstrong, 1993a). Similarly, Labour's television 
campaign opened with tributes to him, in which Moore himself, his caucus colleagues 
and his wife discussed his character (Laugesen, 1993c). The party's full-page 
advertisements in newspapers also focused exclusively on the leader (Levine and 
Roberts, 1994b: 47). 
The campaign's strong emphasis on the leader drew some sharp criticisms from his 
opponents. For instance, immediately after the election, Lange wrote in The Dominion: 
The Labour campaign was a remarkable, and unprecedented, projection of 
personality. The character of Mike Moore was marketed in a way which was 
calculated to make the history, traditions and policy of the party the property of the 
leader. (Lange, 1993a) 
182 His campaign strategy has been said to be heavily influenced by American President, Bill 
Clinton's 1992 election campaign. Caygill says, 'Mike has always in my view been heavily 
influenced by American types of campaign. He reads a lot about American politics ... Mike has been 
influenced by them and was in the 1993 campaign' (Caygill, interview, 1996). 
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Moore strongly denies such a criticism, describing it as 'exactly opposite' (Moore, 
2000). 
See, you say that. 'How's that? Is that true? It's no more true than it has been in 
any other campaign. In fact, less true. We made us ... a lot of our publications, I 
put Helen Clark in there, I put Michael Cullen in there. We went in there as a 
team. There was a less focus on me than there was [on] David Lange. I mean he 
even attacked me for saying that my photograph was on the manifesto, as if that 
had never happened before, Bill Rowling was on the manifesto, so that's happened 
frequently before ... Have you seen those booklets we put out - the larger ones 
with a window cut in them [see NZLP, 1993b]? Everybody's face was in them. 
That's never happened before. (Moore, interview, 1998) 
However, in the following comments he appears to admit that the criticism had a point. 
In fact, the poll ... one of the reasons that I didn't do it [was] because the polls 
showed I was strong, and they were weak. The polling showed that as Leader I 
was strong, but as a team we looked weak. I tried to build a team in the campaign. 
I don't think that is technically possible. (Moore, interview, 1998) 
As Moore noted above, the 'presidential' style of campaigning with emphasis on 
party leaders was not so uncommon in New Zealand. Many MPs and party officials 
indeed accepted such a need. Yet, to what extent Moore should dominate the campaign 
became controversial. Street looks back at the campaign and comments: 
At that point, I have always conceded that there is an element of the campaign that 
must be presidential. There is a focus on the leader. It is a feature of New 
Zealand campaigns - and not just New Zealand ones. But the New Zealand 
electorate does seem to require a leader to embody the things that they are looking 
for. And so, the personality of the leader is always going to be an element in an 
election campaign. And so, I didn't object to that in principle. But the degree to 
which it happened in that 93 election was almost obscene. You know the full 
colour pictures of Yvonne and Mike in the Herald cost us hundreds and thousands 
of dollars. And the stuff was so focused on Mike and so completely obliterating 
of Labour that it was really agitating party members. (Street, interview, 1998) 
The election campaign strategy was not the only area where the leader came under 
criticism. Moore's behaviour during the campaign became 'exclusive' in other respects, 
too. For example, Tizard noticed that he became 'increasingly dismissive of other 
people's views' (Tizard, interview, 1998). Street says that his financial leverage as the 
main provider of the campaign finance (through the MMSC) made his power and 
influence more formidable than other PLP leaders, and he was certainly willing to 
exercise them to 'have his own way' (Street, interview, 1998) . 
... He was really hard to work with because he would over-ride things and make 
unilateral decisions, and then just shout until everybody said: 'Oh, yeah, all right, 
then do it', you know. So the decision making process ... was far from exemplary. 
(Street, interview, 1998) 
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Under the increasing pressure, the distinction between his 'in-group' and 'out-
group' became clearer and clearer. Street says that there were a group of 'utter 
devotees' and others 'who were not so devoted [to him], and the leader treated the latter 
'with suspicion' (Street, interview, 1998). Moore openly admits that that was the case 
for some of his colleagues. 'There is a bit of truth in that [claim]. There were one or 
two I didn't trust, one or two I didn't think were very good, didn't have anything to 
offer' (Moore, interview, 1998). The 'in- group' which mainly consisted of his 
personal staff (and a few MPs), continued to increase its importance to the leader. 
Caygill notes: 
He ... surrounded himself with a small group of people of advisers and assistants 
who he worked with, as if he trusted only that group and not others outside that 
group. (Caygill, interview, 1996) 
The core of Moore'.s personal staff including Clayton Cosgrove, Murray 
Wansbrough and Barry Ebert were referred to as 'the Beagle Boys' by disgruntled 
party members (Harris, 1993b). They were Moore loyalists, shared his 'vision,)83 
(Cosgrove, interview, 1996). Their behaviour, that was described as similar to Moore's 
(Blincoe, interview, 1997), antagonised the 'out-group'. Caygill contends, 'somehow 
some of the people he surrounded himself with were - Clayton Cosgrove was one of his 
aides - ... treated by other people as though [they] were entitled to express the leader's 
personal wish' (Caygill, interview, 1996). To people like Lange, selecting those people 
and allowing them such autonomy was seen as a sign of poor leadership. 
[He selected] The ones he agrees with. Mike has a very interesting range of 
contacts. And he sensibly does not keep a relationship with those who disagree 
with him. One of the hard things about being a leader is that you ought to 
assemble different pieces of advice and select the best. Mike tends to assemble 
the advice that people think he would like. (Lange, interview, 1996) 
Another Moore opponent holds a similar view. S/he believes that by surrounding 
himself with sycophants, he unwittingly helped his own demise. Referring to Moore's 
earlier mentioned lack of discipline, s/he says: 
... I'm not saying that he couldn't be disciplined, but just that he never surrounded 
himself with people who could do that. Because the way you get discipline is by 
being challenged professionally or intellectually all the time, you know. And if 
you surround yourself with people who just go, 'Yes Mike, yes Mike, yes Mike' ; 
you are not going to achieve that. So ... it's a shame, really. (Anonymous, 
interview, 1998) 
183 Street argues that their connection to the leader was 'emotional' rather than 'born out of a 
commitment to principle'. She doubts their loyalty to the Labour Party, but is absolutely sure about 
their loyalty to Moore. (Street, interview, 1998) 
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The feeling of isolation and exclusion was also acutely felt amongst women whose 
prominence had been steadily increasing within the party 1 84. The problem between 
Moore and women was not new. For example, in 1986, Helen Clark described Moore 
as someone who 'can't help appearing sexist' (Myers, 1986: 166). Maryan Street 
asserts that his 'sexist' view was reflected in his selection of his 'in-group' as well. 
But those men, and they were all men, there were never any women in the circle 
around Mike, and I think that is important. He had to work with me, and he had to 
work with Helen. Helen was his deputy ... I think he's always had a bit of a 
problem with powerful or influential, or strong women. I think that is an enduring 
problem area for him. (Street, interview, 1998) 
Judith Tizard agrees. She also believes that his difficulty with women affected his 
dealing with his deputy as well. 
I don't think he is entirely comfortable with women and his office reflected that. I 
think he tried to work quite carefully with Helen, but I don't think, for example, he 
ever used her skills particularly well. (Tizard, interview, 1998) 
To long-time Moore critics, Moore's changed behaviour did not come as a surprise, 
as Caygill comments: ' ... the more exclusive, even manic behaviour he did exhibit during 
the campaign was not much of a surprise' (Caygill, interview, 1996). To them, his 
behaviour during the election campaign was a mere manifestation of his true 
characteristics which they had known and Moore had tried to control. It simply 
reconfirmed the negative views held against him from the outset of his leadership 1 85 . 
More importantly, as his dominant tendency was displayed publicly during the 
campaign, those who previously had not been concerned about (or aware of) this 
shortcoming of his now could recognise it as a serious problem. As is to be seen in the 
next chapter, these 'new finders' included the new MPs whose opinions ultimately 
sealed Moore's fate. 
MMP 
Like the policy concern, the introduction of MMP weakened Moore's position in 
relation to the unity concern on two fronts. Firstly, as almost half of the MPs were to be 
selected through party lists which were compiled by each political party, leaders' ability 
to sustain good relationships with their own parties was seen as more vital than ever. 
Not surprisingly, Moore's acrimonious relationship with the party officials was seen as 
184 With regard to female representation in the PLP, see McLeay (1993). 
185 Some even questioned how seriously Moore hoped to restrain his dominant tendency in the first 
place. Tizard attests that after being asked about her leadership jUdging criteria, she was never again 
approached by Moore on how he was performing according to those criteria. Although she occasionally 
offered him some comments, Moore showed interest only in 'gossip' or 'things that gave him power' 
(Tizard, interview, 1998). 
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posing a potential problem in this area. Even the former leader himself acknowledged 
this in his opposition to the new electoral system prior to the referendum. Being acutely 
aware that he was offside with the party officials and thus future candidates selected by 
them would likely to be ·against him, he argued: 'I fear the power of the party system if 
there are lists and not electorates'. 'The clear message is look after the party bosses, 
they will have the power to lift placings on the lists' (Moore, 1993a: 86). 
Secondly, and more importantly, it was generally considered that under MMP leaders 
had to have skills/abilities to negotiate with other political parties in order to form a 
coalition government or achieve some form of co-operation, as no single party was likely 
to secure the majority. The trouble for Moore was, amongst political parties available, 
the most likely future partner of Labour was the Alliance, with whose leader he had had 
a strained relationship. A political journalist, Gordon Campbell wrote shortly after the 
1993 leadership change: 'The legacy of his [Moore's] personal antagonism to [Jim] 
Anderton now makes co-operation that will be essential under MMP quite difficult' 
(Campbell, 1993a: 38_39)186. 
The impact of failing to resolve the concerns 
How did Moore's failure to alleviate the concerns over his leadership affect his support 
composition? Its effect can be found at least in two areas. Firstly, it convinced a small 
number of moderate/right caucus members - most notably Caygill - who were in line 
with Moore policy-wise that a leadership change was necessary on the ground of his 
unsuitable leadership style. Secondly, it strengthened the resolve of the caucus left who 
were already opposing him for his policy stances. The level of personal animosity 
towards Moore within the party after the election was palpable. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the expectations of and concerns about Moore's leadership in 
the caucus during the period of 1990-1993. Upon returning to Parliament after the 
devastating 1990 election, the leader was fully aware that retention of his leadership 
would depend upon meeting those expectations and eradicating the concerns. The 
186 The change to the new electoral system certainly played a part in the 1993 leadership change by 
underlining Moore's problems as the leader and accentuating Clark's contrasting competence (see 
Chapter 5). However, one ought not to over-exaggerate the importance of this variable. In other 
words, it merely hastened the already moving process. The anti-Moore group were already convinced 
that Moore should be replaced, regardless of the outcome of the referendum. Asked whether Moore 
could have survived if the FPP system had been retained, Dyson replies: '[P]eople had major concerns 
about him as leader under the First-Past-the-Post system. So, I think regardless he would have gone. 
But I think the fact that we were moving into a new environment just highlighted those concerns ... 
So, [his leadership style was] not a good way to operate under First-Past-the-Post, but it's even worse 
under MMP' (Dyson, interview, 1998). Also see Chapter 5. 
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analysis of this chapter has revealed that despite his early success, Moore increasingly 
struggled at both tasks as time passed. In response, discontent with his leadership in the 
caucus gradually yet steadily grew. Under these circumstances, the imperativeness of 
fulfilling the expectation of winning the 1993 election for his survival increased. 
So, how did Moore's performance at the two tasks affect his support composition in 
1993? Did the MPs align at the 1993 leadership vote in the way the propositions would 
suggest? These questions, amongst others, will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTERS 
The vulnerability of the Moore leadership 
Introduction 
Moore failed to either meet his opponents' expectations or eradicate his opponents' 
concerns during the 1990-1993 period. Could his performance in these regards explain 
the collapse of his leadership, as suggested in Chapter 2? This second part of the 
analysis of the Moore leadership examines the validity of the propositions of this study 
more closely against the findings. At the same time, an attempt will be made to 
identify/analyse the variables which affected Moore's leadership demise. 
Moore's 1993 support composition at the time of the leadership vote on 1 December 
provides an obvious starting point for the validity analysis. 
Moore's 1993 support composition 
On 1 December 1993, Moore's support composition appears to have been as follows: 
Loyalists: Braybrooke, Elder, Hawkins, Moore, Robertson, Tapsell, 
Tirikatene-Sulli van 
Uncommitted supporters: Austin, Cullen, Dunne, Duynhoven, Goff, Keall, King, 
Opponents 
Matthewson, O'Connor, Sutton, Tennet, Wetere 
Blincoe, Barker, Burton, Carter, Caygill, Clark, Dalziel, Dyson, 
Field, Gallagher, Hodgson, Hunt, Kelly, Lange, MacKey, Maharey, 
Mallard, Northey, Peck, Pettis, Sinclair, Sutherland, Swain, Tizard, 
White, Yates 
Characteristics of the 1993 Moore support composition 
Moore's opponents now outnumbered his supporters (the sum of the loyalists plus the 
uncommitted supporters) by seven. In comparison to the 1990 initial support 
composition, three points are clear. Firstly, nine 1990 uncommitted supporters had 
switched to become the opponents. They were: Blincoe, Clark, Dalziel, Hodgson, Hunt, 
Maharey, Sutherland, Swain, and Tizard. This result contains no surprise considering 
Moore's failure to meet the expectations and appease the concerns. The second point is 
probably less expected than the first. Despite Moore's failure at the two tasks, twelve 
supporters (excluding Moore himself) stayed with him. Thirdly, a clear voting pattern 
was observed among MPs' 'classes'; Moore derived his support mainly from the MPs 
who first entered Parliament before 1990, while the majority of Clark supporters won 
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their first seats after 1990. All the 1990 and 1993 new intake, except for one from each 
class (Hawkins and O'Connor) voted for Clark. 
Each of these three points raises a further question, which are vital to a 
comprehensive understanding of the 1993 leadership change. They are: 
The Moore opponents: 
o Why and how Clark became 'the' alternative leader among the growing Moore 
opponents? 
It Did the 1993 new intake who had to choose their leader after being in Parliament 
less than two months possess sufficient knowledge of the two contenders to make 
a sound judgement? If so, how did they accumulate it? 
The Moore supporters: 
.. Why did the twelve MPs continue to support him? Why did his failure to achieve 
the two tasks not affect their stance? 
This study now examines these points. 
Moore opponents 
How did Clark emerge as the alternative leader? 
It has already become clear that the number of the Moore opponents within the caucus 
steadily increased as a direct result of his leadership performance. However, the 
dissatisfaction with his leadership alone cannot fully explain Moore's demise. What is 
required to gain a total picture of Moore's downfall is the emergence of Clark as the 
alternative leader, as no leadership change can occur without someone to replace the 
incumbent. 
It appears that the dissatisfaction with Moore's performance in terms of meeting the 
expectations and especially resolving the concerns not only decreased his support within 
the caucus, but also strengthened the standing of Clark, who had a very different 
operational style and disposition (as outlined in Chapter 1). Such striking contrast no 
doubt worked in favour of Clark, who was already a potential successor of Moore 
through her No.2 position in the caucus187 . When the anti-Moore group looked for an 
alternative to replace him, the qualities which they sought were abilities to solve (or 
avoid) the problems associated with his leadership. As those problems were largely 
attributed to his personality and his operational style, they naturally found an ideal 
candidate in Clark, who was as different from the troubled leader as anyone could hope 
for. With regard to Moore's erratic tendency, his deputy was seen as much more 
predictable and reliable. In a recent interview, Clark herself said: 'You don't get 
unpredictable things from me, I'm very predictable' (Main, 1998b). 
187 For instance, Judith Tizard says: 'Helen, who had been Deputy twice ... obviously saw herself as the 
next leader. So she was the natural person to whom those who were dissatisfied with Mike would to 
come to' (Tizard, interview, 1998). 
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In tenns of the dominance problem, Clark was also viewed favourably. Her 
supporters' general perception in this respect was that she would make a consensus 
seeking, inclusive leader. 
[W]e were looking for a person who could give us really sound policies, who 
could run a government, not run an opposition, who could run a government, and 
who could include everyone in the team so we didn't have to have the sort of 'half 
the caucus left out and half the caucus feeling like they knew everything' feeling. 
And even though Helen was clearly identified with the left of the party, she's got 
amazing inclusive skills. (Dyson, interview, 1998) 
As a candidate for the deputy's position, CaygiU 'felt that I could work well with 
Helen', a confidence which he never had with Moore. Thus, 'I had encouraged [Clark] 
to think of challenging Mike for the leadership by talking with her about that even 
before the 1993 election. I said to her that if she did, she would have my support' 
(Caygill, interview, 1996). Some of the reasons which Northey lists for supporting Clark 
also resonate this view. 
She was able to recognise and value her colleagues for the worth of their ideas and 
their work, whether they were on the party's left or right, men or women, Maori or 
Pakeha. 
She knew the Party and how it should rule well from her experience as a New 
Zealand Councillor at the Party and a broad range of roles in it. 
She was intelligent, sensitive and reliable. (Northey 1998a) 
Clark was also believed to perfonn significantly better where Moore failed in tenns 
of his given expectations. In relation to restoring the relationship between the EPLP 
and PLP, Clark had enjoyed a long and trusting relationship with the EPLP. As a 
fonner President notes: 'Helen was really well respected in the party. I mean, anyone 
who has worked with her always has had respect for ability and the level of work that 
she puts into things' (Dyson, interview, 1998). Even after becoming an MP, unlike 
many of her colleagues, she remained firmly convinced that the PLP should be 
responsible to the EPLP. The party's trust in her is most evident in her success in 
remaining as the only MP Party Executive through the turbulent fourth Labour 
Government years until 1989 (with a break in 1988) (McCallum, 1993: 149). Based on 
this proven track record, Clark's attitude towards the EPLP and party policy was 
believed to be markedly different from Moore. Clark was fully aware of that: 'I was 
never thought of by the party as someone who thought the manifesto was for the 
dustbin' (McCallum, 1993: 153). 
The then deputy leader was also more critical of and thus keener to depart from 
Rogernomics (Caygill, interview, 1998) and (less importantly) had a more liberal stance 
on moral issues than Moore. Although she was a Cabinet Minister in the fourth Labour 
Government, unlike Moore, she was not appointed to the position until 1987. Together 
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with her social policy related Ministerial positions, her reputation was hardly tainted by 
her association with the 1984-1990 Government188 . As Sutherland puts it, 
... I think the feeling was that we have to finally shed the remnants and connection 
with the Roger Douglas and Richard Prebble era, and that the only way to do 
that... - and this is not my position, I'm just talking to you from people who were 
supporting Clark - was that... she was the only one who was capable of sort of... 
taking over the leadership and allowing that sort of thing to happen. (Sutherland, 
interview, 1998). 
Clark herself acknowledged this necessity upon her election: 'What I want is a strong, 
clearly identifiable social democratic, centre-left party which articulates what it stands for 
without equivocation' (Clifton, 1993b) 
Also, as a stricter observer of the rules than Moore, she was expected to follow the 
formal policy making procedure. In addition, once policies were made, she was also 
believed to represent them more faithfully. For instance, Street asserts that she expected 
that under the new leadership, the party's formal policy making process and agreed 
policies would be more respected as she could bring a 'more intelligent approach to 
policy and more consistent approach to policy' (Street, interview, 1998). Northey 
concurs: 'She had a consistent, logical, principled, coherent approach to policy 
formation and decision making in the Party' (Northey, 1998a). 
The role of the 1993 referendum 
In the previous chapter, it was indicated that the arrival of MMP intensified the concerns 
over Moore's leadership style, making his position more untenable. The three essential 
leadership skills/abilities which he was perceived to be lacking were those of: a) 
presenting clearly distinguishable policies; and b) working harmoniously with the EPLP 
(especially in terms of party list making); and c) establishing/maintaining constructive 
working relationships with other political parties in view of forming a future coalition. 
The same new electoral system was also a contributory factor to Clark's emergence 
as the alternative, highlighting her claimed positive attributes, and helping strengthen her 
case. In contrast to Moore, Clark being better equipped with the three required skills 
meant that her supporters could promote the alternative leader more vigorously189. 
188 In an interview, Clark said that she believed that she was elected into the Cabinet in 1987 because 
the party needed somebody to keep deregulatory policies away from the social policy area. (McCallum, 
1993: 151). In another interview, she explained that her first Cabinet post as the Housing Minister 
was allocated by the then Prime Minister, Lange, because he saw her 'as a block to the New Right 
approach' (Baysting et aI., 1993: 86) 
189 This was despite Clark being an open and strong opponent of MMP. However, her reason for 
opposing the new system were different from that of Moore, which was his distrust of the party 
hierarchy (see Chapter 4). She argued that the proposed system would be unlikely to produce a party 
with a majority. Under such circumstances, she contended, too much power would be given to minor 
parties, which in tum would make honouring a manifesto considerably difficult (H. Clark, 1993). 
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On the policy front, for example, Maharey prepared a letter to his constituents in 
which he delineated his reasons for supporting Clark, that read: 
The arrival of MMP meant that the party needed a leader who could clearly set out 
Labour's position: 
Under MMP ... some things are very important. 
1. Parties will need to have a very clearly stated position. 
2. They will need to attract support rather than rely on voter dislike of the current 
government. 
3. Parties will need to ensure they have an attractive team of people to put to the 
electorate. 
My support for Helen is based on my belief that she is a Leader whose time has 
come. (Maharey, 1993) 
Dyson comments on this point as follows: 
[M]y view is ... that that [fudging issues] just gets you into more trouble. You end 
up satisfying no-one because one group's going to be disappointed ... however 
they interpreted it, and it is much better to be really up-front about what you're 
going to do, and explain it very clearly, so that the people can make an infonned 
choice ... [T]hat is the key difference between how Helen operates and the way 
Mike operates ... (Dyson, interview, 1998) 
Clark herself linked her candidacy to the new political environment induced by 
MMP. The day before the leadership vote, she explained that MMP 'has a very 
substantial amount to do with' her challenge against Moore. With regard to the need 
for clearer policies, the challenger said: 
In the future, Labour can no longer rely on an appeal to the electorate that says: 
'Well, we are not as bad as they are'. Under MMP, people can vote for whoever 
they like, and expect to get representation in Parliament for that. And that means 
that Labour must position itself in the political scene with a clear political 
programme to attract votes in its own right. (Morning Report, Radio New Zealand, 
30 November 1993) 
On the second front - skills and abilities to work constructively with the party 
officials - Clark's credentials were impeccable. As already noted, she had always 
maintained close and friendly relationships with the party officials even during the 
difficult 1984-1990 period. The trust that the party officials placed in her was almost 
absolute. 
With regard to her abilities/skills in the third area, shortly after the coup, Caygill 
wrote a newspaper article explaining the complexity of job demands on the leadership 
under MMP. Then he went on to justify the change of the leadership in this context, 
praising Clark as a person with the necessary abilities to respond to such demands 
competently: 
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... Firstly, of course, the leader needs to be able to command the support of a 
majority of caucus members. The caucus's concerns necessarily focus on matters 
of internal management. But the ability to present policy effectively - to lead, in 
short - is also crucial. On the other hand, this new environment requires a leader 
able to work harmoniously with other political interests. 
To be conciliatory while differentiating our political product will not be easy. I 
believe Helen Clark has the necessary mix of attributes in large measure. (Caygill, 
1993) 
He concluded that to meet the challenges presented by the new electoral system, leaders 
need 'bold, intelligent, disciplined leadership' which 'Labour (now) offers' (Caygill, 
1993). Street is more blunt in her analysis: 
All parties compete with each other for a share of the vote under MMP, but you 
needed to have people who could negotiate with those competitors after the event 
in order to establish a coalition government. In the view of many of us, Mike 
Moore was not that person... So, he was defeated in favour of Helen. (Street, 
interview, 1998) 
While there was little doubt that Clark and her supporters took full advantage of the 
new electoral system, it is important to stress MMP's role as merely a contributory 
factor. After all, Clark herself was an open and strong opponent of MMP (H. 
Clark,1993). Because ofthis, some privately expressed their concerns about Clark's 
capability of making a smooth transition to it (Dyson, interview, 1998). 
The 1993 intake 
Another determining factor in sealing Moore's fate was the 1993 new intake, who 
overwhelmingly supported Clark. Although Moore's support eroded during the 1990-
1993 period, within the remaining MPs from this group after the 1993 election (25 of 
them) he still maintained a majority support of 13 against Clark's 12. In other words, 
Clark's challenge would not have been successful without the 1993 new intake. It is 
noteworthy that everybody in this group except for one (O'Connor) voted for Clark 
whereas a majority (five out of seven) of the returning former MPs, who lost their seats 
in 1990, supported Moore. Because the new intake's disproportionate preference for 
Clark, the Moore camp claimed that there must have been a deliberate bias in the 
selection process. For example, the former leader himself attributed his loss of the top 
position to this factor in a TV interview in 1996: 
I lost the leadership of the Labour Party well before the election. I lost the 
leadership of the Labour Party after the selection was made. On the eve of the 
selections '[if] you [were] the candidate for X or Y seat', they were asked by the 
President who they would support as the leader, Mike Moore or Helen Clark.190 
(Assignment, 20 June 1996, TV1, 7:30pm) 
190 Whether such a question was asked to potential candidates and whether the selections were made 
based on their replies was a subject of dispute. Austin, a Moore supporter, denies such claim. 
Although holding low respect for the then party officials, she shows reservations about Moore's 
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Moore's claim was not groundless. Under the three previous Presidents (Margaret 
Wilson, Dyson, and Street), Labour had been selecting candidates to ensure the 
representation of certain-ideological viewpoints. In Colin James' words, they 'quietly 
refashioned the caucus through selections of people of whom not many were Moore 
types' (James, 1993b). With regard to the candidate selection for the 1993 election, 
Sheppard documented that in the 'second phase' of the selection - following the 1992 
Party Conference - the chosen candidates were disproportionately from the 
UnionistlFeminist factions of the party (Sheppard, 1998). So, as Moore argued, was his 
demise as the leader a forgone conclusion before the election? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to examine why and how the 1993 new intake 
decided to support Clark. The 'hidden agenda' theory suggests, as Moore put it, that 
'[t]he new members of Parliament had a view before they got here [Parliament] (Kilroy, 
1994).' Asked whether there was any bias in the candidate selection for the 1993 
election, Maryan Street, the then Senior Vice President of the party191 replies in a 
disarmingly honest manner: 'Absolutely. Absolutely. Completely'. However, she 
quickly adds that the bias was not against Moore himself but it was 'discrimination in 
favour of people with left-wing politics' 192. Because of their policy views, they were 
more likely to oppose Moore who was seen as an integral part of the fourth Labour 
Government; in other words, the fact that the majority of the 1990 and 1993 candidates 
voted for the leadership change was merely consequential. Street explains the selections 
of the 1993 candidates in the following terms . 
... we were very careful in the party to select people whose economics we could 
trust, who were much more explicitly left of centre in their economic policy than 
we had tested before with people. So we tried to make sure that the past couldn't 
repeat itself. ... But if there were some residual Rogernomes ['Rogernomics' 
supporters] in the caucus, then they would be outnumbered. And we were 
successful in that. .. We had a much more unified band of people corne in in 93 
than we had seen previously. (Street, interview, 1998) 
assertion: 'No, I don't think that's true. I don't think that's true. It would have been revealed if that is 
the case. I think you've got to give the Labour Party some credibility, but I could be wrong but I 
would doubt if people would be asked that sort of question ... and in fact the selections were made fn 
1992 in the main.' (Austin, interview, 1997) 
191 Asked how deeply she was involved in the 1993 candidate selections, she replies: ' ... when Ruth 
Dyson was President, I accompanied her on most selection panels as SVP [Senior Vice President], and 
certainly on all the contentious ones eg, Onehunga. We had an agenda in mind which was consistent 
with Margaret Wilson's agenda before us, and we worked at it. So the answer to your question is - very 
deeply' (Street, 1998). 
192 The pre-1990 intakes were, on the other hand, selected with different criteria. As one MP 
belonging to this group says: ' Some [MPs] like myself and a number of others in the caucus were 
selected as candidates at a stage when Labour had grown tired of being in opposition and knew they had 
to win more votes from the centre. . .. [T]hey selected more centrist candidates to stand in electorates, 
marginal electorates.' (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
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Both Dyson and Street vehemently deny Moore's accusation that candidates were 
directly asked about their preferred leader at their selection interviews. For example, 
Dyson says: 
That's just a lie! It's just crap! He knows that's not true ... I mean, I didn't ask 
anyone. It's rubbish. (Dyson, interview, 1998) 
Even Damien O'Connor doubts if there was such a direct approach, while not 
completely ruling out such a possibility. 
I don't think it would have been that blatant. Maybe with some of the MPs, a 
small clique, that may have happened. But I think with a majority of the new ones 
coming in, that probably wasn't the situation. It would have happened far more 
subtly than that. (O'Connor, interview, 1998) 
However, the new intake's almost unanimous support for Clark was undeniable. 
Maharey describes this group's enthusiasm for the change in the following terms. 
The bulk of people who came in in 1993 were not Moore supporters. They were 
people who were grumbling in the party before they became candidates, and 
before they won their seats... There were people right through that group who 
clearly came in saying: 'We are here. We want a change. We've lost the election. 
We want a change.' (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
The amount of knowledge about Moore and Clark which the new intake possessed upon 
entering Parliament varied depending upon their previous experiences. As Dyson 
explains, 
You know somebody as a party member. Of course you see them at conferences 
all the time; you see them two or three times a year at major conferences. You get 
to meet them, hear their presentations. As candidates, you work with the leader 
and deputy a lot [who] visit your electorate. A number of those people had been 
on the New Zealand Council, and had seen Mike as the leader. He came to the 
New Zealand Council occasionally when ... they were on the Council. Helen used 
to be a member of the New Zealand Council. ... So although we haven't worked 
with them in the position to which we were electing them - and that is a legitimate 
criticism - I think most of us had some idea about what we wanted out of the 
leader. (Dyson, interview, 1998) 
For veteran party activists like Rick Barker, the two leaders were already familiar. 'Well, 
I knew Helen quite well. I have known Helen ... since the mid 70s, I guess. I've known 
Mike for a similar period of time. Both were well known to me' (Barker, interview, 
1998). For others without a history of party activism, it was the election campaign that 
presented them with the first real opportunity to know the two figures. 
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So, why did the 1993 intake decide to oppose Moore? Northey, himself a returning 
former MP who was controversially selected as a candidate 1 93 , says that during this 
period most new candidates formed negative views of the former leader. His following 
explanation suggests that Moore's dominant tendency and erratic behaviour was 
responsible for creating his own downfall: 
The main reason the new MPs almost unanimously supported Helen Clark was 
their close experience of Mike Moore before and during the campaign. In 
particular there was the weekly telephone conference calls involving Mike Moore, 
party organisers and the non-MP candidates in winnable seats. These conference 
calls were remarkable in their nature and their impact. 
They,would begin with a long Moore monologue rave in which he would 
threaten and attack candidates for not working hard enough, not attracting enough 
loyal hard working workers for the campaign, in contrast to him, asking each to 
carry out a long unsystematic and unrealistic list of tasks in the next week or else 
let the side down, and making an apparently incoherent set of both inspirational 
and irrational comment about the issues and the campaign. Personal, behind the 
public scene conyersations between candidates and Mike Moore when he visited 
their electorate to campaign for them, reinforced this unsettling and often 
disturbing pattern. Either Mike Moore was poorly advised about how to motivate 
his candidates or else his own analysis, temperament and judgement during this 
tense period was faulty. The end result of it was to persuade all but one of the 
candidates that when he failed to win the election, serious consideration should be 
given to replacing him with someone more appropriate. (Northey, 1998a) 
Indeed, through these experiences, new candidates became quickly familiar with the 
concerns of the Moore opponents in the caucus in a short period of time. For instance, 
Jill White asserts: 'I just didn't quite see where we might be going with Mike. I found 
all the different sort of ideas that came out a bit disconcerting'. In the meantime, she 
found his deputy impressive. White says that she acquired a great respect for Clark's 
'power of analysis' and the then deputy leader's approach 'just struck a chord' with 
her in the way that Moore's approach never did (White, interview, 1998). 
Another new MP had more direct contact with Moore in relation to hislher selection 
as the candidate for the 1993 election. Moore publicly supported another candidate for 
the selection and tried to exert his influence to secure this candidate's candidacy, which 
infuriated the MP. His/her negative opinion of Moore further intensified when slhe 
confronted the leader regarding his action. 
I went up to him and told him that he was a leader of a political party, [and that] he 
had absolutely no right, as the caucus leader to be making public statements about 
who should win the selection for ***, which he had done. He denied he had done 
it. So, I presented him with a transcript and he was ... very angry, and he was 
pretty stressed, and he didn't even accept... he wouldn't speak to me. I signed my 
death warrant that day for any support from Mike Moore in my selection 
challenge. I think that was wrong. I think he should have taken it on the chin 
193 His selection was met with strong opposition from the local electorate. See, for example, 'Party 
selection anger', The New Zealand Herald, 21 December 1992, Sec.l, p.5. and Sheppard (1998), 
pp.222-224. 
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[that] I was right. And ... it was almost as if I had no right to say that to him. I 
have every right to say anything I want to say to the caucus colleagues ... 
(Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
Not surprisingly, by the time the caucus vote was taken on 1 December, s/he had 
profound concerns about Moore's 'leadership', 'direction and focus'. On the other 
hand, s/he considered Clark having a leadership style which would allow 'free 
discussion in caucus' and enable Labour to declare 'what it stood for' (Anonymous, 
interview, 1998). 
Moore supporters, however, question the accuracy of the knowledge that the 1993 
new intakehacl-accumulated as well as the strength of their commitment to Clark. 
Austin points to the hasty manner in which the coup was executed: 
... what became apparent. .. was that they had to move very quickly after the 1993 
election because they could not allow new members the lUXUry of being informed. 
They had to move quickly before the pressure that these people put on them 
during the course of the election campaign was undermined by the information 
coming through from other people. (Austin, interview, 1997) 
Moore strongly concurs l94 . 
.. . they never met me. They had never seen me speak in Parliament. What they 
[the Clark supporters] didn't want to do is give me twelve months in Parliament 
where I would have convinced them to come my way. They had to move quickly. 
They'd just won. They had never sat in Parliament... Some of them had never 
been to a Party conference ... they were fearful if I had twelve months to work on 
them, I might have charmed them. (Moore, interview, 1998) 
In fact, some of the 93 intake agree with these views. Mark Peck, who, as a party 
activist, had known both Moore and Clark for a while, lists several reasons why he 
supported the leadership change. The first reason was his wish to strengthen Clark's 
position in the public mind at the crucial beginning of her leadership. Since her win was 
generally considered a forgone conclusion in the caucus, Peck concluded a greater 
majority of her victory would help legitimise the new leadership. 
I felt that we needed a strong leadership team in the House with support of the 
bulk of the caucus. It was clear that Mike didn't have the numbers, and that Helen 
needed strong support. And I was prepared to support her. (Peck, interview, 
1998) 
Endorsing the obvious winner was not the only reason for Peck supporting Clark. 
His other reasons included Clark's impressive abilities demonstrated in her performance 
194 Moore had a very good reason to believe that the things would have been different if he had had 
more time. He had a similar experience back in 1972, although at the time from the other side of the 
spectrum as a new MP. Shortly after he was sworn in, the Labour caucus faced the task of selecting a 
Cabinet for the third Labour Government through votes. Although by the time he had already obtained 
considerable knowledge about his fellow MPs through party activism, the future Party leader found the 
selection difficult and open to manipulation, especially for newcomers (Moore, 1993b: 33). 
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as the party's health spokesperson and Moore's tendency to 'put his mouth into gear 
before he engages his brain' which was evident in his election night speech. Peck also 
says that at that time he was basing his judgement heavily on another MP with a trade 
union background 195, Graham Kelly - a strong Clark supporter. 
Interestingly, Peck is now adamant that if the vote had been taken later, he would have 
cast his vote differently. What he did not know then was 'the way the caucus worked 
and who the strategic thinkers within the caucus were'. He continues: '[C]ertainly 
having the vote as quickly as we did didn't give [us] an opportunity to make those 
assessments' (Peck, interview, 1998). 
Another-new intake whose vote could have gone to Moore is Rick Barker. 
According to him, it was at the caucus meeting on 1 December where his final choice 
was made. 
The thing that made me in the end decide to vote for a change was I felt that Mike 
in the introductien to the caucus had almost conceded the game in the way in 
which the thing had evolved. I sat and watched the first few moments. Lange was 
critical in the process of course. And I thought right from the outset of the 
meeting that Mike looked like, you know, he was beaten and that he'd thrown the 
towel in. So, I thought: Well, if I want someone who is going to fight for the 
leadership, you've got to fight all the way to the line.' (Barker, interview, 1998) 
However, how many of the 1993 new intake would have changed their votes if the 
coup had been executed later is unclear. As is to be seen in Chapters 7 and 8, the 
majority of this group would later become Clark's loyal supporters. This indicates that 
the views of those MPs would most certainly have remained the same regardless of the 
timing. Considering this, it seems that the final outcome of the change would not have 
been any different under such circumstances. 
Moore supporters: why did they support him? 
Moore loyalists 
Before answering the above question, it is helpful to analyse Moore's support 
composition more closely. Perhaps the most noticeable characteristic is its small portion 
of loyalists. As already mentioned, Moore had the distinctive 'in' and 'out' groups. 
The majority of his 'in-group' consisted of his personal staff, whom he personally 
selected, and there were few MPs included. This is apparent in Blincoe's reaction when 
asked to identify who Moore's loyalist MPs were. After a pause, he replies, 'That's a 
good question. I don't know whom he regards as rock solid allies, you know, 
confidantes in that sense. I can't think of anyone you would say: "Just go and talk to X 
because he has got the ear of Mike'" (Blincoe, interview, 1997). Jack Elder manages to 
195 Before entering Parliament, Peck was an official with the Hotel and Hospital Workers Union. 
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name four MPs including himself as 'the more obvious ones': they are Geoff 
Braybrooke, Ross Robertson, and George Hawkins (Elder, interview, 1998). 
What were the reasons for their positive support for Moore? In Chapter 2, it is 
suggested that this type of support is formed because the leader approximates to 
followers' ideal leadership image, which is based on their understanding of the leader's 
fundamental characteristics. Was this the case among the 1993 Moore loyalists? 
Braybrooke's answer clearly indicates his understanding of and profound regard for 
Moore as a leader and beyond: 'He's a great friend, and I love him as a human being'. 
He further elaborates on the basis for his positive support for the former leader. 
I've known him virtually all my political life, and we've been friends of each 
other's family, so ... I've always been a good friend of Mike Moore and he's been 
a good friend to me. So, it's mainly on friendship more than politics. It's a 
personal touch rather than the political touch. (Braybrooke, interview, 1998) 
Another Moore loyalist, Jack Elder I 96 , lists his working-class background and a similar 
political view are among the reasons for his loyalty to Moore. 
Mike is highly intelligent, worked very hard, and he had similar philosophical, 
philosophic views to me. It's not surprising that I actually got on with him, and 
agreed with his views, because we came from backgrounds which were a little 
similar. (Elder, interview, 1998) 
Both MPs' accounts display their sound knowledge of Moore which was acquired 
over a length of time. Also evident is their absolute confidence in him as the leader of 
the Labour Party with the belief that the interests of the party and its constituents (which 
Elder calls 'traditional Labour people') would be best represented under his leadership. 
Naturally, they were far from convinced when Moore's perceived inadequacy to lead the 
party under the new electoral system (such as the lack of clarity), was suggested by the 
Clark supporters . 
... there they were saying the political parties had to narrow their support and 
deepen it. Because we would have had a fundamentally different system. And 
they couldn't understand the fundamental logic of our politics. And the 
fundamental logic of our politics was that although the Labour Party was going to 
a ... basically proportional system, the fact was that we were still going to win most 
of our seats in the constituencies, therefore we had to act like a first-past-the-post 
party. They didn't understand the fundamentals of politics ... And that's why 
they were happy to move with Helen because ... they were looking forward to the 
day when we were talking about niche politics ... [Their] lack of... intellectual 
rigour involved in that just astonished me. I couldn't believe it! ... They were 
going to do exactly the wrong thing, and they could not see it. And the reason was 
of course thei did not want to see it. They wanted to make the Labour Party a 
niche party I 9 • (Elder, interview, 1998) 
196 After the 1993 leadership change, both Elder and Braybrooke seriously considered leaving Labour 
with Moore to form a new political party. See Laws (1998), Chapter 10, especially p.287. 
197 Clark flatly denied that it was her intention to narrow the electorate to which the Labour Party 
would attempt to appeal. The day before the leadership vote, she described such a claim as ' a tactic 
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Some caution can be helpful before concluding that strong personal faith in Moore was 
the sole reason for his loyalists' adherence to him. While having unshakeable respect 
for Moore, they were by no means oblivious to the political advantage in openly 
supporting the highly popular leader. 
... being a politician, you can't help thinking it wouldn't hurt me politically to be 
seen publicly supporting Mike, no matter whether he would have won, lost or 
drew. That's why I was very public about my support. (Elder, interview, 1998) 
Uncommittedc-supporters 
Apart from this small group of loyalists, the majority of Moore's (1990 and) 1993 
supporters consisted of the uncommitted supporters. There was little doubt that they 
had a better relationship with the leader than most of the Clark supporters did. For 
example, Margaret Austin attests: 'I got on very, very well with him' (Austin, interview, 
1997). 
However, it is important not to over-emphasise their personal closeness. In any case, 
high personal respect for and trust in Moore was not visibly present among this group. 
Blincoe says: '[e]ven some of those who voted for Mike in the leadership change didn't 
have great regard for him' (Blincoe, interview, 1997). The Clark supporters' concern 
about his leadership style was shared by this group. One such MP was Peter Dunne. 
He later confessed that he cast his vote for Moore 'albeit with considerable reluctance 
and lack of enthusiasm' (Dunne, 1996). He writes: 
I have no regard for Mr Moore's abilities. To be blunt, I think he is flaky, erratic 
and ill-suited to any leadership role. (Dunne, 1999a) 
Dunne is not alone. Caygill remembers the comments made in 1990 by one Moore 
supporter, on the erratic leader. 
He said: 'Being led by Mike Moore would be like sitting in a cardboard box on a 
motorway. You know you're going to be wiped out. The only thing you don't 
know is which direction that will come from'. (Caygill, interview, 1996) 
So, why exactly did they support Moore, or what prevented them from voting for 
Clark? There were at least six reasons why those 'unenthusiastic' supporters stood by 
Moore in 1993. Firstly, unlike the Moore opponents, they thought that Labour had 
performed well under Moore's leadership, especially at the election. Considering his 
achievement, they believed, Moore deserved another chance. For example, Phil Goff 
says: 
which he [Moore] has adopted in this particular phase of his bid to retain the leadership'. She 
continued: ' I think it's very important that we all concentrate on the issues, on the future of Labour in 
a totally changed electoral scene, and how we may best playa part to serve this country representing a 
broad cross section of New Zealanders' (Morning Report, Radio New Zealand, 30 November 1993). 
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[I]f you looked at the actual result, you'd say: 'Well, here is the man who's taken 
a party devastated in the 1990 election back to within striking distance and almost 
victory in 1993. He deserved a better outcome than what he got and that was 
certainly my view because I voted for him in the leadership contest in 1993. 
He continues: 
I thought that by and large the positives of Mike's leadership from 1990 to 1993 
outweighed any criticisms that were being made of him. And I believed that he 
had a greater ability to build on the advances that had been made in those three 
years to win the 1996 election than did Helen Clark. Mike had a level of 
determination and motivation that surpasses most people in politics, a willingness 
to work hard in extraordinary hours. And I believe that he could have achieved 
more with the strengthened caucus that he had after 1993 than he was possibly 
able to achieve beforehand with a small demoralised caucus that had lost some of 
its leading members in the 1990 election. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
Annette King also saw Moore's achievement in a mere three years as remarkable. 
He did extremely well as the Leader of the Opposition to take us from the biggest 
defeat we'd ever had to within a hair's breadth of being Government by 1993. I 
suppose you could say: 'If he was so bad, how did he do that?' (King, interview, 
1998) 
Secondly, some caucus members felt a personal obligation and loyalty to Moore. 
For instance, the finance spokesperson, Michael Cullen, admits that there was 'a degree 
of personal loyalty in that Mike had promoted me as finance spokesperson at the end of 
1991198 • I had no reason to feel that any obligation thus created was no longer in 
existence' (Cullen, interview, 1998). 
This feeling of loyalty was particularly strong among those who returned to 
Parliament after a three year-break, probably sooner than they originally anticipated. 
Goff attests: 'I guess there was an element of personal loyalty in there. Mike had 
worked his guts out in the period leading up to the election; he'd been around the 
electorates' (Goff, interview, 1998). A similar feeling was expressed regarding the fact 
that MPs were selected by voters based on the understanding that Moore would be the 
leader of the Labour Party. Damien O'Connor cites this as his reason. 
To me it [the decision to support Moore] was very simple. We had this package 
that people had voted for. And I knew that my constituents, those who voted for 
198 The finance spokespersonship could have gone to another MP when David Caygillieft the 
position. Moore explains how Cullen got the nod in the following terms. 'I approached Cullen, 
[Clive] Matthewson and [Peter] Dunne. 1 would have taken any of those. I said to them: "You've got 
a year to prove yourself. Whoever does the work, whoever shows the initiative", and Cullen did. I 
actually wanted Matthewson, 'because he was clean, good looking guy, but he was lazy. Then 1 
organised trips overseas for seminars for Cullen, you know, to bring him up, ... to get him up to speed. 
I was loyal to him, I worked with him, helped him, probably 1 would know more about economics 
than he would, ... to get him up to speed. And he got up to speed. He was very good' (Moore, 
interview, 1998). 
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me, many did so on the basis that Mike Moore was the leader, and that it was a 
package. Damien O'Connor was the West Coast MP and Mike Moore was the 
leader of the party, and they hoped that we would win the election and we could 
get into power. To tum around and say that: 'I didn't consider he was the right 
leader' , to me, was an insult to those who had voted for me. And ... my first 
priority was ... first of all, to show my return of the loyalty that they had shown to 
me by maintaining my loyalty to the package the voters wished to see put in place. 
(O'Connor, interview, 1998) 
Thirdly, due to the left-wing ideological connotation of the leadership challenge, a 
few caucus moderate/right members feared that there would be a radical policy shift as 
well as personnel changes that involved their demotion in terms of caucus 
responsibilities and rankings. Austin described the coup instigators as those 'who 
didn't want the Labour Party to have any bar at all of the economic direction which had 
been set in place from 1984 until 1989. They wanted to take the Labour Party back into 
an interventionist mode' (Austin, interview, 1997). Peter Dunne echoes Austin's 
sentiment. 
In fact, the only reason that I supported him [Moore] was the 'left/right' split in 
the caucus, although I had no real confidence that he would be in any way a 
worthwhile party leader. (Dunne, 1999a) 
Some of the former Ministers of the fourth Labour Government express their 
disagreement with the caucus left's claim that the party should have apologised for the 
Rogernomics era, although their expressions are not as strong as Austin's. 
That those who would have classed themselves as left wing thought that Mike 
Moore had been a Minister for six years and had been tarnished with the 
reputation of the fourth Labour Government. I don't share that view as that having 
being a down side. To the contrary, I think quite differently about it. (Goff, 
interview, 1998) 
This ideological discrepancy was also aggravated by the personality dimension. 
Austin reports that between the pro-Moore 'middle of the ground group' (in which she 
includes Matthewson, Dunne, King, Tennet, Dynhoven, Elder, Hawkins, Keall, 
O'Connor, Robertson, Sutton, Tapsell, Tirikatene-Sullivan, and Wetere) and the coup 
organisers (Dalziel, Maharey, Dyson, and Tizard) there was 'total lack of rapport'. 
During the three years between 1990 and 1993, 'there was nothing that they said or did 
which gave us any confidence that they understood why the changes in the New Zealand 
society and the economy in particular were important' (Austin, interview, 1997). 
The fourth reason for some MPs' non-committal support for Moore was his strong 
popUlarity in the electorate and their strong doubt over Clark's ability to match her rival 
in this regard. As discussed in Chapter 2, leaders of major political parties are expected 
to win an election. In today's media age, election campaigns have become highly 
'presidentialized' (Rudd, 1992: 133), and as a focus of media attention, party leaders are 
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required to possess 'charismatic' personalities that can create a desirable public 
impression. 
In addition, since its fonnation as a political vehicle for the 'working class', the PLP 
has steadily replaced representatives of this group with professionals with tertiary 
education in its composition (Gustafson, 1992: 277-278). In this change, Moore, with 
his true blue-collar backgroundl99 , was seen to possess special appeal to voters who 
might not feel comfortable with the increasing middle class representation in the party. 
In contrast, Clark, a fonner academic, was one of the MPs with a middle class 
background. Renowned for neither charisma nor grand vision20o , Clark had never 
enjoyed the level of personal popularity, to which Moore was accustomed. She had 
trailed Moore in the 'preferred Prime Minister preferences' polls with a large margin 
since her name first appeared in the results (Vowles, et aI, 1995: 155). As a result, many 
supporters shared Moore's view when he said, '[t]he people know Helen Clark is 
unelectable as Prime Minister of this country' (Edwards, 1993f). 
Cullen points out that at the time of the leadership change, the opinion polls indicated 
Moore was the most preferred Prime Minister with no other Labour MP rating 
anywhere near him. He continues to suggest that if Clark's perfonnance in the opinion 
poll rating had been better prior to the coup, it could have been seen by the 1993 
uncommitted Moore supporters in a more favourable light. 
[H]ad Helen's ratings been above Mike's, then you'd say: 'Well, that's sensibly 
suggesting there is a reason why the change occurred'. Given that there was not 
that situation, then certainly it seemed to me that it was unlikely to help us 
politically to make a change at that stage. (Cullen, interview, 1998) 
Another MP adds . 
... I believed that when all things were weighed up that he had a greater ability to 
communicate our message to the public in a way which would win their support. 
In other words, I thought it would be more successful in attracting support if he 
was the leader. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
Fifthly, it is suggested by some Clark supporters that some of the returning MPs 
may not have possessed sufficient and accurate knowledge about Moore as the leader. 
Although many of this group knew and in fact supported him in the 1990 leadership 
change, their experience with him as the leader was over the last seven weeks before the 
election when they lost their seats. Those seven weeks plus the preceding time when 
199 Nick Venter, a political journalist for The Dominion, wrote prior to the 1999 election (and 
Moore's resignation from Parliament): 'The middle class has taken over the Labour Party'. According 
to his estimate, if Labour won the 1999 election, Moore would be the only Cabinet member who could 
genuinely claim the blue-collar background (Venter, 1999a). 
200 See, James (1998a), p.30. 
154 
Moore was the Minister of Overseas Trade did not provide a sound ground to form an 
accurate opinion about Moore's leadership. As Caygill puts it, 
Between 1984 and 1990, Mike had been a Minister, one amongst twenty-odd. A 
high profile Minister in some respects but mainly for his overseas work. [But] 
leading a party is very different thing, and people ... knew him, but hadn't 
necessarily formed an accurate judgement of how he would behave as a leader. 
(Caygill, interview, 1998) 
In acknowledging that her knowledge of Moore as the leader was formed from the 
'frantic few weeks' in 1990, King indicates that she was not absolutely certain about his 
capability in the top job in 1993, apart from his proven popular appeal (King, interview, 
1998). 
On the other hand, some MPs were more positive. Phil Goff, who had known 
Moore for a considerable length of time, is confident that he and his colleagues could 
have worked with him_constructively. 
Those of us who were in Parliament before then, I guess had also had the ability to 
work alongside Mike and knew what he was capable of, and knew what his 
strengths were in relationship to his weaknesses, and felt he was better able to win 
an electoral victory for the party. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
Another returning MP is equally confident, despite his concerns about Moore's 
leadership problems. 'I was concerned about them, but I knew that I could work with 
him' (Anonymous, interview, 1998). 
Lastly, many of the wavering Moore supporters felt incensed at the timing of the 
coup - so shortly after the election - and the ambush style in which the coup was being 
conducted. Jim Sutton, for example, expressed his frustration with these points after the 
vote: 'They [the voters] feel they voted for Labour and Mike Moore - and indeed for 
myself - and that the package they voted for has been taken from them and they feel let 
down'. (This point has already been expressed by Damien O'Connor). With regard to 
the way the coup was executed, he continued: 'Someone went to the media and forced 
the whole thing early and publicly. That was not the right way to do it, and there's no 
doubt that the party has now suffered some damage'. He, however, did not condemn the 
leadership change itself, calling it 'always legitimate'. 'It would have been far better to 
settle down and to have got through the brief sitting of Parliament before Christmas, and 
to state our position clearly there and put the Government on the back foot'. 'Then, if 
there were people who wanted to challenge the leadership, that should have been done 
following the Christmas break' ('Timaru MP upset at Labour coup timing', The Otago 
Daily Times, 2 December 1993, p.2). Cullen worried that a change of leader so shortly 
after the election would unnecessarily compound the public's negative perception, 
(generated in the 1984-1990 period) of the party: the perception that it is willing to 
renege on its promises. 
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But immediately after an election which we had nearly won, you looked as though, 
yet again, we said one thing one week and another in the next week201 • One week 
we said Mike's a great prospective Prime Minister and next week we said he was 
not good enough to be leader of the opposition. I didn't think the public thought 
that was too bright; either. (Cullen, interview, 1998) 
The strength of uncommitted supporters' support for Moore 
This study has hypothesised that non-committal support is unreliable and thus if one's 
support composition contains a large portion of this type of support - such as Moore's -
hislher leadership is vulnerable to a potential change. So, how strong was the support of 
those uncomtted supporters' for Moore? How reliable was it? Or, more specifically, 
if Moore had managed to fend off Clark's challenge in December 1993, how long could 
he have retained their support? 
Answering any hypothetical question in politics is always difficult, if not impossible, 
and those who provided Moore with non-committal support at that time stress this point, 
too. However, what is interesting is that those uncommitted supporters acknowledge 
that their continuous support for Moore after December 1993 would have been 
uncertain or conditional if he had avoided the leadership coup. Asked whom he would 
have supported as the leader if the leadership vote had been taken at the beginning of 
either 1994 or 1995 (when a regular leadership review was scheduled to come up), one 
MP's reply is typically ambiguous: 
I really don't know. I don't know, but it would've depended, I suppose, on two 
things. One was how Mike Moore had performed as Leader since the election, 
and secondly, what was the public's response to the party and to the leadership. I 
mean I would have supported whichever candidate that I thought would advance 
our cause most effectively. I don't have any problems with the personality and so 
on of either Mike Moore or Helen Clark. I'm perfectly happy to work with either 
of them. But I want to be a part of a .. , winning team. (Anonymous, interview, 
1998) 
Another uncommitted Moore supporter, Annette King asserts that if the coup 
organisers had been 'wise', they would have waited until the regular leadership review in 
February 1995 when they could have addressed Moore's leadership problems, which 
might have been evident to the 1993 uncommitted supporters by then. But in December 
1993, 'the people who had voted for him didn't see what they [the Clark supporters] 
saw' (King, interview, 1998). Cullen agrees that choice of different timing for the coup 
might have produced a different consequence. 
201 It is interesting to note that both sides used the question of trustworthiness as justification of their 
actions. While the Moore camp argued that a leadership change would make the whole premise of the 
election campaign a lie, the Clark supporters insisted that Moore's unwillingness to endorse the party 
manifesto was likely to be seen as by the public as a breach of trust. 
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... the interesting thing is, had Mike stayed as Leader post 93, had there been no 
leadership coup, what would have happened by February 95. And I think that's a 
very open question as to whether by that stage there would have been a feeling 
'it's time for change in the leadership' or whether they wouldn't mind. My guess 
deep down is in that situation I think maybe by February 95, there would have 
been mood for change, which would have been somewhat stronger and more 
broadly acceptable. (Cullen, interview, 1998) 
Regarding the way her own vote would have gone if the vote had been taken in 1995, 
King's position lacked certainty. 'It's hypothetical... I can't say "yes" or "no" 
mainly because I would have had to be convinced that he was being a bad leader, and I 
don't know w~ther he would have been' (King, interview, 1998). 
The differences between loyalists and uncommitted supporters are obvious. Unlike 
loyalists, uncommitted supporters lacked absolute commitment to Moore. They had 
some doubts about his leadership ability, yet decided to support him for reasons other 
than their faith in him, such as his popularity, the bad timing of the coup etc. Under 
-
different circumstances in terms of its timing etc., those uncommitted supporters' 
support for Moore still could not have been guaranteed. This again highlights Moore's 
leadership vulnerability for relying upon a large portion of these less reliable supporters. 
It seems that even if Moore had survived the leadership coup in December 1993, his 
position would have always remained insecure against another potential challenge. 
Why did Moore fail to consolidate his leadership? 
Moore himself was well aware of the situation he was in upon returning to Parliament 
after the 1990 election. He made some conscious efforts and produced encouraging 
results in some areas, especially in the early period of his leadership. Why was he 
ultimately unsuccessful in altering his support composition? In Chapter 2, it is 
suggested that leaders' achievement of this task is hindered by institutional, practical, 
and personality reasons. In Moore's case, the following factors or a combination of 
them may provide some explanations. 
a. Ideological beliefs 
With regard to ideological beliefs, Moore needed to distance the party from its 
immediate past and re-establish an identity as a centre-left party. However, this process, 
as evidenced in David Caygill's selection as the deputy leader in 1993 when Moore was 
replaced, did not involve total disownment of the contentious 1984-1990 period (this 
point will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7). What was required was a shift of 
focus and an admission of the necessity to correct some 'wrongs' of the fourth Labour 
Government. 
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Although once considered left of the party - mainly due to his background as a blue 
collar worker and trade union official - Moore had gradually shifted his ideological 
position throughout his parliamentary career. As Lange puts it, 
... like all of us are, and Mike is more willing than most to change his viewpoints. 
That is not to say he is wrong when he makes a change, nor to say that it is ill-
considered. I am indicating to you that he is a person whose thinking is fluid. 
When he first came into Parliament... they used to call him 'pinky' because they 
thought he was a bit of a red fellow, and now of course they'd never dream of 
saying that. (Lange, interview, 1996) 
Consequently Lhe ended up being 'probably more on the conservative side of the Labour 
Party', while avoiding becoming an 'ideologue' (Dyson, interview, 1998). This 
acquired conservatism was evident in his view of the economic policy. While insisting 
that he was not a free marketeer, but an interventionist in the economy in 'certain 
places', he strongly advocated a fiscally cautious approach to economics. 
[You] cannot spend your way out of it. I'm not prepared to go into deficit 
budgeting again. We had to be as rough as guts in bells for the first time in about 
twenty years, and I wanted to preserve that (Moore, interview, 1998). 
With this conviction, the admission of the 'past mistakes' during the fourth Labour 
Government years was neither a necessary nor appropriate action for him. 
[Some said that] I should formally stand up to New Zealand and say: 'Qh, I'm 
sorry we were wrong. I apologise'. I wasn't prepared to do it. Although my 
economic strategy would have been different from Douglas ... I'm not saying 
everything Douglas said was wrong. He was 75% right, given the options you 
had in 1984 - a nine billion dollar deficit, a wage and price freeze, for Christ sake. 
Where would you go? (Moore, interview, 1998) 
b. Skills 
Although it is impossible to predict all tasks in advance, leaders are normally chosen for 
their suitability to handle a variety of (likely) situations and fulfil the required roles in 
them. This was not the case in 1990. Unlike his first task at the 1990 election where his 
strengths - such as natural flair for popular appeal - were an asset, his new task of re-
building the party demanded quite different skills altogether. Those skills such as 
patience, careful planning, consultation, and adherence to agreed plans were not what 
Moore was renowned for. Perhaps the skills which Moore lacked most severely were 
those that unify people and groups. These were essential for both satisfying his 
expectations and alleviating his concerns. 
Moore's track record showed that he was divisive, and his autobiography, A Labour 
of Love, contained evidence of that. It said that he faced stem objection from the party 
hierarchy when he contested for the candidacy for the Papatoetoe electorate for the 1978 
election. Moore wrote: 'Head Office had vetoed my selection!' as well as '[t]he anti 
158 
Moore faction had won again!'. When Moore's loss was announced at the candidate 
selection meeting, two senior party members 'embraced each other, one joyfully saying 
to the other, "We stopped the bastard again'" (Moore, 1993b: 61-62). This open 
hostility was a rather astonishing reaction to someone who had been an MP for one term 
and Junior Vice President of the party. 
When the new expectations, in particular re-gaining the trust of the EPLP, were thrust 
upon him after the 1993 election, Moore had to learn and adopt new leadership skills 
and style. The problem was that those skills did not come naturally to him, and they 
could be practiced only at the expense of his natural leadership style; his natural flair 
and flamboyarit leadership style needed to be tamed. Initially, he appeared to be content 
to learn those new skills. But when he realised that the potential cost could be too great 
in light of the coming election, at which his natural skills would be a major asset, his 
attempt was dropped and the old Moore returned. 
But why did he decide to discontinue his effort, while being fully aware of its likely 
consequence - the loss of his leadership? One reason suggested in this chapter was that 
he did not have any other option; he judged that the only way to save his leadership was 
to win the 1990 election (see Chapter 4). However, that was not all. His decision can be 
better understood if his personality is taken into consideration. 
c. Personality 
Another important factor for understanding Moore's failure is his personality. In 
particular, two characteristics - self-confidence and ambition - seem to playa significant 
role. In relation to the former, Moore seemed to believe that no matter how impractical 
and unrealistic his ideas might seem, he would get final vindication. His book, Fighting 
for New Zealand, gives some insights. 
Manufacturers are enjoying substantial growth into new markets like Australia 
because I negotiated CER ahead of National's programme. Rural New Zealand 
sits poised to reap the benefits of the Gatt round, the single most important 
agricultural development since refrigeration. I was mocked for a 'pie in the sky' 
approach when we began negotiating these deals (Moore, 1993a: 50). 
Elsewhere, he recalled the 1992 electricity crisis, during which he suggested practical 
energy conservation ideas such as installation of hot water cylinder blankets. 
I was attacked by the National Party and the media mocked the idea. Yet within 
the fortnight the electrical authorities were advocating water cylinder insulation and 
screening TV advertisements to promote the idea. Nobody said they were crazy. 
(Moore, 1993a: 124) 
On the 'lambburger', an idea which he advocated as the Minister of Overseas Trade and 
Marketing in 1989 and for which he was made fun of by National and the media alike, 
he proudly asked: 'who's laughing now?' (Moore, 1993a: 66) 
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What becomes quite clear from these comments is a very high level of self-
confidence. He recollected when he first became an MP in 1972 in the following words: 
But when I got over my feeling of awe, I looked around at some of the people 
and thought, "I can do as well as this, if not better." And I was surprised at how I 
could capture the imagination of people. I was surprised at how easy it all was, 
and surprised that the more I read and the more I thought about things that this 
was the direction I should go. (McMillan, 1993: 34) 
He was not one to underestimate his own worth as a politician. In his very first speech 
in Parliament as the Prime Minister, he commented on the leadership change which 
installed him in the top position: 
I find myself in a difficult position 8 weeks before an election ... That difficult 
position is not nearly as difficult as the position that Opposition members are in. 
Their worst dream has come true202 • (NZPD, vol. 510, 1990: 4132; emphasis 
added) 
Given this high level of satisfaction with his own achievements, all based on his ideas 
and initiatives, it was not hard to understand his reluctance to restrain his 'erratic' and 
'dominant' tendency. For him, making odd mistakes was a natural and necessary part 
of a learning process. In Fighting for New Zealand, he quoted an anonymous 
philosopher who read: 
"How do you avoid mistakes? 
By experience. 
How do you get experience? 
By making mistakes." (Moore, 1993a: 15) 
Moore's other important characteristic is his strong, long-held personal ambition. 
Personal ambition is by no means unique amongst politicians. It is its intensity and his 
openness about it that separates him from his contemporaries. As already noted in 
Chapter 1, he first entered Parliament at the age of 23. After losing the seat three years 
later, he actively and unsuccessfully sought the candidacy for two seats which might 
return him to Wellington. Remarkably, his determination to become an MP again was 
not hindered by his discovery of having cancer. 'As soon as I was well enough I went 
to Wellington to study the seat that might be available'203 (Moore, 1993b: 62). 
202 Moore's self-evaluation may have been over-exaggeration but not entirely groundless. One of the 
former advisers to a National Finance Minister, Ruth Richardson (1990-1993), wrote that when the 
National caucus was informed of Palmer's victory over Moore in the 1989 leadership vote, 'there was 
spontaneous burst of applause'. 'National MPs were convinced Moore would have been a more 
dangerous opponent in the 1990 election' (Hames, 1995: 91-92) 
203 His illness returned after the 1978 election. He was hospitalised for treatment and returned to 
Parliament in September 1979 (Moore, 1993b: 69-79) 
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Apart from Parliament, the Labour Party always carned significant importance to 
him. His 1987 comments in his autobiography portrayed a man who had devoted his 
life to the Labour Party: 
Apart from my mother, and because of her, the second most powerful influence in 
my life has been the Labour Party and Parliament. The party was my training 
college and Parliament has been my university. (Moore, 1993b: 175) 
The Labour Party has been good to me and I love its ideals and principles. In 
return I have given everything I have. There hasn't been a day for over twenty 
years when I haven't thought of it, worked for it and been exasperated by it 
(Moore, 1993b: 181). 
Like many other MPs, Moore's ambition extended beyond becoming a mere MP. 
His ambition was to become the leader of his beloved party and, of course, ultimately the 
Prime Minister. In fact, it was an ambition that he had held for a long time. Upon 
becoming the Prime Minister, he was interviewed by a journalist. 
Q: When did Mike Moore decide to become Prime Minister? 
A: (Moore): I was always going into politics. 
Q: From what age? 
A: I won my first election, I would have been seven or eight, for Mayor of 
Toy town. I kept the ballot papers for years thinking they might be usefu1.204 
(Bums, 1990) 
In his autobiography, this self-professed 'political animal' (Clifton, 1994b) quoted 
one of his former colleague's comment that: 'The only job to have in politics is the 
Prime Minister or Minister of Finance, all other jobs are branch managers'. This was 
the point which he later wholeheartedly concurred: 'The more I experience of 
government, the more I understand his point' (Moore, 1993b: 179-180). Despite 
receiving obvious suspicions from his colleagues due to his open ambition205 , he was 
unrepentant. After the 1990 General Election, regaining the prime ministership became 
his main focus206 . 
204 In A Labour of Love, he indicated that while seeking another seat between 1975 and 1978, he was 
eager to have a '''Boeing seat" (an electorate with an airport serviced by Boeing aircraft - a big-city seat) 
and preferably one with radio and television studios'. This view seemed to be formed with his future as 
a leader in mind. 'I have always thought one of [the then leader] Bill Rowling's problems was that he 
had difficulty getting on television when he was stuck in his sprawling Tasman electorate' (Moore, 
1993b: 63). 
205 He complained in A Labour of Love that: 'Because I was different, every action I've taken has been 
given the most sordid of motives, the darkest flavour of ambition and conspiracy, which sometimes, 
but only sometimes, was accurate' (Moore, 1993b: 26). 
206 As recently as late January 1999 - more than five years after his ousting - Moore expressed his 
aspiration to the leadership role. 'I would like to be Prime Minister of this country. I think I 
understand a lot of what this country needs, and I've always felt that my base reaction to a lot of issues 
is similar to the heartbeat of New Zealanders. It is a disappointment (that I cannot be Labour leader) 
but this is life ... what will be will be' (Rentoul, 1999). Wanting to regain the prime ministership is 
not unusual for former leaders. For example, see David Lange's comment in McMillan (1993: 63). 
161 
As already mentioned, the dilemma for Moore was that his weaknesses and strengths 
stemmed from the same source - his operational style. His attempt to meet the first two 
expectations (restoration of the EPLP's trust and re-establishment of party identity) and 
ease the concerns through the acquired 'inclusive' style of leadership was generally 
regarded as a reasonable success in the first two years. Nevertheless, he was not totally 
convinced of the merits of the changed leadership style which he was required to adapt 
to for his survival. His high level of self-confidence caused occasional 'slip-ups', and 
his tendency to distinguish people into an 'in-group' and an 'out-group' according to 
his trust level alienated many key people. His relationships with the party hierarchy and 
some caucus colleagues started to deteriorate considerably. This was the beginning of a 
vicious cycle for Moore. 
Without the good will and trust of the party hierarchy and some of his colleagues, the 
leader had no choice but to rely on the skills and abilities for which he was originally 
selected as the leader in 1990. Besides, he was accustomed to over-riding internal 
oppositions and proven correct. In A Labour of Love, he recalled the election campaign 
in 1984: 
I set up my base in the caucus room in Parliament Buildings and hired videos, 
telexes, telephones and word processors. Though I was never appointed campaign 
manager and some resented my usurping the role, I simply took over the function. 
At one point I received a letter firing me! I told the angry executive members that 
they were losing control, and that if we didn't win the election they could blame 
me. (Moore, 1993b: 104) 
Of course, he was vindicated. Whether it was thanks to Moore's campaign management 
or not, Labour won the 1984 election handsomely. 
At the same time, in order to realise his long-held ambition, he would no longer 
temper his energy and spontaneity; he knew that they were his biggest political assets to 
be an effective leader. In 1985, he stated: 'The Leader needs to be popular, the rest of us 
need to be competent' (O'Sullivan, 1985: 58). Moore judged that the maximisation of 
Labour' selection chances would be achievable through his personal appeal to the 
electorate. Since the realisation of his dream (an election victory) seemed to be well 
within his reach, considering Labour's solid opinion poll performance, Moore decided 
to fully utilise his proven populist skills. 
Strong personal ambition and a high level of self-confidence can be a dangerous mix. 
Through his long association with and dedication to the party, he seemed to consider 
himself a main defender or even embodiment of Labour's ideals and philosophy. (As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, this point was made by Clark during the leadership challenge in 
her criticism of his self-portrayal as 'the sole repository of Labour values'.) Realising 
One may point out, however, the intensity of Moore's desire was noticeably stronger than his 
contemporaries. 
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his personal ambition - through winning an election and himself becoming Prime 
Minister - became tantamount to achieving Labour's goals. A conclusion stemming 
from this logic could be that winning the 1993 election at any cost could be justified in 
view of the party's interest, and that anybody who opposed him personally should be 
dismissed as a threat to the party. As Judith Tizard attests: 'I think part of the problem 
is that Mike thought he was the Labour Party. So, anybody else's view of the party was 
wrong because he was the Labour Party' (Tizard, interview, 1998). 
Not surprisingly, this type of behaviour intensified his leadership style problems -
particularly his erratic tendencies and dominant behaviour. Such displays further 
strengthened the belief of the anti-Moore camp that he needed to be replaced. 
e. Moore's limited control over realisation of the unity expectation 
Moore was held responsible by his opponents for failing to maintain constructive 
working relationships with the party officials. However, to have a good relationship 
requires co-operation and good will on both sides as well as compatibility. While 
Moore may have been a difficult leader to work with, the lack of compatibility between 
him and the key party officials in terms of personality and ideologies (for which he 
alone should not have been held responsible) may have worked against the leader as 
well. In this sense, what Moore could have done in his capacity as the leader of the 
Parliamentary party to meet the expectation of restoring the EPLP' s confidence may 
have been limited. 
f. Sufficient caucus support - conflicting expectations/concerns 
Moore's later decision to abandon his effort to be an inclusive leader may have been 
influenced by the fact that between 1990 and 1993, he had a sufficient number of caucus 
members who were not worried about his 'erratic' leadership style. Those MPs -
including some frontbenchers - were prepared to tolerate his shortcomings. For 
example, Margaret Austin, attests that Moore's behaviour was not universally regarded 
as seriously problematic within the caucus. 
He is ebullient. He generates ideas ... that only last a week. And he is all onto 
something else, and good ideas never got developed to the point. .. where you 
could see they could be implemented. But, I don't really think in general the 
caucus was discontent, other than amongst the group who were open about the 
criticism of his presidential style. (Austin, interview, 1997) 
The finance spokesperson, Michael Cullen, also says that Moore's 'erratic' 
leadership style did not pose a serious problem. 
1 think a lot of people in the party who had that sort of problem don't recognise 
that Mike's highly intelligent, reads enormously widely, has read more widely 
than most of them have. And although Mike himself is probably the first to admit 
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his thought processes aren't the most structured in tenns of a trained intellect, they 
are much more intuitive. But I always thought it was a good balance. I'm not so 
intuitive. I do tend to be nerdy, and therefore, we complemented each other to 
some extent in that regard. (Cullen, interview, 1998) 
Also, supported by a sufficient number of the caucus members was Moore's stance 
towards the policy achievement of the fourth Labour Government. For example, one of 
the 1990 intake notes that Moore's reluctance to deal with (and detach the party from) 
the contentious period was echoed by some of her colleagues between 1990 and 1993. 
I don't think that he wanted to front up to that period. And in some ways, I don't 
think all of the caucus did, either. Because there still were a significant number of 
people who were there at that time ... I think that fronting up to some of those 
consequences of the economic restructuring that occurred in the 80s would make 
people feel quite ... I think. .. guilty? .. about the impacts. (Anonymous, interview, 
1998) 
Despite occasional rumours of a leadership challenge, Moore's position did not 
come under serious threat until after the 1993 election when the anti-Moore group 
secured the numbers with the help from the new intake. 
Upon becoming the leader, Moore knew that gaining support from some of his 
caucus colleagues and the Party Head Office would be extremely difficult. They had 
already fonned strong views of him as being unsuitable for a Labour leader, which could 
not be altered. As he states: 'People like Ruth Dyson decided from day one that was it. 
They were going to destroy you ... ' (Moore, interview, 1998). Although he would have 
hoped to see his opponents change their opinions of him, he knew that his survival 
ultimately depended on winning the 1993 election. While it was obvious to him that the 
majority of the 1993 new intake would not be sympathetic to him, he was confident that 
once the election was won, he could have turned (a sufficient number of) them around to 
sustain his leadership. 
In analysing why Moore failed to consolidate his support base, two 'external' factors 
- both of which have already been mentioned - also seemed to play significant roles. 
1) The party organisation support 
Although not eligible to vote directly on the leadership, this case study has evidenced 
that the party hierarchy can exert a significant influence on the fate of leadership. In 
Moore's case, it happened in two ways. Firstly, the knowledge of the deteriorating 
relationship contributed to solidifying the anti-Moore MPs' views of his inadequate 
leadership skills in tenns of maintaining constructive working relationships. 
Secondly, the party officials' selection of the new 1993 MPs damaged Moore's 
cause. Although the candidate selection policy was not specifically aiming to weaken 
Moore's position, the ideological criteria applied (especially in the selection round after 
the 1992 Party Conference) worked against him by eroding the relative strength of his 
existing support base. Moore's own right/moderate policy preference was not the line 
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which the selectors were looking for. While most of those new MPs did not possess 
strong anti-Moore feelings until they witnessed his problematic leadership style first-
hand, their ideological stance may have made them more susceptible to such views. 
2) Alternative leaders 
Although it did not affect Moore's performance in satisfying expectations or alleviating 
concerns, Clark's emergence as the credible alternative leader was no doubt a crucial 
variable in ending his leadership. It provided his opponents with the focus for 
converting their dissatisfaction into opposition. Until then, the frustration with Moore 
was just disorganised and direction-less grumbling. Despite the widespread and 
deepening concerns about Moore amongst his opponents, Moore's leadership did not 
come under serious threat until Clark's emergence as 'the' challenger. Earlier rumours 
of potential challenges did not materialise partly for this reason. When the anti-Moore 
group secured both the numbers and an alternative leader in Clark, his fate was 
practically sealed. 
A similar comparison can be made with another former Labour leader, Bill Rowling 
(1974-1983). Although Labour lost three consecutive elections under his guidance, he 
remained as the leader primarily because there was no obvious alternative, who was 
regarded by the colleagues as capable of competing (and hopefully defeating) the 
aggressive and domineering National Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon. However, the 
well respected Opposition Leader's position became precarious once a young lawyer 
from Auckland named David Lange came to Parliament in 1977. Lange was not only 
charismatic and ebullient but also a brilliant performer on television, the medium through 
which Muldoon had long enjoyed dominance against the sincere, yet uninspiring 
Rowling. 
An interesting aspect of Clark's ultimate emergence as 'the' alternative leader is the 
extent to which it seems to have been helped by Moore's perceived problems. Although 
always considered potential leadership material, the ambitious deputy leader was not 
always 'the' only possible challenger against Moore in the anti-Moore camp's mind. 
During the 1990-1992 period, the left was encouraging Lange and Cullen to take up this 
task. However, as they refused and Moore's leadership problem worsened, the anti-
Moore camp's attention shifted to Clark. Clark was regarded as an ideal candidate 
because her character and leadership style/skills were vastly different from those of 
Moore's. In contrast, Lange, who was not considered strong on organisation and 
discipline, became a less likely candidate. This suggests that an incumbent leader may 
help to create conditions and criterion for his/her successor, by (re)defining the image of 
an ideal leader for the time. 
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Conclusion 
The study's propositions set out in Chapter 2 have, generally, been validated by the case 
study on Moore. It has documented that there are indeed different kinds of leadership 
support - positive support (held by loyalists) and non-committal support (held by 
uncommitted supporters). As hypothesised in Chapter 2, positive support was formed 
based upon followers' sound knowledge of the leader. Moore's loyalists not only 
knew him well but also recognised him as a personal friend. Their belief in him as the 
best person to lead the party was unquestionable. 
On the other hand, non-committal support turned out to be more tentative and 
conditional than that of loyalists, which was also in the propositions of the study. 
Uncommitted supporters supported him for various reasons without their holding the 
conviction of his suitability for the job. If some conditions (such as Clark's popularity 
and the timing of the coup) of the 1993 leadership challenge had been different, so 
would have been the votes of a number of MPs belonging to this non-committal group. 
Moore's leadership experience confirms another core proposition of this study: 
leadership durability is greatly affected by the support composition at the time of hislher 
selection. Although Moore was elected by a significant majority in 1990, the numerical 
strength of his majority was misleading. The 'real' durability of his leadership -
measured by the support composition - indicated otherwise. It later became clear that 
supporters of his were on the verge of being opponents. 
The vulnerability of the Moore leadership and his 1990 support composition 
If the collapse of Moore's leadership was only a matter of time, it indicated the high 
(potential) vulnerability of his leadership. Indeed, it appears that this problem already 
existed at the beginning of his leadership in 1990. Two factors seemed to contribute to 
his high vulnerability. 
The exclusive and short-term expectation in 1990 
When he replaced Geoffrey Palmer less than eight weeks before the 1990 General 
Election - his proponents had only one expectation of him - to minimise the magnitude 
of Labour's inevitable election defeat. Fearing that they might lose their seats under 
Palmer's leadership, those MPs were willing to back the popular Cabinet Minister in the 
desperate hope that he might be able to reverse their diminishing fortune. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the primary roles of leaders of major political 
parties (including the NZLP) is to lead their parties to electoral victory. If they are 
considered ill-equipped to accomplish this task, their days as leaders are numbered. For 
example, Moore recollected in his autobiography that when the leadership position 
became available following Norman Kirk's death, he decided to cast his vote for the then 
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Minister of Finance, Bill Rowling, rather than for his 'old friend' and Deputy Prime 
Minister, Hugh Watt. Referring to this decision as 'one of the worst moments' in his 
political life, Moore nevertheless justified it by arguing that his seat stood a better 
electoral chance under Rowling's leadership (Moore, 1993b: 46). 
In this sense, what happened in 1990 (Palmer's demise and Moore's rise) was not 
unprecedented. What was unique about the change was its imminent nature; the demand 
on a new leader's ability to win an election had never been so unpretentiously clear and 
urgent. Moore was supported for his popular appeal and nothing else. In other words, 
the 1990 leadership change was unique in the sense that a leader's electoral appeal was 
employed as 'the' criterion in such an open fashion. To illustrate this point further, at 
the time of the leadership change, Palmer was not under any criticism from his 
colleagues regarding his general leadership (or lack thereof) such as his skills or the 
ideological direction in which he was leading the party. In a panic mode, few in this 
group gave careful consideration to his general suitability as a leader, or his ability to 
lead the party after the election. The supporters' expectation of Moore was solely 
focused on the several weeks until the election day, and not beyond. 
The weak support composition untested by a lack of alternative leaders 
What characterised Moore's leadership was its weak support composition, which 
largely consisted of uncommitted supporters, with a very small number of loyalists. 
This was already obvious at the time of his election as the leader in 1990 when the 
majority of the caucus still seemed to be in favour of retaining Palmer. Moore acquired 
the top position through his predecessor's unexpected resignation, based upon the 
position taken by the majority of the Cabinet. 
Through Labour's history, the holding of leadership selection to fill a sudden void 
due to either death or voluntary resignation was not unheard of. However, what 
distinguished the 1990 situation from the other precedents was the lack of any serious 
contenders for the leadership. The only other rival for Moore was a backbencher, 
Richard Northey, whose chance of winning was rated virtually nil. (In fact, the lack of 
rivals was one of the main reasons for Northey's standing.) 
Despite the contest being virtually a one-horse race, however, Moore failed to 
convince a handful ofMPs (between 19.30% to 33.33% of the whole caucus) of his 
worth. Moreover, even among his proponents there was little positive support for him. 
Given the way in which Moore became the leader, one may question whether he 
could have attained the position under any other, more normal circumstances. For 
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example, Caygill admits that should he have decided to stand against his former 
colleague in 1990, Moore's victory would not have been necessarily guaranteed207 . 
I think if Mike had not taken the leadership when he did, he would not necessarily 
have got it easily after 1990 .... I'm sure that if Geoff Palmer had not stood down 
and continued to be the Prime Minister into the 1990 election, the Labour Party 
would still have lost. Geoff would then have stood aside. And there would have 
been a major battle within the caucus for the leadership. I might have stood 
against Mike at that stage. I think he probably would have won. But it's hard to 
know whether the caucus would have united readily behind him. (Caygill, 
interview, 1998) 
Caygill als0 says that while Palmer was the leader, he and Clark jokingly discussed 
their leadership aspirations after the 1990 election, following Palmer's expected 
resignation which would have been a consequence of the election defeat. The only 
question at the time, Caygill joked, was 'who will be the leader and who will be the 
deputy' (Caygill, interview, 1996). Of course, there is no way now to know for sure 
whether the Clark-Caygill team would have been victorious under those circumstances. 
Yet, what is interesting is that influential figures such as Caygill and Clark were 
considering contesting the leadership after Palmer only to cancel the plan because of his 
unexpected resignation. 
Moore's popularity was doubtless an asset in Labour's effort to win the 1993 
election. However, for equally imperative tasks such as formulation of sound alternative 
policies and restoring a trusting relationship with the EPLP, candidates like Clark and 
Caygill might have been judged as more suitable to lead the party by their caucus 
colleagues. For Moore, taking over the leadership from Palmer before the 1990 election 
could have been the only opportunity to occupy the top position that he had long aspired 
to. 
In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Moore's vulnerable original 
support composition (despite his large 'numerical' majority) contained very few 
loyalists and heavily depended on less reliable uncommitted supporters. In order to 
consolidate his position, Moore needed to satisfy the new set of expectations placed 
upon him while countering the concerns held by the suspicious uncommitted supporters 
and opponents. Unfortunately for Moore, however, he did not find achieving those new 
tasks easy or even feasible. There were some important incompatibilities between the 
tasks and his personality, skills, and ideologies. In particular, with regard to one of the 
expectations (restoring the EPLP's trust), the clash with the party hierarchy worked 
against him. Moore's failure at both tasks meant that his support composition remained 
weak throughout the 1990-1993 period and beyond. Given this, when the critical 1993 
207 Moore himself believes that he could still have become the leader if Palmer had carried on and 
resigned, as expected, after the election. (Moore, interview, 1998) 
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intake joined the caucus and Clark became a credible candidate, Moore's loss of the 
leadership became inevitable. 
This concludes the first case study on Moore. The next three chapters will deal with 
the second case study - the Clark leadership during the 1993-1996 period. Like Moore, 
Clark faced (a series of) caucus revolts. But unlike her predecessor, she withstood the 
pressure by retaining the necessary majority support. How did she succeed? What 
accounted for the two leaders' contrasting fates? Before these questions are examined, 
the next chapter will outline the development of discontent with Clark's leadership 
which everitiulIIy accumulated to the 1996 leadership crisis. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Clark leadership crisis overview: 1993 - 1996 
Introduction 
Clark's leadership between 1993 and 1996 was probably best characterised by its 
instability, induced by a series of difficulties which she encountered. Without enjoying 
the usual 'honeymoon period' during which newly selected leaders receive good wishes 
and warm receptions from people inside and outside caucuses, the new leader was in 
trouble froIll the outset. Discontent in the caucus steadily grew until it culminated in the 
1996 leadership crisis, where she was directly asked by her colleagues to relinquish the 
leadership. However, unlike her predecessor, she successfully fended of the challenge. 
This chapter outlines the development of the discontent with Clark's leadership and her 
survival. 
The earliest sign of dissatisfaction - Maori MPs 
Only a few hours after taking over the leadership on the 1st of December 1993, Clark 
was confronted with a serious, yet predictable, challenge. As a result of almost two 
weeks of internal bickering, the party's three Maori MPs Koro Wetere, Whetu 
Tirikatene-Sullivan, and Peter Tapsell (who had already signalled their possible 
departure in case of Moore's defeat) had an emergency meeting with the new leadership 
team. This meeting included two Maori party executives, Dover Samuels and Shane Te 
Pou. Viewing the leadership change as an act of 'treachery', in Tapsell's words, they 
threatened to leave the party 208 (Orsman, 1993c). Although Clark settled this crisis by 
having more meetings, and through personnel decisions, ie., agreeing to release Tapsell 
to the Speaker's job (despite the fact his appointment practically gave the Government a 
two-seat majority, and accordingly weakened Labour's position), the new leadership still 
needed to reunite the serious divisions within the caucus which transcended the three 
Maori MPs. Now there were two distinctive camps in the PLP, divided along the voting 
pattern on 1 December. Between them, little trust and good will existed. 
In order to restore caucus unity, Clark used the first shadow cabinet position 
allocation as a tool to ease the anguish and frustration of the Moore supporters. On the 
same day she assumed the leadership, she and Caygill quickly interviewed all the MPs 
regarding their aspirations and preferred portfolios, while hinting that one of the 
208 David Caygill recalls that at that time, he did not consider the four Maori MPs' threat serious. 
Rather, he sensed a lack of solidarity in the group as well as personal ambitions as a main motive for 
the action. 'As to the Maori issue ... I didn't think there was a serious prospect of them leaving but I 
thought that they were using this as an opportunity for ... well, to gain greater influence perhaps in 
policy terms, perhaps personally. It was hard to tell, partly ... because they didn't agree amongst 
themselves'. (Cay gill, interview, 1998) 
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vehement Moore supporters, Michael Cullen would remain as a finance spokesperson. 
Within several days, another Moore voter and staunch opponent of tax increases, Peter 
Dunne was assured that he would retain his revenue spokespersonship. Using a small 
management training session held north of Wellington, the leadership team, together 
with Michael Cullen and Senior Whip, Jonathan Hunt, finalised the shadow cabinet line-
up (Caygill, interview, 1998; Hunt, interview, 1998). The list announced on 13 
December 1993 turned out to be far from an occasion to reward her own supporters at 
the expense of her opponents. Clark's determination to unite the PLP was such that she 
refused to accept one Moore supporter's offer to sit on the backbench. 
I had offered to go on to the backbench after the change in 1993 because I was 
clearly opposed to the change in leadership. That offer was declined by both 
Helen and David Caygill when I met with them after the leadership change. (Goff, 
interview, 1998) 
Among the 11 frontbenchers, there were only four Clark supporters: Caygill (No.2); 
Jonathan Hunt (No.5); David Lange (No.6); and Lianne Dalziel (No.ll). The other 
frontbench positions were all allocated to known Moore proponents: Michael Cullen 
(No.3); Koro Wetere (No.4); Clive Matthewson (No.7); Phil Goff (No.8); Annette 
King (No.9); and Peter Dunne (No. 10). A special consideration was also given to the 
Maori MPs as a sign of reassurance of Labour's commitment to Maoridom. Apart 
from Wetere's retention at No.4, Tirikatene-Sullivan was awarded not only the 
respectable ranking of No. 15 but also a newly created responsibility, Maori social 
development. 
Social policy responsibilities, which were seen as vital by her supporters, went to 
Matthewson (social welfare), Dalziel (health), Margaret Austin ranked No.12 
(education), Maharey (employment and labour relations), and Swain ranked No.24 
(housing). Although given one of his desired portfolios, Maharey was ranked No.17 
(which made a stark contrast to another 'rising star' of the left, Dalziel at No. 11). There 
was no obvious reward for the other major Clark supporters, either; Hodgson (No.19); 
Kelly (No.20), Blincoe (No.23), Northey (No.26), and Tizard (No.29) who were all 
ranked below many Moore supporters. 
Nevertheless, the party's relationship with Maoridom suffered another blow in early 
1994 when three Labour MPs failed to second Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan's nomination 
as Chairwoman of the Electoral Law Select Committee. Although all the select 
committees' chairpersonships had been conferred and agreed upon between National 
and Labour at its first meeting before Christmas (with National's Tony Ryall as the 
agreed candidate for the chairpersonship of the Electoral Law Select Committee), 
Tirikatene-Sullivan suddenly consented to nomination by another Maori MP, Winston 
Peters of New Zealand First. Without prior knowledge of her intention, the other three 
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stunned Labour MPs - Pete Hodgson, Richard Northey, and Mark Peck - voted in 
accordance with the pre-made arrangement for Ryall. The action had been designed to 
test the stance on the Maori MPs of Jim Anderton (the Alliance) not of the three Labour 
MPs. However, Tirikatene-Sullivan still found the lack of support from her own 
colleagues unacceptable: 'I have, in a public sense, learnt that the loyalty of those three 
MPs was not with me, and the Labour caucus must now accept that the loyalty I have 
always shown will no longer be guaranteed' (Laugesen, 1994a). 
Clark quickly condemned the action of the three MPs stating: 'There has been a long 
connection between her [Tirikatene-Sullivan's] famillo9 and the Labour Party and I 
would hope the insensitivity of three members of a select committee wouldn't be the 
cause of a final breach' (Munro, 1994a). Clark later said on the radio that she believed 
that there was a sexist element in the three male MPs refusal to support Tirikatene-
Sullivan's nomination2!o. The Southern Maori MP finally declared that the matter was 
over after receiving net only Clark's personal apology, but also apologies from the three 
MPs - the latter in front of the full caucus (Herbert, 1994a). 
It was under these uncertain and unsettled circumstances that the third ranked finance 
spokesman, Michael Cullen, made an unusual speech in Parliament, which seemed to be 
addressed to his own colleagues. 
The past few months have been for me a horrible and traumatic period in 
political terms that I do not wish to relive. One of the few political pleasures I 
have had is the fact that nobody has linked me with any of the 1,001 breakaway 
movements that have been touted, mooted, rumoured, or denied. Perhaps for once 
in this business, loyalty will be more than its own reward. I shall continue to serve 
the Labour Party in whatever capacity it needs or asks of me . 
... All I can say is that Labour remains the best and only hope for a working 
social democracy in New Zealand. Whether we achieve that potential not for 
ourselves but for those whom we claim to represent, will in part depend on our 
capacity to stop fighting past battles, stop trying to restore reputations that were 
never lost, and instead concentrate on a future that is still ours to make. (NZPD, 
vol. 539: 432) 
Further erosion of support - the first crisis 
From this point onwards, on her own admission, Clark encountered four 'bad times' 
before June 1996 when she faced a more direct threat - a request to step down by five 
frontbenchers (Roger, 1996: 55). The first of those occasions came in April 1994, when 
Labour's slide in the opinion polls continued, while the same polls registered a surge in 
support for the Alliance. In denial of a rumoured challenge against her2!! , she insisted 
209 Her father, Eruera Tihema Tirikatene, first elected to Parliament in 1932, was a Labour MP from 
1938 until his death in 1967. Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan succeeded to her father's seat by winning the 
by-election. 
210 Hodgson vehemently denied this claim as 'utterly without foundation'. He explained: 'It was a 
collective bungle, pure and simple'. (Herbert, 1994a) . 
211 One of the names (constantly) mentioned as an alternative leader around this time was former Prime 
Minister, David Lange. He strongly denied his interest in the top job. See, Goulter (l994b). 
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that her leadership was safe, arguing that it would require some time for her to establish 
herself in the opinion polls: 'It's a new role [as leader]. Obviously the start to it has not 
been an easy one. But you carry on.' 'Most people are fairly realistic. They have seen 
my strengths, as someone strong on policy and strong on common sense, and needing 
time for those qualities to show through. They don't expect dramatic results' (Goulter, 
1994a). 
The second crisis 
The second major crisis of her leadership struck in August 1994, following the 
disastrous restilt of the by-election for Selwyn, where Labour fared badly (winning 
10.3% of the valid votes), coming distant third behind National (42.3%) and the Alliance 
(40.3%)212. Throughout the campaign, the focus of the media was placed upon the 
crisis within the Labour Party, which was underlined by a series of incidents. The local 
candidate at the 1993 General Election (and also a close Moore supporter), Ron Mark 
refused to stand for the contest. Some of the local party members sympathetic to Moore 
were accused of having offered to leak Labour's campaign strategy to the Alliance. 
Secretary of Service Workers' Union and Clark supporter, Mark Gosche made a public 
call for a purge of dissident MPs - Moore, Peter Dunne, Jack Elder, George Hawkins, 
and Ross Robertson. The Labour leadership became a main issue during the election 
campaign, and the Labour candidate, Marian Hobbs, often found herself defending 
Clark (Gibbs, 1995: 80). 
In light of the magnitude of the defeat in the by-election, fierce argument between the 
opposing factions over the causes of it, and the method to recover from it, was expected 
to take place in the first caucus meeting after the by-election. In the meantime, Clark 
directed all the caucus members to leave all comments on the by-election result to herself 
and David Caygill. Prior to the caucus meeting, Clark, putting on a brave face, said that 
the by-election came at the wrong time and in the wrong place, adding: 
We respect the decision the voters made in Selwyn to vote tactically, sensing that 
the Alliance had a better chance of winning. We go on this week, improving our 
policy, our organisation, and aiming our sight at the first MMP election. (Moming 
Report, Radio New Zealand, 15 August 1994) 
After six hours of debate at the caucus meeting, Clark emerged having retained the 
leadership, announcing that there were no recriminations. 'The unanimous conclusion 
was that a house divided against itself can't stand and that a public perception of 
bickering is always fatal, and was in [Selwyn]' (MacLennan and Laugesen, 1994: 1). 
She also denied bitter inter-faction fights which could trigger a 'radical lurch' to either a 
212 In comparison to the 1993 General Election when Labour came a close second behind National, the 
party's share of votes plunged by 27.1 %. For detailed account and analysis of the Selwyn by-election, 
see Gibbs (1995). 
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left/right direction: 'Virtually no one is interested in defining the precise point in the 
gradient in the right-left, liberal-conservative spectrum that Labour might sit on. I don't 
think the public's interested' (MacLennan and Laugesen, 1994: 1). 
Clark's tentative leadership stability 
After surviving the second crisis, Clark enjoyed a reasonably secure period, which was 
accompanied by Labour's regaining of the second spot in the opinion polls. This was 
achieved despite having lost one member, Peter Dunne, who left to form Future New 
Zealand in October 1994. Dunne had been critical of Labour's policies under Clark's 
leadership for 11 while and his predictable departure213 was seen by Clark as helpful in 
further defining Labour's position (Edwards, 1994d) 
In December 1994, one year after the leadership change, Clark appeared to be 
enjoying some security. In an article entitled 'Coup just a memory now', a political 
journalist, Brent Edwards commented that she 'faces the Christmas break in a strong 
position though opinion polls have her languishing within the margin of error and 
Labour still a long way behind National'. Due to her effort to rebuild caucus unity, 
'[n]ow there are few either inside or outside the caucus who quibble at her leadership'. 
Edwards continued: 'For many MPs familiar with Moore's ad hoc, almost frantic 
planning, the sense of clear direction was a godsend. It won over some of her toughest 
critics, including close Moore supporter Geoff Braybrooke' (Edwards, 1994d). As a 
sign of such security, at the first caucus of the year in early February 1995, where the 
leadership (together with deputy leadership) was routinely reviewed, the Clark-Caygill 
leadership team was re-elected unopposed. On Clark's security as the leader at this 
stage, The Dominion's political journalist, Simon Kilroy commented as follows: 
Regarded by party insiders with the best connections in the wider party in years, 
Ms Clark has an iron grip on the leadership. Partly it is the good job she has 
done over the past year in developing a policy acceptable to the bulk of the party 
and in rebuilding caucus and party unity after the destructive coup in which she 
took the job from Mike Moore. But equally important is that there is no 
alternative candidate willing to take the job and likely to make enough of a 
difference to offset the impression of instability caused by yet another leadership 
change. (Kilroy, 1995) 
The third crisis 
This relatively calm period214 ended in October 1995 with the release of a One Network 
News-Colmar Brunton poll result. In the poll, Labour received an abysmal 16 per cent 
of the party support - an eight per cent drop from the previous month - which meant 
213 During the Selwyn election campaign, Dunne had a meeting with National Prime Minister, Jim 
Bolger regarding his support for the Government. 
214 The loss of two further senior MPs Clive Matthewson and Margaret Austin to a newly formed 
'centre' party, United on 28 June 1995, had little effect on Clark's leadership. 
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there would be only 21 MPs in the next Parliament if translated to seats under the new 
electoral system. Clark herself did not fare well, either - at 3 per cent backing as 
'preferred Prime Minister'. This result quickly triggered speculation about Clark's 
leadership position. Although she dismissed the result as a 'rogue poll' (Roger, 
1996:55), many of her caucus colleagues were not so sure, and were prepared to express 
their concerns at the next caucus meeting scheduled for 12 October. In fact, prior to the 
caucus meeting, one MP, George Hawkins, publicly predicted a leadership challenge 
(Morning Report, Radio New Zealand, 13 October 1995). 
Although not publicly expressing their views, Hawkins was by no means the only 
MP who was worried about the state of the party. At the crucial meeting, instead of 
waiting for someone to raise the issue, Clark herself put her position and latest showing 
in the opinion poll on the table for discussion. She stated at the press conference 
afterwards: 'I said that I was prepared to fight, that I believed the policy was right, I 
believed I would do a very good job as prime minister, if people don't agree, let me 
know' (Kilroy and Spedon, 1995). After a three-hour discussion, she retained a 
majority of support once again, and only one member called for a vote on her leadership 
in the following week only to be 'shouted down' (Roger, 1996: 55). Clark's leadership 
and her possible resignation, however, was certainly discussed at the meeting. Although 
caucus members, like many meetings of this nature, spoke in a 'somewhat coded' 
fashion, the meaning was quite clear to all the attendees (Cullen, interview, 1998). Many 
caucus members were deeply concerned about Labour and Clark's performance in the 
polls. 
As an indication of such concerns, the third ranked, finance spokesperson, Michael 
Cullen, became seriously interested in the leadership position. About this time, he met 
Clark and discussed their views. He, however, was interested in taking over the top 
position only with the incumbent's consent. 
When discussions took place [in the caucus], I certainly had a discussion with 
Helen, about whether that should occur because that was a point where our poll 
ratings really had collapsed in the previous two or three months and things were 
disastrously bad ... I had already made it clear that I was not prepared to become 
Leader as a result of a coup. I was not interested. It was only if there was a 
consensual change that I was prepared to become Leader... (Cullen, interview, 
1998) 
Perhaps sensing such tension, at the 12 October caucus meeting, Clark said that she 
would step aside if she felt that her presence was damaging the party. 'If I assess I 
can't make an effective contribution, of course, I'd reassess my position. I'd be crazy 
not to' (Kilroy and Spedon, 1995). 
Clark's pledge at the caucus meeting, however, unwittingly formed a platform for 
future leadership discontent. Although her exact words were not formally recorded, the 
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Clark supporters and her critics interpreted them in a completely different manner. 
While the former group viewed them as a mere expression of her intent to review the 
situation, the latter took them as definite promise to re-consider her position with the 
implication that a voluntary resignation would be a likely consequence if Labour's poll 
ratings did not improve. As Annette King attests: 
... she actually said that she would, I think her words were [that] she would be 
prepared to re-look at the situation if things didn't improve in the new year. I 
think she said a month and I can't remember whether it was March or something 
like that. And that was certainly something that people remembered. (King, 
interview, 1998) 
Nevertheless, as already noted, the caucus decided to support Clark at the meeting. 
They accepted the leader's argument that the party's polices had been well received in 
the community and that the problem rested with the presentation. Braybrooke, for 
instance, gave the lead~r his strong endorsement. 
I don't think there is going to be a leadership ... I'm one of [the] people who 
always backed Mike Moore and he's still a great friend of mine. But no, we are 
not going to change our leader. Helen Clark maybe is not the ... you know, greatest 
on television, but she's a very sincere person. She's a person who I have 
personally gained an enormous amount of respect for her since she became the 
leader. I tell you now, once you get to know that good lady, she's good. The 
trouble is we've just got to make sure that the people of New Zealand know as we 
in caucus know her. I've changed my mind about her. I'm honest about that. 
She's a good lady. (Moming Report, Radio New Zealand, 13 October 1994) 
After the caucus meeting, Clark argued that if the caucus stopped 'whispering' and if 
she adopted a new strategy, Labour would soon escape its miserable situation. The new 
strategy, explained by Clark was: 
I will get out of Wellington, out of the ivory tower, Bowen House, and Parliament 
Building and get out into the communities of New Zealand and talk a lot of more 
with people. (Moming Report, Radio New Zealand, 13 October 1995) 
To ensure her success, the caucus agreed to set up a 'task force' to reassess the party's 
entire strategy. The members were: Annette King, Jim Sutton, Trevor Mallard, Steve 
Maharey, Rick Barker, Mark Peck and Ruth Dyson, covering both factions of the 
caucus. 
The fourth crisis 
The fourth difficulty for Clark came after Labour's announcement of its party list for 
the 1996 election, the first to be held under the new MMP system, it was released in late 
October 1995. The list, compiled by the Moderating Committee and based upon 
recommendations made by the six Regional Selection Conferences, was controversial 
from its early stages. The aim of the list was to be 'made up of the sorts of people the 
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party had come to represent' (Street, 1997b: 151). Special consideration was given to 
candidates' gender215 , ethnicity, geography, age, skill, and political experience. For 
incumbent MPs, since the Committee worked on the vulnerability of each seat and 
'whether or not any protection for sitting members was required' (Street, 1997b: 152), 
the ranking on the list was, in a way, an indication of their 'worthiness' in the eyes of 
the partl16 . 
The final list announced on the 29th of October, brought mixed fortune to the sitting 
MPs. Two list only MPs, Lianne Dalziel and Jonathan Hunt (who had declared that 
they would not contest a constituency seat), were ranked within the first ten positions. 
In contrast, another list only MP, Jack Elder, who had been openly critical of the party's 
direction and a close Moore ally, was ranked a lowly 40, the bottom position allocated to 
any sitting MP. Infuriated with Moore supporters' treatment as well as the inclusion of 
a controversial Maori activist, Tariana Turia (No.21) and a prominent trade unionist, 
Mark Gosche (No. 6), Moore and his supporters openly criticised the list. For example, 
calling the list a 'suicide note' (MacLennan, 1995b), Moore stated: 'When moderates 
like Jack Elder, Jim Sutton, Damien O'Connor and Phil Goff are at the bottom and the 
Mark Gosches are at the top217, I'm beginning to get the hint that the party is changing 
fundamentally and that I and people like me are looking more like dinosaurs' (Herbert, 
1995a). Braybrooke commented:. 'It's obvious people haven't been selected on merit. 
They've been selected on their gender, their ethnic background, their political 
correctness (MacLennan, 1995d). 
The announced list damaged Clark herself. Despite her personal encouragement to 
her colleagues to put their names forward for the list, the ranking, which was primarily 
designed to 'complement rather than supplement' the constituency nominations, failed 
to provide many sitting MPs with higher, electable positions. The 'marginality of their 
electorate', rather than their talents, appeared to be given priority (Herbert, 1995c). 
Nevertheless, a handful of MPs were still left with hopeless rankings in marginal 
constituencies. Two such MPs were Mark Peck and his fellow 1993 intake, Rick 
Barker. Ranked at a hopeless No.22 and No.29 respectively, they publicly demanded 
their names be withdrawn when the list was published. Barker explained that he 
reluctantly agreed to put his name forward because of Clark's invitation to do so. The 
215 On the gender issue, Street stated that' ... in constructing our Party List, we had to be mindful of 
the need for gender balance to which we were committed and careful to do our best to enhance the 
chances of our endangered women MPs'. (Street, 1996: 454) 
216 A frontbencher, Phil Goff, withdrew from the regional list in order to avoid humiliation after 
failing to win even the 11 th slot. 
217 Despite Moore's criticism, some of the 1993 Clark supporters did not receive favourable treatment: 
Ruth Dyson (No.20), Mark Peck (No.22), John Blincoe (No.24), Martin Gallagher (No.25), Suzanne 
Sinclair (No.28), Rick Barker (No.29), Richard Northey (No.30), and Pete Hodgson (No.31). Also, 
Phil Goff, Jim Sutton (No.19) and Damien O'Connor (No.33) both returned to Parliament at the 1996 
election by winning their constituency seats. 
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leader wanted the list to be filled with recognisable names. The undertaking that he was 
given then was that all MPs would have the opportunity to study the list before it was 
made public and, if they so wished, to withdraw their names. To Barker's dismay, the 
list was published without his prior approval (Morning Report, Radio New Zealand, 1 
November 1995). 
Increasing support for Clark 
Although Clark later confessed: ' ... with the fiasco which followed the list I was really 
pessimistic about [it] ever picking up again' (Roger, 1996: 55), she managed to survive 
this latest ctiaIIenge. Her position was re-confirmed and strengthened first at the two-
day caucus retreat in Greymouth. For example, after the caucus meeting, one of the 
persistent Clark critics and Moore supporter, George Hawkins, publicly expressed his 
satisfaction with the result of the meeting. 
Caucus has had things explained to them. I think that people are somewhat more 
cheerful now than they were the week before. There is a resolve that we all go out 
there and get Labour's message across rather than doing the squabbles. (Morning 
Report, Radio New Zealand, 9 November 1995) 
Geoff Braybrooke, was equally positive. 
I am much happier leaving than I was when I came. And I feel much better in 
myself. And I think that we are going to do all right. 
He further asserted that fluctuating popularity was a problem which all political parties 
encounter and that Labour was no exception, adding, 'I'm confident we're going to go 
up' (Morning Report, Radio New Zealand, 9 November 1995). 
Clark's position received another confirmation at the annual Party Conference held 
between 17 and 19 November where she was enthusiastically welcomed by the 
delegates218 • The President, Street, mindful of the recent leadership problem, paid a 
special tribute to Clark, in which the party's unequivocal support for her was pledged. 
I have watched Helen Clark this week speak at state luncheons and official 
functions honouring the Canadian Prime Minister and the President of South 
Africa. She is magnificent. She will be a remarkable Prime Minister. She has an 
enormous experience and understanding which enables her to speak with feeling 
and meaning to world leaders. She has her own reputation in international circles 
which makes her universally respected. 
And she understands what New Zealanders need. She knows about the 
overcrowded, under-funded kindergartens and the desperate choices some families 
218 After the conference, Michael Cullen said: '1 think it [the conference] has made it [Clark's 
leadership] very much stronger. 1 think people have united in the party' (Young, 1995d). Cullen, 
Caygill and Dalziel gave 'clear endorsements' of Clark's leadership in their speeches (Taylor, 1995). 
Also, another journalist observed: 'However stage-managed the event was, it strengthened in caucus her 
position as leader because she can point to the backing she received from the wider party' (Boyd, 1995). 
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have to make between food bills and medical bills. She knows that poverty is a 
reality in this country. And she has a passion to change that. 
Helen, you have our love and support as a Party. We will work hard to get you 
into the position Jim Bolger is minding for you at the moment. (NZLP, 1995: 6) 
Persisting divisions and discontent 
Beneath MPs and the party's efforts to appear publicly united, discontent continued 
simmering. Some Clark supporters suggest that her leadership had been constantly 
under pressure in the caucus during this entire period. In this sense, the four crises 
listed by Clar~were merely public eruptions of such on-going dissatisfaction, which 
was the underlying problem for the Clark leadership. The frustration may have been 
tempered for a while after discussions in the caucus, but they were due to return soon 
afterwards as the core of the problem - Labour and Clark's poor opinion poll 
performance - remained unsolved. As Maharey notes, during this period, 'every few 
weeks someone was trying to chuck her out for no reason that was obvious' (Maharey, 
interview, 1998). 
The factor which aggravated Clark's leadership instability was the deep divisions in 
the caucus, which were a direct legacy of the bitter 1993 leadership coup. As Cullen 
notes: 'The 1993 vote division basically remained as an undercurrent right the way 
through the 1993 to 1996 period, and didn't really come to an end until the 1996 
election campaign' (Cullen, interview, 1998). A then new MP, Rick Barker makes the 
following statements which illustrate the state of the caucus divisions vividly. 
I was just amazed on occasions here that some people don't talk to each other. 
And people who had differences of opinion who simply wouldn't speak to each 
other or air it. Wouldn't air it. Wouldn't try and resolve it, which made life very 
difficult. (Barker, interview, 1998) 
In fact, another MP, Liz Tennet lists the state of the party after the 1993 leadership 
change as one of the main reasons that she decided to retire from Parliament at the 1996 
General Election219 . 
The coup, the expedient rearrangement of leadership positions, and the resulting 
parlous state of Labour politics after 1993 so disillusioned me, I decided to 
withdraw from national politics. (Tennet, 1998) 
The caucus dispute was not viewed by most MPs as directly linked to the party's 
policy direction or philosophy. While a few MPs mention an ideological cleavage 
between the two camps - especially in terms of their views of economic policy - its 
significance as a cause of the divisions is universally downplayed. To be sure, since the 
majority of the Clark supporters in 1993 were derived from the caucus left and the 
219 Tennet stood unsuccessfully for the mayoralty race for Wellington in 1995. She retired from 
national politics after three terms at the 1996 election. 
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Moore supporters from the moderate/right, some differences in policy views between the 
two sides existed. For instance, Damien O'Connor generalises the Clark supporters as 
'idealists' with 'wetter' stances on economics and her critics as 'pragmatists' with a 
'drier' approach to issues. However, he quickly explains that 'polarisation of the party 
is not what some would probably make out exists' (O'Connor, interview, 1998). 
O'Connor's fellow 1993 intake, Rick Barker agrees: 
I don't believe there is a caucus left and caucus right... I have challenged several of 
them to define for me the difference between left and right, where is the line or 
cleavage in the caucus and to say this group is left, that group is right. And none 
of them,no-one, has been able to pinpoint policy areas, philosophy divides. The 
caucus, in my view, ... is reasonably homogeneous in terms of their views on 
education, on health and so on ... the role of the state, etc, etc. (Barker, interview, 
1998) 
Annette King acknowledges the presence of the divisions in the caucus in terms of 
policy stances, but quickly adds that it has always been a norm for Labour: 
There are definitely two distinctive groups within our caucus, which is quite 
normal in a party, that is made up of people who're conservative and people 
who're very progressive. So, you've got... the whole range in our caucus. And 
it's probably always been the case in the Labour Party. You've got those who're 
considered to be centre-right - this is within the Labour Party's context, not within 
the context of New Zealand - and those who're considered to be centre-left. And 
there are two distinct groups within the caucus. (King, interview, 1998) 
King further asserts that the dispute was never about Labour's major policy direction, 
citing economic and health policies as areas where there was no disagreement within the 
caucus. At the same time, she witnessed 'so-called left wing' MPs occasionally 
supporting someone like Jim Sutton, generally considered a right-winger of the party, in 
policy debate. She believes that although the divisions were often portrayed as 
ideologically driven by the media, they principally revolved around 'personalities' and 
friendships. She continues: 
I think the real trigger for quite a distinct grouping, that's quite obvious between 
the two groupings of the caucus ... was the deposing of Mike Moore. That acted 
as a defining point, if you like, for the acceptance that there were two sides to this 
argument. And what I suppose has developed is the people who were initially, you 
know ... in support of Mike Moore in 1993, have formed friendships, and the 
people who supported Helen formed friendship. (King, interview, 1998) 
Along the same lines, Steve Maharey attributes the caucus internal divisions to the 
emotional 'wounds' suffered by MPs during the brutal few weeks leading up to the 
caucus vote. He stresses that MPs are susceptible to emotional reactions just like 
ordinary people whom they represent. 
Politicians are no different. In fact, politicians are worse in many cases than 
people outside politics. They hurt more and feel more deeply by hurts than you'd 
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ever expect politicians to do. I think that's because all politicians are heavily ego 
driven, but their ego gets hurt [like] most people. So, I think most of it was ... 
nothing to do with different discussion about policy or whatever, but more to do 
with what ... this change [was] about, who the hell were you [to] make this change, 
why did you call me that and etc. etc. And once it got rolling, it just never seemed 
to stop. (Maharey;interview, 1998) 
According to Michael Cullen, there were two mistakes made by the 1993 Clark 
supporters in their challenge against Moore, which made the division more difficult to 
heal. The first mistake was their choice of the timing for the coup, which was discussed 
in the previous chapter. The second was their refusal to let Cullen, a known Moore 
supporter, take-the No.2 position as a sign of reconciliation between the two sides220 . 
Regarding this second reason, Cullen asserts: 
... because they should have voted for me as Deputy Leader. It was very silly not 
to have healed the wound as quickly as possible by making the leadership clearly 
representative of the two groups who had divided in '93. But by not doing so, that 
helped keep the wound open. There was a really intense feeling that given that 
they changed the leader, then it was utterly wrong I wasn't the deputy leader21. 
(Cullen, interview, 1998) 
It is interesting to note that although the caucus disputes were centred around the 
bruising 1993 leadership change, Clark personally did not receive any blame from the 
1993 Moore supporters. For example, Annette King, who was deeply upset over the 
1993 coup (see Chapter 3), attests: 
Interestingly enough, I didn't direct my anger at Helen Clark. She was the person 
who became the horse that was in the race for them. Perhaps 'cos I had known 
her in the past, I knew her when we had been in Government. So, I didn't direct 
my anger at her, but... there were people I was angry with ... the people who had 
manipulated, and manipulated me. I felt really as if I was badly let down by some 
people in the caucus whose agenda wasn't concentrating on a Labour Government 
or a Labour victory. (King, interview, 1998) 
There were no disputes over Clark's leadership style per se, either. For example, 
asked whether he had any particular concerns about Clark's leadership during this 
turmoil period, Jack Elder, one of Moore's closest colleague, replies: 
No, not really. I actually ... funnily enough ... I still quite like Helen. Helen is.a 
very straightforward, intelligent person. (Elder, interview, 1998) 
220 One may challenge his viewpoint. As seen in Chapter 3, not all the votes for the deputy's position 
were cast along the same lines as for the leadership position, although Cullen's pro-Moore stance 
influenced some Clark supporters' decision. 
221 Appointing the leader and the deputy leader from opposing sides was believed to facilitate the 
healing process of the caucus in 1983. When David Lange became the leader of the party, his deputy's 
position was fought between two candidates. They were Palmer, backed by the 'A team' (which 
supported Rowling) and Moore, supported by the 'B team' (that pushed for Lange's ascendancy). 
Palmer's one-vote victory ensured that 'there would be at least accommodation between the two factions 
and eventually a reconciliation and realignment' (James, 1986: 157) 
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Elder is not alone in his praise for the struggling leader. As is to be examined in 
more detail in the next chapter, the non-Clark supporters generally valued the new 
leader's leadership skills highly. Similarly, since she did not appear to be a major 
instigator of the 1993 leadership change, she hardly found herself as a target of residual 
negativity from the coup. Rather, it was directed at her supporters who were at the centre 
of the change. However, there were a few exceptions to this, and the former leader, Mike 
Moore, was one of them. 
Moore's bitterness towards the leadership 
Another legacy of the 1993 leadership change facing Clark was Moore's ever-present 
bitterness towards her and her supporters. It kept the caucus divisions alive, and his 
public anger at his dismissal also made Labour's problems with the opinion polls even 
more difficult. After December 1993, the former leader vented his frustration through 
his constant sniping at his successor22 and the party at large. Shortly after losing the 
leadership, he declared he would campaign against the 'neurotic Left' of the party (van 
Beynen, 1993), and in 1995, he called the party a 'toxic waste dump' (MacLennan, 
1995e) and 'a bit of a poisoned chalice' (Hunt, 1995). In March 1996, he wrote: 
Labour just can't get momentum. Some of its people just don't get the 
message of the polls. I live in a different world from some of the Klingons from 
outer space who spend all their time talking about issues that ordinary Kiwis don't 
care about. (Moore, 1996a) 
In another newspaper article, the former leader asked 'why is New Zealand Labour at 
its lowest ebb since polling began?' His diagnosis was that his beloved Labour Party 
had been taken over by people 'who want everyone to look like them' with minds closed 
to new ideas. Also blamed were paid officials who 'have acted undemocratically and 
worked to undermine ideological opponents and support favourites'. His successor did 
not escape his (although rather indirect) attack, either. In an unfavourable comparison to 
successful Labour parties in other countries such as Britain, Moore pointed out that one 
of the differences between them was that the other Labour Parties have a hunger for 
office as well as 'acceptable leaders'. He further raised a question over the competence 
of Clark: 'Do it [NZLP] and its leaders223 understand the complexities of the global 
economy? (Moore, 1994b) 
Also through a series of newspaper articles and his weekly column in The Sunday 
News (entitled 'People's Man'), he pushed his own views on issues like law and order, 
mental health, compulsory superannuation, and racial issues, which were often at 
222 Moore was reported to have told Clark to step down as the leader in early March 1996 after a series 
of poor opinion poll results. (Herbert, 1996a) 
223 Who were included in the plural 'leaders' was not clear from the context. 
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variance with Labour's official positions. In addition, the timing of some articles' 
publication seemed to be designed to cause disruption to the party. For instance, one of 
his newspaper articles 'Labour Party "has lost its way'" (Moore, 1994b), in which he 
criticised both the Clark·supporters in the 1993 coup and the party hierarchy, was 
published on the morning of the Canterbury regional council meeting. He did the same 
before and during the annual party conference in 1995, that was crucial to Clark's 
leadership after the two recent crises (caused by a series of bad opinion poll results and 
the post-party list fiasco). The day before the conference, there was an article called 
'It's time for more humour in politics' in a newspaper. In this article, he asserted: '[It 
is] Not for meat this time to write of the tensions and humour that surrounded 
leadership battles in New Zealand. The party would not like it. So I will not talk about 
New Zealand. Anyhow, I am not bitter about my defeat' (Moore, 1995a). However, 
from his past criticism of political correctness prevalent in Labour, it was obvious that 
his undisclosed target was his own party. Moore also published an article entitled 
'Mike Moore's conference call', which was described as 'the speech he would have 
given' to the party conference 'if he was still leader' (Moore, 1995b). 
Moore's bitterness about his leadership loss was also apparent in his refusal of 
Clark's offers of a front bench position and/or trade shadow cabinet portfolio. On one 
occasion, he said: 'I am not for sale, nor are the issues I believe in for sale' 
(MacLennan,1995c). He appeared even upset to be approached as a means to boost 
Labour's flagging popularity. 'MPs who have been to see me are talking about their 
seats. They are not talking about their constituents' (Edwards, 1995b). 
The new Party President, Michael Hirschfeld, who took over the presidency from 
Maryan Street at the 1995 Party Conference, was acutely aware of the danger of 
Moore's behaviour. Upon election, the successful businessman and long-time personal 
friend of Moore was determined to bring back the former leader into the Labour team 
again. While Clark did not ask him to take on this task, 
I think she knew I was quite explicit that, you know, you can't have people with 
ability and drive who don't play their role in the party. There is no doubt that 
divisions between leaders [are] inherently damaging. (Hirschfeld, interview, 1998) 
The Moore problem continued 
Although the new President continued his effort, it was fruitless224 . Moore was not 
ready to forgive or forget what had happened to him in December 1993. The leadership, 
224 It was not until mid September 1996 - in the middle of the election campaign - that Moore agreed 
to endorse his successor's leadership and accept the long-standing offer of a frontbench position as well 
as the spokespersons hip of foreign affairs and trade. However, even this late decision appeared to be 
'forced' by the leader of the New Zealand First Party (NZF), Winston Peters' open offer of a cabinet 
position if NZF was involved in the next Government without Labour. The offer, devised by Moore's 
friend and NZF MP, Michael Laws, was aimed to destabilise Labour by exposing its ongoing internal 
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which was not only a vehicle to realise his long-held ambition to become Prime Minister 
again but also to recover the top position of his beloved organisation, which had been 
cruelly taken away from him. As Michael Laws, a rebel National MP who tried to lure 
Moore to form a new political party during this period, described: 
He [Moore] had no children; the Labour Party was his surrogate charge - his 
entire emotional energy had been projected into that cause. Losing the leadership 
was like being banished from the family hearthside. (Laws, 1998: 260) 
As a result of his behaviour, there was constant speculation about his future in the 
Labour Party (eg., Young, 1995a). He was frequently reported by the media as being 
about to launch a new 'centre' political partl25 (eg., Riddell, 1995). In fact, he is 
reported to have considered joining two Labour colleagues who formed the United Party 
at the end of June 1995, only to decide to forgo the opportunity, possibly because he 
was not offered the leadership, but more likely because of his tribal loyalty to the Labour 
Party226 (Austin, 2000). On different occasions, various politicians such as Michael 
Laws and his fellow National MP, Peter McCardle, plus his close Labour ally, Jack 
Elder, openly invited him to start a new political party which they said they would join 
(see especially Laws, 1998: 259-266 and 281-297. Also Booker, 1996; Campbell, 
1996). 
Meanwhile, within the caucus, Moore's disruptive behaviour further strengthened the 
entrenched attitudes of the two camps towards each other. In Ruth Dyson's view: 
Mike's antagonism was just overwhelming. He just dominated everything and 
soured everything, and the caucus was a very unpleasant place to be. It was very 
nasty, very sort of bitching at each other, and really destructive. (Dyson, interview, 
1998) 
Cullen reports that as Labour's misfortune and Moore's behaviour continued, the 
feeling of vindication of their positions in 1993 on both sides intensified . 
... the situation we were in was that those who voted one way kept feeling, 'Well, 
we were right, weren't we?' 'This wasn't going down with the public, wasn't 
going to work out right for the party.' Whereas those on the other side, as 
Mike's behaviour got somewhat more erratic and, at times, unhelpful... felt: 'Well 
problems. (See, Laws, 1998: 360-361) With this offer being put in front of him, Moore had to declare 
his position in relation to Labour publicly. Laws' book vividly illustrated Moore's hesitation to make 
a decision on his future despite constant pressure by his supporters. 
225 This speculation was fuelled by his constant refusal to commit himself to the party. Asked about 
his possibility of leaving Labour, he replied in April 1994: 'Nobody can ever rule that out' (Clifton, 
1994b). In March 1996, Moore put a one-page open survey request - 'I need your advice' - on local 
community papers in his constituency. In one question, he asked his constituents: 'Should MP's [sic], 
like Jim Anderton and Peter Dunne, who resigned from the parties for which they stood when they were 
elected, also immediately resign from parliament and contest a by-election?' (Christchurch North 
News, 2 March 1996, p.2) 
226 Austin has formed this observation from her conversations with Moore since the 1996 leadership 
crisis (Austin, 2000). 
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Gosh, we were right to do it anyway because, look at what has happened since.' 
So, you really had two groups feeling totally justified. Each of whom still felt 
terrified of the fact we were not doing well enough. And therefore they were 
inclined to blame each other of course. (Cullen, interview, 1998) 
Not surprisingly, Clark's leadership performance was adversely affected by this 
constantly hostile atmosphere in the caucus. Barker attests: 
... she wasn't able to [perform] well because of the dissent and grumpiness within 
the caucus ... It was difficult to sort of, you know, meld a fine, functioning, high 
performing team out of a group of people who are generally grumpy with each 
other. (Barker, interview, 1998) 
Even some of the most ardent Clark supporters, while remaining firmly confident in 
her leadership skills, could not resist being pessimistic about the caucus' capability of 
overcoming such negativity. Dyson, for example, says that she had doubts about their 
'ability as a caucus to move on from the leadership coup' and 'get ahead and get on 
with it' (Dyson, interview, 1998). 
Clark's hindered effectiveness and the low morale of the caucus created a vicious 
circle, which aggravated each other's problem. With the demoralised and infighting 
caucus, Clark could not successfully project an image of Labour as a credible alternative 
Government with convincing and worthwhile messages. As Goff attests: 
Whenever a party is seen to be divided it won't do well in the polls because the 
public think, and I believe rightly, that if the party that can't sort itself out, how can 
it sort the country out. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
In April 1996, the fourth Labour MP, Jack Elder, exited the party to join a third party, 
New Zealand First which was then enjoying surging popular support in the opinion 
polls. His departure carne as no surprise. As already noted, ranked an unelectable No. 
40 in the party list with no constituency, Elder had been an open critic of the direction of 
the Labour Party for sometime227 . Together with Moore, Laws, and McCardle, he had 
been involved in secret talks to set up a new 'centre' political party. His final decision 
to join New Zealand First carne only after Moore's incapability of severing his ties to 
the party which he once led became obvious228 • 
227 In April 1994, Elder resigned as caucus secretary after some MPs accused him of acting disloyally. 
With regard to his criticism of the Labour Party for abandoning traditional family values, see Elder 
(1995). For the former party president's direct reply to Elder's criticism, see Street (1995). Michael 
Laws wrote on Elder: 'He was a former school teacher with conservative social views and a clear belief 
that the modern Labour Party had gone to the dogs - particularly the lesbian dogs ... Like Peter 
[McCardle], Jack had nowhere else to go [but to join New Zealand First]' (Laws: 1998: 287). Also 
according to Laws' book, Elder once recounted at a meeting 'how he had alienated himself from 
Labour's post-election Caucus with Moore's blessing' (Laws, 1998: 285). 
228 Geoff Braybrooke estimates that 'at least eight' Labour MPs would have followed Moore out of the 
party if Moore had decided to go (Braybrooke, interview, 1998). So, why did Moore decide to stay with 
Labour? After all, according to Laws, Moore at one stage was proclaimed '99 per cent certain' to depart 
the party (Laws, 1998: 292) One likely reason is his 'romantic' and 'tribal' affiliation with the party 
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Persisting leadership instability 
While rumours about Clark's leadership continued, Labour's position in the opinion 
polls was suffering from the rise of New Zealand First. Under these circumstances, 
Clark's leadership was discussed in a 'brutally honest' fashion at a caucus meeting on 
5 March 1996. At this meeting, Manurewa MP, George Hawkins expressed his 
dissatisfaction with Labour's poll ratings and Clark's leadership. In Hawkins' words, 
'[t]here was some straight talking by everyone without fear or favour and we've come to 
a reconciliation .. .' (Martin, 1996a). Although one MP was understood to have 
expressed the view it would be helpful to change the leadership, '[n]o one else was 
interested in doing the job, so from that point of view it is not an issue' , according to 
another MP, Chris Carter (Martin, 1996a)229. 
The media speculation over a potential challenge heated up again when a One 
Network News-Colmar Brunton poll result was released on 18 March 1996, which saw 
Labour plummet to 17 per cent, putting the party second equal with New Zealand First 
and just 1 point ahead of the Alliance. To fuel this speculation, one senior MP, on 21 
March, Jim Sutton (who was touted as one of the potential replacements for Clark) 
suggested that a leadership change could come within a year: 
What is unthinkable is a bloodletting, it's simply out of the question to have a spill. 
After our recent experience, our experience of the post-93 election, we would say 
that whatever the situation was at the present time, you know we handled our last 
change of leadership extremely badly, and the next one, whether it is in 1996 or 
2006, has got to be done a lot better. (Laugesen, 1996a) 
Clark, however, was determined to fight any challenge against her. In late March she 
was reported as having said that her earlier comments in which she declared that she 
would step down voluntarily if she perceived that her presence was damaging Labour's 
chances to become government were slightly misconstrued. She was now saying that 
she did not believe that her leadership was playing a part in the party's predicament. 
She stated: 'I believe I'm doing a good job and that I retain good support in the caucus 
for doing it, so I'm not running around racked with self-doubt... The truth is, a change 
could make things a great deal worse' (Herbert, 1996b). Several days later, as the 
rumour about her leadership position continued, Clark re-stated her intention of not 
(Clifton, 1994b). Braybrooke says: 'Mike was always very bloody reluctant... he is tribal, and he loves 
the Labour Party. He loves it. And he would have taken a lot of persuading' (Braybrooke, interview, 
1998). Michael Laws added: ' .. he lacked the necessary desperation and the resolute independence to 
take that fateful leap; the self-will to breach his fears was absent' (Laws, 1998: 293). 
229 In addition, a political journalist, Patricia Herbert wrote: 'Although she [Clark] invited comments 
on the leadership at the Tuesday caucus, she prefaced the invitation with a steely speech which had the 
effect of inhibiting the discussion. Her deputy, the Hon David Caygill, deliberately raised the threshold 
by asking if anyone was willing to put a motion calling for a formal leadership ballot' (Herbert, 
1996a). 
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resigning without a fight. 'There is nothing to gain and everything to lose from running 
around like headless chooks'. She went on to say: 'I have no intention of reviewing my 
options ... What I have every intention of doing is strongly promoting policies which I 
believe will restore a seI1se of balance and fairness in New Zealand' (Martin, 1996b). 
Despite her firm determination, the pressure on Clark intensified with the release of 
the April One Network News-Colmar Brunton poll result which placed Labour on 18 
per cent, with New Zealand First as the second party after National at 22 per cent. In an 
attempt to revive the party's electoral fortune, Clark approached two former and still 
popular leaders, Moore and Lange, with an offer of a front bench position and a request 
to participate actively in the coming election campaign, only to be turned down by both 
(Martin, 1996d). 
Although Labour and Clark's unpopularity had been a topic often discussed inside 
and outside the caucus, as the 1996 election came closer, the nervousness of the 
worrying MPs noticeably increased. Cullen recollects: 
Well ... people were meeting each other all the time in caucus, seeing each other 
every day. People started saying: 'It ain't going to work, is it? We've got a 
problem, haven't we?' And so it develop[ed] from there. Nothing more than that 
as I recollect. But then things started to take on a sort of momentum. (Cullen, 
interview, 1998) 
The 1996 leadership crisis 
An attempt to return Moore as Leader 
Around this time - approximately early May 1996 - a few frontbench members 
approached Moore regarding his availability as an alternative leader. Behind this 
approach was the belief that the presence of a popular leader was a key to avoiding the 
looming electoral disaster - exactly the same logic applied by Moore supporters 
(ironically including Clark) back in 1990. Despite his burning ambition to lead the 
party (and hopefully the country) once again230 , Moore found this second-time rescue 
call from his desperate colleagues a surprise. 'Well, I had not planned to take over the 
leadership ... if I had, I would have been slightly more polite [sic], not... such a grumpy 
prick'. In response, he first had to let his frustration and anger show. His target was 
Labour's policy direction. 
I said: 'You haven't got the guts to do it. Your policies of say, taking tax up and 
matching the Alliance on promises. That somehow you feel good because you're 
going to take money off people to help poor people - sounds good but it's 
230 As recently as late January 1999 - more than five years after his ousting - Moore expressed his 
aspiration to the leadership role. '1 would like to be Prime Minister of this country. 1 think I 
understand a lot of what this country needs, and I've always felt that my base reaction to a lot of issues 
is similar to the heartbeat of New Zealanders. It is a disappointment (that I cannot be Labour leader) 
but this is life ... what will be will be' (Rentoul, 1999). Wanting to regain the prime ministership is 
not unusual for former leaders. For example, see David Lange's comment in McMillan (1993: 63). 
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bullshit. It's not going to work. It'll create more unemployment. You're not 
focusing on the issues that are facing New Zealand. This is simplistic 1970's 
stuff, and the globalised economy is just baby talk, it's crazy. Show us some 
courage. Say 'No' to people'. (Moore, interview, 1998) 
After the outburst of anger, he instructed those MPs what procedure would be followed 
if a leadership change was to be executed. 
I said: 'What you have got to do, if you want to change the leadership, you 
shouldn't do it as Helen Clark did it. What you should quietly do is tell no media, 
get a piece of paper with all the names on. You bring me a list of names when we 
have them in majority. Right? And then I think you are obliged to go to the leader 
and dofQr her what she didn't do it to me. That is say: "Look, you do not have 
the confidence of the party. Here are the names. We suggest you think about it. 
[Then] we'll take these names to a caucus [meeting], and the leadership will 
change.'" (Moore, interview, 1998) 
Testing the water 
Following this meeting, a few caucus senior members including Phil Goff started 
approaching their fellow MPs who might have similar viewpoints regarding the state of 
the party. They also asked them to sign a letter of intent, which expressed their wishes 
to have a leadership change. Given the party's dismal opinion poll performance in the 
previous two years, it was no surprise that a number ofMPs agreed to the request. Goff 
reports that the numbers between the pro- and anti-leadership change camps were close: 
I think it's fair to say at that time the numbers were evenly divided within caucus. 
And when I say 'evenly divided' I mean evenly divided. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
However, the collected signatures fell short of the outright majority. To illustrate this 
point, Annette King compares their position with the November 1997 leadership change 
of the National Party (from Jim Bolger to Jenny Ship~ey), where a similar technique was 
employed by the insurgents. Although the actual letter was never presented to Bolger, 
the Shipley camp claimed that they had obtained enough support to oust the incumbent 
(Bolger, 1998: 15). This was not the situation for Labour's pro-change group in 1996 
(King, interview, 1998). According to Moore, they were 'two short' of the magic figure 
(Moore, interview, 1998). 
Despite the lack of immediate strength to enforce a leadership change, the insurgents 
remained confident that the figures were under-representing their 'real' position. They 
estimated that there would be more than enough MPs to overcome the two-vote deficit in 
their favour when it came to the crunch. Apart from some sympathetic MPs who were 
overseas at that time (thus could not sign the paper), several MPs were believed to be 
supportive of their cause although they were reluctant to declare their disloyalty openly. 
Moore explains the latter: 
... there were several people who told me although they wouldn't sign the paper, if 
there was a vote, they would go for me, but they were too scared of the public 
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position to go against Helen publicly, but if there was a vote, they would go for 
me. But they hadn't signed the paper, because they wanted protection. (Moore, 
interview, 1998) 
In assessing the 'rear strength of the insurgents, one point deserves special 
attention. The letter, curiously, did not bear the name of Moore, or in fact any name of 
alternative leaders. What it contained was MPs' wishes for Clark to step down from the 
top position and a vote to be taken to fill the vacancy (Anonymous, interview, 1998). 
This ambiguity over the alternative raises a question: Could it be possible that those who 
agreed to sign the letter did so without knowing who would replace Clark? Annette 
King thinks that could be the case for some. 
Oh, I think that would be true. Because it wasn't... the case of 'this person is 
better than you [Clark]'. It's a case of 'we are in serious trouble. You'd have a 
[personal] rating of 2 or 3 or 4 per cent [as preferred Prime Minister], and the 
party has got 15%. We are heading for oblivion. We've got to do something to 
change it. We bdieve that we've got to change the leadership, or consider 
changing the leadership as an option.' ... The letter certainly didn't include an 
alternative leader. I can't remember what the words said, but it didn't say: 'We 
want to have Mike Moore as our leader.' (King, interview, 1998) 
Furthermore, the identity of the alternative leader was not clarified verbally when the 
approach was made to MPs, either. This was highly unusual. As Larry Sutherland, who 
found out about the caucus manoeuvring as Junior Whip231, comments: 
one of the things that 1'd asked ... was ... who they were talking about [as an 
alternative]. And it was very, very unclear. Nobody would state clearly who it was 
going to be. Normally the first thing some people want to do is find out where 
you stand, right? So, there was ... not necessarily anybody particular's name [sic] 
came forward. (Sutherland, interview, 1998) 
The maintaining pressure on Clark 
In the meantime, the tension within the caucus increased with the release of the May One 
Network News - Colmar Brunton opinion poll result on 21 May. The result confirmed 
the concerns of those worrying MPs - Labour was losing ground badly. The result 
which rated Labour at 15% (a three point drop from the previous month) was the worst 
for the party since Television New Zealand (TVNZ)'s polling began in 1974. Although 
the governing National Party recorded the lowest rating since October 1994, it offered 
little comfort. At 35%, National was still in a much better position than its diminishing 
riva1232 • With the 15% poll rating, Labour was to gain only 20 seats in the expanded 
Parliament of 120, which means that more than half of the 45 incumbent Labour 
politicians would lose their seats. To make this grim prospect even more realistic, on the 
231 He says: '[C]ertain members of the caucus were going around sounding out people, and as a Whip, 
it [didn't] take long to find that out' (Sutherland, interview, 1998) 
232 The major winner in the poll was New Zealand First which increased its share by seven points. 
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same day, the Prime Minister, Jim Bolger officially set the next election date as 12 
October -less than five months away. 
Needless to say, this news undermined Clark's position further. When another poor 
poll result by TV3-CM Research came out earlier in the month on the 14th, Clark 
dismissed it as 'pure speculation' (,Clark dismisses 'pure speCUlation' of poll', The 
New Zealand Herald, 16/5/96). She cited the poll's small sample numbers to discredit 
the reliability of the result which showed Labour at 16%, dropping 10% from the 
previous month. However, since the more recently released One Network News -
Colmar Brunton poll, which had a greater sample number of 1,000, had produced a 
similar result, Clark was exhausting her excuses. 
The May TVNZ poll also dealt a blow to Clark personally; her own rating as 
'preferred Prime Minister' recorded a mere four per cent (steady from the previous 
survey). The popularity gap between her and the leader of New Zealand First, Winston 
Peters (29%) and the incumbent Prime Minister, Jim Bolger (22%) seemed stark. 
Moreover, these figures convinced some worrying caucus members of the political 
necessity for a party to have a popular leader. King continues: 
[R]egardless of what we were saying and doing, we were unable to get the party 
up in the polls, the party was on 15%, Helen was down near the margin of error in 
popularity. And, as you know, in New Zealand over many years, you've seen a 
more presidential style election in New Zealand. And so you had to have a leader 
that was connecting with the public. That was our concern, and we felt that 
because we were ... dropping in the opinion polls, and Helen's credit rating was 
dropping, that we weren't connecting with the public. And we were looking at the 
biggest defeat in our history. [It was] seen to be a defeat when Mike Moore only 
got about 35% of the vote. We were on 15% at that stage. (King, interview, 1998) 
Given the party's abysmal poll performance, the two-day annual Party Conference 
on 25 and 26 May (it was referred to as Congress for the election year) was held in a 
surprisingly (perhaps artificially) buoyant mood. As one journalist described the 
atmosphere: 
It was almost as if they had come to the congress to give their MPs and each other 
a much-needed morale boost. And it seemed to work, with MP Judy Keall saying 
she wished it could go on forever and that she did not have to "return to reality". 
(Herbert, 1996c) 
No doubt encouraged by such a up-beat atmosphere, Clark was eager to seize this 
occasion to strengthen her position in the caucus by delivering a strong speech. Maryan 
Street, who retired as the Party President at this conference, explains that through the 
speech, Clark intended to demonstrate her leadership (and resolve to retain it) to those in 
caucus who were still questioning and undermining her authority233 (Street, interview, 
233 But, why did she have to use the Party Congress to address her own doubtful colleagues? Street 
explains: 'Well, I think there aren't too many opportunities within the caucus dynamics. There aren't 
190 
1999). In the earlier part of the speech, Clark commented on 'what leadership is truly 
about'234. No doubt referring to the state of her own caucus at the time, she said: 'It 
isn't a matter of style or public posturing. The only measure of leadership is the 
direction in which we are being led' (NZLP, 1995: 42). In order to live up to that 
measurement, she used the latter part of the speech to show the party and caucus 
members a clear direction to follow. Instead of making the usual party conference 
speech in which leaders merely confirm the already announced policies or broadly 
discuss the future general directions of policies, Clark went further to announce her 
'personal agenda' as the leader (see Chapter 7). In effect, it was a clear statement of: 
'I'm the leader. This is what I stand for. This is where we are going to go' (Street, 
interview, 1999). 
However, Clark's spirited speech had little effect on a group of wary, pro-change 
MPs who continued lobbying in an attempt to strengthen their position. Indeed, their 
intention became known beyond a circle of parliamentarians at this conference. The 
then Party President, Michael Hirschfeld, is amongst those who realised this caucus 
undercurrent during those two days. 'We had started to hear things during the 
Congress. That's when we first heard' (Hirschfeld, interview, 1998). The news must 
have been an ironic reminder of the unstable nature of the PLP leadership for the 
President. Only six days earlier, he aired the idea of a new leadership selection system 
by extending voting rights to party members - along the same line as their British 
counterparts. At that time Hirschfeld made the following comment as if he could have 
predicted what was to come: 
You can't just wake up on Monday to a poll of 500 people that is bad news for the 
party and rush off on Tuesday [normal caucus day] and change the leader. 
(Martin, 1996c) 
Despite the EPLP' s apparent distaste for another leadership coup, the resolve of the 
pro-leadership change group was strong. The series of poor opinion poll results 
compelled them to act. Five front benchers, Goff, Jim Sutton, Koro Wetere, Michael 
Cullen, and Annette King, who were all 1993 Moore supporters, continued discussions 
about the merit of having a new leader. The conclusion which they reached was that the 
party would be better off with someone at the helm who had wider popular appeal. They 
also agreed with Sutton's earlier expressed view (in March) that the next leadership 
too many opportunities for a really structured expose of one's positions. So, what she took was an 
opportunity to be very clear about what she was intending. And sometimes, putting it out in the 
public arena has been the best way of conveying it to the caucus. Once it's out in the public arena, 
there's little they can do about it. .. they cannot pretend that they misheard, or. .. they cannot argue with 
it at the time' (Street, interview, 1999). 
234 In this part, she was referring to the former Labour leader, Bill Rowling, who died prior to the 
conference. Although well respected for his personal integrity, Rowling - like Clark herself - suffered 
from a lack of popularity during his leadership. See Chapter 1. 
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change had to take place in a bloodless and hopefully amicable fashion. To achieve a 
trouble-free transition, Clark's consent to voluntary resignation would be essential. It 
was their unanimous view that the next step should be an approach to Clark to ask her to 
re-consider her position in the best interest of the party and her colleagues. After all, 
they believed, at the 12 October caucus meeting, Clark herself promised to re-examine 
her position if things would not improve. By any measurement, the situation had not 
improved for Labour since. In the sense that it provided them with grounds to raise the 
issue with the leader, Clark's October pledge at the caucus meeting acted as a 'catalyst' 
for the meeting. 
Nevertheless, the decision to demand self-sacrifice from the leader was not an easy 
one. Although they became increasingly desperate as the election came closer, their 
views of Clark in terms of her general leadership were positive. In fact, because of their 
appreciation of Clark's leadership skills, they had long felt reluctant to take any action 
about the matter. However, time was running out. As Cullen puts it: 'Well, it was a 
kind of "needs must" situation, wasn't it?', pointing out that at that stage the prospect 
of Labour coming third or even fourth (behind the Alliance) in the coming election 
looked very real (Cullen, interview, 1998). Being the only female l\IIP of the group, 
King, found the situation particularly difficult. 
I, probably out of the group of five who went to see Helen, was closer to her than 
any of the rest. And ... I went reluctantly, and I was personally very emotionally 
upset about it because I felt guilty that I was broaching the subject, but I knew I 
had to. So, I felt an obligation but I felt guilty as well. (King, interview, 1998) 
Clark facing five frontbenchers 
Around 9:00 am on 28 May, Mike Moore, in the knowledge that the five frontbenchers 
would contact Clark later that same day, sought a meeting with her. The purpose of the 
meeting was to warn her about the coming approach as well as to tell her his interest in 
making himself available as a candidate if a vote was to be taken on the leadership. In 
his words: ' .. .I went and saw Helen Clark because that was the proper thing to do. I 
was ambushed as leader. I thought that dishonest, so I did it differently.' (Moore, 
1996b). He further elaborates: 
I went to her, and said: 'This is what you never did to me. This is how it should 
be done. How it's been done throughout the history of our party. I believe that 
there are a large number of people who do not support you as the leader.' And 
I'd have said: 'If there are the numbers there, I will accept the vote. But I would 
not go out and campaign, undermine you, leak, or do things that are inappropriate. 
I will act with honour.' (Moore, interview, 1998) 
An hour after Moore's visit, the five front bench l\IIPs - Cullen, Goff, King, Sutton, 
and Wetere - sought a 30-minute meeting with Clark. On arriving at her office, to their 
surprise, they found that there were four other l\IIPs already there apart from Clark -
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Jonathan Hunt (Senior Whip), Larry Sutherland (Junior Whip) and two loyal Clark 
supporters, Lianne Dalziel and Trevor Mallard. The latter two were asked to be present 
to provide some support to the leader. As Moore indicated earlier, the five MPs invited 
Clark to step down in light of Labour's support levels, after reminding her of her own 
words made in the previous October35 . Sutherland recalls: 
I think their comment was that they were concerned, with respect to ... the public 
perception of the party and who ... the leader [was]. That one ... senior caucus 
member in particular whom I won't name ... did say that it was felt by that person 
that the time wasn't right for a female leader, so to speak. .. and that was one of 
the reasons given by that person. Generally they applied their own analysis ... 
from their own experiences as to the fact that we weren't going anywhere and that 
she should reconsider her position to stand down ... (Sutherland, interview, 1998) 
The meeting was not confrontational or aggressive. In one participant's words, 
'[e]ach of them [the five MPs] talked why they thought she should step down and then 
other people at the meeting commented. And that's it' (Anonymous, interview, 1998). 
The letter for which some of the five MPs collected signatures was not presented. 
Neither did the delegation threaten a move against her236. Goff recalled: 
It was a meeting at which we spoke frankly and honestly, as all of us, as members 
of caucus, have the obligation to do, in terms of the advice we might give to our 
leader. We made it clear, explicitly, that the reason there would be no leadership 
challenge was because the Labour Party, at this point in the election cycle, did not 
need to go through the trauma that such a challenge would involve. (Kilroy, 
1996a) 
As they agreed, the wishes of those frontbenchers to avoid a repeat of the 1993 
leadership coup fiasco were evident. For this reason, they vehemently reject the label of 
an 'attempted (and failed) coup' for their approach. King asserts: 
I don't know what history's done to it, but you've got to understand that the 
meeting never went in and gave her an ultimatum. I hope that's been told you. 
We never went to say: 'You've got to go, or else.' It was not... it was not done 
like that at all. We went along, we sat down, and five of us expressed what our 
worries and concerns were . 
... We did not give her an ultimatum ... we exactly asked her to consider her 
position. (King, interview, 1998) 
The central figure of the group, Goff, also says: 
235 King says: '[I]n fact, ... at the meeting I think it [her comment] was sort of like the lead-in to a 
discussion with her: "You said at caucus that you would reconsider your position blah, blah, 
blah."'(King, interview, 1998). 
236 The leadership issue was not discussed at the caucus meeting which immediately followed the 
approach by the five MPs. The reason for this was that the five MPs had not obtained the nine 
signatures necessary to call a special Caucus meeting on leadership, and they wanted to pursue the 
matter only if Clark agreed to stand aside voluntarily. (Laugesen, 1996c) 
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If! had set out to launch a coup against Helen, I wouldn't have done it in that 
manner. We were trying to avoid a coup ... if it was a coup, I had been around in 
politics long enough to know how you run a COUp237. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
He further elaborates on. their action: 
If you are going to change your leadership, and you want to do it brutally, then 
you don't signal your punches to the person who is Leader. The five people who 
went to see Helen did so on the basis of thinking that the party was in real 
difficulty and it was, obviously, in the polls, thinking that a leadership coup was 
only going to lead the party at the end of it more deeply divided and in greater 
disarray. But [we] felt that there was a need to talk frankly to her about how the 
party was doing and what her role in that might have been. So, five of us 
approached her, and said: 'The polls are awful, and heading downwards. You may 
be looking at the survival of the Labour Party if the trend in that polling and the 
longevity of the poor polling was correct. We think that you should consider the 
issue of the leadership, and whether you feel that you are still the best person to 
carry this party into the next election'. In that sense, we set out to do precisely the 
opposite to what happened in 1993. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
In hindsight, he admits that their approach to this sensitive leadership issue, which 
depended upon rationality and logic, underestimated the likely reaction from the Clark 
supporters. 
To have thought you could have a discussion over leadership without being seen 
as imminently about to challenge her leadership through the ballot process - was 
that naive? Perhaps. But at the time, given the circumstances we were in, we 
thought that it did offer some possibility of confronting the problem without 
making the situation worse. I don't think at that time, I don't think now that Helen 
ever wanted to be somebody that would go down in history as having led the 
Labour Party to its final demise. Yet, the situation for us in terms of the public 
response to us was about that level at the time the discussions took place. There 
was no guarantee that there was going to be a Labour Party other than as a 
diminishing rump, had we maintained our voting support at [15]%. (Goff, 
interview, 1998) 
However gently it was put forward to Clark, the request to consider voluntary 
resignation by the prominent frontbench colleagues was nevertheless an indication of 
no-confidence on their part. It would be surprising if any leader in that situation was not 
affected by such a motion. Cullen remembers Clark's reaction to their request. 
She ... wanted to think about it. I mean, Helen was tremendously upset at that 
point. She was devastated by the way that the polls had gone, she felt quite rightly 
that it was a dreadfully unfair reflection of her abilities and her contributions as 
Leader. She was deeply upset. And yet she decided to stay on and fight for the 
237 Goff first entered Parliament in 1981 when he was 27. Prior to this, he had been a member of the 
Labour Party since 1969, experiencing various executive positions. He helped Moore's election 
campaign in 1972, and once said: 'Mike Moore had quite an influence on me' (du Chateau, 1987: 93). 
This former university politics lecturer had a remarkable political career in the fourth Labour 
Government. In 1984, he became the youngest Cabinet Minister (as Minister of Housing) in New 
Zealand history at the age of 31. By the time he lost his seat in 1990, he had risen to No.7 in the 
Cabinet ranking as Minister of Education. 
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leadership. Now, that wasn't a big fight. It was a sort of 'Right, we've talked that 
through. That's it.' (Cullen, interview, 1998) 
Questions over the credibility of the pro-change movement 
The controlled manner of the approach in an attempt to avert a messy leadership change 
had an unexpected effect; the Clark supporters interpreted it as a sign of their weak 
standing. As Clark loyalist recalls: 
... basically, the position was that they were approaching Helen directly to try to 
make her feel guilty and then go, because they didn't have the numbers to topple 
her. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
When the shocked Clark consulted with her trusted friends and colleagues regarding her 
options after the meeting, they also reached the same conclusion and advised her 
accordingly. 
My comment to Helen when she told me that this was happening was: 'They 
haven't got the numbers. They are trying to stare you down'. She, being Helen, 
had of course worked exactly that out. And I said: 'In my view, the only choice 
you have is whether you want to stay or whether you want to go. If you want to 
stay, you must have the numbers, because they haven't. Because if they had, they 
wouldn't be doing it this way. So, if you want to stay, you just look at them and 
say "Where are the numbers?'" (Tizard, interview, 1998) 
Another point that gave the Clark supporters the impression of the approach as 
having no 'realistic chance of success' (Hirschfeld, interview, 1998) is the vagueness 
about the alternative leader. Like the letter of intent which the pro-change group was 
collecting signatures for earlier, the identity of the alternative leader remained unclear at 
the meeting. Based upon this, the view was quickly formed by the anti-change group 
that the other camp did not have a unified candidate behind whom they could unite. 
Although Moore's name was on people's lips, no confirmation was forthcoming even in 
the subsequent lobbying. Jonathan Hunt, Senior Whip, remembers the situation and 
says: 
It didn't necessarily mean he mightn't have been the only one interested. You 
remember that it was more a vote of saying to Helen that she should stand down 
rather than anybody else should apply. All sorts of people ... there were at least two 
people, who would have been interested, had she said 'Yes' [to the request to 
resign]. But it's not by any means certain that Mike would have won. 
In fact, at one stage the word Mike was used, but that might not have necessarily 
been Mike Moore. (Hunt, interview, 1998) 
The 'other' Mike, rumoured to have set an eye on the leadership position was Michael 
Cullen. However, his name, like Moore's, remained just a rumour. 
So, was Moore 'the' alternative candidate? Or, as Hunt suggests, was there 
somebody else? Moore himself is adamant that he was the only candidate. In reference 
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to the fact that his name was not on the pledge paper, he insists: 'Well, there was no 
doubt about it [his sole candidacy]. That means nothing' (Moore, interview, 1998). 
Despite the former leader's confidence, however, Moore's sole candidacy was not a 
unanimous agreement. At least two members, Cullen and King, were not part of the 
group which approached Moore regarding his interest in re-gaining the leadership 
(Cullen, interview, 1998; King, interview, 1998). By the time they started acting as a 
group of five, the inquiry had been already made to the former leader. King attests that 
there was no formal approach made to Moore by the group as a whole. 
Mike Moore was probably the obvious person to be the challenger. But the group 
of us dian' t formally approach him. There were discussions and meetings and 
talking and worrying .... I mean, some people obviously spoke to Mike. But... the 
five of us didn't go and say: 'Mike, will you be the leader?' No, that's not true . 
... we never sat down and formally said: 'It's Mike' or 'Take Michael on. 
Mike'll be the leader.' 
(King, interview, 1998) 
Not having been involved in the earlier approach to Moore, King did not have a 
specific alternative leader in mind. Besides, as far as she was concerned, the purpose of 
their approach to Clark was merely to express their concerns to the incumbent leader. If 
Clark agreed to comply with their request, then a search for an alternative would begin, 
and Moore as Clark's successor was not a foregone conclusion. King acknowledges 
that some people considered other names apart from Cullen such as Goff and herself, 
although they themselves were not part of such discussions. Also a possibility was that 
the Clark supporters would have put forward someone like Steve Maharey as the next 
leader if Clark had relinquished her position. Thus, when asked her preference in that 
situation, her answer is non-committal: 'I don't know who would have stood' (King, 
interview, 1998). 
In contrast to King's uncertainty, the other four members saw Moore as the only 
possible candidate capable of taking over the leadership and, more importantly, of 
rescuing the party from its predicament. Cullen says: 'There was no question who the 
alternative was' (Cullen, interview, 1998). Goff is equally clear about his support for 
Moore. 
I ruled myself out - I think I did it on television - from having an ambition to lead 
the party. Mike Cullen - I don't think at any point during the discussions -
thought that he would be put up as a leadership candidate. That wasn't really 
discussed. The only name that was ever mentioned in the discussions was Mike's 
[Moore] ... Mike Cullen has the ability to be a leader, and may have the ambition to 
be a leader at some point in the future, but he certainly wasn't under consideration 
as a potential leadership candidate at that point of time. Nor was there any dark 
conspiracy between him and I that we should seize the positions of leadership and 
deputy leadership. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
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For Cullen, the only unresolved question was in regard to the deputy's position in 
case Clark stepped down with David Caygill following her. If the No.2 position had 
become vacant, he would certainly have been interested. 
The only issue which arose, the only issue which arose in that context, was that if 
Helen wasn't prepared to stay as Deputy and in the event of a leadership change, 
then I was probably the natural choice as Deputy Leader. (Cullen, interview, 1998) 
Since the leadership primarily occupied the concerns of the pro-change group they did 
not have anyone specific - let alone a unified candidate - in mind for the deputy's role. 
Asked whether he had anyone specific in mind for the position, Goff replies that Clark 
would have been an ideal choice, while doubting its feasibility: 
Good question, actually ... I don't think we did give a lot of thought to that because 
the thing wasn't designed as a coup to happen in one day and the decisions to be 
made on the other... The approach that we made to Helen was one that was 
designed to enable a healing process after any such change in which case you may 
have looked to her own supporters or indeed to her if she'd agree to this to fill that 
position. In fact, I do recall the suggestion being made whether or not it was 
regarded as realistic, if the thing had simply been a mature discussion among 
Parliamentary colleagues about the problems we faced and what were the options. 
And had she been prepared to stand down, would she have been the ideal person 
for that process to have gone through with a reality and with the public image of 
having been something that healed the problems in the party rather than fuelled 
them? Now, to expect her to have done that was that naive? Perhaps. (Goff, 
interview, 1998) 
Clark fighting back 
Regardless of its accuracy, the perception of the anti-change group that the opposite side 
had neither the necessary numbers nor a unified alternative gave them confidence. 
Jonathan Hunt assessed the situation and concluded that the challenge had little chance 
of success. 
I knew a great deal about what was happening at this time because I had to report 
absolutely bluntly and fully to Helen about it. And I came to [three] conclusions. 
One was there were people who were talking. That was obvious. Secondly, no-
one had a majority ... thirdly while there were some who might have wanted to get 
rid of her, they did not have a unanimous, alternative choice . 
... if you are going to have a successful challenge, first you have to decide who 
your alternative is. And secondly, that person must be able to get a majority. I 
was able to tell Helen that at no stage, were either of those conditions ever met. 
(Hunt, interview, 1998) 
Nevertheless, such reassurance did not make Clark and her supporters relaxed. 
Instead, they decided to go on the offensive. Clark's determination to fight off this 
latest challenge was most evident in her speech to the Hillary Commission's Women's 
Leadership Conference held on 8 June - in the midst of the leadership crisis. Not 
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surprisingly, the speech was full of implied references to the predicament in which she 
was at that time. In the part where her political career was discussed, Clark said: 
... over the years the knockers have never gone away. The key thing is: Never let 
them get on top of you. They represent the past, not the future. At each stage of 
my career the knockers have come out. And they've been there with a vengeance 
ever since I became leader of the Labour Party. (H. Clark, 1996, emphasis 
original) 
Later on the speech, she advised the audience on how to cope with the 'knockers'. 
Because the knockers will want you to back off weeping, believing that you have 
nothing to offer and nobody likes you. And in the business I'm in I see regular, 
ugly attempts to drag people down in exactly that way. I despise and deplore it. 
But - never get mad, get even! (H. Clark, 1996) 
Then she went on to stress the importance of asking for support from others. She said 
that although women were not generally good at doing it, there were people - both males 
and females - who would be willing to help them. 'They will be there for you - if you 
ask - and you must. ' 
I count myself very fortunate to have: 
• the total and unequivocal support of my family - close and extended 
.. a solid group of old friends 
.. and many, many newer friends and colleagues who want to help. (H. Clark, 
1996) 
Indeed, Clark had a group of colleagues who were prepared to respond to her request 
for help and fight the battle all the way with her. They decided to employ several tactics. 
Firstly, to the five MPs further surprise238 , Clark's supporters contacted the media 
regarding their approach. As a result, by the end of May, the news was public 
knowledge. Secondly, knowing that the anti-Clark camp had 16 to 17 votes, not far 
short of the 21 needed to secure the caucus majority, she and her supporters appealed 
directly to the external Parliamentary organisation and affiliated organisations for their 
sUpport239 • The news about the threat to Clark was certain to bolster her support in the 
EPLP where loyalty to the leader was always strong. As Goff analyses: 
238 Goff was bitter about this leak. 'I'm very upset about the way it developed. What was a private 
conversation with the leader on my part, in the privacy of her room, was maliciously made public, and 
misrepresented, and comments were made that, frankly, were lies'. (Kilroy, 1996a) 
239 In response to this call, the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions came out strongly endorsing 
Clark and criticising Moore on 6 June. In a press release, it said: 'We were never convinced that Mike 
Moore had a firm grip on the issues it [CTU] raised, or a comprehensive understanding of what Labour 
Party industrial relations policy was ... Since the 1993 election, this has changed. Helen Clark is a 
former Minister of Labour. The CTU worked closely with her in negotiating Labour Party's industrial 
relations policy. She has a precise understanding of all the details of why the ECA doesn't work and 
what is needed to replace it'. (CTU, 1996) 
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The political response to that approach was for some of her supporters - some of 
Helen's personal supporters- to take that publicly to scream 'Coup' at the top of 
their voice in the sure knowledge that Labour Party members and activists, who 
were always loyal to the leader, regardless of who the leader is, would then put 
pressure on some of those people that shared the opinions of the five who went to 
see Helen. And that's precisely what happened. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
Another tactic employed by Clark was to link the five frontbench MPs' approach to 
two former Labour Cabinet Ministers, Roger Douglas and Richard Prebble. The five 
MPs' approach took place the day before Prebble - by then the leader of another 
political party, ACT - delivered a speech entitled 'Why Labour Must Replace Helen 
Clark'. Because of this timing, Clark described on 3 National News (6:00 pm, 31 May 
1996) the attempt as 'a bit of last gasp of Rogernomics about the way in which Richard 
Prebble is behind them'. Although any association with Richard Prebble or his new 
party was strongly denied by the five front benchers (Kilroy, 1996a), Prebble's speech 
did nevertheless intere~tingly mirror what was happening in the Labour Party. For 
example, he said: 
The country cannot afford to lose the experience and intelligence of MPs with 
Ministerial experience such as David Caygill, Mike Moore, Phil Goff, Jim Sutton 
and Annette King. 
Labour must replace Helen Clark. Some ask with whom? I say, just about 
anyone would be better - David Caygill or Phil Goff - or really admit they were 
wrong and go back to Mike Moore (he would be better than Helen!) (Prebble, 
1996) 
However, Clark's remark is generally seen as nothing but clever political rhetoric. 
Widely credited for their contribution to the economic reform during the fourth Labour 
Government, both Douglas and Prebble were highly unpopular figures240 amongst the 
party members. Any indication of a potential link between them and the approach was 
guaranteed to generate public support for her. While acknowledging the fact that the 
majority of the five MPs might have had rather conservative views on economics, the 
then President, Hirschfeld, believes that the comment was made for a 'political reason'. 
'[It was] a very effective way of simplifying the issue and shoring up our [Clark 
supporters'] position' (Hirschfeld, interview, 1998). Michael Cullen, who was certainly 
240 During his later days as an MP for Auckland Central (especially after 1984), Prebble became a 
target of strong antagonism from some segments of his local party organisation for his enthusiastic 
support for Rogernomics. (Prebble's Cabinet portfolios included Associate Minister of Finance and 
State Owned Enterprise.) In an unusual move, his opponents challenged his candidacy in 1988. Since 
1996, Judith Tizard has represented Auckland Central, which was once his seat until he lost it at the 
1993 election. Tizard explains the state of the local party organisation in 1996: '[W]e had absolutely 
no organisation here. Prebble had not only burnt the forest, he'd salted the earth in terms of Labour 
Party activists'. She describes the defeat of her former colleague as 'almost a cause of celebration' 
(Tizard, interview, 1998). With regard to Prebb1e's struggle with his party organisation, see Hyde 
(1994). 
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not a Rogernomics supporter during the fourth Labour Governmene41 , stresses that the 
implication of Clark's comment that their approach was motivated by ideological factors 
is totally wrong. 
I certainly didn't [have any concerns about the policy direction under Clark's 
leadership]. And I don't think most people in that group had any serious 
concerns about policy direction. I don't think ... it was ever a fundamental policy 
issue at all. Generally speaking, you could say that most of those who ~ere 
inclined to make a change were on the right end of the caucus, and most of those 
who weren't were on the left, but there was so much interchange and muddy ... and 
any of those differences aren't large in the Labour caucus these days. That really 
wasn't that powerful-a-factor. (Cullen, interview, 1998) 
Annette King also points to the fact that none of the five MPs have subsequently 
suffered any retribution, which should have taken place if Clark's claim had carried any 
substance242 • 
There hadn't... there was no argument about policy in the Labour caucus. And I 
think that comment from Helen was a lashing out at the situation ... a reaction to a 
situation because if she truly believed it was the last gasp of Rogernomics, none of 
us were demoted, none of us received any retribution from her. (King, interview, 
1998) 
Final stages 
The news of the five frontbenchers' approach promptly compelled some of the key 
Clark supporters such as Hodgson, Mallard, and Tizard to start intense lobbying. At the 
same time, the anti-Clark members refused to publicly declare their loyalty to Clark and 
(in particular Goff) continued number-crunching. As already mentioned, this group was 
conscious of the potential damage caused by yet another public infighting, and that was 
'the reason for opting for a private meeting with the leader. The Clark supporters' leak 
to the media completely destroyed that purpose. Facing this unexpected development of 
the event and the Clark camp's fierce determination to fight, the insurgents had to decide 
on their next move - continue or retreat. They chose to fight on. This decision was a 
reflection of their confidence that enough colleagues were still in favour of a leadership 
change . 
... I guess if there had been numbers there at that point, there wouldn't have been 
anything to lose from pursuing the leadership challenge to the final point. (Goff, 
interview, 1998) 
241 Lange wrote: 'Michael Cullen is the only active member of the last Labour government who stood 
up to the juggernaut at considerable personal cost' (Lange, 1999a). 
242 The present Labour ran kings are: Cullen (No.2 - Minister of Finance); Phil Goff (No.4 - Minister 
of Justice, Foreign Affairs and Trade); King (No.5 - Minister of Health); and Sutton (No.6 - Minister 
of Agriculture, Minister for Trade Negotiations). Wetere retired at the 1996 election. 
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Two interesting points need to be noted regarding the efforts of the pro-change 
group. Firstly, throughout this ordeal, Moore himself was absent from direct lobbying. 
In the spirit of his agreement with Clark at the meeting on 28 May, the former leader 
refrained from pursuing the top position in a public manner. 
I didn't give any interviews. I made no comment. I did one Holmes show, and I 
trebled my poll in one night. You can do that. I mean I could do up 10 [points in 
the opinion polls] if [I] want. I'll do them [sic] in a week. But I thought the party 
had been through enough bloodshed, and I had been a bit of shit anyway ... Also, I 
think the leader should be given the opportunity to stand down with dignity. 
(Moore, interview, 1998) 
The former leader decided not to resort to a more certain tactic to undermine his 
successor, which he knew would be far more effective . 
... if you want to destroy a leader, you've got to leak over a period of time. You've 
got to build up resentment. You've got to build ... destabilisation. There was not a 
destabilisation programme. If you want to do it, and you are ruthless, you 
destabilise all the time, you make the leader look weak, frightened, harried and 
harassed, and politically drag the person down. (Moore, interview, 1998) 
Secondly, perhaps partly due to Moore's self- restraint, there remained a 
conspicuous absence of a single alternative candidate - even at this late and crucial stage 
of the campaign. While Moore was generally seen as the leading candidate, other names 
such as Cullen still had not been completely ruled out. 
Meanwhile, the numbers of MPs for either side reported by the media were not 
conclusive because both sides inflated them and some MPs promised their votes to both 
sides. By 7 June, the fate of Clark seemed to have rested upon uncommitted MPs 
identified in one newspaper as Rick Barker, Mark Peck, Philip Field, Martin Gallagher 
and Janet Mackey (Herbert, 1996d). Although the two camps were split along similar 
lines to the 1993 leadership change, some original Clark supporters were considering 
changing to the pro-change camp as they had no hope of returning to Parliament on 
current polling indications. To firm up those wavering, the Clark camp continued to 
encourage party officials to put pressure on them. The EPLP responded swiftly. 
Hirschfeld explains the role the party organisation played as follows: 
... the party's role was to find out, you know, the President of the party's role was 
to find out what the views of the party are. We invited people and faxes and letters 
started to pour in. They were overwhelmingly in favour of Helen. It was quite 
clear that the party didn't not want a change in the leadership. And as soon as the 
evidence was to hand, we let the party's voice be known to the caucus members. 
(Hirschfeld, interview, 1998) 
The process of the 'let the party's voice be known' involved lobbying individual MPs in 
the caucus whose positions were believed to be in favour of a change or undecided. 
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'One or two' waveling MPs were identified, and duly approached by the party officials. 
(Hirschfeld, interview, 1998). 
By the end of the week, the momentum of the anti-Clark camp seemed to have 
slowed and some MPs changed their allegiance. Many MPs were put under pressure 
from party officials in their electorates, whose help would be crucial in the nearing 
election. Annette King was one such MP. From being the most reluctant participant of 
the 28 May approach to Clark, she was reported to have pledged to her electorate not to 
vote against Clark if there would be a vote on the leadership (Martin, 1996e). 
I went to my local Labour Party, called a meeting ... and I explained to them how 
the whole situation had arisen and why it had arisen, and where I stood, and 
exactly what I had said to Helen Clark. They did not want to change the leader. 
That was quite obvious. It was also obvious that they were concerned about where 
we were as a party. (King, interview, 1998) 
King was not alone in changing allegiance. The number of those in favour of a 
leadership change decreased, or in Hirschfeld's word, 'evaporated' (Hirschfeld, 
interview, 1998). In retrospect, Moore sees his rather gentle approach as a 'mistake'. 
Helen Clark. .. cleverly and effectively - as she's very good at this - worked on 
two or three other peogle and they changed their minds. Some came back wanting 
their names off the list 43. (Moore, interview, 1998) 
The former leader adds with a hint of regret: 'If I had campaigned it [the final result] 
might have been different' (Moore, 2000). 
Gone with such last-minute change of minds was the confidence of the insurgents in 
their strength. Now they had to review the situation. Goff says that the final days of 
intense lobbying tipped the balance towards the incumbent: 
It [the media leak] forced it to the point where you'd either have to force the issue 
to a vote if the numbers were there or simply back away from it. In the end, I 
think the numbers were too close to call, and after pressure as a result of the 
publicity, the numbers would have favoured Helen marginally. (Goff, interview, 
1998) 
Another member of the anti-Clark group is quite philosophical. 
It is notorious in politics that if you are going to make an attack on an established 
leader, you are going to have ... some of your 'soft' supporters lose their nerve at 
the last minute. There will be tremendous pressure put on them ... And it was no 
surprise, really, that in the end [the pro-change group] didn't quite have the 
numbers. 
243 Moore must have known that this was possible. In 1980 he organised a campaign against the then 
leader, Bill Rowling. As happened in 1996, his group collected signatures from fellow MPs who 
wanted the leader to be replaced. However, again like 1996, under mounting pressure the pro-change 
group's support eroded. He wrote: 'Towards the end of 1980 I went to see Rowling, taking a piece of 
paper with the names and signatures of all the MPs who wanted him to stand down. I still have the list 
and it makes interesting reading because some changed their minds under pressure' (Moore, 1993b: 83). 
202 
... we always knew ... you know ... someone would be saying: 'I want to take my 
signature off the list'. You know, there were one or two of those who did change 
their minds along the way. If everybody who did pledge themselves to support 
had stayed with it, we would have changed the leadership. (Anonymous, interview, 
1998) 
The defeat of the leadership challenge 
The possible leadership challenge carne to an abrupt end on 10 June, the day before the 
caucus meeting where a vote had been expected. The five front bench MPs issued a 
press release under Koro Wetere's name in which they stated: 'We have no desire to 
prolong the infernal debate ... All five of us are committed to doing our best to elect a 
Labour-led government' (Kirk, 1996a). Nevertheless, at the caucus meeting, Clark 
herself put the issue on the table. Probably she wanted to have a clear resolution to the 
matter once and for all. 
At the subsequent caucus, she challenged anybody who wanted to move a motion 
to do so, and no-one did. And I'll tell you why no-one did. Because I was able to 
tell her no-one else had the numbers. And that is a key thing. No-one will move 
for challenge if they don't think they can win because losing is worse than 
winning. And in fact, there have been very few challenges by any individual ever 
since I have been a member of the caucus for 32 years [sic]; I don't think there 
have been any challenges that have succeeded in that way. (Hunt, interview, 1998) 
Despite Hunt's total confidence, (part of) the likely result of the votes if the anti-
Clark group had decided to force the issue at the caucus meeting still remains a moot 
point. On the one hand, there is a general consensus across the caucus that a first vote -
which would decide whether there would be a vote on the leadership - would have been 
rejected in favour of the status quo. As Goff states: 'If we had actually taken it to a 
ballot, I don't believe that we would have won' (Goff, interview, 1998). Naturally, the 
pro-change group's final decision not to proceed with the challenge was based on this 
assessment. 'Certainly there was no point in challenging in the knowledge that there 
wasn't a majority in favour of it [change]' (Goff, interview, 1998). 
On the other hand, there is some disagreement on what would have happened if the 
first vote had been carried. For example, Moore is convinced that he had secured 
enough support to regain the leadership if the second vote had been taken. 
The test was whether there would be a vote or not, and there were those who ... 
wouldn't vote for a leadership change, but if there was to be a leadership change, 
they wanted Helen to go. (Moore, interview, 1998) 
Michael Cullen is of the same view (Cullen, interview, 1998). He sees a strong 
resemblance between the 1996 and 1993 situations. 
Exactly the same thing would have happened in 1993 if the motion of having a 
vote had been contested. There would have been three or four people who would 
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have decided not to vote for a vote. I know that. I know who they are. So, I know 
exactly who probably would have voted in 1996 if it had come to a vote. (Cullen, 
interview, 1998) 
Moore and Cullen's yiew is strongly disputed by Jonathan Hunt. While he 
acknowledges the presence of some MPs who might have behaved in the manner 
suggested by Moore and Cullen, he is adamant that no alternative candidate at any point 
of time mustered sufficient support to topple Clark. He insists that the Clark camp 
always enjoyed the majority without those MPs whose support for her was considered 
unreliable. 
There wEre some people who told both sides they would support them. And I can 
tell you at least three people were in that category. How they would have voted? I 
wouldn't have known. I never counted them. I mean one thing you would do is 
anyone who tells both sides they are going to vote for them, you never count them 
as one of your supporters. (Hunt, interview, 1998) 
In support of Hunt's interpretation ofthe situation, one of the five frontbenchers, 
Annette King, argues that the 1996 situation was different from that in 1993. '[T]hat 
didn't apply in the case of Helen Clark. It didn't apply. I mean there wasn't... enough 
people [sic] to change the leadership' (King, interview, 1998). (The question as to why 
some MPs may have been reluctant to force a leadership vote while being prepared to 
endorse a challenger is to be dealt with in Chapter 8.) 
Apart from the likely defeat, another concern for the pro-change group which made 
them abandon the challenge was the likely close result of the first vote. They were fully 
aware of the further destabilising effect which Clark's narrow victory would have on her 
leadership. If she was to win the vote to remain the leader, she needed to win 
convincingly. 
You don't want them coming out even, really, very destabilising. When Bill 
Rowling was challenged by David Lange first in late 1980, he won by one vote. 
So of course, the media said he was saved by his own vote. And he was 
weakened. He was doomed. The party was floundering after that. If it had come 
to a vote, if we'd forced a vote, we'd probably have lost but we might not have . 
... if we'd had a time for a long battle ... but we didn't, it would have been 
damaging. In the end, one side or the other would have won decisively ... by three 
or four votes. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
The then Party President, Hirschfeld, argues that the potential adverse impact of such a 
close result would have been far-reaching. It could have well extended to the EPLP. 'It 
would've been [of] extraordinary damage to the party structure. The party structure 
would have been irreparably damaged' (Hirschfeld, interview, 1998). It is natural that in 
realising the likely result of the first vote, the pro-change group's focus shifted to the 
interest of the party beyond the current dispute. 
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This leadership crisis had one more twist at the end. At the caucus meeting on the 
following day, Deputy Leader, David Caygill suddenly resigned his position244 , and was 
replaced by Michael Cullen unopposed. At the press conference after his election, 
Cullen pledged his loyalty to Clark: 'My job is very simple. My job is to support Helen 
as the leader of the Labour Party, to ensure that on October 13, Helen is summoned to 
be the prime minister of New Zealand in a Labour-led Government'. He was at pains to 
emphasise that the dispute was now fully over: 'I don't think there is any doubt at all that 
Helen Clark is the best person to be the prime minister of this country. And the public 
will see that, come election time. My job is to assist in doing just that'. Cullen even 
claimed that this failed coup had produced some good: 'Helen over the last few days has 
performed in the public arena in a way which has been extraordinarily positive and 
encouraging.' 'Now we go forward to the election as a united party and as one of 
which clearly has the best policies and the best team' (Smeele, 1996). Clark agreed: 
We have the odd difference about tactics245 , but our views on policy philosophy 
and direction are identical. I think we'll make a great team ... Michael brings 
tremendous good will into the position with him ... I, of course, have my very 
strong supporters as well. Together we move on now to get this team as a 
disciplined fighting force to win an election. (Kirk,1996b) 
Although Caygill denied that his decision to vacate the deputy position was motivated by 
political calculation to resolve the internal division peacefully246, the inclusion of one of 
the critics in the leadership no doubt helped sooth the bitter feelings that had prevailed in 
the party. Together with the approach of the next election, scheduled on 13 October 
1996, Cullen's appointment meant that Clark's leadership was to be secure at least until 
after the election. 
Scars of the leadership crisis 
Despite the sudden and non-aggressive ending of the whole event, this latest leadership 
turmoil left a negative mark on the caucus. In the view of the incumbent's supporters, 
the approach and the subsequent lobbying was not only a manifestation of the lack of 
faith in the leader, but also a sign of poor political judgement. As one loyal Clark 
supporter notes: 
244 Caygill informed Clark of his intention several days before the caucus meeting. Clark, however, 
did not pass this information onto Cullen until after he and the other four MPs withdrew their 
leadership challenge. (Kirk, 1996b) 
245 Asked to elaborate on the differences over the tactics, Cullen replied: 'That's in the past. I'm here 
to support Helen Clark as leader and that would be a very, very bad way to start being deputy leader of 
the Labour party'. (Boyd, 1996) 
246 After the resignation, Caygill said: 'No, it is not fair that I claim that degree of heroism. It is my 
hope that my colleagues will unite behind whoever replaces me, and Helen, and I am confident that they 
will. But I haven't stood aside so there can be that sort of cleansing or whatever' (Luke, 1996). 
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I still feel, very angry about that attack on her. What angers me is not that the 
attack happened, but that a large group of my colleagues' political judgement was 
so bloody poor. (Anonymous interview, 1998) 
Another Clark supporter:' s criticism is equally fierce. 
I like Jim Sutton and, you know, Michael Cullen and Annette and Phil, [but] I 
don't trust them any more, because the point is that all they are interested in is their 
electoral result. You know, to me, they don't care about what comes after, and I do. 
Because one thing that New Zealanders are sick to death of is being told one thing 
before an election and getting something else dished up to them afterwards247 . So, 
I don't trust them. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
Negative feelings felt by the Clark supporters also extended to the waverers who 
considered abandoning the struggling leader. When asked why s/he thinks some MPs 
entertained the idea of switching the leader, one MP's reply is blunt: 
Because they're wimps. Because I think that they thought they might lose their 
seats, and if we changed leaders, that might win their seats. I think that was about 
as deep as their analysis goes. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
Interestingly but not completely surprisingly, there was not such obvious resentment 
in the pro-change group. Perhaps the only sign of bitterness shown by this group was 
towards some Clark supporters' decision to leak the five frontbenchers' approach to the 
media. Nearly two months after the incident, Goff told a journalist: 
I regret nothing that I have done ... I think that I should always have the right as a 
member of Parliament in the privacy of caucus or in the privacy of my leader's 
room to speak my mind and to give the advice that I think most appropriate ... I 
would always expect that sort of advice to be treated in the same sort of spirit in 
which it was tendered. It wasn't by some. (Kilroy, 1996a) 
Another MP, who was considering supporting Moore at that time, echoes Goff's 
opinion. 
[At the time the five MPs made the approach] we didn't have a sense of direction. 
We were lacking in formalisation and in momentum and in terms of the people 
who were going down to see Helen, I mean I didn't have any particular criticism 
of them. You know, I thought it wasn't a particular foolish thing to do in the face 
of it. It was, I thought, quite a sensible thing to do - to have these issues out. 
What made it a problem was that the meeting was deliberately leaked by, I suspect 
by, well, I won't tell you the name of the person, who I believe who did it, but by 
someone who was a Helen Clark supporter, and try and tum the whole thing 
around. So it became a spectacular side show. And it became quite spectacular. I 
think it was greatly overstated, well it was. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
247 This comment may seem ironic considering that Moore was replaced shortly after the 1993 
election, which the party fought with him as the leader. 
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The challenge: a catalyst for the caucus and Clark 
Unlike the post-1993 situation, the above discontent felt by both sides did not develop 
into a situation of constant distrust between the two camps. On the contrary, the overall 
tension between them ea:sed after the leadership crisis. This is in no small part due to 
Clark's handling of the caucus in the following period (this is to be discussed in 
Chapter 7 and 8) as well as other unpredicted events such as Moore's belated 
acceptance of the frontbench position. Ironically, two unexpected by-products of the 
leadership challenge helped the long-standing division mend. Firstly, Cullen was at last 
elevated to the deputy's role. As earlier noted, the animosity between the 1993 Moore 
supporters ancfClark proponents was intensified because of his failure to win the No.2 
position ahead of Caygill. Now with Caygill's voluntary resignation, the finance 
spokesperson obtained the position unopposed. As a consequence, in Cullen's own 
words: 
It meant that someone [ie, himself] identified with supporting Mike Moore in 
1993 became deputy leader, so that the two groups in caucus ... now saw a 
leadership that reflected both groups. (Campbell, 1999) 
Secondly, Clark and Labour's popularity showed an up-tum following the leadership 
crisis and it culminated in a strong surge during the election campaign (especially after 
the televised leaders' debates)24s. Many Labour MPs - in particular, the pro-change 
group - believed that the turning point originated in the leadership turmoil in May/June 
1996 and in the manner in which the leader dealt with it. In other words, Cullen's 
comments after his becoming the deputy leader regarding Clark's behaviour during the 
crisis turned out to be accurate. Goff says: 
... one of the ironies of politics was that it gave Helen a second wind and she 
performed better and the Labour Party performed better after that event. It gave 
her a profile that actually she hadn't been able to get in the media for quite some 
considerable time. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
Another member of the five frontbenchers, King, thinks that the crisis compelled the 
leader to change her tactics and attitudes, from which the party and Clark herself 
benefited greatly. 
It acted as a catalyst for Helen Clark herself and she came out fighting. And in 
fact, you know, if someone had said to us: 'Was it a well planned strategy?, No, 
it wasn't. But it certainly acted as a spur for her to come out with all guns blazing. 
And she did, and if you actually track it from that time, you actually saw a change 
in her approach: she became more aggressive, she became more on the front foot-
I suppose - rather than being on defence all the time. And leading into the election 
248 See Levine and Roberts (1997), p.227. In the event, Labour won 28.2% of party votes and 31.1 % 
of electorate votes. Although the result was the worst in the party's history, it looked significantly 
better than was predicted before the campaign (Levine and Roberts, 1997: 228). For the analysis of 
Clark's popularity and the 1996 election result, see Aimer (1997). 
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campaign, she just peaked, as you know, totally out-shone Bolger in the election 
campaign249. So, she probably wouldn't thank us for it, and she probably 
wouldn't even agree that that was the case. But it certainly acted as a spur for her 
personally. And I think perhaps a lot her inhibitions about getting out and getting 
stuck in went. (King, interview, 1998) 
The turnaround for Clark and Labour was no doubt welcome news for all the caucus 
members. In a way, it provided both sides with a sense of vindication. 
In Helen's case, clearly, it has proved something of a make or break experience, ... 
particularly in the 96 situation. She ... thought about things, then she decided to 
stand and fight for leadership, and did so, and won. It doesn't matter how close it 
was, she won. And the way she did so, which was done without rancour by and 
large,l mean people say a few things but politics is politics, without recrimination, 
without revenge of any sort, I think it actually was the beginning of the turnaround 
in the public perception of Helen. So, in a funny sort of way, you could argue that 
both sides were right. Helen's supporters were right to keep her. We were right 
to put her to the test. Because I have a very strong feeling had it not happened, we 
might not have done as well in the '96 election as we did, in a funny sort of way. 
(Cullen, interview, 1998) 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the development of the discontent with Clark's leadership 
during the 1993-1996 period. Unlike Moore, whose leadership faced only one serious 
threat (in the form of the 1993 coup), Clark had to endure a series of potential threats, 
which generated a constant state of instability. The timing of the 1993 coup left a bitter 
aftermath. In these circumstances, almost any form of effective leadership seemed 
doomed from the outset. As it was, a challenge appeared to be an almost inevitable 
outcome although whether this could have been avoided by appointing Cullen as the 
deputy leader in 1993 is a moot point. Certainly, the combination of a failed challenge 
and Cullen's appointment in 1996 proved the catalyst for the more unified caucus. 
If the event of the 1996 crisis came as no surprise, what was more surprising is 
Clark's survival. During the period, Clark did not appear to be a 'successful' leader. 
The next two chapters attempt to analyse her survival. Once again, the study's 
suggested theoretical framework provides an analytical perspective. 
249 Aimer summarised Clark's performance during the 1996 election campaign as: 'In a nutshell, Helen 
Clark stole the first MMP campaign' (Aimer, 1997: 134). 
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CHAPTER 7 
Clark leadership: expectations and concerns 
Introduction 
Why did Clark survive the 1996 leadership crisis? The answer to this question is 
simple: Clark retained the numerical majority support in the caucus. The question of 
real interest is how she maintained this support, despite Labour and her own constantly 
poor performance in the opinion polls. After all, even strong Clark supporters admit that 
the ratings which the party and its leader recorded during the 1993 and 1996 period 
were disastroUS. Steve Maharey, for example, simply puts it, 'those numbers were a 
killer for any leader' (Maharey, interview, 1998). So, why did her supporters retain faith 
in her in such adverse conditions? 
The analysis in this chapter is conducted in two sections250 • The first section 
identifies four variables crucial for the analysis of Clark's leadership. They are: a) her 
original support composition at the time of her selection as the leader; b) her supporters' 
expectations; c) her opponents' concerns; and d) her strategic decision. The second 
section analyses how Clark tried to meet the expectations and eradicate the concerns. 
An attempt is also made in the second section to explain her leadership survival in 1996 
in light of her performance in the above two tasks. 
Section A 
a) Clark's support composition in December 1993 
Outside the caucus, at the party organisation level, Clark had strong constituents in the 
(trade-union affiliated) left and the women's wing (positioned on the liberal side of the 
conservative-liberal scale on moral issues - including law and order). Within the caucus, 
however, her support base at the time of her election was rather different. Four points 
need to be noted. Firstly, some women MPs did not cast their votes along gender lines; 
in fact, every femaie MP who had first entered Parliament prior to the 1990 election 
(except for Clark) - namely, Austin (84), Keall (84), King (84), Tennet (87), and 
Tirikatene-Sullivan (67) - aligned with Moore in 1993. 
Secondly, as predicted, the moral conservatives in the caucus such as Tapsell, 
Tirikatene-Sullivan, Geoff Braybrooke251 (Munro, 1994a), as well as Jack Elder52 , 
250 This deviates from the format used in Chapter 4 (3 sections), the chapter directly comparable. As 
explained shortly, this is because of the similarities between the expectations and concerns associated 
with Clark upon her selection. The number of sections aside, this chapter follows the format of 
Chapter 4. 
251 These three MPs all voted in July 1993 against amendments to the Human Rights Act to outlaw 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Although this was taken as a conscience vote, to 
which the party whip does not apply, their action drew criticism from the Labour Party Council. 
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George Hawkins, and Ross Robertson (Clifton, 1997a: 31) unanimously supported 
Moore. At the same time, Clark failed to attract support from some moral liberals such 
as Cullen for the reasons described in Chapter 5. 
Thirdly, although, as Lange observed, the biggest block of her proponents belonged 
to the left which constituted about a third of the caucus (Lange, 1995), some 
moderate/right caucus members also supported Clark. David Cay gill, former Minister 
of Finance in the fourth Labour Government and normally considered right on the 
economic policies and Jonathan Hunt belonged to this group. 
Fourthly, the generation factor seemed to play an important role in determining the 
camps. Clark'S supporters (not only women, as already mentioned, but also men) were 
largely drawn from the newer intakes who first entered Parliament after 1990. Among 
this group of 19 MPs, only George Hawkins (90) and Damien O'Connor (93) 
supported Moore. 
Upon her election as the leader, Clark's support composition appeared to be as 
follows: 
Loyalists: Blincoe, Burton, Caygill, Clark, Dalziel, Dyson, Hodgson, 
Hunt, Kelly, Northey, Pettis, Sinclair, Tizard, White, Yates 
Uncommitted supporters: Barker, Carter, Field, Gallagher, Lange, Mackey, 
Maharey, Mallard, Peck, Sutherland, Swain 
Opponents: Austin, Braybrooke, Cullen, Dunne, Duynhoven, Elder, Goff, 
Hawkins, Keall, King, Matthewson, Moore, O'Connor, 
Robertson, Sutton, Tapsell, Tennet, Tirikatene-Sullivan, Wetere 
The above list forms an interesting comparison to Moore's initial support 
composition after the 1990 General Election. In particular, two differences immediately 
become clear. The first point is the number of opponents. While Moore faced very few 
opponents, Clark's situation was much worse. One may correctly point out that 
Moore's real support strength was never seriously tested in a vote at that time and thus 
the number of his opponents may have been 'deflated'. However, it is still true that 
Clark had to commence her leadership in a more hostile environment than her 
predecessor did. Coupled with the damaging manner in which the coup was executed, 
openly declared opposition in a vote (as opposed to potential, unrealised opposition) 
made Clark's task as the new leader more challenging. 
The second difference between Moore and Clark's initial support compositions is 
the number of loyalists. Clark's winning margin over Moore in 1993 was seven votes 
252 Elder complained that within the Labour Party, there was 'increasing intolerance of people or 
views which do not fit with the particular trendy social issues of the day'. He continued: To succeed 
we have to welcome people who are conservative on social issues ... '. (Elder, 1995) 
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(as opposed to Moore's 13 - 29 majority in 1990). However, unlike Moore's case in 
1990, her support base consisted of a large proportion of loyalists with several 
uncommitted supporters. As loyalists' support is expected to be reliable and stable over 
a long period of time, in·this sense, Clark was better positioned at the beginning of her 
leadership than Moore. 
Another factor which assisted the new leader's standing in the caucus was some of 
the uncommitted MPs' support for her, which proved highly reliable. This may sound 
paradoxical. Indeed it is misleading to categorise all the 'uncommitted supporters' into 
one group, implying that all of them shared the same (or similar) level of support for 
Clark. As seen in Chapter 4, some members like Barker were genuinely undecided as to 
which leader they would support in the vote until the last minute. For this reason, they 
were 'waverers'. Others such as Lange and Maharey, on the other hand, were 
unambiguous about their positions on the virtue of the leadership change: they were 
firmly behind it. Unlike their 'wavering' colleagues, they never considered voting for 
Moore. So, what was the difference between the loyalists and these 'non-wavering' 
uncommitted supporters? 
The latter (named here 'pragmatic supporters') lacked loyalists' positive support, or 
commitment to Clark. Those MPs supported her mainly because she was 'the' 
alternative with the best chance to beat Moore. Maharey, for example, openly admits 
that his knowledge of the future leader was limited at the time of the leadership change 
and his reason for supporting her was primarily strategic. 
I think I supported Helen initially because she was the alternative ... I didn't know 
Helen that well, really. I thought [during] the three years that I had been there, I 
had much more to do with Mike than I had with Helen. So I didn't know her all 
that well. (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
However, he quickly adds that besides the fact that she was the unified alternative, there 
were other factors which made his choice 'comfortable' for him . 
... I was aware of the fact that for three years, she had been a staggeringly 
successful health spokesperson, and she was hyper-intelligent. And that 
combination, I suppose, is what I see as the basis of good leadership. And 
because I think good leadership is good management, I see the leader as a person 
who's got a vision, able to communicate it, able to get it across to the public, able 
to effectively struggle against the National Party, and she had done that, all the way 
through. 
Whether she was 'the' leader or 'a' leader was probably found out in the next 
little while. But at the time, [I] thought, you know, 'Clearly this is a person who is 
at the top of the political tree'. So, it felt comfortable. (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
Therefore, pragmatic supporters were committed firstly to the cause (the leadership 
change) and then to Clark mostly as its main advocate. While her loyalists' conviction 
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that she was 'the' best person to lead the party was missing, their support for her had a 
reasonable degree of reliability and stability, especially in the absence of any other 
alternative leader. Therefore, it seems more accurate to sub-categorise the 
'uncommitted' supporters into two groups as follows: 
Pragmatic supporters: 
Carter, Lange, Mackey, Maharey, Mallard, Peck, Sutherland 
Waverers: 
Barker, Field, Gallagher, Swain 
So, what were the expectations which her supporters held of her as the new leader? And 
what were the concerns which prevented her opponents from supporting her? 
b) Supporters' expectations 
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, Moore's leadership problems were largely identified 
with his style of leadership (erratic and dominant tendency). What equally contributed 
to the demise of his leadership was his failure to satisfy the initial supporters' 
expectations. Apart from the election loss, under his leadership, the relationship between 
his office and the EPLP hierarchy deteriorated and the PLP could not re-establish itself 
as a centre-left alternative government. 
Under normal circumstances, it seems reasonable to assume that a predecessor's 
unresolved concerns and unfulfilled expectations are automatically passed onto to a new 
leader as new expectations. This was certainly the case for Moore's unresolved 
concerns, ie., his problematic leadership style and one of his unfulfilled expectations -
re-establishing the party's identity. Upon her selection, Clark was expected to 
demonstrate better leadership skills and shift the party policies leftwards. However, 
interestingly, the other unfulfilled expectations under Moore's leadership - re-gaining 
trust of the EPLP - was not transferred to Clark as one of the expectations. Since the 
obstacle between the EPLP and the PLP (especially the Leader's Office) was ascribed to 
Moore himself (and his personality) and because of Clark's proven record as an EPLP 
loyalist, Moore's dismissal automatically guaranteed an end to this problem. Therefore, 
in electing Clark, an improved relationship between the two bodies did not feature in her 
proponents' minds as an expectation. As a result, Clark faced mainly three, inter-
connected, expectations. They, once again, correspond to Jackson's three leadership 
(de )selection criteria: 
A. Unity expectation: Provide better leadership 
B. Policy expectation: Re-establish Labour's identity as a centre-left party 
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C. Elective expectation: Lead the party to victory at the 1996 election 
Unity expectation 
During his leadership, Moore isolated and antagonised a significant number of the 
caucus members and party officials. As the 1993 General Election approached, the 
mistrust between them intensified, and the distinction between his 'in-group- and 'out-
group' grew. The Clark supporters, most of who belonged to Moore's 'out-group', 
naturally hoped this treatment of the caucus members would cease under Clark's 
leadership. In other words, she was expected to show a more inclusive, team approach 
in the caucUs so that it could be more unified. Indeed, according to David Lange's 
observation, some MPs from the centre and right of the caucus voted for Clark in 1993 
against Moore's leadership style and performance (Lange, 1995). This expectation was 
also held by the other Clark supporters. Describing the new leader as 'meticulously 
fair' , one of her loyalists, Judith Tizard, says that one of the expectations which she had 
from the new leader was 'better leadership': 
I guess I wanted to see people being used for what they were good for and good 
at, rather than ... being excluded for their political views or the perception of their 
political views. Yes, I wanted to see a much more inclusive party. (Tizard, 
interview, 1998) 
Similarly, her supporters expected Clark to provide better leadership skills than her 
predecessor in other areas such as decision making and presentation of agreed party 
policies. These skills were believed to ensure that the party's legitimate decision making 
process would be followed and observed, and once policies and decisions were made, 
they would be adhered to. Instead of an ad-hoc and 'erratic' approach, which 
characterised Moore's leadership, it was hoped that Clark would indicate a clear 
direction to the party and caucus with a long-term plan to pursue. Steve Maharey says 
that he hoped that Clark would eliminate: 'what appeared to be an erratic, unconvincing 
approach on policy, and a kind of party which seemed to be run by a very small group 
of people' (Maharey, interview, 1998). Lange, who voted against Moore because he 
'was unstable and irrational', says he expected 'coherence' from the new leader (Lange, 
1999b). 
Along the same lines, Rick Barker compares the two leaders and makes the following 
comment: 
I would say that... Mike's very head strong and a very strong individual. And I 
mean he ... always liked to do things, he liked to do things the way that suited him 
best at the time that suited him. I mean that can be a strength, it can be a 
weakness. But that could be frustrating to people that things could change from 
day to day, or week to week ... Mike wasn't that good on those things. Helen is 
much better at that. She likes organisation, she likes discipline, and she likes 
sticking to a plan. So, I guess that there is one key area that I would expect from 
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Helen be about better organisation in caucus, a clearer view of what was to be 
done, and a longer term plan and strategy of dealing with it. (Barker, interview, 
1998) 
Policy expectation 
Clark's better leadership style and skills were also believed to be essential to achieving 
her second expectation, ie., re-establishing the party's centre-left identity through sound 
policies, a task unaccomplished by Moore. In Tizard's words: 'I wanted a Labour 
leader that could deliver Labour policy' (Tizard, interview, 1998). Maharey adds that he 
hoped: 
that we would have a clear-cut, electable policy, that we all could talk about, and 
feel centre-left about. I'm a social democrat, and I do not want to be in politics to 
be anything other than that. (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
To re-establish Labour's identity as a centre-left party, Clark was expected to produce 
more clearly defined and coherent policies. It is important to note that, since the 
majority of her supporters derived from the caucus left/centre-left, 'policy clarification' 
was understood to involve a leftward policy shift. 
So, to what extent did the Clark supporters expect policy to shift to the left? It seems 
that the Clark supporters' expectations were not unanimous in this respect. The caucus 
left (as opposed to centre-left) - a minority group of the Clark supporters - preferred 
considerable policy changes such as repealing the Reserve Bank Act (1989) (Peck, 
interview, 1998). In addition, they believed that re-establishment of the party's identity 
needed to include attaining of spokespersonships in key policy areas (such as education, 
employment, and health) by the left leaning Clark supporters. For example, Maharey, 
indicated his expectations of Clark in the following terms: 
I think she knows that this has got to be a big break, because we may have only a 
year or two years before we have to face another election. So it [the shadow 
cabinet] can't be seen by anybody as anything other than fresh. (Campbell, 
1993b: 38) 
However, the majority of the Clark supporters including the caucus centre-left did not 
seem to share such an expectation. The selection of Clark and Caygill as her deputy 
certainly suggested that any policy shift under the new regime would be far from radical 
(James, 1993b; Morrison, 1993). 
In her early parliamentary years, Clark was considered a leading figure on the left, 
known for her strong opposition to right-wing economic policies which the then Labour 
Government was eagerly pursuing. In 1986, she stated: 'If this Labour Government 
fails I think it's the free market economic approach that will get the blame' (Myers, 
1986: 170). However, after her admission to the Cabinet in 1987, her position started to 
change. In terms of the economic policy, she became more fiscally conservative. In 
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1989, she attributed her earlier view on this matter to her being 'economically illiterate'. 
She explained: 
It didn't occur to us that the resource might not be there to pay for it. I didn't 
think what confrorited this Labour Government was that there wasn't a tap that 
could be turned on to pour vast amounts of money out. Decisions became a lot 
harder because you were up against the setting of priorities. It has been a 
sobering experience for a lot of people, including me. I freely confess to having 
become a lot more hard-headed. (Munro, 1989: 31) 
In other words, by the time she was elected as the leader, it was obvious that Clark was 
no longer a le~ding left-winger of the party, but more of a pragmatist - or master of 'the 
art of the possible' - as Clark has been described on several occasions by the media 
(e.g., Beach, 1989; Welch, 1990). 
Caygill's credential as a potential saviour of the left-wing cause was much lower. 
While he did not receive the unanimous support of the Clark supporters, the majority of 
them supported him nevertheless. Together with Richard Prebble, he was an Associate 
Minister of Finance in the first term of the fourth Labour Government, ably assisting 
Roger Douglas with his major economic reforms. Also as the Minister of Trade and 
Industry, he enthusiastically opened up the hitherto protected industries to foreign 
competition, even at the cost of jobs (L. Clark, 1988). When he became the Minister of 
Finance, following Douglas' resignation in 1988, he refused to disassociate himself 
from his predecessor or his achievemenr253 . The Reserve Bank Act (1989), which a few 
caucus left MPs were keen to abolish or modify after the 1993 coup, was passed during 
his ministership. 
Some left-wing Clark supporters acknowledge that Caygill was not their preferred 
deputy leader because of his 'right-wing' views (Dyson, interview, 1998). David Lange, 
for example, in the letter which he sent to eight caucus members in the midst of the 
leadership battle, said: 'We need to become a Labour Party again. That is why I support 
Helen, and why I support Michael Cullen254 , (Rentoul, 1993a). At the same time, other 
left-wing MPs who were in favour of Caygill quickly point to his achievement as the 
Health Ministee55 including his rejection of corporatisation of the health system as 
justification for their support. 'He would be far too dry for me on some of the ... 
253 In an interview in 1989, he said: 'We have had to do things that have hurt people, that have impact 
on the economy and on people, that have added to the recession which would have occurred in any event 
for other reasons. Those things that produced that result have been necessary, partly because they will 
ultimately lead to a better standard of living, more opportunities for people' (Booth, 1989: 67). 
254 But, was Cullen a radical left-winger? It was unlikely. In 1994, asked to verify his image as 'the 
lonely guy, the prime wet who opposed the Rogernomics programme to the last', he replied: ' ... it's a 
bit of an urban legend'. Then he continued: 'I was fully in support of the general thrusts of 
deregulation and competitiveness. What I didn't agree with was, in part, the process ... a mentality 
developed of crash through or crash, and it tended to take over' (Campbell, 1994c: 14). 
255 Caygill was the Minister of Health in the second term of the fourth Labour Government until 
January 1989. 
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economic stuff... but on the health system, you know, he was an absolute wet' 
(Anonymous, interview, 1998). Clark herself expressed a similar view. In an interview, 
she said: 'Caygill is a person who is dry and pro-market on the economy but not on 
social policy' (Baysting·et aI., 1993: 122). 
Caygill's victory was one of the keys to understanding the nature of the majority of 
the Clark supporters' expectations of a 'leftward policy shift'. It seems that what they 
demanded was 're-affirmation', 'clarification' and 'further re-defining' of the Labour 
policies that had already been emerging in the previous three years (1990~ 1993). It 
embraced the open economl56 while endorsing the government-provided social services 
in areas such as health and education257 • As discussed in Chapter 4, the anti-Moore 
group was, amongst others, concerned about the former leader's unwillingness to 
present the party policy in full detail. Otherwise, they were generally contented with the 
then party policy. It was the focus of the party policy, not the content itself, that they 
wanted to see shift. 
The majority of the Clark supporters' lack of interest in a radical policy shift was 
clear in their expectations regarding the party's future relationship with a potential 
coalition partner under MMP, the Alliance. At the time of her election, because of the 
coup's left-wing connotation, many moderate/right MPs suspected that Clark's 
elevation signalled closer ties with the rival left-wing party. However, although some 
MPs were sympathetic towards the Alliance's policies258 , the majority of the left-leaning 
Clark proponents did not expect the relationship between the two parties to drastically 
improve. Steve Maharey, for instance, acknowledges his expectation of the relationship 
to be 'more professionally based in the sense of less ... personal animosity' (Maharey, 
interview,1998). However, that was where his expectation stopped. Many Clark 
supporters deny that they expected a better relationship with the rival party at all. One 
1993 intake puts it bluntly: 'I didn't expect that for a moment' (Anonymous, interview, 
1998). 
256 One of the prominent Clark supporters and left-wing MPs, Ruth Dyson, was reported to have said 
in early 1994 that the Labour caucus including those on the left accepted the market economy (Edwards, 
1994b). 
257 The clear separation between the economic policy and social policy, and refusal to fully extend the 
liberal economic doctrine to the latter was evident in Caygill's following comment made in 1988. 'I 
can favour deregulation in relation to industry, the reduction of protection, because 1 think protection is 
inefficient and because I think it is unfair. I dislike import licensing as much because I see it as a 
monopoly in the hands of the few and because I think it imposes costs unnecessarily. But in relation 
to health, the justification for a degree of protection, specifying a standard, is much more obvious.' 'It 
puzzles me that anyone would expect you would behave the same towards patients or hospitals or 
health care as you behave towards industry' (L. Clark, 1988: 32). 
258 For example, David Lange wrote in an article in which he criticised the Alliance's decision to 
support National after the 1993 election: 'This isn't to say that I don't agree with some Alliance 
policies (not the wacky transaction tax but the Alliance can have my vote whenever it wants it for 
remodelling of the reserve bank act to take account of the employment target)' (Lange, 1994b: 68) 
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Judith Tizard adds: 'I had no expectations of a better relationship with the Alliance. 
What 1 had hoped was that a Labour Party, clearly articulating a Labour view of 
economic and social policy, would actually beat the Alliance' (Tizard, interview, 1998). 
Given the moderate n'ature of the expected policy changes, David Caygill was quite 
relaxed about his new role as the deputy leader. This was despite his awareness that the 
new caucus would require symbolic separation from the controversial 1984-1990 era 
during which he played a pivotal role in the Government. He was of the view that such a 
move was politically necessary. 
I believed that it was necessary to mark soine degree of change from the 84-90 
Government, that was by the end, a politically unpopular Government. For all that 
1 believed we needed to do the things that we did, from tax reform through to 
privatisation, 1 had no wish to dissociate myself from those decisions, but 1 
thought it was time to move on. 1 used to say that the decisions we had taken then 
were appropriate then, but that didn't mean that there was any need to repeat them, 
you know, or to go back to them. (Caygill, interview, 1998) 
Despite his association with the fourth Labour Government, Caygill refused blind 
pursuit of the orthodox economic policy. His belief in the government's positi ve role in 
the economy as a means to achieve a just society was more than in tune with Clark and 
her supporters' positions . 
... the economic policy is not the end in itself. You don't want a strong economy 
for the sake of the kudos that the country might get, though there are some 
benefits in that. You want it because of the advantage that a strong economy can 
confer in terms of not just higher living standards but more equal living standards. 
There is, in my view, a distributive responsibility in government. (Caygill, 
interview, 1996) 
With regard to the ideological difference between himself and Clark, Caygill points 
to her preference for higher taxes, but quickly adds: 'that wasn't... a policy 
disagreement that 1 regarded as fundamental' (Caygill, interview, 1998). 
For Caygill, the leadership change was important not only because of Clark's 
superior leadership skills but also her interest in 'social issues' as opposed to Moore's 
interest in 'the business side of politics' (Caygill, interview, 1998). The new leadership 
indicated Labour's intention to renew its emphasis on social policy areas without 
changing its support for the fundamental economic framework installed by the fourth 
Labour Government. 
Elective expectation 
Although implicit at that time, like any leader of a major political party, Clark was 
nevertheless expected by her supporters to lead the party to victory at the 1996 election. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, during the leadership battle, the newly introduced MMP 
system was often cited as a powerful factor for the change as she was hailed as better 
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suited for the new system than Moore. Put simply, if the anti-Moore camp had thought 
that Labour's electoral fortune would be jeopardised by Clark, she would not have 
received their backing. Moore's problematic leadership style and his presentation of the 
party policy, all ofwhicli Clark was expected to rectify, were seen as detrimental to the 
party's election chances. Maharey asserts that he became concerned about the public 
perception of the party as a whole being tarnished as 'erratic' under Moore's 
leadership. Combined with Moore's exclusive leadership style, he judged that Labour's 
prospect of becoming government with Moore at the helm was grim. Clark, in contrast, 
seemed to offer a better chance at governance. Asked what he expected from Clark at 
that time, his reply again emphasises his desire to win the Treasury benches: 
I can remember [wanting to] be in government, I've never been shy about that. I 
did not come in to be in opposition. So, my ambitions, I suppose, were that we 
would define ourselves, [run] a successful party, and get into power. (Maharey, 
interview, 1998) 
c) Opponents' concerns 
As seen in Chapter 5, the 1993 Moore supporters' reasons for backing him were six-
fold: 1) Labour's better than expected performance at the 1993 election; 2) personal 
obligation/loyalty to Moore; 3) the left-wing connotation of the coup; 4) Moore's high 
public popUlarity; 5) the lack of sufficient knowledge about Moore as the leader; and 6) 
the timing of the coup. Not featured in this list were concerns about Clark as a potential 
leader. On the contrary, it seems that there existed strong admiration for her leadership 
abilities among the Moore supporters. For example, Peter Dunne, a reluctant Moore 
supporter, says: 
At a personal level I have nothing but the highest regard for her, her abilities, her 
consistency, and her strength. (Dunne, 1999a) 
However, there were three concerns which they held at that time - two were related to 
the image of the coup as being left-wing driven, and the other was regarding Clark's 
election winning ability. They were essentially mirror images of the Clark supporters' 
expectations. 
Unity concern 
Firstly, the anti-Clark group were concerned about the opposing side's possible 
retaliation through a shadow cabinet portfolio allocation. The caucus infighting during 
the leadership struggle was so intense that the atmosphere of the PLP was far from 
conciliatory. The temptation for the victor to punish the opposing side appeared real. 
Besides, it was known in the caucus that some of the Clark supporters prepared lists of a 
potential cabinet line-up with some crucial portfolios being occupied by their group 
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members259 (Austin, interview, 1997). A Clark supporter, Richard Northey, thinks that 
this concern might have entrenched some of the Moore supporters' attitude against the 
coup . 
.. .1 think some of those people may have felt that [if] Helen Clark became Leader, 
she would be punitive and would promote her supporters at their expense even 
though they had supported her, she would get more left-wing people. So it was 
partly about self-preservation. (Northey, interview, 1998) 
Indeed, a Moore supporter, Annette King, when asked about her own loyalty to 
Clark's leadership upon election, replied: 'The answers given by Helen that she intends 
to use the talents of all members - will be judged on the way it [the new shadow cabinet] 
is put together' (Stone, 1993d). Damien O'Connor, the only 1993 intake who 
supported the former leader, admits that he was initially concerned about the prospect of 
the Clark supporters dominating the shadow cabinet. 
... I knew that a balance of senior members within the party would ensure we 
continue the sensible policies. And to remove all the senior members, many of 
whom would have been perceived to be on the right, would've been just 
disastrous. (O'Connor, interview, 1998) 
This concern, however, was not universally shared among the Moore supporters. For 
instance, one MP says: 
I wasn't really concerned about [it] - about the [shadow] cabinet... portfolios ... I 
didn't think my own portfolios were threatened. It was pretty obvious what 
portfolios people wanted me to take and that I think whether it was a left wing or 
right wing leader, I would probably still get them. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
Phil Goff had the same view. He argues that rewarding her supporters at the expense of 
competent and able MPs who favoured Moore at the vote was politically unrealistic. 
In terms of rewarding her supporters, I don't think realistically, any leader can 
afford to put a section of the party that is competent on to the backbenches 
because of the ideological views they might hold. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
Policy concern 
Secondly, there were uncertainties about a 'leftward policy shift' which was expected to 
take place under the new leadership. As discussed earlier, because of the high proportion 
of the caucus left among the Clark supporters, some caucus members believed that the 
1993 leadership change was ideologically driven by those who desired to move 
259 According to Richard Northey, those lists contained members from both camps. However, they 
had a 'different balance of people' between them, more in favour of the Clark supporters than the actual 
allocation in December. Those extra Clark supporters were ear-marked for social policy portfolios. 
(Northey, interview, 1998) 
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Labour's policy to the left and to narrow its targeted voters. For instance, Peter Dunne 
notes: 
1 think that the leftward group did want to see things like the Reserve Bank Act. 
changed, the whole commitment to an open market economy turned around, and 
Labour generally do much more to 'out-alliance' the Alliance. (Dunne, 1999a) 
Shortly after Clark's election, Phil Goff warned against any radical policy shift under 
the new leadership: 'I have devoted all my adult life to the principles and policies of the 
Labour Party ... 1 don't intend to change that but it needs to be a Labour Party that 
reflects the hopes and aspirations of the people 1 represent' (Stone, 1993d). He also 
expressed his concerns about Labour's potential move to abandon wide political appeal 
and target a narrower electorate under the new electoral system: 
Narrowing the political focus is always a risk for any political party, and 1 would 
hope that people with the intelligence of Helen Clark, David Caygill and Maryan 
Street would avoid following the path of some of our political organisations 
overseas, which have excluded themselves from office. (Munro and Laugesen, 
1993: 2) 
Dunne reports that his concerns over the anticipated policy shift was 'shared by 
many of the moderate and right-wing Labour MPs' (Dunne, 1999a). However, some 
Moore supporters argue otherwise. They say that they were philosophical that some 
form of policy shift (although not radical) under the new leadership would be inevitable 
as a natural 'cycle' for the party. 
Well... 1 knew there would be a policy shift. 1 believed there would have been 
some realignment of policy regardless of the leadership. There was a lot of 
pressure from grass roots membership of the Labour Party to move to the left. 
And to some extent, 1 regarded that as inevitable. It's a part of the cycle in 
Labour. When you are in government, you become more pragmatic. You sort of 
get confronted with the realities ... So, that was not my major concern although 1 
mean, I'm prepared to argue for what 1 believe in, in the caucus whether 1 tum out 
to be on the left or on the right of the argument. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
The view that a radical policy shift would be unlikely was especially strong amongst 
those who had known Clark for a while. The selection of David Caygill as the deputy 
leader worked as further assurance260 . The following comments made by Goff, who 
warned against narrowing the political focus, illustrate this point. Furthermore, they 
underline that if the Clark opponents had any doubts over Labour's future policy 
direction, it was due to her supporters' perceived views and not those of Clark. 
260 Because Moore's policy stance came under strong criticism during the 1993 leadership change, the 
selection of Clark, and especially Caygill, raised questions as to the authenticity of the rationale (King, 
interview, 1998). 
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Helen is before anything else pragmatic. She understands havinp been in politics 
as long as I have and having taught politics before that as I did26 , the realities of 
the political scene and that moving the party to the left was not the answer to 
Labour's bid for power.. . 
... One could never have accused David Caygill of being likely to lead the party to 
the left. David is a centrist, he has economic knowledge and ability, as Helen does, 
to know that the solution does not lie in the direction such as that proposed by the 
Alliance. Helen had been a Minister, she'd had to make hard decisions, she had 
been willing to make the hard decisions. So, I had no great fear of a major swing 
to the left as it were, though some of her supporters with lesser ability than I 
would have ascribed to her, would've clearly moved in that direction. (Goff, 
interview, 1998) 
The different level of anxiety towards a likely policy shift reflected each MP's own 
ideological position. Like the caucus left/centre-left, the caucus moderate/right 
encompassed varying policy views. For some MPs like Dunne, Austin, and Clive 
Matthewson, whose natural inclination was towards centre-right of the political 
spectrum, any policy shift to the left was undesirable. For the majority of the group, on 
the other hand, some degree of a leftward shift could well be accommodated. 
Elective concern 
The third and probably the most serious concern held by the Moore supporters was 
linked to their fourth reason for supporting him, listed above. Although Labour failed to 
win the 1993 election, Moore's personal popularity was never in doubt. As pointed out 
in Chapter 5, Clark's personal popularity never matched that of Moore's. Those who 
were prepared to support Moore despite his shortcomings had serious doubt about 
Clark's ability to make the party popular with the public. Their concern was further 
reinforced by the huge public backlash witnessed during the 1993 leadership change262 • 
d) Clark's strategic decision and the urgent need for party unity 
As was the case for Moore in 1990, there were few real conflicts between her 
supporters' expectations and her opponents' concerns, which Clark had to deal with. 
The biggest and most imminent problem facing the new leader was the highly divided 
261 Both Clark (1973-75 and 1977-81) and Goff (1975-79) taught politics at the University of 
Auckland. 
262 One may ask how the Clark supporters felt about her unpopularity. Although none of the group 
denies the importance of having a popular leader, they were optimistic about Clark's future performance 
at the time of the leadership change. Mark Peck's view is typical. Asked whether he was worried about 
the matter, he replies: 'No, not at the point. It didn't. No, 'cos I mean the way 1 looked at it was that 
it's like any leader, eventually you will come up in the polls. I always believed in the maxim that a 
week is a long time in politics. And I thought, you know, give Helen a few months in the job, and a 
clear run at the Government, and we would be fine' (Peck, interview, 1998). Furthermore, one MP 
saw it as an advantage upon which the party could build on. 'I said that low ratings three years out of 
an election are excellent. It's much easier to go up one percent than it is to maintain a very high 
leading in the polls. So, they don't actually bother me' (Anonymous, interview, 1998). 
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and volatile state of the caucus. As already illustrated in Chapter 6, there were profound 
ill-feelings and suspicions between the 1993 Moore supporters and Clark supporters. 
Under these circumstances, careless handling of expectations and/or concerns could 
further aggravate the already threatened PLP unity. A leftward policy shift which was 
expected by the majority of the Clark supporters was within the acceptable range by 
most of the Moore supporters. However, because of the lack of trust (and 
communication) between the two sides, there existed a certain degree of anxiety within 
the latter group in this regard. Given this situation of profound mistrust between the two 
camps, Clark was highly aware that even the slightest hint of mishandling of those 
matters would exacerbate the internal divisions. The political consequences of that 
would be costly both for herself and Labour at large. As Street notes: 'she was very 
careful on the dynamics of that very tender, bruised caucus' (Street, interview 1999). 
However, it is important to note that there was potential for real conflicts between the 
expectations and the concerns regarding the pending policy shift. Minorities on both 
the left and right upheld firm policy stances which were simply not compatible263 . An 
attempt to satisfy either position would surely alienate not only the other minority group 
but also many of the majority MPs. For example, any radical attempt on the Reserve 
Bank Act was likely to be met by strong resistance by some in the caucus (including 
Cullen, Caygill and Clark herself). Another likely contentious issue was taxation. A 
few caucus right/moderate MPs' obstinate opposition to any income tax increase was 
well known, while many of the caucus left seemed to favour a tax increase in order to 
fund more social services. Conversely, if Labour accommodated the minority right's 
view that no policy leftward shift was desirable and the party's centre orientation should 
continue, dissatisfaction from the left/centre-left would be inevitable. Similarly, some 
Clark opponents kept a close eye on the first shadow cabinet portfolio allocation, which 
the left Clark supporters believed should be used to signal the new centre-left identity 
for the party. 
Given the diverse and contradictory policy views in the caucus, one might wonder 
whether Labour could have achieved the expected policy shift to every MP's 
satisfaction. Lange, who was one of the minority left-wing MPs, concluded negatively: 
If such differences [on the positions on the Reserve Bank Act and taxation] in the 
Labour Party are merely the result of uninformed prejudice, we may yet be 
reconciled. But if our differences arise from deeply-held philosophical 
convictions, they are beyond resolution. They are not matters of detail, easily 
traded off. Left unsettled, they lead us inevitably to a manifesto so lacking in 
specifics as to be meaningless. (Lange, 1994a) 
263 It is interesting to note that a number of Labour MPs during 1993 and 1996 - including Clark, 
Moore (McLoughlin, 1991: 54), Maharey (1997: 39), Dunne (McLoughlin, 1991: 57) and Goff 
(McLoughlin, 1995: 119) - have at some stage identified either themselves or the Labour Party as 
'social democrat'. 
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One of the minority right-wing MPs, Peter Dunne, who disagreed on many issues with 
Lange, was an unlikely ally on this matter; he was reported to have wondered whether 
any compromised economic policy between the opposing sides would be in the best 
interest for the party in the long-term (Edwards, 1994a). 
Even the then Senior Whip, Jonathan Hunt, who normally strongly denies the validity 
of the left/right labels for Labour MPs, admits that there were some exceptions. For 
those 'extreme' MPs, according to Hunt, the option was either to adopt the majority 
position or depart the party. 
Those terms [left or right] are used by supporters and opponents, but it doesn't 
necessarily mean that they are true .... There are a few people right at the extremes 
on both sides, who probably like to see themselves as that. But they always accept 
the caucus position or else they leave the caucus. (Hunt, interview, 1998) 
Indeed, the likelihood of some MPs' departure looked strong at the beginning of the 
Clark leadership264. Due to the uncertainty incurred by the introduction of the new 
electoral system, together with the reduction of the 'local' constituency numbers from 
99 to 65 (which necessitated major boundary re-drawing), many Labour MPs engaged 
in talks of potential defection265 • In particular, MIvIP, which was predicted to greatly 
increase representation of minor parties in Parliamene66 , appeared to have a profound 
impact on the two major parties' internal unity. For example, Richard Mulgan, a 
member of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, which recommended the 
introduction of the new electoral system267 , commented in 1994: 
It is not clear whether the major parties will survive in their present form or 
whether they will split into smaller rival parties once they have lost the incentives 
to remain united for electoral purposes (Mulgan, 1994: 219). 
A former Party President, Maryan Street, explains the breadth of the Labour caucus' 
ideological views under the old electoral system as 'broad church', containing from 'un-
reconstructed Marxists' to 'neo-liberalists' with many 'social democrats' in the middle 
264 However, Maryan Street argues that she did not expect a large number of defections. 'I didn't think 
the likelihood of that was very great. 1 thought there might be a few who would go. But most of them 
knew that they were where they were because of the Labour label. They would not have been there had 
they not had Labour after their name. The most honest ones admitted that quite freely. But the others 
recognised that grudgingly as a truth' (Street, interview 1999). 
265 For example, a political journalist reported in August 1994: 'Around 30 constituencies will be 
abolished in preparation for the new MMP Parliament. It is expected that this will finally trigger the 
movement of several MPs to "list" parties like the Alliance and Roger Douglas' ACT', adding, , Mr 
Maharey agrees there have been problems in keeping the Right and Left happy, in policy terms. This, 
he says, should sort itself out when the dust from the new boundaries settles' (Rudman, 1994). 
266 See, for example, Palmer (1992), Chapter 8, and Gustafson (1993). 
267 See the Royal Commission on the Electoral System (1986). 
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(Street, interview, 1998). However, as Mulgan noted above, the arrival of the new 
electoral system was believed to change the dynamics . 
. .. with the emergence of MMP, people were at greater liberty to carve out a 
political niche for themselves that better reflected their politics ... And so the 
pressure, then went off the internal workings of the Labour Party, because the 
Labour Party was then able to re-group and say: 'Yes, ... we are of the social 
democratic tradition. We're social democrats, that's what we are.' (Street, 
interview, 1998) 
It appeared that Clark's decision was to prudently meet her supporters' expectations 
in a manner w!1ich would not unnecessarily alienate her opponents. Clark's primary 
concern seemed to be retention (or restoration) of the unity of the PLP. Unlike her 
National counterpart, Jim Bolger (Laugesen, 1994f), Clark never openly encouraged 
desertion from the caucus ranks268 • On the contrary, she seemed to be determined to 
prevent or minimise any unnecessary losses of her colleagues. 
Since the caucus' ideological diversity was so great, a loss of some MPs from the 
right as a result of a necessary leftward policy shift was considered inevitable269 • At the 
same time, Clark recognised that shifting the party policies to the degree which would 
satisfy the leftist supporters would not be politically viable. In a new, unpredictable 
political environment, such a radical lurch might drive many moderate/right MPs away 
from the party. A further clarification and re-definition of the existing party policies 
might not be sufficient to retain some left-wing MPs' support, but that was the only path 
for her to take. 
Section B 
Meeting expectations and dealing with the concerns 
Since there was a considerable overlap between the Clark supporters' expectations and 
her opponents' concerns (ie., better leaderships - biased shadow cabinet portfolio 
allocations; the level of the intended policy shift; and winning the election - Clark's lack 
of popular appeal), the manner in which the new leader handled both expectations and 
concerns are examined together below. 
A. Unity expectation/concern: provision of better leaderships 
From the outset, Clark was determined to establish a clear and reliable leadership style, 
making a notable departure from Moore's style. 
In an early 1994 interview, she boasted that she had replaced Moore's unfocused, 
long, and rambling debate with a more formal, business-like approach. Also, on her 
268 However, after the Selwyn by-election, she commented seemingly out of frustration with the on-
going infighting: 'We're at the point where if people want to go they should go' (Stone, 1994). 
269 Michael Cullen, for example, said in Parliament on 16 March 1994: 'I will regret the leaving of 
any of my colleagues -some, I have to say, more than others - should they choose to go' (NZPD, vol. 
539: 432). 
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insistence, issues were now first examined by caucus committees 'to iron the wrinkles 
out'. Following that, briefing papers were made for each MP before the same issues 
were discussed at a full caucus. As a result, Clark was reported to have said that Labour 
was not 'the party of default any more' (McManus, 1994). At the same time, with the 
help of business experts, the party had introduced a strategic plan consisting of six 
corporate objectives, each of which was reported on regularly (Smith, 1994: 29). 
The new leader's effort was immediately recognised as successful by her supporters. 
Her public performance was austere, solid and reliable, which was a breath of fresh air 
after Moore's often brilliant yet unreliable style. As one Clark loyalist puts it: 
'" you'd never have to hold your breath before she opens her mouth. You always 
know she is going to say something, ... that's spot on. So, that's been a big plus. 
(Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
Rick Barker was also impressed with the new leader. 
Helen's pretty good. Helen's got a clear view of what she wants to do. She's 
energetic. She's hard working. She's a good communicator. .. Organised, 
disciplined, and she leads from the front. I mean she doesn't expect others to 
work harder than her. She works as hard as anybody else. Sets high standards. 
And expects other people to follow suit. (Barker, interview, 1998) 
At the caucus meetings, she was also willing to show a clear direction for the caucus to 
follow. As Jill White explains: 
I think that she is decisive. I also very much in caucus enjoy the way she is able to 
take in a wide range of perceptions and views from caucus members and then at, a 
sort of, an important point, say: 'Right. This seems to me to be the way 
forward.' ... Now, it isn't very often that caucus does not agree with the way 
forward that Helen perceives. That's to me a very, very good skill in managing a 
group of people who all do want to get to the same place, but who can have quite 
different points of view that they want to express, and want to express quite 
vigorously. (White, interview, 1998) 
In 1994 Maharey was reported to have pointed to three positive consequences of 
Clark's new leadership style: more efficient running of the caucus; clearer 
understanding of the leader's expectations of the caucus members; and a removal of 
personalities from caucus debate (Edwards, 1994c). 
In order to restore unity in the seriously divided caucus, an even-handed style of 
management was essential. If she was intent on consolidating her position by 
converting the 1993 opponents to new supporters, she needed to prove that they were 
not disadvantaged under her leadership. Thus, the 'inclusive' approach, she often 
referred to, featured very strongly in her leadership. She did not need to wait for long to 
put that style into practice. The first shadow cabinet portfolio allocation presented her 
with an ideal opportunity. 
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Although being acutely aware that her 'support base was within the intakes of 1990 
and 1993' (Campbell, 1993b), she was prudent not to isolate the Moore supporters, 
many of who had rich Parliamentary experience and expertise. Their exclusion from 
crucial portfolios and the front benc~ would not only have deepened the existing 
divisions within the caucus but also heavily eroded the party's credibility as the 
alternative government. In October 1994, she explained her personnel policy: 'There is 
ajob for everyone and my role's been to try and assist everyone to settle into a role 
that's supportive of the group' (Smith, 1994: 28). On the importance of maintaining the 
fragile party unity, she said. 
My way of dealing with that [the possibility of the PLP flying apart after the 1993 
coup] has been to be reasonably tolerant of diversity and to try to include everyone 
in what is done. And that has been overwhelmingly successful. (Smith, 1994: 28) 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the announced line-up delighted the wary Moore 
supporters270 • For instance, Jim Sutton (ranked No.l3) stated at that time: 'I think she 
has obviously been guided by experience and talent rather than loyalty considerations, 
and I think it is an excellent move to get the party back together again' (Clifton and 
Kilroy, 1993). David Caygill, says that the decision, which was made 'ultimately' by 
Clark after consultation with him (Caygill, interview, 1998), Hunt, and Cullen (Hunt, 
interview, 1998), was designed to appoint people 'on their merits' against a natural 
temptation to reward her own supporters271 (Caygill, interview, 1998). 
Clark's determination not to exclude her opponents was most obvious in her 
willingness to accept Moore's return to the frontbench . 
... Helen talked to a lot of us about the fact that she wanted to bring everyone back 
together again ... that she wasn't going to exclude Mike regardless of what he 
did ... that when he was ready to come back, the door would be open. And you 
know, a lot of people said that would be seen as weak, and she said: 'Tough'. She 
was going to do it anyway. She wasn't going to seek revenge on him for the way 
he'd behaved, that she was going to include people who had been strong 
supporters of Mike, you know, her whole style was very clearly laid-out. (Dyson, 
interview, 1998) 
270 A Moore supporter, Margaret Austin reports that her successful retention of the education 
spokespersonship in the reshuffle had to be fought hard: 'I. .. said [to Clark and Caygill at a meeting 
prior to the portfolio allocation that] I knew that I was under threat, but education had been my life and 
I wanted the education portfolio ... I also indicated to them at that meeting that retaining the education 
portfolio was exceedingly important to me; whether I was on the front bench of the Labour team in the 
House [or not] was of no consequence to me. And in the end, I retained the education portfolio and 
moved to the second row, which suited me perfectly well.' (Austin, interview, 1997) 
271 Asked whether he thinks Clark wanted to promote her supporters ahead of her opponents if she 
could have, Caygill answers: 'Yes. Yes, I think she would've liked to do that. I think she would 
naturally have wanted to reward people who had helped her and who she wished to encourage. But I 
think it was a matter of striking a balance, and also of recognising ability and experience' (Caygill, 
interview). 
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The first shadow cabinet portfolio announcement was generally well received and 
appreciated inside and outside the caucus, by both her 1993 supporters and opponents. 
The then Party President, Maryan Street, who observed the caucus from within, said: 
'She's uniquely good at'binding the caucus together as a team ... With two exceptions, 
both former leaders with their own agendas ... She'd tried to be inclusive, and she's 
succeeded, particularly on the front bench where she's put a wide range of people 
because she believes that the broad range of people in the Labour Party should be 
represented. If you weld together a team that behaves like a team, then you've got all the 
components that appeal to our constituency' (Roger, 1996: 54). Elsewhere, Street also 
said: 
I think a number of people who didn't vote for her in the leadership change have 
been pleasantly surprised at her inclusive approach, her genuine team approach, 
rather than the kind of rhetoric we used to hear from the leadership about team 
approaches, which never in fact materialised. (Munro, 1994b) 
Clark's 'inclusive' approach did not stop at the shadow cabinet portfolio allocation. 
Until mid 1994, Clark's supporters continued to meet as a group regularly 
(approximately once a month) outside caucus meetings. Those meetings, which 
originated in the middle of the 1993 leadership challenge, had two purposes. Firstly, 
they provided the new leader with 'psychological and emotional support' at the personal 
level. Secondly, the meetings were used as a forum to discuss 'strategy about issues', 
and 'develop policy ideas' before full caucus meetings. In the spirit of 'inclusion', 
Clark requested these meetings, which were normally attended by twenty MPs272 , to 
discontinue. Her reason was that they might look like a faction, and that she wanted the 
caucus to work as one entity (Northey, interview, 1998). 
Clark exercised the same principle in her running of the caucus meetings. One MP 
describes her style in this regard as 'consensus leadership' (O'Connor, interview, 
1998). Unlike Moore, who had been accused of being dismissive of opposing views, 
she allowed her opponents including Moore 'as much as speaking time as they wanted' 
(Northey, interview, 1998) in discussions. Apart from the opinions of spokespeople on 
issues in their specialist fields, views were frequently sought from a wide range of the 
caucus members (O'Connor, interview, 1998). 
Clark's conscious effort to unite the caucus was manifested in a public manner as 
well. An example was found in the fiasco over the selection of the Labour candidate in 
the re-drawn Mangere seat. Prior to the selection for this safe Labour seat, the retiring 
incumbent, David Lange, was publicly endorsing the then Service Workers Union 
272 The attendees were: Barker, Blincoe, Burton, Carter, Caygill, Clark, Dalziel, Dyson, Kelly, 
Mackey, Maharey, Northey, Peck, Pettis, Sinclair, Sutherland, Swain, Tizard, White, Yates. Hunt 
declined to attend them, citing his position as the Senior Whip. David Lange occasionally participated. 
(Northey, interview, 1998) 
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Secretary, Mark Gosche, as his successor. The problem was that the new boundaries 
affected two neighbouring incumbent MPs, Philip Field (for Otara) and Ross Robertson 
(for Papatoetoe), whose electorates and Mangere merged into two new seats, Mangere 
and Manukau East. It was believed that Lange's intention was that by handing over his 
seat to Gosche - a proven left-winger - the left-leaning Field would win Manukau East, 
leaving the right-leaning Robertson without a seat (Young, 1995b). In the event, this 
potentially problematic situation was resolved by Gosche's last minute withdrawal as a 
candidate, which left Field and Robertson securing the nominations for Mangere and 
Manukau East, respectively. Throughout this event, Clark came out supporting the two 
incumbentMPs for their nominations, even though Robertson was a well-known Moore 
supporter. She asserted at that time: 'Traditionally - and I can't think of any exception 
to this - the leader has supported colleagues going into selection contests. If I expect 
loyalty from MPs, I've got to give it back' (Young, 1995b). 
Evaluations of Clark's leadership 
Despite her efforts to prove her superior leadership skills, the evaluations of her 
performance varied (in some cases greatly) in the caucus, depending on MPs' support 
positions. 
Not surprisingly, the most favourable appraisal came from her loyalists. Asked 
whether Clark met her expectations in terms of provision of better leadership,Ruth 
Dyson replies enthusiastically: 
.. , she's actually been ... I think quite stunning in some ofthe things she has been 
able to do. She has got nerves of steel, I always thought she had, but she has 
proven that beyond doubt. She's got an amazing capacity for work and 
determination to get things right... I think she's got more out of the caucus than I 
would have expected. She's got loyalty from lots of people in the caucus that I 
couldn't imagine she would ever get... So, in some ways, I think she has been 
better than I thought. (Dyson, interview, 1998) 
This group of MPs also enjoyed the leader's personal approachability and 
willingness to provide support at the personal level. 
She's very publicly and politically supportive of colleagues. And if you go to her 
with an issue, she will think very carefully about what you've said ... and she'll 
come back to you. And on policy stuff, personal stuff, on political stuff, Helen is 
fastidious at getting back to caucus members. And others find she's up till all the 
hours of the night answering phone calls or answering messages. So, she goes to 
a huge extent to make people feel good. She'll often ring you - and I know a 
number of other caucus people - Helen will ring every now and again just to have 
a chat. How is the family, how's the electorate, you know, usually they are about 
specific issues she wants to ask you about, but then she will give you a chance to 
have a general carry-on as well. (Tizard, interview, 1998) 
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Clark's willingness to remain accessible to her fellow MPs was also appreciatively 
acknowledged by Dyson, too. 
She's really busy. [But] if you walk past her office, and she will have people 
walking in about..: caucus members can just go into her office at anytime. I think 
that's mad. But she does it. She likes it. She likes to say: 'Come in.' (Dyson, 
interview, 1998) 
Although not as enthusiastically as the Clark loyalists, most of the 1993 Moore 
supporters gave the new leader positive endorsement for her leadership style. As one 
MP puts it: 
... I believe that Helen Clark did reasonably well in keeping the caucus, getting the 
caucus to work together despite those contests of ideas that [have] always been 
part of the Labour Party and politics. We were in absolute ferment most of the 
time. We were a party of change. When you're the party of the status quo, it's 
easy to be united. When you're the party of change, everybody's got their own 
ideas about [in] what form that change should take place. And she did it pretty 
well, and let me-list one or two of her other qualities: she's extremely hard-
working. I've never seen her the worse for alcohol, she is loyal to her 
subordinates, strongly loyal to her subordinates. A lot of leaders think loyalty is 
something those lower down have for those higher up - it's not owed in both 
directions. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
Michael Cullen expresses his satisfaction with Clark's leadership in the following 
terms. 
I was very happy with Helen's leadership style in the caucus ... I've never felt that 
Helen was going to embarrass you, or do something which was like, 'Oh my 
God', you know, 'What's happened now? How do we clean this mess up?' So, 
there was never any of that sort of situation with Helen. (Cullen, interview, 1998) 
Even some MPs who defected from Labour during her leadership praise Clark's 
leadership. Margaret Austin was one of them. 'She had grown into the job quite well' 
(Austin, interview, 1997). 
Clark, however, could not meet every caucus member's expectation. Most notably, 
two groups of the 1993 uncommitted Clark supporters were left disappointed and this 
was reflected in their assessment of 'poor' for her efforts. Interestingly, those two 
groups were disappoin~ed for opposite reasons. Firstly, a few MPs on the left felt that 
the new leader was too generous to her opponents and questioned the merit of such 
leniency. For example, David Lange wrote in his weekly column for The Dominion: 
Ms Clark's victory [in 1993] was not overwhelming. It may have been the 
narrowness of it which persuaded her to pursue even-handedness in her 
management of the caucus. Friend and opponent alike were rewarded ... 
Retribution was [avoided]. (Lange, 1995) 
The former leader continued: 'For all that, the immediate post-succession period was 
very destructive. There was destabilisation stimulated by the disaffected' (Lange, 1995). 
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The example which he provided to illustrate his point was Clark's handling of the 
'ambush' nomination of Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan for the chairperson of the Electoral 
Law Select Committee in February 1994 and the other three Labour members' failure to 
second it. Clark's response was to strongly condemn those hapless MPs even though 
they happened to be Clark's supporters in the 1993 leadership change. Her action was 
designed to massage the bruised ego of the Maori MP, who had hinted at her defection 
from the party in the wake of the leadership change. One of the Committee members, 
Richard Northey recalls: 
Ah, I thought it [Clark's public criticism] was appalling. There wasn't any truth 
in it. We were just carrying out a caucus decision. (Northey, interview, 1998) 
Another Committee member, Mark Peck, says: 
That hurt. That hurt. I mean I'm not sexist. And neither am I racist. And I 
always got on well with Whetu as well ... And I mean, myself, Pete Hodgson, and 
Richard Northey did exactly as the caucus told us. It was all over in a minute. In 
fact, in less than a minute, probably about twenty seconds, and it was all over. 
(Peck, interview, 1998) 
When Northey sought an explanation from Clark, it became clear that the three male 
MPs had to be publicly reprimanded to resolve a more pressing issue . 
... She [Clark] said: 'No, we've just got to solve this problem.' She felt Whetu 
Tirikatene-Sullivan felt really hurt, and that was the main problem we've got to 
solve. (Northey, interview, 1998) 
Although it may have seemed politically necessary at that time, to appease a grumpy MP 
was one thing, but to do so at the expense of her own supporters was an entirely 
different matter73 • Although this incident did not cause Northey, a Clark loyalist, to 
review his support for her, he admits: 'Well, it affected it [his view on Clark] adversely 
because I felt it was an unfair comment' (Northey, interview, 1998). 
Similarly, the caucus left MPs were critical of Clark's shadow cabinet portfolio 
allocation. As Hunt notes: 'In fact, there were criticisms by some of her supporters that 
she had been too generous' (Hunt, interview, 1998). Those Clark supporters anticipated 
better representation of their own group in the line-up, and consequently they were 
disappointed. In Maryan Street's words, 'some of her supporters were really brassed 
273 Also, from a more overall strategic viewpoint, her willingness to accommodate those Maori MPs' 
demands seems questionable. As James (l994b) and Riddell (1994a) noted, by the time Clark acquired 
the leadership, the long-standing relationship between the Maori and the Labour Party had already 
weakened significantly. Although any further loss of the Maori links would have been a blow to the 
party, there was a sign that the younger generations with different political perspectives and aspirations 
had started looking for another political affiliation elsewhere, especially with the New Zealand First 
Party. Considering that Labour failed to win any of the five Maori seats in the 1996 election, one 
needs to question the appropriateness of Clark's tactical decision to make numerous concessions, in 
terms of securing her leadership in the long run. 
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off about that' (Street, interview, 1999). One such MP, Lange, saw a risk in Clark's 
decision and gave her a stem warning: 
In the effort to sterilise the poisoned chalice, dependence on the right has grown 
incrementally. Of Labour's front bench of eight, I see two only as being on the 
left, and this is to include Ms Clark herself among the left. The preferred could 
doubtless argue that the positions are filled on the basis of merit, or even that the 
distinction between right and left has been submerged in common subscription to 
agreed policy. If I were Ms Clark, I wouldn't count on it. (Lange, 1995) 
Such disapproval, however, seemed to be confined to a small number of MPs, whose 
commitment to Clark was not strong. In contrast, the loyalists on the left, who were also 
initially dismayed by her decision, quickly overcame the sense of disappointment, and 
accepted (and endorsed) their leader's position that unity of the caucus was the priority. 
Far from undermining her position, therefore, Clark's resolution to treat the whole 
caucus fairly enhanced her supporters' faith in her skills and judgement. 
Helen was very clear right from the start that it wasn't going to be a factionary 
based frontbench, and that caused some argument, too. But she was very clear 
about that. And I agreed with her. I think it was the right thing to do. I thought 
we had had enough of only the loyalists to the leader being rewarded. I thought it 
was time to recognise people's skills and give them an opportunity to contribute. 
(Dyson, interview, 1998) 
The dissatisfaction with Clark's leadership style was also found in the second group 
of the 1993 uncommitted supporters - some of the newer intake. In contrast to the 
caucus left's frustration, and sharply contradicting the Clark loyalists' positive appraisal 
of her in this respect, they were highly critical that Clark was not providing sufficient 
support and encouragement to MPs on an equal basis. One new MP attests: 
I think that leaders need to be conscious of that... despite their work loads, they 
have colleagues that really do need to be talked to and included. [I will] give you 
an instance. After I got elected ... about the second week that I was a Member of 
Parliament, I had an issue I wanted to speak to Helen about... so I picked up the 
phone and rang her. And she picked up the phone and then put it down again, you 
know. 'Oh;I've got the message. You don't bother the leader, right?' That's the 
message I've got. So, I never rang her again. The only time I ever rang her was 
when she rang and asked me to ring, or if the Whips said that Helen wanted to talk 
to me about something. So, I mean that I wasn't able to forge a strong 
relationship [after] that point. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
The same MP continues: 
... I really think a lot of effort's got to be put into making sure those that formed 
the caucus have their views valued, and listened to, I think that's the first thing they 
have to do ... I'm a fan of what's called a 'high performance team'. I don't know 
whether we have done any team building, but I believe in putting groups together, 
giving them jobs to do, and reviewing their work. Now, that can be through your 
caucus committees or special groups or whatever. But I think you have to have 
teams that are performing and reporting. So you have an accountability function 
going on through your caucus and through the leadership. I also think that it 
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doesn't hurt occasionally to sort of go around the back benches and sit down and 
see how they are doing and make sure people are reasonably happy. And that's 
an area that the leadership - not just Helen, but most of the senior members of the 
caucus are lax [at] doing. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
Interestingly, some Clark loyalists admit that such criticism was not surprising. For 
instance, Judith Tizard acknowledges that sufficient appraisal was not always 
forthcoming from Clark (possible reasons for Clark's behaviour are discussed later in 
this chapter). 
She has a very high expectations of people. I think she doesn't always give 
people credit for what they do do. She's often very critical of what they haven't 
done, without accepting what they do ... (Tizard, interview, 1998) 
Nevertheless, they do not see her alleged shortcomings as a major problem in the 
given circumstances and are prepared to defend their leader. For example, Northey 
says: '[t]here's a certain sort of personal stiffness and inapproachability', while adding 
in her defence 'which are in a sense quite good and appropriate in the leader that you are 
not quite equal to everyone else any more' (Northey, interview, 1998). 
The same group of newer MPs also found Clark's heavy reliance upon a certain 
group of people objectionable. They argue that Clark's 'inclusive' leadership style did 
not extend to her source of advice on crucial matters and that only particular individuals 
were asked for their input. Among the sources of great influence on the leader, one 
name received constant mention: Heather Simpson, then Clark's Executive Director (and 
now the Chief of Staff in the Prime Minister's Office), for whom Clark openly admitted 
her unreserved truse74 . One MP says: 
Well, I think she relied a heck of a lot on advisers... I mean one or two advisers 
were very close to her. For instance, Heather Simpson is extremely close to her, 
has been since she [Clark] was a [Health] Minister. And I think she relied quite 
heavily on her, and a small group of members of Parliament were intensely loyal 
to her. People like Steve Maharey, Lianne Dalziel, Judith Tizard, to name a few, 
were very, very close to her. And what she would do was seek advice, assistance, 
and reinforcement from them. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
Phil Goff cautiously agrees that Clark's inclusiveness had a limit. 
... she's inclusive in the sense that she's prepared to use all the skills in her 
political team and in terms of their portfolio responsibilities. Probably she might 
have.been better advised in a perfect world to seek advice on political strategies 
and skills from a wider group of people. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
274 Criticism of Simpson was not new. For example, one journalist wrote that Clark had been 
accused of depending 'too much on a small coterie of loyal advisers and MPs, especially Heather 
Simpson, and was unwilling to follow advice from others' (Kilroy, 1996c). Clark openly 
acknowledged a great deal of trust in her adviser. In an interview, she justified her reliance by saying: 
because Heather knows exactly what I think' (emphasis original) (Clifton, 2000b: 15). While aware of 
criticisms of her relationship with Simpson, the leader seemed to disregard them, simply attributing 
them to jealousy (Bain, 1999). See, also, McLoughlin (2000). 
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Even some strong Clark supporters admit that there was some truth in this criticism, 
although, again, they defend their leader. For instance, Maryan Street notes: 
I've seen Helen ... I've seen Helen do that [relying on a small group of people]. 
And I understand the impetus for it on her part. She's got to have people around 
her whose intellect she admires. And in the end, when you have been through the 
sort of things she's been through, there are very few people you can trust. So, she 
has surrounded herself with ... well, hardly surrounded herself. She's got about 
two people in her office who are close guardians of her in a way, and that has 
tended to alienate some of the caucus members as well; they are not happy with 
that. 
And I think probably, I mean Helen has Heather Simpson and Tony Timms, and 
Jonathan Hunt, now probably Mark Burton275 the Senior Whip, close to her. 
And, because of those people there are ... some caucus members who find it 
difficult ... to get through to Helen. They find them as a block between them and 
Helen rather than a facilitator 276 • (Street, interview, 1998) 
From a slightly different angle, Street's successor, Michael Hirschfeld argued that 
the homogeneity of Clark's inner circle in terms of their views and skills also presented 
a problem to her leadership. He believed that she tended to value intellectual abilities at 
the expense of other skills and viewpoints277, consequently leaving those MPs lacking 
the former attributes feeling unappreciated. 
I think that's in a sense a management mistake of not recognising the skills and 
levels that people can bring because of a view that says that policy detail and the 
intellectual coherence of policy detail is too important. .. That's not what the 
world is about. Or even being right. .. But politics is a wider assembly than that, 
and I'm sure there are people who don't have some of those skills which are more 
highly valued, who could bring value, that feel excluded. 
Nearly all successful groups are comprised of people with different skills. That's 
my personal view point. But the right network is important. And the criticism is 
that we have too high a level of common skills ... and too great an emphasis on that 
slightly too narrow range of skills .... [T]hose who closely surround her share 
Helen's strengths and probably therefore her weaknesses. (Hirschfeld, interview, 
1998) 
275 Mark Burton was elected as Senior Whip after the 1996 election. In 1999, he became the Minister 
of Defence and Internal Affairs amongst other portfolios as well as Deputy Leader of the House. As 
one of Clark's trusted colleagues, the 16th ranked Minister currently lives in a separate house on her 
official residence (Main, 2000a). 
276 According to one journalist, Simpson was often regarded as 'Clark's gatekeeper - someone whose 
approval MPs must gain to get access to their leader' (Clifton, 1995c). 
277 In an interview, she attested that a good education was a necessary requirement for politicians to 
work effectively. 'We are dealing with complex issues which we have to cut through to understand the 
essence. Take something as complex as the changes to roading funding and management which the 
government is considering. The discussion documents on this are so theoretical, so abstract and so 
complex most people would not understand what they are about. You have to have the ability to read 
quickly, understand it, formulate an alternative and articulate it in words of few syllables' (Light, 1998: 
21-22). 
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The problem was that those who enjoyed Clark's trust as a source of advice were 
mostly derived exclusively from her loyalists, and that that was obvious to the whole 
caucus. As Annette King notes: '[In] the overall view it would be true to say that she 
had a group of advisers, 'a small group of advisers. And understandably so, because 
they were the people who had organised for her to depose Mike Moore' (King, 
interview,1998). Not all her opponents or uncommitted supporters were given the same 
opportunities to make similar contributions. Even some senior MPs were 'out of the 
loop' (King, interview, 1998). (Why the frustration with Clark's leadership style in 
terms of unity was confined to some newcomers is to be discussed shortly.) 
B. Policy expectation/concern: policy shift 
The first step Clark took in this aspect was to confirm Labour's basic position in the 
political spectrum. In the early stages, she showed an inclination to meet her 
supporters' expectations by re-defining what Labour stood for. In April 1994, she 
commented: 'We won't seek to be all things to all people ... we'll be sharpening our 
profile on issues of concern to most of our core constituency, keeping the principles of 
our industrial relations policy and updating and revising policy areas like health' 
(McManus, 1994). In another interview, Clark defined the 'core constituency' as: 
'people on lower and modest incomes, people identified with the industrial labour 
movement and the Maori community and other ethnic minorities such as Pacific 
Islanders and increasingly in Auckland the Indian community' (Edwards, 1994a). At 
the same time, Clark clearly positioned Labour as a centre-left party. In 1994, she said: 
'I'm certainly strongly against us being the centre party, because the centre party can't 
be a major party. The centre party will be a party that makes up the balance [of power] 
for one party or the other... The only viable position for us is as the social democratic, 
centre left party with the other smaller parties coming to us' (Ralston, 1994a)278. 
Like the first shadow cabinet portfolio allocation, any policy shift was anxiously 
watched by the caucus moderate/right. Perhaps in order to appease these anxieties 
shared by the right, shortly after the leadership change, the deputy leader, Caygill, wrote 
an article in which he outlined the expected policy directions under the new leadership. 
He asserted: 'Labour's goal (like National's) must be to be the largest party. To achieve 
this, we must broaden, not narrow, our appeal. Explanations for the change of Labour 
leadership based on a shift of ideology can thus be readily dismissed'. He continued: 
278 Almost all caucus members appeared to be satisfied with being in a centre-left party. The 
exceptions to this, were Dunne, who eagerly painted himself as 'centre right' (Laugesen, 1994h), 
representing 'the middle class' (Dunne, 1992 and 1994) with strong opposition against an increase in 
tax and social spending, and Moore, who openly maintained that the party should be positioned at the 
centre, not centre-left (Moore, 1994a). 
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We cannot afford to allow the economic gains achieved so painfully in recent 
years to be squandered now by hesitation or policy drift. Nor can we continue to 
ignore the social divisions many economic reforms have produced. Or, to state the 
goal of social justice another way, the fruits of a stronger economy cannot be 
allowed to fall simply where the implacable market determines or New Zealand 
will become a very unpleasant and un-New Zealand place to be279 . (Caygill,1993) 
Despite this reassurance given by the deputy leader, there remained noticeable 
tensions within the caucus because of the presence of some minority MPs on both sides 
who had uncompromising views and because of the mutual distrust between the two 
camps. For the caucus moderate/right, in Goff's words: 'The concern that the [1993 
leadership] change signified a shift to the left was destabilising' (McLoughlin, 1995: 
119). 
Probably sensing this uncertainty, Cullen repeatedly insisted that Labour's policy 
change, especially the economic policy, would be a 'fine-tuning' of the existing policy 
presented at the 1993 election, rather than a complete re-writing (Kilroy, 1994a; 
MacLennan, 1994a). Clark was fully supportive of Cullen's position. From the early 
stage of her leadership, she was determined to lead the party's policy changes with a 
steady and firm hand. In so doing, unlike her predecessor who carefully avoided 
controversial issues for the sake of party unity, she was prepared to tackle them 
whenever necessary. 
For example, at the caucus retreat in Nelson in late May 1994, amongst the issues 
dealt with for the first time since her elevation was Labour's stance on the Reserve Bank 
Act (1989). The act, which was passed by the fourth Labour Government, ordained that 
the Reserve Bank pursue currency stability as its sole objective; its contract between the 
Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Bank sets 0-2 per cent as the targeted 
underlying inflation range. Although identified as one of the linchpin pieces of 
legislation by Cullen for the stable economy (Cullen, 1994), the act was viewed as 
hindering job growth by some left MPs, who were calling for radical changes or its total 
abolition. Clark was not prepared to tolerate such a move. Labour's policy needed to 
be altered to the left, but not to that extent. At the caucus meeting, she managed to make 
the caucus accept her own recommendation to broaden the Bank's inflation target from 
o to 2 per cent to -1 to 3 per cent. At the same time, the caucus rejected other more 
radical proposals such as removal of the Bank's statutory independence as unanimously 
as possible 'without being unanimous' in Cullen's words (Herbert, 1994c). 
Clark exhibited similarly prudent leadership in her handling of another contentious 
issue - the tax policy. The left's natural preference was to increase taxes on the wealthy, 
279 A similar statement was made by Cullen in March 1994, in which he said: 'The party that can best 
articulate a practical programme to those ends will likely form the core of the next Goverrunent. It 
will, by definition, be a party of the centre Left. That does not just mean of the Left alone, or the 
Centre alone, as some of my colleagues seem to argue as they pirouette on the heads of pins apparently 
in the mistaken belief that they are angels. (NZPD, vol. 539: 432) 
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while the right, led by Dunne, openly opposed such an option. On 3 December 1993, 
Cullen made it clear in his letter of invitation to discussions on economic policies that 
Labour's programme would not require any tax increase. Contradicting this position, a 
few days later, Clark indicated that a comprehensive overhaul of the tax system including 
direct taxes was on the table for discussion. 'No one wants to go back to the high tax 
rates of the past, but there is a real issue over the extent to which tax rates were cut in 
1988' (Rentoul, 1993c). 
However, this position was reversed by mid February 1994 due to the improved 
fiscal situation. On the eve of the caucus retreat, Clark said: 'I don't myself think that 
we would need to change the tax scales to make a point of principle. If the resources we 
require are there, and the growth that is coming through will generate enough to do the 
kinds of things we want to do to address poverty, then that is not necessary. The most 
recent fiscal update convinced me most of what we must do can be done now' (Clifton, 
1994a). 
By late September 1994, Labour had a re-think about its tax stance once again, in an 
attempt to re-claim its status as a major centre-left party from the Alliance after the 
massive Selwyn defeat. During the doomed by-election campaign, a group of MPs 
including Maharey, Dyson, and Clark had a meeting at Maryan Street's home, the 
purpose of which was reported as being 'to make progress on policies' (Riddell, 
1994c). 
The tax policy announced by Cullen in early October 1994 indeed included an 
increase in income tax for an income over $60,000 by 6 cents per dollar. While this 
announcement triggered the long-predicted departure of Dunne from the party, this 
policy shift was hardly surprising, given both Clark (Campbell, 1994a: 17) and Cullen's 
personal preference for such a move280 • In the same policy announcement, Labour 
promised to boost spending on Family Support, health, education and other social areas 
by $650 million, if it was elected as the government. In a newspaper article which 
preceded the announcement of these policies, Cullen explained the basic stance of the 
party and the 'redistributive' aim of the economic policies in the following terms: 
The costs of restructuring and of recovery have been borne disproportionately 
by low-income earners, by Maoris, Polynesians, and women, by the young and 
beneficiaries. 
If we are not to create a permanent underclass, the Government must act to 
ensure the levels of economic growth we have experienced over the last two or so 
years are sustained and the proceeds shared with those who have suffered most 
over the last decade. (Cullen, 1994) 
280 For instance, Cullen commented on the new tax policy in October 1994: 'I've always believed 
[the tax system] should be a little more progressive than it has been in the last few years ... So it's 
certainly positioning Labour to say, yes, we do believe in the tax system being used for redistribution 
purposes, and unashamedly so' (Campbell, 1994c: 14). 
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The most significant public initiative by Clark herself in terms of policy came at the 
party's 1995 annual conference. Her 'personal agenda' speech' (see Chapter 6) was 
remarkable in the sense that the party's return to its traditional stances such as universal 
provisions of social services and assistance (James, 1998b) was clearly signalled. The 
belief in fairness, participation, opportunity, inclusion, dignity, equality, and humanity 
were explained by the leader as 'Labour's values'. Her personal agenda to realise such 
values included: abolition and replacement of the Employment Contracts Act; realisation 
of full employment; provision of free, quality early childhood education and universal 
student allowances; elimination of poverty; repeal of market rents for state housing; 
reduction of waiting times for surgery; and removal of asset testing of geriatric hospital 
and rest horne patients and horne care (NZLP, 1995: 45-46). 
The speech was not only designed to re-claim Labour's traditional values, which was 
surely welcomed by her centre-left supporters as a sign of her commitment to the new 
centre-left identity of the party, but also according to Street, to 'dispel fears' among the 
centre-right MPs. Despite her careful handling of the issues, the concerns in the caucus 
that Clark was intent on 'leaping to the left' and that she would exclude those who did 
not share such policy views still persisted. By publicly clarifying her personal 
intentions on the policy, the wary MPs were reassured of the boundary of the policy 
shift as well as her genuine intention to be inclusive (Street, interview, 1999). 
During the first three-year period, Clark managed to shift the party's policy in the 
manner which she intended. Indeed, Clark's 'personal agenda' was later fully 
incorporated into the party's election policies. Accordingly, Labour's planned spending 
in social policy areas increased to achieve what she set out to do. At the 1996 election, it 
promised an extra $1.4 billion in the first year, rising to $3.77 billion in 1999/2000 if 
elected to the Government. 
So, how was Labour's policy shift perceived by the caucus members? In sum, the 
majority of her supporters saw it as quite satisfactory. The policy shift under Clark's 
leadership was seen by this group as careful and gradual, yet certain. It was a re-
definition or further clarification of Labour's existing policies rather than a major policy 
shift. However, it was still seen by her supporters from the left/centre-left as having 
successfully re-established the party's identity as a centre-left party. Most of the policy 
shift which they hoped for was accomplished. For example, in 1994, Steve Maharey, 
had argued that the party should re-write its core principles (Laugesen, 1994e). 
Regarding the economic policies, he had insisted: 
~ Use the state to redistribute wealth so all can live with dignity and 
independence. 
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• Promote a socially just and economically productive mix of market forces and 
public intervention.281 
• Favour public ownership of economic and social resources when appropriate. 
By the time Clark was approached by the five front bench MPs Labour's policies had, 
by and large, embraced all of Maharey' s ideas282 . 
Given this, when asked whether she was contented with the policy shift under Clark, 
one Clark loyalist replies fervently: 'Yes, very much so' (Anonymous, interview, 1998). 
S/he continues: 
.. , I think that under Helen it has been quite a lot more explicit that we're a centre-
left party and that's our ground, you know. So I think we've staked our ground 
from the sort of waffly centre that we were before. And I mean, you have to 
realise that we have come from being viewed as a right-wing party and 
government, we've come a long way. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
The transition from the previous image of the centre-focused Labour Party under 
Moore's leadership was noted by another Clark supporter, Street. 
I think as far as the policy shift is concerned, there has been a policy shift. And I 
think it is much more now aligned with core Labour party principles than it was 
previously. So, in terms of a comparison with the '84 to '90 Government, there 
has undoubtedly been a shift under Helen to the left. And that wouldn't have 
happened under Mike. One because I don't think he had the intellectual fire power 
to understand what kinds of shifts were needed, And secondly, he didn't have the 
political will to sell something that was going to make us look left-wing when he 
thought we should be more centrist. (Street, interview, 1998)283 
Besides the content of the shift, the Clark supporters welcomed the precision of the 
policies, which they thought had been absent under Moore's leadership. As one MP 
puts it: 
... It is those specifics going into an election, which clearly defines what you're 
going to do in a certain situation, what the policy will be and how it will be 
implemented. We could take every person in this Parliament, and we could all 
write a general policy statement in New Zealand that we would all agree on ... 
Where people differ is how we reach that goal. And I think that [the clarity 
regarding how to reach the desired goals] was one of the differences [between 
Clark and Moore]. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
281 Elsewhere Maharey explained his idea of 'intervention' in the following terms: 'The way forward is 
to adopt a developmental form of state intervention. Such an approach means making use of the state 
to promote the competitiveness of New Zealand, not just as an economy but also as a nation. This 
would not see the state taking over from the market, or vice versa. Rather, it would be the state's role 
to act as a sort of "conductor", trying to direct and "harmonise" the efforts of market actors. The state 
is taking a leading role in the economy but it does so by negotiation rather than command.' (Maharey, 
1992: 15) 
282 In a newspaper article, Cullen argued for 'intelligent government intervention' (Cullen, 1994). 
Regarding the third point which Maharey made, Labour promised no further asset sales under its 
governance in the 1996 election manifesto. 
283 See, also Street (1997b: 149-150). 
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From the viewpoint of Clark supporting moderate/centre-right MPs, there was no 
objectionable major philosophical change from the previous leadership (Caygill, 
interview, 1996). Similarly, the majority of the 1993 Moore supporters found the policy 
shift under the new regime acceptable. One MP, who supported Moore both in 1993 
and 1996, sums up: 'I think we [the 1993 Moore supporters] were by and large pretty 
comfortable'. S/he adds that herlhis concern about the extent of the policy shift turned 
out to be unfounded: ' ... her [Clark's] own policy position on a number of issues 
demonstrated that... a lot of her own instincts were moderate rather than left-wing' 
(Anonymous, interview, 1998). Another Moore supporter on both occasions, Phil Goff, 
approved the party's economic policy direction with some caution. In an interview for a 
magazine published in December 1994, he asserted: 'We should be building on the 
[economic] recovery and ensuring the benefits are evenly spread across the community. 
That doesn't mean a spending spree. I'm comfortable with the income proposals we 
have adopted'(McLoughlin, 1995: 119). Asked about the party's policy positions, 
Mike Moore stated in November 1994: 'I would have some differences, but so what? If 
you're saying is there one flash point where you say 'look I can't live with this, I'm 
walking out of here' the answer is no' (Kilroy, 1994b). 
If the majority of caucus members' acceptance of the policy shift came as no 
surprise, neither did the disappointment felt by minority groups on both the right and 
left. For the right, the proposed economic policy, especially the tax increase, presented a 
serious problem. Among them, Peter Dunne was the most publicly vocal and consistent 
critic of Labour' s new policies (eg., Harris, 1994; Campbell, 1994b; and Goulter, 1994c) 
until his departure in early October 1994. Indeed, he attributes his decision to his 
ideological incompatibility with the party re-fashioned under Clark's leadership. 
My decision to leave the Labour Party was based on two premises. One, an 
increasing policy incompatibility with the leadership, and a realisation that things 
would only get worse. While I never felt personally threatened (in fact, quite the 
contrary despite frequent invitations in caucus and in public from David Lange for 
me to leave) I did not relish the fate likely to befall me of being Labour's long-
term 'tame' right-winger. I did not want to be the person wheeled out for 
respectability reasons on various occasions to show that we were a broad church, 
when in fact we were not. 
The second reason for my departure was an increasing realisation from the late 
1980s, that my personal politics were more classic liberal than neo-socialist or 
social democrat and that that I was out of place in the Labour party ... 284 (Dunne, 
1999a) 
284 He continues: '1 had become particularly interested in the work of people like Dr David Owen in 
Britain with his original SDP, and subsequently the resurgence of the Liberal Democrats, and felt that 
with proportional representation looming, something along those lines was needed in New Zealand. It 
is an interesting point to observe, despite United's comparative lack of success to date compared to 
other parties, that that void still exists on the New Zealand political spectrum, which is why I still 
continue to seek a role. (Dunne, 1999a) 
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Although the most vocal, Dunne was by no means a single figure who resented the 
new policy direction in the caucus. According to him, there were several colleagues who 
shared his views to a varying extent. Among them, Margaret Austin was the only MP 
who 'consistently spoke up'. David Caygill and Clive Matthewson were supportive of 
him to a lesser extent, while a less influential group in the caucus, Jack Elder, Ross 
Robertson, and George Hawkins also supported him (Dunne, 1999a). 
As for Margaret Austin, who later formed the United Party together with Matthewson 
and others, her frustration with the left's attempt to influence the party policies also led 
her to the same conclusion as Dunne. (However, she also emphasised that that decision 
was 'by far' motivated by her sense of urgency to secure a centre political party which 
would be capable of forming a coalition with either National or Labour under the new 
MMP system). 
The other aspect of it was that during the course of the early months of 1995, we 
started to put a definitive policy together, and it was perfectly clear that the left was 
once again exerting their influence on economic policy, social policy, trying to 
manipulate me in education policy. And week after week, it would be left to Peter 
Dunne, Clive and myself to mount the debate to challenge what was being 
proposed. That gets very tedious and frustrating in the end, but I suppose what 
really, absolutely [was] the last straw for me was being asked to come to a meeting 
on tertiary education policy, and being asked to sign up to policy which in my 
view not only threatened but would require change to the legislation with respect to 
the autonomy of tertiary institutions. I just wasn't prepared to go down that 
pathway. So with that, some of those things made the decision to go easier. 
(Austin, interview, 1997) 
Given their views, which by then became apparently incompatible with the party 
policies, the defection of those right-wing MPs seemed to be a forgone conclusion. 
Their positions could no longer fit the party's newly defined 'centre-left' identity285. 
The frustration with the policy shift was not confined to the caucus right; it was 
equally experienced by a few left-wingers, although for an opposite reason - the policy 
shift was too small and too moderate to their liking. Like their right-wing counterparts, 
285 An interesting question one may raise here is: Why did the others not follow Dunne, Austin, 
Matthewson, and Elder (the latter left Labour for New Zealand First in April 1996)? One possible 
explanation is that they did not experience the same level of frustration as those who left. Certainly, 
that was the case for Caygill, who was comfortable with the policy changes despite his personal 
objection to the tax increase. Dunne suggests another reason. 'I think the short answer to this 
question is that most have put their own electorate fate ahead of principle' (Dunne, 1999a). He 
elaborates that some Labour MPs such as Phil Goff, Jim Sutton and Peter Tapsell were interested in 
joining United or at least supportive of the formation of the party. 'Phil Goff was certainly interested 
in being part of United, and indeed his interest flagged only about a month before the party was 
launched, because he figured his long-term prospects were better in the Labour Party. I am not sure 
that Jim Sutton had ever gone as far down the path as Phil Goff. Jim Sutton was certainly of the view 
that a party of the type we were envisaging was required under MMP, but he felt that it should emerge 
after the 1996 election, not before. In any case ... he felt that his electorate was not an appropriate base 
from which to be involved in such a party'. (Dunne, 1999b) 
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their views were too extreme for the majority Labour MPs, even under the new centre-
left banner. 
The first public sign of the dissatisfaction of the left appeared in February 1994. 
Following the news of Clark's decision to rule out tax increases to fund Labour's 
proposed increased social spending, both Richard Northey and Graham Kelly carefully 
expressed their disapproval. For example, Kelly said: 'I still hold to the view that those 
on higher incomes can afford a little more without even noticing it going, so we can pay 
for health, education and so on' (Clifton, 1994a). Several days later, at the first caucus 
retreat of the year in Masterton, two MPs - Paul Swain and Graham Kelly - were 
reported to have challenged the economic policy direction presented by Cullen (Herbert, 
1994b). 
However, after this point onwards, the left's frustration with the party policy was 
publicly aired by one person - David Lange. In March 1994, Lange argued that the 
image of party unity, which had been crucial for a party like Labour where it was under 
the previous First-Past-the-Post system, was no longer important under the new electoral 
system. What was critical was clearer identification along their policies, which inevitably 
required 'some realignment of political groupings'. He went on to identify two policies 
to exemplify how realignment might take place. 
Some of its [Labour's] members believe, as do most Government members, that 
the Reserve Bank Act is the pillar of the economy and discount other instruments 
of economic management. 
I don't. I believe that the obsessive concentration on the inflation rate, and the 
neglect of other instruments, is destructive ... 
It's the same with taxation. Some on both sides of the House believe that 
taxation is theft. I don't. I think it's in the public interest that some people who 
can well afford it should pay more tax than they do now. (Lange, 1994a) 
Lange further encouraged his party to establish firmly as a centre-left party, rather than 
'maintaining a fiction of unity'. In his view, losing some MPs from the caucus was not 
only inevitable but 'desirable'. 'Hence my pleasure at the prospect of the right wing's 
leaving US286 , and my disappointment at it's apparent determination to hold us hostage' 
(Lange, 1994a). 
Labour's disastrous showing at the Selwyn by-election and the Alliance's 
surprisingly good performance at it caused Lange to urge the party leadership to declare 
the party's identity. 
Here lies a choice for the Labour Party. It must decide if it wishes to be the major 
party of the left, or if it prefers to be a party of the centre, the perpetual pawn of 
286 More than 10 days before he wrote this column, he publicly invited Peter Dunne to resign from the 
party 'for his own sake and for the integrity of the party and for the integrity of Peter' (Laugesen, 
1994c). 
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larger groups. If it chooses the left it must define what it means to be of that 
persuasion. (Lange, 1994b) 
He went on to state that the decision was a matter of leadership 'in the sense that once 
the choice is made, the It~ader must make the direction plain'. Later he likened Clark to 
'a rally driver with three navigators' with '[l]eft, right, centre' as the simultaneous calls, 
which he described as'wall-hitting stuff' (Lange, 1994b). Lange's message was clear: 
Clark needed to decide the party's direction which should involve personnel changes. 
In the same article, he argued that in case the party and Clark decided to choose the 
centre, she would have to remove him from the front bench as he 'cannot support the 
new orientation, nor invite voters to support it' (Lange, 1994b). 
In Lange's view, his message was ignored. Hence his criticism continued. In June 
1995 (by which time he had announced his retirement at the 1996 election and was 
subsequently removed from the frontbench) he re-visited Labour's policy positions. 
This time, his criticismwas even more blunt: ' ... Labour has taken on the personality of a 
centre party and has the policy of a centre party' . 
For all the rhetoric, Labour today is further to the right than the last Labour 
government. The pursuit of low inflation and the balanced budget remains, but not 
centralised wage bargaining or the possibility of pay equity, which the Labour 
government offered. The promised tax increases are cosmetic . 
... There is no plan to restructure the economy in favour of the people who usually 
vote Labour. It's a view of the economy the National Party could live with. In 
terms of economic policy, Labour is to the left of National on matters of style, not 
substance. It's genuinely left of National on the non-economic issues, which 
don't make a lot of difference to the way people live. (Lange, 1995) 
So, what did Lange believe Labour should do in terms of its policy? In his later 
column, the former Prime Minister admitted that his government did a lot of 'what was 
right in the economy', the achievement which he believed the party 'should be proud 
of'. However, at the same time, he added that '[ w]e got some of it wrong' and that 
'[w]e should acknowledge that'. He further argued that Labour did not need to defend 
the ideologies behind National's economic policy which denied any role of the 
government in the economy. Instead, the party should promote the government's more 
active role, that was to 'engage with the economy, and manage it'. Instead of being an 
'interested spectator' as the fourth Labour and the present National Governments were, 
the government must have aims such as 'improving education and training, increasing 
investment, or increasing employment' as well as the means of achieving those aims. 
Taxation (both increasing and decreasing thereof) and provision of universal services 
were suggested as such tools (Lange, 1994b). 
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Despite the announcement of Clark's 'personal agenda' at the 1995 Party 
Conference and the subsequent policy changes to accommodate her views, they were not 
sufficient to erase Lange's feeling of disappointment with Clark's leadership. 
If I was disappointed it was only at the leadership's insistence on claiming that a 
policy stance which is actually to the right of the last Labour government is 
somehow an assertion of old Labour values. (Lange, 1999b) 
Elective expectation/concern: winning the 1996 election 
If Clark's performance in the two previous expectations had been regarded as a success 
by the majority of the caucus at the time of the crisis in May/June 1996, they could 
hardly argue the same about her achievement in the last expectation - winning the 1996 
election. While the actual election was still only several months away, the indications in 
the opinion polls were not good. In fact, as described in the last chapter, after becoming 
the leader in December 1993, both Labour and Clark personally constantly struggled in 
the polls. By the time the five frontbenchers made an approach to Clark, Labour was in 
a considerably poorer form than when it was led by Moore, and accordingly the chance 
of the party winning the coming election looked remote. 
Clark responded to Labour's and her own popularity problem through at least five 
approaches - without major success. Firstly, she denounced the media (and public) bias 
against female politicians including herseles7,. For instance, in June 1994, she stated in 
her address to female business leaders that 'women often need to go beyond the 
mainstream media to get their message across'. 'Those attributes which are in men are 
still turned against women. To succeed in politics, as in business, women must be 
strong, determined and forceful. ' 'In terms of the stereotype, instead of being strong, 
they are tough; instead of being determined, they nag; and instead of being forceful, they 
are bossy. If the stereotypes are applied, women just can't win. If they were weak, 
lacked persistence, and didn't make their mark through their actions, they couldn't 
succeed anyway' (MacLennan, 1994b). In December 1995, after surviving the crises 
caused by the disastrous 16% poll rating and the party list, Clark said: "We've done a 
lot of qualitative research on me over the years and people will always say Helen Clark 
is very intelligent, hardworking and she's right... but the media say she's got a poor 
image' (Chisholm, 1995). 
Secondly, Clark tried to bring back Mike Moore into a more prominent role in the 
Labour line-up. These attempts had two purposes. Even after his defeat, Moore was 
still popular among the electorate. In particular, he was believed to have strong appeal to 
the male-working class voters, who had deserted the party after December 1993. At the 
287 See also H. Clark (1996), Light (1998), and Main (1998a). Her criticism seems to have some 
justification. See, Ralston (1994b) and McGregor (l996a). 
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same time, the inclusion of Moore in the responsible role was expected to stop his 
constant and open criticism of the party and would help project a unified party image. 
Clark recollected the problem she encountered with Moore and the media attention his 
comments had attracted: . 
Because a woman had never before led a major political party in New Zealand the 
news media implied that it was therefore somehow illegitimate for one to aspire to 
do so, particularly when she shoved a bloke out of the way. The whole thrust of 
media coverage from December 1993 right through 1994 had a sort of subtheme 
of the illegitimacy of my holding the position. Everything Mike Moore said was 
always cranked up because I was this awful woman who pushed a nice bloke out 
of the way. (McGregor, 1996a) 
Clark offered a front bench position and/or shadow trade portfolio four times during 
the period between December 1993 and June 1996. On each occasion, Moore declined, 
stating that he could not guarantee his loyalty to the leader who toppled him, which 
would be required by acceptance of such positions288 . 
Thirdly, she attempted to de-emphasise the significance of the poll results. 
Regarding the party's standing, she often pointed to the party's better performance in 
the 'constituency vote' polls (as distinct from 'party vote' polls289), arguing that on 
election day, party votes and constituency votes would come very close290 . On her 
personal rating, while admitting that the leader's popularity matters during election time, 
she said: ' .. .1 don't think that in the end people vote on the popularity of the leader of 
the party. Mike Moore was a leader with consistently the best ratings and yet he 
couldn't secure victory for the party in 1993' (Roger, 1996: 54). On another occasion, 
she argued: 'I certainly haven't seen polling that says people aren't going to vote for 
Labour because of Helen Clark' (Kilroy, 1995). 
Fourthly, Clark referred to her 'inclusive', 'consensus' approach. On her poor 
personal ratings, she stressed that it was due to her selfless leadership style. For 
example, in February 1995, she said: 
I could spend the whole budget boosting myself. I won't make the obvious 
allusions that this has been done before and hasn't won elections either. In the 
end Labour stands or falls on the quality of its policy and its ability to relate it to 
real needs of real people in real communities. (Kilroy, 1995) 
288 For example, when he was offered ajob for the second time, in April 1994, he said: 'I think it 
would be dishonourable to take a job in a situation where 1 can't give 150 per cent. I was hurt as leader 
when people wouldn't give me 150 per cent.' (Gardiner, 1994) 
289 The 'constituency vote' polls asked: 'If a general election were held now, which local candidate 
would you vote for?' while the 'party vote' question was: 'If a general election were held now, which 
party would you vote for?' (See, the NBR opinion polls.) To both questions, participants were 
required to answer with the name(s) of political parties. 
290 Clark made this point clear in the wake of the 1996 failed leadership coup during an interview with 
Bill Ralston on 3 National News (31 May 1996). 
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The inclusive approach infers distribution and sharing of responsibilities. On several 
occasions, she attributed her own and the party's struggle in the polls to some unco-
operative caucus members. Clark stated in February 1996 (after the leadership crisis in 
late 1995): ' ... there was the fact there'd been a hell of a lot of carping, criticism and 
whingeing within the caucus ... I went on to say, "I've read newspapers in which some 
of you say that I have got the courage to stand aside if that's what the party needs. 
However, what you need to contemplate is what people will think of the Labour Party 
which hasn't got the courage to stick with a leader. Over to you",291 (Roger, 1996: 
55). Her view was that ' ... people don't, in the end, vote for people who are fighting 
themselves, and banishing that as a factor is very important' (Wilson, 1997). In other 
words, if the party was unpopular while being divided, the blame should be placed not 
solely upon her as the leader, but also upon the caucus members who caused that 
division. In October 1995 after the disastrous poll result, Clark commented: 'I'm not 
the only person who takes responsibility for it. Everybody's got to take a part' (Kilroy 
and Speden, 1995). 
Fifthly, a series of attempts were made to improve her image by hiring media 
advisers292 . Ross Vintiner, who was behind Labour's successful election campaigns in 
1984 and 1987, was appointed as Clark's media adviser. He, however, left the position 
11 months later over Labour's strategies. His position was taken up by Di Billing who 
lasted only for two months, again having failed to lift her public image. Billing's 
successor, a former political editor of The Dominion, Mike Munro, has improved the 
situation, but Clark's real tum-around had to wait until the 1996 election campaign -
nearly four months after the failed coup attempt - during which she made a 'Cinderella-
like transformation' on airwaves thanks to two media trainers, Judy Callingham and 
Brian Edwards293 (Kominik, 1996). 
So, between December 1993 and May/June 1996, how did Clark's performance in 
terms of meeting expectations and dealing with concerns affect her support 
composition? 
291 At the two caucus retreats in May 1994 and November 1995, the lack of discipline and failure to 
stick with the party policies among the caucus members, at least, were discussed. 
292 This is not to say that Clark did not try to raise her public image. In October 1995, for example, 
her staff published an eight-page tabloid called 'Labour News' which extensively featured Clark 
including numerous personal photographs. See Trotter (1995). Clark also attempted to be seen at 
places and events which were traditionally regarded as 'working class' such as horse racing and rugby 
league. The effect, however, was not always positive. Seemingly feeling uncomfortable, she often 
looked out of place. Regarding criticism of Clark's media effort, see Jesson (1994). 
293 Regarding the advice which Clark likely received from them, see Edwards and Callingham (2000). 
245 
The success/failure to fulfil expectations/resolve concerns and its impacts 
Unity 
Despite the fact that the caucus remained severely divided throughout the 1993-1996 
period, in the eyes of many caucus members, Clark's performance in the unity criterion 
was satisfactory and did not affect their views of her negatively. This paradox could be 
explained by the group's general consensus on the matter that the continuation (as well 
as the origin) of the divisions was beyond her personal control and responsibility. In 
other words, the caucus believed that the infighting was perpetuated despite her effort to 
resolve it. The caucus members universally appreciated the seriousness of the divisions 
as well as the leader's genuine and continuous effort to mend them. 
This probably signified the lower degree of importance assigned to the unity criterion 
in leadership retention consideration than the other criteria, especially that of elective. In 
assessing Clark's performance in terms of unity, the emphasis seemed to be on the 
input (her effort) rather than the outcome (the result of her effort). Certainly, such 
leniency was not exhibited by a considerable number of MPs in May/June 1996 when it 
came to her performance in the elective criterion. 
However, as already noted, some of the 1993 uncommitted supporters found her 
leadership unsatisfactory for opposite reasons. The first group, comprised of the caucus 
left, considered Clark's 'inclusive' leadership style over-generous to her 1993 
opponents. On the other hand, some 1993 newcomers saw the level of her support and 
encouragement as insufficient. What also concerned this second group was the leader's 
heavy reliance on a small group of people. Not surprisingly, both groups' allegiance to 
Clark weakened by 1996. 
One may question why the second group's concerns over Clark's leadership style 
was not prevalent amongst the 1993 Moore supporters. Probably, failing to gain full 
trust from the new leader was predictable for the 1993 Moore supporters. When Clark 
became the leader in 1993, this group was anxious about Clark's possible retaliation. In 
comparison, Clark's subsequent 'inclusive' leadership, despite its limits, were seen 
positively by this group. To put it simply, when one's expectation is low, it is not 
difficult to satisfy it. 
This was not the case for some of the newer intakes who voted for Clark without 
positive support. Their insufficient knowledge of both Clark and politics in general at 
the time of the 1993 leadership change may have created unrealistic expectations from 
her leadership. Needless to say, the higher the expectations, the greater the 
disappointment when they are not met. With regard to the level of support that Clark 
provided to the caucus members, Richard Northey asserts that MPs' judgement of the 
leader's performance in this respect often reflects their preferred leadership style. He 
says that, for example, unlike Moore, Clark preferred contacts with her fellow MPs 
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'through the normal caucus meetings, caucus committees rather than ... taking people out 
to the Green Parrot [a restaurant popular among Labour MPs] or wandering around the 
corridors [like Moore did]' (Northey, interview, 1998). 
In support of the Clark loyalists' argument, the 1993 Moore supporters assert that 
Clark's leadership style was justifiable given her workload. Furthermore, they say that 
Clark always gave support whenever it was sought (O'Connor, interview, 1998). Along 
a similar line, Caygill attributes this perceived problem to the nature of politics as well as 
his caucus colleagues' wrong expectations of a political leader. 
Helen wasn't somebody who was easy to get close to. I didn't regard myself as a 
close personal friend, for example, even though I was her deputy. But I was her 
deputy ... not her partner... We had a good working relationship. I could go to her 
and talk to her about matters of concern, and I did. She appeared to listen. She 
wouldn't always agree, but that's not the measure of success. 
Politics is very much a sink or swim business. And many people do sink. Some 
... eventually struggle back to the surface. But... there is no formal training for it. 
Much of the skills have to be acquired on the job. I think political parties struggle 
to acculturate new members and to help them fit in and give them useful roles. 
And that's especially true in opposition. (Caygill, interview, 1998) 
Similarly, regarding Clark's reliance on a small group of MPs and advisers, both her 
1993 opponents and loyalists defend the leader by arguing either that that was not an 
uncommon problem among political leaders or that it was understandable under the 
given circumstances. For instance, according to Phil Goff, any leader, especially when 
slhe is under heavy criticisms and pressures (as Clark was between 1993 and 1996) is 
likely to tum to the colleagues whom slhe can trust. (A similar point was already raised 
by Street earlier.) The extent to which a leader can be 'inclusive' has a limit under such 
circumstances . 
... I guess when you are under pressure as the leader of the party - a part of the 
pressure is simply time - that you are going to rely on a smaller rather than a 
larger group to give you input as to what you ought to be doing personally, and 
the psychology of leadership is interesting. When you are under criticism on a 
whole lot of different fronts, you don't necessarily want to go to somebody that is 
going to give you more of the same. You want to go to somebody that can give 
you the sort of psychological uplift and support you are looking for. I'm making 
that comment generally rather than about Helen specifically because I think it 
applies generally. So, if it's a criticism of Helen, it's a criticism of most other 
people who have ever been leader. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
The 1993 uncommitted supporters who entered Parliament did not have an accurate 
understanding about what they could expect from Clark as a person or a leader. Nor did 
they possess knowledge about party leaders in general. Expectations formed by those 
MPs did not reflect their real chance of realisation by Clark, and, not surprisingly ended 
up in disappointment. 
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Policy 
Clark delivered what she set out to do at the beginning of her leadership regarding the 
expected policy shift. While a radical policy lurch was avoided, Labour's policies 
received further definition and clarification with an additional emphasis on social 
policies. As a result, Labour arguably established a more centre-left identity. However, 
as predicted, the caucus members on each end of the ideological spectrum found the 
policy shift disappointing. On the one hand, the caucus right felt that the shift had gone 
too far. The proposed tax rises, more generous social spending, and more assertive role 
of the government in the economy made them increasingly uncomfortable with the new 
direction. Subsequently, four MPs left Labour to either form or join other political 
parties, which offered them a more compatible ideological base as well as a better 
electoral prospect. 
On the other hand, the disappointment was also felt by the caucus left, although none 
of this group resorted to defection. As it has been documented, Lange was the most 
outspoken critic of the policy direction of the party under Clark's leadership. However, 
Peter Dunne comments that Lange was not the only MP whose expectations were 
unfulfilled: ' ... Mr Lange was one of those on the left who felt alienated, with others in 
that category being people like Graham Kelly and those from a traditional trade union 
background' (Dunne, 1999b). So, who else was in the same category as Lange? 
Maryan Street, a regular attendee at caucus until her retirement in October 1995, says 
that if a distinction was made between the left and the centre-left in the caucus during her 
presidency, the former was 'very small'. She further adds that while this small group294 
strongly adored Lange and even might have agreed with some of his criticisms in some 
respects, only 'very few' of them experienced his level of despair (Street, interview 
1999). In fact, a group of left MPs saw the former Prime Minister's open criticisms of 
the party and the leader as 'destructive' and urged him to halt them . 
.. , people in that left group went to David and said: 'Stop it... You cannot keep on 
doing this. This is just terrible'. (Street, interview 1999) 
The fact that their original expectations of a leftward policy shift were never realised 
did not appear to adversely affect Lange's fellow caucus left MPs' support for Clark 
(especially positive support of loyalists). This, together with the same MPs' acceptance 
of Clark's failure in another (minor) expectation - favourable shadow cabinet portfolio 
allocations - are to be explored more thoroughly in the next chapter. 
Despite the low level of frustration among this group, there was speculation that the 
majority of the caucus left/centre-left had become dissatisfied with the moderate level of 
the policy shift. For example, in April 1994, one journalist reported that within the 
294 She loosely includes in the caucus left, Steve Maharey, Lianne Dalziel, Trevor Mallard, Graham 
Kelly, Judith Tizard, Liz Tennet, and Ruth Dyson among others (Street, interview 1999). 
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caucus Lianne Dalziel and Steve Maharey were organising a coup against Clark because 
of the lack of a leftward policy shift (Small, 1994b). Margaret Austin is of a similar 
Vlew: 
During the 93-95 period they became very disillusioned and there was talk of a 
coup which was very real in 95-96. ... My assessment is that they always saw the 
Clark-Caygill team as a stop gap on the way to achieving their agenda which was 
greater alignment with the left of politics and themselves in leadership. The reality 
is that none of them are ... regarded as the rising stars they themselves believe they 
are or were although I am certain that Steve Maharey still thinks of himself as the 
only one to give Labour the leadership it needs. (Austin, 1997) 
However, both Maharey and Dalziel strongly deny that they entertained the idea of 
replacing Clark (Maharey, interview, 1998). Although Maharey acknowledges his own 
ambition, he stresses that it is not an ambition 'at the personal level '. 'I'd walk across 
anybody's face if I have to restore this party's sense of mission. But I wouldn't walk 
across anybody's face for my own personal ambition' (Maharey, interview, 1998). He 
admits that he has always wanted to be a Cabinet Minister. Nevertheless, that is as far as 
his aspiration goes: 
I actually consciously don't want to be [a leader]. I think there are better people 
than me to be Leader, because I understand myself well enough to know that the 
kind of person that I am would make being a leader a very, very difficult thing. 
That's true of any leader. You know, David Caygill ... once was asked to be the 
leader of the Labour Party and turned it down, because he understood himself well 
enough to know it was not a good idea. I think I understand myself well enough 
to know it wouldn't be a good idea. So, I've never really thought of myself 
seriously as a leader of the Labour Party. I've always thought myself as ... 
hopefully battling my way through to being a significant Cabinet Minister in a 
centre-left government. (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
Similarly, Dalziel, who was named as a future world leader by Time magazine in late 
1994, denied any immediate leadership ambition. In an interview in early January 1995, 
she said that she was not planning to become the leader at that stage, while adding: 'But 
I'm not going to rule it out at some time in the future. Of course I'm not. Who 
knows?' (Campbell, 1995) 
Elective 
By far the most pressing issue for the Labour caucus was Labour and Clark's own low 
popUlarity. By May/June 1996, all the opinion polls were indicating that the party was 
heading for the biggest election defeat in the party history. So, how did Clark's 
'failure' in this regard affect both her supporters and opponents' views of her as the 
leader? 
Naturally, the Clark loyalists became concerned about Labour's failure to capture 
public support. However, amazingly, none of her 1993 loyalists changed their positions 
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and remained loyal to the embattled leader. (The reason why they were unaffected is to 
be examined in more detail in Chapter 8.) 
The effect of the low popularity on the 1993 Clark opponents was, on the other hand, 
more predictable. Indeed, it was this very concern which propelled the five frontbench 
MPs to approach Clark in May 1996. Annette King, Phil Goff, and Michael Cullen all 
emphasise that no other reason came into consideration when they made that critical 
decision (King, interview, 1998; Goff, interview, 1998; Cullen, interview, 1998). 
Whatever other initial concerns they might have had at the beginning of her leadership-
in relation to a shadow cabinet portfolio allocation or a policy shift - Clark had by then 
alleviated them. Moreover, she had proven to them that she was more than a competent 
leader in difficult circumstances. 
However, no matter how difficult, it was nevertheless her responsibility to lead the 
party successfully, and one measurement of success was the opinion polls. Her 
superior leadership skills were considered by increasingly nervous MPs as an 
insufficient reason for putting off a leadership change. As one MP who was in favour 
of a leadership change notes: 
If she had been competitive with Bolger as most preferred Prime Minister in the 
opinion polls and if Labour had have been performing really to the level that we 
should have expected in the opinion polls, she'd have been very acceptable to 
most. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
Cullen agrees: 
I think there was a genuine attempt by Helen to be very inclusive, to balance the 
interests of different sections of caucus, and to try to provide an overall platform 
that all could be reasonably happy with. The difficulty was, I think, that because 
of the nature of the 1993 coup, when Mike, the last working class hero in the 
party, had been replaced, Helen's leadership in that period always faced enormous 
difficulties with the public at large. In a so-called attempted coup, [it] had nothing 
to do, at least for many of us, with any form of antipathy to Helen. It was simply a 
desperate feeling that an election which ought to be ours for the taking ... [but] at 
least, at that stage, we seemed to be struggling to maintain ourselves as a major 
party ... (Cullen, interview, 1998) 
Goff further explains that it was the continuous 'trend' in the opinion polls that 
worried him: 
The polling, you should never panic at a poll that shows one or two-off, or three-
off decline. You should never ignore the polls. But when you have a trend in the 
polls over a long period of time, then that is usually reinforced by what people are 
telling you in your electorate, or what people are telling you in the groups you 
meet, then you simply can't bury your head in the sand and say: 'Oh, I hope it all 
goes away.' Yes, so that was our reason for approaching her. We thought we 
were doing disastrously and she was doing disastrously in the polling, which I'm 
not stating as an opinion, I'm stating as a fact. We were doing disastrously in the 
polling. That required us to examine all options. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
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Cullen argues that given the seriousness of the trouble in which Labour was at that 
time, his and other Labour colleagues' positive views of Clark needed to be put aside. 
Ah, well, I think that you have to realise that this was a judgement about the 
public's judgement, considered judgement about our judgement. This was a 
judgement about the opinion polls, and the polls that'd come out with us hitting as 
low as 14 per cent, certainly consistently under 20, with Helen's rating 
consistently very low ... Absolutely ridiculously low. But, you know, there is a 
reciprocal democracy that produces judgements which are not necessarily correct, 
that just happen to be a majority judgement, that's all. And at the end of the day, 
you know, if you think basically the bar of soap is pretty good, but the wrapper is 
not working, I mean ... you have to say: 'Well, I thought the wrapper was lovely', 
but the public was saying something different. (Cullen, interview, 1998) 
The 1993 Moore supporters were not the only group of MPs who were tempted by 
the idea of changing the leader. Some of the 1993 uncommitted Clark supporters 
became either waverers or pro-leadership change. In Goff's words: 'there was a very 
significant group of people who voted against him [Moore] in '93 who by '96 felt they 
had made a mistake in so doing' (Goff, interview, 1998). In particular, those who were 
not standing or were being given low ranking in the party list, on which they could not 
expect to return to Parliament, given the poll rating at that time, were concerned about the 
situation295 • For them, choosing an unpopular leader (with hope of improvement) at the 
beginning of their career was one thing, but continuing to support her close to the 
election time was another matter completely. After the party list was announced, 
journalist Jane Clifton asserted: 
.. .list selectors relegated key backbench talent like Mark Peck, Janet MacKey, 
Rick Barker and Darnien O'Connor in a way that has to rebound on Ms Clark. 
They are all marginal seat MPs. Without the insurance policy of a high list place, 
they cannot much longer sit back and tolerate a poor poll performance from either 
the party or its leader. (Clifton, 1995e) 
As they were the same new intake who found Clark's leadership style less than 
exemplary, the incentive to consider changing their support for her was even stronger. 
The Junior Whip, Larry Sutherland, witnessed a change of mood in some of the 1993 
intake . 
... it may well have been that some people felt a bit aggrieved about the fact that 
they had been talked into or coerced into or persuaded perhaps, a better word, to 
vote for Ms Clark in the initial stages of rolling of Mr Moore ... and that they felt 
very angry about that, and felt that it shouldn't have happened. And even though 
they had gone and carried out that wish to vote against Mike Moore and put in 
Helen Clark, because Helen Clark wasn't doing well in the poll stand, [they 
thought] that they should flick back again to Mike Moore. There was that sort of 
feeling among a few. (Sutherland, interview, 1998) 
295 The 1993 intake who supported Clark in 1993 but were considering changing their support in 
1996 and their list rankings were: Philip Field (not standing on the list); Rick Barker (No.29); Martin 
Gallagher (No.25); Janet Mackey (No. IS); and Mark Peck (No.22). 
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One such MP was Mark Peck. Without hesitation, he admits that if there had been a 
caucus vote on the leadership in June 1996, his vote would have gone to an alternative 
candidate, Mike Moore .. The reason for his change of mind was simple - he wanted 
Labour to win the 1996 election. 
I simply wanted to win. Right? I was sick and tired of being in opposition. I was 
sick of it after a year. You can't do anything in opposition. And I mean, the 
people that I wanted to represent were hurting, and I didn't think we offered them 
anything by being in opposition. (Peck, interview, 1998) 
And to win the election, in his judgement, was not achievable under Clark's leadership . 
... I've publicly been loyal to Helen, and my arguments with her would have been 
in caucus. I've never publicly announced any position other than support for 
leadership. So, loyalty is not the issue. What the issue for me, is who can win. 
And if you want to look at the one issue that occupied my mind, it is how we could 
win the election .and form the government after the '96 election. And I didn't see 
that with Helen as the leader, we could do that. (Peck, interview, 1998) 
The continuously poor showing in the opinion polls also led the dissatisfied MPs to 
question Clark's suitability as the leader of the party, especially when in opposition. 
Some MPs thought that Clark lacked the necessary personality traits and/or skills to 
become a successful Leader of the Opposition296 • 
I mean I've always said that Helen will make a better Prime Minister than Leader 
of the Opposition because she has the ability and rationality and work ethic to do 
that job well. As Leader of the Opposition there's some advantage in the person 
being a bit of a cowboy - although that probably is a sexist term, but it doesn't 
quite seem right to call it a cow person - somebody that is able to go out there and 
smite the issue and belt the issue and put the Government on the back foot. I don't 
think Helen herself would argue that it is her chief skill. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
Along the same lines, another veteran MP asserts that different sets of qualities and 
skills are required for being a successful Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition. 
Like Goff, this MP came to the conclusion that Clark was better equipped to be a 
successful Prime Minister. To lead a major party in Opposition successfully, s/he says, 
the leader was missing a vital asset: 'charisma'. 
296 Clark herself was aware of this. More recently she confessed that female Opposition Leaders 
required a different approach from male counterparts. 'As a female leader of the opposition I can't really 
operate the way a man would in the same role. The public doesn't like women who attack or who are 
aggressive. People say Muldoon was a brilliant opposition leader and he cut peoples' throats all the 
time. I could not get anywhere with a political style which was based on attack, even though the role 
of the opposition is to oppose, because coming from a woman it's seen differently. Labour's fortunes 
changed when we adopted a positive, constructive style for the election campaign in 1996.' (Light, 
1998: 22) Elsewhere, she said: 'There is no harder job in politics [than the Leader of the Opposition]'. 
'You don't take anything for granted. Your job is on a tenterhook for you to deliver results. There is 
no deference towards you' (Main, 1998b). 
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... Her strengths were acquired strengths. She is not a flamboyant leader. She is 
not a star on the television. And she is not charismatic. Her qualities will make, if 
she gets the chance, make her a more successful Prime Minister than Leader of the 
Opposition. There are qualities that a Leader of the Opposition needs and there 
are qualities that a Prime Minister needs, and they are not all the same. And the 
ability to draw attention to yourself and blow your own trumpet, it's something 
you definitely need in opposition. You don't need it when you are in government 
because the attention of the public is on you anyway. (Anonymous, interview, 
1998) 
The erosion of those MPs' confidence in Clark as an election winner was now blatantly 
obvious. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the 1993 Clark supporters' expectations and her opponents' 
concerns as well as her dealing of them during the 1993~1996 period. The background 
of this duration was the serious caucus divisions, a direct result of the brutal and messy 
1993 leadership change. The level of volatility and absence of good will towards the 
new leader from a number of her colleagues made Clark's work as the leader more 
difficult. 
Despite such high odds, unlike her predecessor, Clark largely succeeded at meeting 
the expectations and alleviating the concerns. Through her careful and determined 
leadership, she managed to keep the majority of her original loyalists contented without 
antagonising her 1993 opponents. While some caucus members (original uncommitted 
supporters and opponents) felt disappointed and a few of them left the party over their 
disagreement, such fallout (which was expected anyway due to the introduction of the 
new electoral system) was minimal. 
Clark's leadership, however, was not a resounding success in the view of her 
opponents in one particular area. She failed to raise her own and Labour's popularity in 
the opinion polls. In the end, it was this aspect of her leadership that eventually 
precipitated the May/June leadership crisis. 
While the findings and analysis in this chapter have generally confirmed the 
propositions of the thesis, a necessity to amend one of the propositions has also been 
suggested. The category of 'uncommitted supporters' encompassing caucus members 
who do not belong to either loyalists or opponents has turned out to be inadequate. 
Some of the 1993 Clark uncommitted supporters were totally committed to removing 
Moore and saw her as its means to achieve that goal, while others were genuinely 
undecided over the two candidates. While the original classification of uncommitted 
supporters envisaged the latter group (waverers), the former (pragmatic supporters) was 
a new finding. The two types had markedly different attitudes towards the leader as well 
as support reliability; it was apparent they did not belong to the same group. In order to 
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rectify this inadequacy, this chapter has sub-divided uncommitted supporters into two 
groups. 
Important questions remain to be answered. For example, one of the characteristics 
of Clark's original support composition in comparison to that of Moore's was her high 
proportion of loyalists. Did this characteristic affect her leadership survival in 1996? If 
so, how? An equally interesting question is how pragmatic supporters and waverers 
differed. These questions are addressed in the next chapter, the second part of the 
analysis of the Clark leadership. 
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CHAPTERS 
Retention of the leadership and loyalists 
Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, as far as the majority of Clark's opponents' were 
concerned, her success as the leader was overshadowed by her perceived inability to lead 
the party to a victory at the 1996 election. At the same time, some of her wavering 
supporters - particularly those from the 1993 intake - had started to reconsider their 
position by the time the May/June leadership crisis developed. 
Like Chapter 5, the main purpose of this chapter is to examine the validity of the 
study's propositions regarding leadership durability. The analysis of Moore's 
leadership has revealed - in support of the propositions - that his demise as the leader 
was indeed attributable to his weak support composition and his failure to deal with his 
colleagues' expectations and concerns. As discussed in the previous chapter, Clark's 
original support composition was 'stronger' than Moore's in the sense that it contained 
a higher proportion of reliable loyalists. Another difference from her predecessor was 
found in her better handling of the expectations/concerns, although she was not entirely 
successful at it. Did these differences contribute to Clark's survival? This is one of the 
key questions that require close examination. 
The analysis starts with how Clark's support composition had changed by the 
My/June 1996 leadership crisis. 
The 1996 support composition 
According to the information gathered from research interviews, in May/June 1996 
when Clark was asked to step down by the five frontbenchers, Clark's 1996 support 
composition appears to have been as follows: 
Loyalists: Blincoe, Burton, Caygill, Clark, Dalziel, Dyson, Hodgson, Hunt, 
Kelly, Maharey, Mallard, Northey, Pettis, Sinclair, Sutherland, 
Tizard, VV1rite, l{ates 
Uncommitted supporters: 
Pragmatic supporters: 
Braybrooke297 , Lange 
Waverers: Carter, Field, Mackey 
297 Geoff Braybrooke, one of the 1993 Moore loyalists, was generally considered a Moore supporter 
again in 1996 by the pro-change group. However, he says that he would have voted for Clark despite 
his personal friendship with the former leader. (Braybrooke, interview, 1998) 
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Opponents: Barker, Cullen, Duynhoven, Gallagher, Goff, Hawkins, Keall, King, 
Moore, O'Connor, Peck, Robertson, Swain, Sutton, Tapsell, 
Tennet, Tirikatene-Sullivan, Wetere 
A comparison between Clark's 1993 and 1996 support compositions indicates three 
interesting points. Firstly, Clark almost completely failed to broaden her support base 
into the 1993 opponents; nobody from the 1993 Moore supporters was prepared to 
support Clark in 1996, except for Braybrooke. In addition, she seems to have lost three 
uncommitted supporters, namely Barker, Peck, and Swain in the same period. This all 
happened in spite of Clark's efforts as described in the previous chapter. 
Secondly, despite the serious popularity problem which she faced after her inception 
as the leader, her loyalists stayed with her in their entirety. As earlier hinted, included in 
this group were those on the left, whose policy expectation was not met in its original 
form. Furthermore, Clark had gained three new loyalists - Maharey, Mallard, and 
Sutherland - during this turbulent period. 
Thirdly, because of the minute change in her support composition between 1993 and 
1996, the vote was once again split almost along the MPs' intake year groupings: this 
time the pre-1990 intake overwhelmingly supported a leadership change while the 
majority of the post-1990 intake adhered to Clark. 
Now this study examines several questions which stem from these three points in the 
following sections. The questions include: 
The Clark opponents: 
.. Why were these MPs not convinced of Clark's virtue as the leader? 
.. Why did Moore become a likely alternative leader among many pro-change MPs? 
.. Why did the majority of the pre-1990 intake support a leadership change? 
The Clark loyalists: 
.. Why did this group not desert the leader even when Labour's poll ratings were 
disastrously poor? 
.. Why did three 1993 uncommitted supporters become loyalists during the 
troublesome period? 
.. Why did the caucus left loyalists not re-consider (or downgrade) their support as a 
result of the less than expected policy shift? 
The Uncommitted supporters: 
.. What were the factors that eventually persuaded them to stay with Clark? 
.. Why did those factors work for those MPs and not others? 
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The Clark opponents 
The question as to why Clark failed to convert her 1993 opponents into her supporters 
seems fairly obvious, given Labour's worsening popUlarity problem throughout her 
leadership. As a political journalist, Colin James, put it, 'MPs who discover they have a 
diminished future also tend to develop diminished loyalty' (James, 1994). They might 
appreciate Clark's clear focus and competent leadership skills, but what they expected 
from their leader was primarily the ability to win popular support and an election (and 
protect their seats). Any other leadership skills were simply secondary to it. No matter 
how effective and impressive Clark had proven herself as the leader internally, their 
support was still hinged upon her 'external' success measured by the opinion polls. In 
another journalist's words: 
... MPs loyalties coincide with their own interests. And no matter how much the 
caucus admires the job Helen Clark might have done in drawing them together or 
working up policy, if she is damaging their chance of being re-elected, reality will 
outweigh loyalty. (Young, 1995c) 
King's following comments exemplify Young's point. 
In 1996, Labour was going through a particularly bad time in the opinion polls, 
and we had for several months. I was concerned about the leadership of the 
Labour Party - not about Helen Clark because Helen Clark actually is a good 
leader. She's a strong leader, and she's a fair leader. But I was concerned that 
we'd reached 15% in the opinion polls, and we were facing an election in a few 
months time. (King, interview, 1998) 
Apart from turning around Labour's diminishing popUlarity, could Clark have done 
anything to change her opponents' positions? One MP replies dispassionately: 
No. Politics is pretty, I mean, pretty brutal. If you can't deliver, you don't retain 
support as Leader. 
... it's a pretty unforgiving business. You've got to be succeeding to stay at the 
top, you have to be. If you're not delivering the results, you're not going to last. 
(Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
The importance of the leaders' ability to win an election was further highlighted by 
the re-emergence of Moore as an alternative leader for many Clark opponents. 
Re-emergence of Moore as an alternative leader 
When Moore was approached by some concerned caucus colleagues regarding his 
availability, the situation resembled that in 1990 when he stood against the unpopular 
Palmer. And as in 1990, he was considered by his backers an ideal alternative leader for 
one reason and one reason only, ie., his popular appeal. For example, Mark Peck 
confesses: 
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The only candidate I could see winning the election at the time that issue came up 
was Mike Moore. And I would have supported him. He would have got my vote. 
(Peck, interview, 1998) 
The 1993 novice MP reports that the two and half year experience in national politics 
taught him to appreciate Moore's strengths and abilities. Asked to elaborate on them, he 
continues: 
[He is a] Better communicator. Got on well with people. I mean he could go into 
any room of people and be quite comfortable with them. He was what you might 
call 'on message'. He could very quickly work out which issues were the ones 
around which we could gain support. And I suppose when you are looking at 
winning an election, that's what it's about - getting votes. He's quite quick on 
that. Things like law and order, mental health, looking after senior citizens, doing 
something about the health system, things he is very quick 'on message' about. 
And I felt, aside from that, no other person in the caucus actually had a clear 
coherent message to deliver. (Peck, interview, 1998) 
Another factor which worked to the former leader's advantage was the limited 
amount of time left before the election. As Clark's clear determination to hold on to the 
leadership guaranteed that any move to oust her would be bloody, the new leader needed 
to already be very popular; the positive impact of the new leader's appointment needed 
to outweigh any damage caused by another leadership change. Names such as Cullen, 
Goff and King were frequently mentioned by the media (eg., Speden 1995), but nobody 
seemed capable of producing such a strong, positive impact in only a few months. For 
instance, Cullen, who contemplated becoming the leader back in October 1995, was 
acutely aware of his lack of charisma, and concluded that sufficient time was not 
available to establish himself as a popular leader before the election. 
That [a leadership change to Cullen] was not going to lead to an automatic and 
immediate increase in Labour's support; I just don't have that kind of charisma 
and natural appeal ... (Cullen, interview, 1998) 
In this regard, there was only one candidate around - Mike Moore. Even after the 
1993 leadership coup, Moore retained his popularity with the public. According to the 
NBR-COllsultus opinion poll published on 24 October 1995, 70% of the respondents 
reported that they had a 'very favourable' (21%) or 'somewhat favourable' (49%) 
opinion of Moore. This combined 'favourability' rate was the highest among all the 
Labour MPs surveyed298 . In comparison, Clark's total favourability rate was merely 
42% (9% very favourable, 33% somewhat favourable). As one of Moore's supporters 
puts it: 
It is too close to the election to get a new leader up in the public's mind and build 
the image. So, it would have to be Mike Moore who already had the image, whose 
298 Apart from Moore and Clark, the other Labour MPs featured in the poll were Caygill, Cullen, 
Dalziel, Goff and Maharey. 
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'following' held up personally in the polls, and you know, had a lot of personal 
support in the public. There was no doubt about that. 
I think we quickly realised that there was not time to put up a completely new 
figure and ... you know, time in terms of selling a new figure to the public ... Mike 
Moore, really, was already on the shelf, if you like. Ready to go. (Anonymous, 
interview, 1998) 
Another factor in favour of Moore's candidacy seemed to be the potential cost of 
assuming the leadership under those particular circumstances. Even if someone had 
successfully replaced Clark, it would be the new leader - not Clark - who would take the 
blame in case of Labour's defeat at the 1996 General Election (which appeared a real 
possibility). As Moore had discovered earlier, such a defeat would taint the new 
leader's record, and could be counted against hislher performance later. Therefore, it 
would be logical for any ambitious leadership contender to wait until the election was 
over. In this respect, Moore was seen as the only MP with both the necessary talents 
and political will. As Goff says: 
You have to make a decision as to whether there was anybody else that might be 
able to recover Labour's position. And Mike was the person who we thought 
most likely and indeed he may well have been the only person who would have 
had an interest in leading the party at that particular point. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
But, how about his disruptive behaviour after he lost the leadership, which must have 
damaged Labour's poll ratings? As a result of his actions, the media rated Moore's 
chance of regaining the top position as quite slim (e.g., Speden, 1995; Clifton, 1996a). 
Even one of the five frontbenchchers who approached Clark, Annette King, confesses 
that due to his behaviour she had become 'less confident' by May/June 1996 in the 
former leader's suitability to regain the top position: 
... [B]ecause his behaviour was not that of a person who ... had been able to get 
over it [the loss of the leadership] and get on and show what sort of leadership 
quality you wanted ... which is one of the reasons that I would have been doubtful 
about supporting Mike. (King, interview, 1998) 
Did the 1996 Moore supporters not share King's concern? Interestingly, some MPs 
from this group openly admit that they did. Cullen, for instance, acknowledges that the 
former leader's behaviour was a cause of concern. 'I think a number of us who were 
supporting Mike may have indicated to him that we hadn't loved everything he'd done' 
(Cullen, interview, 1998). Peck is more blunt. '[Moore's behaviour] pissed me off. To 
be frank, it really did. And in fact, I told him so' (peck, interview, 1998). 
However, there was strong sympathy towards (and understanding of) Moore's 
position in the group. Geoff Braybrooke argues that considering what had happened to 
his old friend, his resentment was understandable. 
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He was very hurt, very hurt indeed. And we all felt for him because of that, and 
he'd done his best. He's been a working man all his life, and the movement that 
he'd loved had just kicked him, kicked him in balls, you might say. Nobody 
appreciates that, believe me. (Braybrooke, interview, 1998) 
Phil Goff has a similar view. He maintains that under the given circumstances, Moore's 
behaviour was as good as one could hope for. 
Mike was, you could argue, loyal to the extent that was reasonable to expect him to 
be, having been Leader, having worked his guts out suddenly finding that the rug 
was pulled out from under him. There are very few people who can go through 
that experience and still ... come out at the other end and say: 'Well, I don't hold 
any grievances'. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
Along the same lines, a new 1993 intake, Rick Barker, refers to those who expected 
better behaviour from the deposed leader as 'incredibly naive' (Barker, interview, 1998). 
Another 1993 intake, Damien O'Connor, points out that while Moore's action did 
not help the party, there were others such as Lange and Mark Gosche who were equally 
guilty of their unhelpful actions. ' ... Mike Moore wasn't alone in creating a few 
unnecessarily negative views' (O'Connor, interview, 1998). 
Even among those who did not necessarily approve of Moore's actions, the attitude 
towards him started changing as Labour's popularity problem worsened. One MP 
explains the situation in the following terms: 
You see, he was widely perceived by both his friends and his foes as being a bit 
bitter and twisted about that. And after a while, you know, this was not helping his 
cause. But nevertheless at the end of the day, when the crunch came, when the test 
came, ... he was the one who had enjoyed public support and had a gift [of] being 
able to communicate - to 'connect' was the fashionable term those days - to 
'connect' with the voters. (Anonymous, interview, 1998). 
As unforgiving as they were of Clark's failure to popularise the party, those same MPs 
were equally forgiving of Moore's shortcomings and misbehaviour if he could rescue 
the party and their seats. In one MP's words: 'A leader who will deliver the goods ... 
you are prepared to forgive quite a lot' (Anonymous, interview, 1998). 
Those MPs' readiness to forgive Moore implied their equal readiness to dispose of 
him if he failed to perform. It is interesting to note that the majority of his backers were 
uncommitted supporters in 1993. Two and half years later, their support for Moore was 
once again conditional. Asked if the former leader could have survived after the 1996 
election, one 1996 Moore supporter replies: 'If he'd been successful, he'd have retained 
it. He, in tum, would have had to deliver the goods' (Anonymous, interview, 1998). 
If Moore had successfully replaced Clark, but failed to lead the party to victory in 
the 1996 election (his third election loss in a row), could his leadership still have 
survived? Cullen's answer underlines the short-term and context-specific nature of 
Moore's re-emergence in 1996. 
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I must say my thoughts ... they didn't extend to the consideration of what might 
happen in case of all those circumstances. We were focussed rather more short 
term than that. Yes, I mean, it's probably fair to say that in that situation then 
obviously a further consideration would have been given to the leadership at some 
stage post 1996. Goodness knows. I'd have no doubt have talked with 
colleagues, talked with my wife, but I hadn't thought about it at that stage at all. 
(Cullen, interview, 1998) 
However, Phil Goff does not believe that Moore's position would have been in any 
immediate danger even if the election outcome had not been in his favour, although 
adding that he - like anybody else - could not have expected to be a long-term leader. 
Well, I think we thought that, I mean, you weren't going to make Mike the leader 
of the party to drop him six months later. If he was considered to be a legitimate 
candidate for the position, then what you were looking at was for the medium 
term. Nobody is ever a leader for the long term; they are either a short-term leader 
or a medium-term leader. I don't think there was any concept that Mike would be 
put there, do the job, and suddenly somebody else would overthrow him and step 
into his place. I mean, self-Machavellian, and maybe that's the impression people 
have of politics, but I can assure you that that wasn't the case. (Goff, interview, 
1998) 
Pre-1990 intake 
Apart from their assessment that, under Clark, Labour would not win the 1996 election, 
the majority of the Clark opponents had something else in common; as in 1993, their 
group continued to comprise mostly of the pre-1990 intake. This was a direct result of 
the remaining divisions along the 1993 leadership voting pattern during the 1993-1996 
period. What accounted for this stasis? There are two possible explanations. 
Firstly, as described in Chapter 6, the feeling of hurt over the 1993 leadership coup 
felt by the 1993 Moore supporters was never properly healed. One of the major factors 
which kept the divisions unbridged was the persisting perceptions of ideological 
positions, formed through past behaviour. The focal point there was over the evaluations 
of the fourth Labour Government's achievement. This same argument that had been 
featured during the 1993 leadership change (see Chapter 5) was still rife in the caucus 
with undiminished intensity. Some of the newer MPs felt so strongly about the issue -
even six years after the collapse of the Government - they tended to treat those who did 
not readily acknowledge (at least some of) the Government's controversial policies as 
mistakes, with strong suspicion and hostility, 
This was ironic considering the reality of the ideological status in the caucus. As 
described in Chapters 6 and 7, apart from a few members at both ends of the spectrum 
(such as Dunne and Lange), the majority of the Labour MPs agreed on the party's 
current policy positions. This present near consensus seemed to have little effect upon 
some MPs' grumbling over one another's past stances. As one pre-1990 MP reports: 
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I think you'll find that those who came in after 1990 wanted to blame those who 
had been there up to 1990 for the errors of the fourth Labour Government. So, 
there was a lot of blaming [going] on. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
Such hostility no doubt consolidated the 'friendships' within each group, which had 
been formed through the parliamentary entrance classes and the traumatic infighting at 
the 1993 leadership change. In this environment, it would not be surprising if the anti-
Clark, pre-1990 intakes had seen replacing Clark as an opportunity to exact revenge 
against their colleagues. 
The second explanation relates to the actual experiences in government. The pre-
1990 intakes were part of the fourth Labour Governmene99 • In addition, many of the 
pre-1984 intakes, in particular, had ministerial experiences300. Experiences in 
government add a different outlook to MPs by making them aware of the absolute 
necessity of power in order to achieve anything substantive. As one former Cabinet 
Minister attests: 
I mean we are all in this because we want to achieve something in the way of 
promoting our policies. And really to do that effectively, we've got to be in 
government. ... some people are in it ... because of personal ambition, they want 
the positions of power. But to have them you've got to be in government as well. 
(Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
King also asserts that 'there was an element of realism' among this group after six 
years of government experience, and that they 'knew what it was like to govern as 
opposed to always being in Opposition' (King, interview, 1998). An 'element of 
realism' in politics is the acute realisation that in order to obtain power, they must first 
win an election and as a means to that end, the presence of a popular leader would 
certainly be helpful. The then Party President, Michael Hirschfeld, says that such 
realisation made many pre-1990 intakes 'hard-headed'. 
The Mike Moore supporters were normally those who had been in government, 
who were more hard-headed people. They had just simply looked at the polls, and 
drawn their conclusions, I think. The experience of government does make a 
difference in ... how hard-headed some of these judgements are. (Hirschfeld, 
interview, 1998) 
Another 'element of realism' had taught those MPs tolerance of less than perfect 
leaders. For example, Cullen looks back at the turbulent fourth Labour Governmene01 
and says: 
299 Four MPs were also part of the third Labour Government. They were: Jonathan Hunt, Mike 
Moore, Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, and Koro Wetere. 
300 Amongst the 1996 leadership change proponents Moore, Wetere, Cullen, Goff, King, Sutton, and 
Tapsell were Ministers of the fourth Labour Government. Tirikatene-Sullivan was a Minister in the 
third Labour Government. 
301 For the state of the fourth Labour Government in its final days, see, for example, Russell (1996), 
Chapter 16. 
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We [the pre-1990 intake] were not un-used to leaders who were sometimes 
somewhat idiosyncratic. Lange was scarcely the perfectly inclusive democratic 
leader of the Labour Party. So that, while it [Moore's behaviour] was always a bit 
of a concern, I mean I always had to sort of watch my own comer to make sure 
that... strange things weren't happening. [But it] was part of life in the Labour 
Party. (Cullen, interview, 1998) 
What came with higher tolerance was acceptance of a less idealistic image of the 
leadership. As one former Cabinet Minister notes: 
Leaders aren't made in heaven, they only come from the ranks of ordinary people 
like the rest of us, and there are no perfect leaders. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
Phil Goff concurs: 
I guess I've been around long enough to know not to want a perfect leader, or to 
know there's no such animal... (Goff, interview, 1998) 
One may argue that the pro-change MPs' readiness to seek another popular leader in 
place of Clark came as no surprise; it merely verified the conventional view that survival 
was of utmost importance for professional politicians. Judith Tizard, a Clark loyalist, 
critically agrees that surviving instincts can be a very powerful factor in politicians' 
decision making. 
People get into Parliament, wanting to be in government, wanting to change the 
world usually, or at least wanting to make it a better and safer place. ... It's a very 
interesting job, very challenging job, there is a lot of excitement, a lot of adrenalin, 
and people get very hooked into being MPs. And ... I always say, 'You are an 
MP to do what?' But when you are tired and threatened, the instinct to hold on to 
what you have is very strong. (Tizard, interview, 1998) 
David Caygill, who served as an MP for 18 years, also explains: 
I think that the truth is that for a lot of politicians this is simply the best job they 
are ever likely to have. They like the job in terms of often literally the salary. ... 
Many members of Parliament are better off financially as Members of Parliament 
than they were as farmers or teachers or small business people or whatever. But 
it's not just the money. This is an exciting job - it's ajob with some prestige. 
Sure, people are cynical about politicians, you know, are rude about them. It's a 
job that involves a lot of sacrifice. But it is a job that has a lot of compensations 
for those sacrifices as well. If you've got a kind of ego that likes to be in the 
public eye, well you know, unless you want to be a television personality or 
something, it's hard to think of a better job. If you want to make a difference to 
the country, there aren't many other jobs that give as many as opportunities as 
this. It's a job where it's easy to feel that you are doing something worthwhile. 
And I think for a lot of people that is something that they would be loath to give 
up ... they are reluctant to leave that job not just because of the fear of losing ... not 
getting other employment - that's certainly true - but I think it's part of a larger 
whole. This is a job that most people who are elected enjoy doing. The ones who 
felt miserable or out of place and hate it are a distinct minority. (Caygill, interview, 
1996) 
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The longer one stays in politics, the heavier hislher reliance on the job becomes, 
either financially or psychologicalllo2 • In this respect, there was little surprise that MPs 
with longer experiences opted for a leadership change to someone who could improve 
their chance of survival. . 
This leads to another question: if MPs' concern for electoral survival was so strong 
and prevalent, why did the majority of the Labour caucus members - especially Clark's 
loyalists - decide to back her in 1996? At the 1996 General Election where Labour 
performed better than expected, three Clark loyalists lost their seats: John Blincoe, 
Richard Northey, and Suzanne Sinclair. In addition, some MPs who appeared to be 
unlikely to return to Parliament if the abysmal 16 per cent party support continued -
such as Dyson (ranked No.20 on the party list), White (No. 10), and Yates (No. 17) -
stood firmly by Clark303 • What accounted for their decision, which appeared to 
contradict the conventional view of politicians as people whose primary concerns were 
their re-election? 
The Clark loyalists 
Were the loyalists not worried about the 1996 election? 
There were a number of factors which explain why a number of MPs remained loyal to 
Clark. First of all, some Clark loyalists claim that unlike those who seriously 
entertained the thought of a leadership change, they were not driven by the opinion poll 
results. They argue that there were more significant considerations than the party's 
popUlarity when Clark's leadership came under pressure. Included in those 
considerations was the party's credibility as a major centre-left party, which Clark had 
managed to establish. For instance, when asked to identify the factor which separated 
the Clark loyalists from the rest of the caucus, after a pause, Ruth Dyson replies: 
I think long-term commitment, probably... Although all of us wanted to [come] 
back into Parliament [and] none of us was sort of prepared to sacrifice ourselves 
for the greater good, frankly ... I think [we had] less self-interest and more interest 
in where Labour was going to be in the next little while. (Dyson, interview, 1998) 
As Dyson's comment indicates, although the Clark supporters valued her 
achievement as the leader more highly than her opponents did, they were by no means 
driven by altruism. As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the Clark supporters' 
302 In relation to a move to introduce term limits in Parliament, Geoffrey Palmer commented: 'There 
is merit in such restrictions. Public life changes one's outlook and sometimes all politicians seem to 
have more in common with each other than they do with the public they represent. Turning politics 
into a career does not enhance the performance of the system - it makes survival the only imperative.' 
(Palmer, 1992: 127) 
303 In November 1995, a political journalist, Jane Clifton, stated that given the then state of the party, 
only six list members would be returned to Parliament. They included four incumbent electorate MPs 
Caygill, Dalziel, Hunt, and Jill White. (Clifton, 1995d) 
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expectations of her leadership was to win the 1996 election. Even in comparison to the 
seasoned MPs with ministerial experiences who were in favour of a leadership change, 
they did not lack the desire to win the Treasury benches. The hunger for power was 
particularly noticeable among those who first entered Parliament before 1993. For 
instance, Steve Maharey's already noted ambition304 to be a Cabinet Minister depended 
upon Labour's winning an election for its realisation. Similarly, another Clark loyalist, 
Trevor Mallard, was reported to have said: 
I have no ambition to be a long-term Opposition MP. The world's too big, there 
are other things I'd like to do and if I thought it was unlikely we were going to get 
into government, I wouldn't be a candidate. (Black, 1997) 
In sum, the Clark loyalists were concerned about Labour's popUlarity problem, like 
their wary colleagues. For instance, when asked about her views when the opinion polls 
continued to slide, Ruth Dyson replies: 'Oh, yes, of course, they concerned me' (Dyson, 
interview, 1998). 
Why did the loyalists stay with Clark? 
The dividing factor between the loyalists and others was the presence (or absence) of 
positive support for the leader. As was the case for the Moore loyalists, the Clark 
loyalists had acquired a profound knowledge about the leader and her leadership style 
by the time the leadership crisis emerged. As discussed in the previous chapter, they 
had been satisfied with her leadership style and handling of policies. 
In addition, the small size of the caucus enabled all the loyalists to maintain 
personal305 and formal contact with the busy leader, who in tum reciprocated their 
loyalty with provision of friendship, personal support and encouragement. 
Consequently, strong positive support for Clark uniformly existed in this group, which 
led them to quite different assessments of the situation from those held by the other 
caucus members. In short, they firmly believed that the party's interest (including its 
chance of winning the 1996 election) would be best served under her leadership. For 
instance, Judith Tizard reported: 
... She's having to re-make the job of Leader of the Opposition and Leader of the 
Labour Party in a context that we have not seen before, and it's not been easy. 
But I'm absolutely sure that nobody else could do it better; while it is not always 
the best reason to keep somebody as a leader. I'm sure that Helen is the best 
leader that we have available. I still believe that she will be the best Prime Minister 
304 Maharey openly admitted this ambition to his colleagues by saying: 'I didn't come in here to be on 
the backbench, pal. 1 want to be a cabinet minister' (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
305 Cullen asserts that personal loyalty was strong particularly among some of the female MPs. 
According to him, one of the 'complicating factors' at the time of the May/June leadership crisis was: 
'the first chance of a woman Prime Minister'. 'If we changed the leadership, that chance would have 
been thrown away, at least for the foreseeable future, for another period' (Cullen, interview, 1998). 
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this country has seen in the long time if we can get her there. (Tizard, interview, 
1998) 
One of the 1993 intake, Jill White, explains her position in 1996 in the following terms: 
I always believe there is only one poll that counts, and that's the poll on election 
day. And I also believe that when the going is rough, that that is the time you 
actually hang on to what you believe, and you know, that's when you get really 
stuck in with what you believe. 
I didn't know that we were going to win or not win the election. But I had 
absolute conviction that Helen was the best leader. I had absolute conviction. No 
sort of wavering from that at all. (White, interview, 1998) 
Interestingly, instead of undermining their confidence, the manner in which she 
operated under the constant pressure from both inside and outside the caucus further 
reinforced the loyalists' positive support for Clark. Jill White continues: 
... it [her support for Clark] grew in respect... You know, I also have a lot of 
respect for Helen for the way she has handled a lot of crises. I mean ... caucus 
after the Selwyn by-election was in a ... pretty down sort of state... But I very 
much admired Helen's courage and the way she sort of worked to pull things 
together. And I admire her sort of strength of character and her resolution... She 
does not wilt under adversity. . . .I think that she is a woman of very considerable 
and admirable character, and I think she's grown in the job. And that is a very 
good indicator of a person's sort of inner strengths, I think. (White, interview, 
1998) 
Positive support and its effect on how problems were viewed 
So, how did the uniformly shared positive support help Clark when she and Labour 
were battling with poor opinion poll showings? It led her loyalists to a different 
diagnosis of Labour's popUlarity problems. In their view, the causes of the problem lay 
outside the leader. Therefore, replacing Clark would not help improve the situation. A 
former Party President, Ruth Dyson, who witnessed (and opposed) the leadership 
change from Palmer to Moore in 1990 under similar circumstances, states: 
Ijust don't think the answer is changing the leader. I've never thought that's the 
answer to the problem ... I didn't think it when David Lange left. I didn't think it 
when Geoffrey Palmer left. And I didn't think it when we changed Mike for 
Helen. And I still don't think it. The leader is not the answer to the problem. 
(Dyson, interview, 1998) 
Larry Sutherland shares a similar viewpoint. 
... that to have another change of leader was not really the answer to the whole 
issue. That we still needed more time ... that we were really suffering at the hands 
of [Winston] Peters' popUlarity and [Jim] Anderton doing his thing. And that 
really wasn't all of what Helen Clark was necessarily doing wrong, or the negative 
things about Labour in general. It was basically the fact that we had to be patient 
enough to wait till people found out that there wasn't going to be ... a pot of gold at 
the end of the rainbow... But generally, I thought it would have been very reckless 
to have a change of Leader and that Helen Clark did enjoy quite a depth of support 
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irrespective of the polls, and that we wouldn't be seen as stupid as a party that just 
constantly keeps changing leaders, and is not totally poll-driven in that respect, and 
isn't prepared to consolidate itself and say: 'Right, let's look at the ways that we 
can tum these things around'. It wasn't just Helen Clark's leadership, there were 
other factors. (Sutherland, interview, 1998) 
One of such 'other factors' in the views of the Clark loyalists, was the internal 
disarray in the caucus. They argued that the on-going divisions between two camps 
along the 1993 voting pattern and some MPs' behaviour deprived the leader of the 
opportunity to exhibit her true leadership potential to the pUblic . 
... I usedto say in caucus: 'We're a team here. OK? That's a point. That's a 
good point. But, how can you tell she can't do it [winning the 1996 election]? 
Because when this caucus finishes, somebody is going to go straight down ... to 
the [press] gallery and tell everybody what has been said in here. And then she's 
going to spend her whole day, being phoned by people who will ask about 
something that's happened in here, which is bad. So, how do you tell when she is 
good? She never gets a chance.' (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
The loyalists' view was that once given a chance, she would prove to be a successful 
leader, and the public would eventually corne to see it, too. Such a belief was so strong 
that the deputy leader, David Caygill's confidence about Clark's election winning ability 
was unshaken by the discouraging poll results. He said that 'I was confident that she 
could have [won the 1996 election]" adding: 'I still believe that... Labour is likely to win 
the 1999 election under her leadership' (Caygill, interview, 1998). Asked to elaborate 
on the basis of his confidence, his reply was as follows: 
I would often say to people that you couldn't judge the popUlarity of a leader from 
opposition. I had seen two things happen more than once. First of all, I had seen 
somebody who had been thought unpopular before an election suddenly rise in 
popUlarity in the campaign itself. 
... What happens in an election campaign is that the Government loses much of its 
advantage. Outside an election campaign, the Government dominates the news. 
The Government makes news, the Opposition merely comments on it. The 
Opposition doesn't announce decisions, it doesn't announce legislation. It 
criticises, and that is generally seen as a negative function. But in an election 
campaign, the television stations in particular are obliged to treat the parties and 
their leaders more equally and even the Prime Minister, whoever he or she is at 
that point, is often seen merely as the leader of their party, and no longer as the 
leader of the country. So, the relationship becomes much more equal, and the 
Leader of the Opposition is seen as a potential Prime Minister, almost by virtue of 
their leadership of the largest alternative party. And so suddenly people look at 
these leaders in a different light. And of course if they campaign well... and I had 
no doubt that Helen's intelligence and ability would create the opportunity for her 
to corne across well ... only in that very limited environment of the last two or three 
weeks before an election. So, I said to people: 'Well, yes, of course you need to 
be led by a popular leader. But don't confuse the popUlarity that somebody has 
or doesn't have now with the popularity that people may perceive just before the 
critical moment - the moment when they have to cast their vote. (Caygill, interview, 
1998) 
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Regardless of the discouraging opinion polls, the Clark loyalists retained their faith 
that Labour could still win the 1996 election. In their opinion, their expectation for 
Clark to lead the party to victory had not been unfulfilled. Unlike the pro-change 
colleagues who had already concluded that realisation of the expectation was not 
forthcoming, the Clark loyalists were prepared to withhold their judgement. In addition, 
even if the party failed to achieve that goal, according to their view, it was not due to 
Clark's leadership; on the contrary, if Labour was not being led by the best leader in the 
caucus, the situation could only be worse than it was. 
New loyalists 
Similarly, the increased knowledge of and growing faith in the leader were responsible 
for transforming three 1993 pragmatic supporters - Steve Maharey, Trevor Mallard, and 
Larry Sutherland - to her loyalists. For example, Larry Sutherland, who assisted 
Clark's leadership closely as the Junior Whip, says that the experience of working with 
her led him to the conclusion that Clark was the best person to lead the party. 
I don't think any other leader has had to survive against such odds. I go back to 
Bill Rowling. I used to be Electorate Chairman of Bill Rowling' s electorate. I can 
remember the slow whittling away of him. I can remember the whittling away 
attempts at Palmer and Lange. But I just don't... think any of those were much up 
to the sort of pressures that Helen Clark has had to survive under. And so, I think 
my greatest admiration for her is, and why I thought we should stick with her is 
the fact that she is unmovable, that she is a force to reckon with, and anyone who 
can survive those odds is really someone who's got true leadership qualities. And 
certainly you shouldn't be talking about chopping her head off anyway. 
(Sutherland, interview, 1998) 
Another MP with the same view was Steve Maharey, who voted for Clark in 1993 as 
a less reliable pragmatic supporter whose initial support for her was due to her sole 
candidacy against Moore. By1996, the then social welfare spokesperson had been 
converted into a solid loyalist: 'I think it would be fair to say that I would be the last 
person, last vote she would lose in the caucus' , if there was a ballot (Maharey, interview, 
1998). He describes the relationship that developed between him and the leader during 
the two and half years in the following terms: 
... we got on enormously well during that whole period of time, she knew she 
could trust me during that period of time. And I knew I could trust her during that 
period of time. Those are important things, they're very rare in politics. (Maharey, 
interview, 1998) 
In the meantime, his view that Clark was an ideal leader for the new political era of 
MMP had been enhanced. 
I think I said this at that time [to the caucus], that MMP being the system coming 
along, you need a person who can negotiate, operate, be clear, keep lines of 
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communication open, be very professional- all of those things I think Helen has in 
buckets. So, as the MMP era unrolls, I think her strengths have become stronger 
and stronger. (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
A question of interest here is: why did some of the 1993 pragmatic supporters 
become loyalists while others did not? One variance was the knowledge of Clark at the 
time of the leadership vote in 1993. Although the new loyalists did not possess intimate 
understanding of her, at least they had observed her in the deputy leader capacity in the 
Parliament settings306 • With better knowledge of her as an individual politician as well 
as of parliamentary politics in general, their expectations of her as the leader may have 
been more realistic (thus more achievable by Clark) than those lacking such pre-
exposure to her. 
Another difference between the two groups was (working) relationships with Clark. 
Unlike those who found Clark distant and distrusting, the three new loyalists all worked 
closely with Clark, enjoying her personal trust after the 1993 leadership change. 
Mallard was initially given the ranking ofNo.14 with the spokespersonship in state 
services, internal affairs, and civil defence among others. Rising eventually to No. 10, 
following several defections and resignations, Clark's confidence in him became 
sufficient enough to name him as one of her 'kitchen Cabinet' members (Clifton, 
1997b: 33; Clifton, 1997c: 18lo7 • As noted by himself above, Maharey (another 
'kitchen Cabinet' member), also established a close and confiding relationship308. The 
leader's confidence in them paid handsome dividends when her leadership came under 
pressure. 
The caucus left: why did they remain loyal? 
While the majority of her 1993 loyalists viewed the policy shift achieved under Clark's 
leadership as a realisation of one of their original expectations, this was not the case for 
a few MPs on the left. The achieved policy shift was moderate in comparison to their 
original expectation. Indeed, as has been seen, it was for this reason that David Lange 
remained an pragmatic supporter. 
However, the other left MPs decided to remain loyal to Clark (or became her new 
loyalists). This contradicts one of the hypotheses of the study: a leader has to satisfy 
306 Mallard and Sutherland entered Parliament in 1984 and 1987 respectively. Although Mallard lost 
his seat at the 1990 election shortly after Clark became the deputy leader, he worked in Parliament 
between 1990 and 1993 as Executive Assistant to Mike Moore. 
307 More recently, Clark identified him as her potential successor as the leader: 'Watch him if I ever 
get run over by a bus' (Main, 2000b). 
308 Following the five frontbenchers' approach, David Caygill resigned from the No.2 position. In 
order to fill the vacancy made by Cullen's elevation to No.2, Clark promoted Maharey to the No.3 
position. Maharey explains that that decision was motivated by her desire to bolster her support base 
on the frontbench. Although two other candidates - Dalziel and Mallard - were considered, the latter's 
'enforcer' image and Dalziel's youth counted against them (Maharey, interview, 1998). 
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hislher supporters' expectations in order to retain (or strengthen) their support. So, 
what accounted for this deviation from the hypothesis? 
In short, those left MPs' expectations of the policy shift were reshaped during the 
two and half years of Clark's leadership. Just like their reaction to the first shadow 
cabinet portfolio allocation, which they hoped would reward them ahead of her 
opponents, those MPs initially found the extent to which the new leader was prepared to 
change the party policies disappointing. Peter Dunne reports that among them there was 
'a sense of pennanent grumpiness that things were not moving in the direction that they 
would have liked, although given the very brittle state of the Labour Party at that stage, 
no one was too keen to publicly rock the boat' (Dunne, 1999b). What helped them 
overcome this disappointment and what prevented the loss of their positive support for 
Clark was the realisation of the necessity of pragmatism for the sake of caucus unity. 
They were able to see Clark having to adopt pragmatism in the leadership in order to 
include her opponents and heal the rifts incurred by the leadership change. As Maryan 
Street puts it, 'they [the caucus left] understood what she was doing, and could see the 
need for it, actually' (Street, interview 1999). The fonner President continues: 
... some were left disappointed but they also understood because of her persuasion 
and because of her management of the caucus and her attention to the dynamics of 
that caucus which was feeling very bruised and very embittered. But... any 
disappointment they had about policy changes was replaced by a recognition of 
the pragmatic need for that. (Street, interview 1999) (Street, interview 1999) 
What appeared to play an important role in the transition of those MPs' views was 
their faith and trust in Clark. They were willing to accept her positions. And with the 
acceptance of the necessary pragmatism came a subsequent shift of their policy 
expectations309 • 
... in the end I suppose pragmatism shifted people more towards the centre, centre-
left than being outspokenly left-wing. (Street, interview 1999) 
As a result of this shift, the moderate policy shift under Clark's leadership was seen as 
satisfactory for the majority of the 1993 caucus left. They were contented with the 
clearer centre-left identity of the party. 
Also what may have facilitated the shift was the lack of ideological rigidity or fine 
definition of the ideals among the caucus left. Lange points to this problem, arguing that 
309 Probably, the following comments made by a former Party President, close personal friend, and 
now a Cabinet colleague of Clark, Margaret Wilson, may echo the sentiment felt by the left loyalists. 
When asked about changes in Clark's policy views after she became a Minister, Wilson replied in 
1988: 'She understands better than most what she's doing - that if you're going to play the game but 
you want to be ultra pure in principle, then you won't ever be a player. She knows what the important 
principles are ... if people feel disappointed then it should be in the system and what it requires, not in 
Helen' (Legat, 1988: 92). 
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in the caucus where orthodox economic policies had become a dominant philosophy, 
what this group managed to come up with was, at best, loose ideas, and nothing more. 
There were enough political scientists in the caucus to know what social 
democracy is, but they are none of them social democrats. Members of the caucus 
who aren't wholly consumed by self-interest have some rough idea of what helps 
and what doesn't help the people they are supposed to represent. This is as far as 
it goes. All of this applies to me. (Lange 1999b) 
Of course, if one does not have concrete and precise views, s/he is more susceptible to 
persuasion by those with such views. Moreover, the readiness to listen and modify 
one's own views is expected to increase if the persuasion comes from the leader whom 
s/he trusts. 
What Clark accomplished has an interesting implication for the study. She proved 
that a leader could modify his/her loyalists' expectations when there was a cleavage 
between them and what s/he could realistically achieve. Conversely, this indicates that 
loyalists' expectations were not rigid and inflexible. Because the loyalists' support for 
Clark was formed around their understanding of and trust in her, they were prepared to 
make necessary adjustments to their original expectations in support of her leadership. 
The nature of positive support 
It is noteworthy that positive support for Clark did not tum her loyalists into her blind 
followers. Instead, according to some loyalists, they retained the capacity to criticise her 
leadership performance whenever they saw necessary. This was a marked difference 
from the Moore loyalists. Judith Tizard, who had known Clark on a personal basis for 
more than 24 years310, refers to herself as Clark's 'extremely critical friend', adding: 
... over these three years when he [Moore] was the leader, he occasionally would 
say things like, 'It's good to have uncritical friends' and then I thought: 'Shit. 
Show me one.' 1've never been an uncritical friend of Helen. (Tizard, interview, 
1998) 
Another loyalist, Maharey, also argues that he did not hesitate to criticise Clark 
occasionally, especially regarding her disinterest in increasing her personal popUlarity. 
While having no doubt about her overall leadership abilities, he came to the view that her 
only weakness was her not being a 'classic popular leader'. After devoting strong 
loyalty to the leader in the caucus by defending the embattled leader from internal critics, 
he felt entitled to express his opinions to Clark. 
310 Tizard traces back the origin of her own political career to her candidacy for the local Power Board 
in 1977, a decision strongly encouraged by Clark. At one stage during her university lecturer years, 
Clark was living with Tizard's parents in Auckland. Based upon such a long and close friendship, 
Tizard describes Clark as 'like a sister' (Tizard, interview, 1998). 
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... I had just spent an awful lot of time supporting her, and at a personal level that 
position of me in the caucus was probably [that of] her major supp011er. So, you 
know, in the sense of personal energy and time, effort, and stress and so on, her 
leadership cost me a lot. Supporting her cost me a lot. So, I also felt [that] that 
gave me the right to say to her: 'It isn't working, Helen'. I remember Ian Fraser 
saying to her on television ... that: 'If you want to be Prime Minister, you've got be 
popular. You've got to get some numbers in the polls, personally.' And ... she 
said: 'I think that's wrong. 1 think what's important is [that] the party gets the 
numbers. And I become the Prime Minister on the basis of the place. I'm a team 
player.' And I said to her after the interview again ... : 'I just think you are wrong, 
you know. If you think you can ... somehow run the party as the thing that people 
vote for, modem politics isn't about that. Politics has never been about that... 
certainly not now. If you're not popular, we're not going to make it. We'll get 
the numbers OK, but the bit that gets us into being government, those extra sort of 
ten points come from you.' So, we always had sort of fairly robust discussions 
about things. But they were not discussions of my doubt about her ability ... 
(Maharey, interview, 1998) 
However, Maharey adds that his input was not always appreciated by the leader. 
[However]. .. at times she didn't treat me very nicely because I used to say 
these things. It was me wanting to give her clear feedback on what might make a 
difference in, like, television performance, style of speaking ... not that I'm, you 
know, any bloody expert. But just ... you watch someone whom you support 
going through this crap everyday, you start to want to say: 'Well, look, maybe 
they have got a point. So, let's try correcting that'. (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
In tum, Clark's readiness to listen to such criticisms - whether she accepted them or not 
- impressed Maharey and further bolstered his loyalty to the leader . 
... it is awful being the leader of a party ... it is just a full-on, you know ... when 
times are bad, you're it, and when times are good, you're it. So, it's great when 
it's going well, but it's awful when it is going the other way. And she had that for 
two and half years. So, in that climate, Helen's like me, Helen would say: 'What 
do you think about this?' - it wasn't easy. So, I think it's just another sign of her 
strength that she and I still get on enormously well. (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
There was no question that the loyalists' support for Clark was solid when her 
leadership was tested in May/June 1996. However, was their positive support as reliable 
as it has been hypothesised? If the loyalists were not blind followers, they must have 
had limits to the extent to which their support could go. The simplest way to find the 
answer to this question appears to be to identify the circumstances under which they 
would have considered changing their positions. 
The loyalists admit that their positive support was not unconditional. For instance, 
Dyson says: ' ... I'm not a person who is so besotted with loyalty to anyone that I'd say 
I'd never change, that's silly' (Dyson, interview, 1998). Nevertheless, the scenarios that 
the Clark loyalists provide in which Clark could have no longer relied on their support 
are best characterised by their unlikelihood. For instance, Judith Tizard notes: ' ... if she 
goes completely barmy, I wouldn't support her' (Tizard, interview, 1998). In less direct 
words, another MP states: 
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It would only be for policy . You know, if suddenly Helen had an attack of the 
jitters and decided to side with the more right wing views ... .If [she] suddenly 
decided that we actually can corporatise the health system, the education system. I 
mean she's not going to do these things, I can say. I can say this with absolute 
assurance that it's not going to happen, but if there was a real shift in policy so 
that we moved back into the centre or even beyond, then I wouldn't support her 
for the leadership. (Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
Ruth Dyson's view is remarkably similar. She says that she would not have supported 
Clark: 
... If Helen wasn't performing as the leader in the way that I expected in a leader .. . 
It would take a bit. I mean I'm not a fickle person with loyalty. But yeah, if she .. . 
suddenly started behaving quite differently or sort of signed up to the Business 
Roundtable views or did something extraordinary, had a personality change, then 
yes, I probably would. (Dyson, interview, 1998) 
Radical ideological shifts and behavioural changes are also listed by Richard Northey as 
the possible causes for his support change. 
I think if there were things in her behaviour that she started promoting ... policy 
proposals that were ... you know ... strange, inappropriate, or too right wing, that 
just didn't hold together... [that] would be the main thing that would stop me 
supporting her. (Northey, interview, 1998) 
And how likely does he think that would happen? 'I don't. That's my expectation. 
She's pretty predictable, which is very different from Mike Moore who is not 
predictable sometimes' (Northey, interview, 1998). 
Steve Maharey pledges that he would have supported Clark as long as she wanted to 
remain the leader, adding: 
Because I was so closely involved with her to see at least over those five days 
[before the 1993 leadership change], I feel that as long as she wants to be Leader, 
I'll support her. Because I also do trust Helen to be a person that will know when 
she's ready to give it up. And clearly, I don't think it was during those three years 
and she was right. But I think when the time comes, she will be one of the people 
who is wise enough to say: 'I'm off.' And I trust her to do that. (Maharey, 
interview, 1998) 
Judith Tizard also trusts that Clark would know the time to leave the leadership without 
external pressures. Although she cannot foresee such a situation ever arising, Tizard 
would not hesitate to vote against Clark if she became incapable of making the right 
judgement on her fate . 
... [she] will know when to go. So I can't imagine ever having to vote against her. 
I also can't imagine ever having to do what David Caygill had to do to Bill 
Rowling and say: 'It's time to go, Bill'. But if I did think it was time for her to 
go, I would tell her that. I hope it doesn't [come to that] because it would indicate 
that Helen had lost her grip on what's happening in the world. No, ... I can't ever 
imagine needing to vote against her. But what I have to say is if I thought there 
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was a dramatically better... leader for the party, and Helen was trying to hang on, 
yes, I would probably vote against her. But I would tell her I would do that. But 
as I say, I can't imagine it ever happening because the other thing is that Helen has 
a really good grasp of politics and knows the damage [her refusal to go might 
cause]. She has loye and passion for the party. (Tizard, interview, 1998) 
What has become clear, once again, from these statements is the loyalists' positive 
support based upon their profound knowledge of and trust in Clark as a person. Unless 
such trust was breached, their support would have continued. Of course, such a 
situation, by their admission, was highly unlikely to materialise. In other words, Clark 
could rely on her loyalists' support even during the most testing times. 
Uncommitted supporters 
Like the 1993 situation, the distinction between the two sub-groups - pragmatic 
supporters and waverers - existed in 1996. The first group comprised of Braybrooke 
and Lange, while the latter appeared to consist of Chris Carter, Philip Field, and Janet 
Mackey. Both groups' support reliability from Clark's viewpoint was less than that of 
loyalists; they at least had notable concerns over Clark's leadership and considered the 
potential merits/demerits of a leadership change, when Clark was challenged. However, 
notable differences between the two groups were found in terms of their rationale for 
taking positions and the support reliability. 
Pragmatic supporters 
This group of MPs decided to support Clark for either of the two following reasons. 
1) Antagonism towards the challenge 
Firstly, there was the feeling that the leadership challenge was ill-timed and poorly 
thought through. Braybrooke says that he opposed the potential coup because of the 
belief that such a move was 'wrong' (Braybrooke, interview, 1998). Apart from his 
growing respect and sympathy for Clark, this former Moore loyalist found the challenge 
disagreeable for the 'stupid' manner in which it was mounted. He was especially 
critical of the subtlety of the overall approach, which (together with the Clark 
supporters' leak to the media) eventually led to a public display of disunity: 
I mean if you are going to have a coup, then you have to organise one. Because 
you only normally get one hit, and they went about it all wrong way ... 
(Braybrooke, interview, 1998) 
2) The lack of acceptable alternative leaders 
The second reason was, in a sense, the reverse of the 1993 situation (see Chapter 5). At 
that time, the 1993 pragmatic Clark supporters' decision to vote for her was based upon 
the fact that she was 'the' alternative leader with best chance to beat Moore, whom they 
were keen to depose. This time, for Lange (one of the 1993 pragmatic supporters), there 
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were no acceptable candidates who could improve the situation to his liking. Therefore, 
while disillusioned with the party's lack of leftward policy shift under Clark's 
leadership, he had no other option but to adhere to the incumbent. When asked to 
explain the reason for his support for Clark in 1996, he bluntly says: 'There was no 
alternative' (Lange, 1999b). In his eyes, any candidate from the right/moderate 
including Moore would simply worsen the problem and thus was not a viable option. 
From the left/centre-left groups, although names such as Lianne Dalziel and Steve 
Maharey were often mentioned as potential leaders by the media (Clifton, 1995b; 
Speden, 1995), neither of them had built a sufficient support base within the caucus. 
More importantly, neither of them was interested in challenging Clark. 
Reliability of pragmatic support 
The support reliability of 1996 pragmatic supporters turned out to be, as in 1993, high. 
This was ironic considering that both Braybrooke and Lange had been two of the most 
vocal and frequent critics of the Clark leadership (see Chapter 6). Braybrooke's feeling 
against the potential leadership change was so strong that he states that he would not 
have provided support to any challenger including his old friend, Moore (Braybrooke, 
interview,1998). For Lange, no matter how frustrated he was, there was nobody else to 
change his support to. In short, their support for Clark was 'entrapped'. Although 
neither of those MPs shared the Clark loyalists' enthusiasm for her leadership, the 
leader could have relied upon their votes if the issue had been taken to a vote. 
Waverers 
On the other hand, waverers did not have strong pre-disposed opinions about the virtue 
of a leadership change or about potential alternative leaders. While they may have some 
inclinations towards either side, they were open towards suggestions and persuasions 
from both camps. For example, one MP admits that s/he thought 'there were some valid 
concerns about some of the things that were happening with Helen Clark's leadership' . 
However, after consulting with both sides, s/he 'didn't necessarily think that changing 
[the leader]. .. was a very constructive thing to do right before an election' (Anonymous, 
interview, 1998). 
If it had gone to the vote, I would have voted against it. I talked to both sides. I 
had lunch with one side one day, and lunch the other side the next day. But, no. 
When the numbers were down, my name would have been on Helen Clark's list. 
(Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
Although the number of MPs who belonged to this group was small, their support 
was crucial for Clark's survival for one simple reason: the Clark loyalists and pragmatic 
supporters did not constitute the majority in the caucus. So, what variables affected 
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decisions in Clark's favour? At least three 'external' factors seemed to influence their 
decisions. The first was the EPLP organisation and the pressure which it applied to the 
waverers. The second was the formal leadership selection procedure, and the third was 
the (unclear) identity of the alternative leaders. 
1) The party organisation support 
Strong loyalty to Clark existed in the EPLP. As the then President, Michael Hirschfeld 
noted: 'Helen's support was overwhelming in the party' (Hirschfeld, interview, 1998). 
Unlike when Moore's leadership came under pressure in 1993, the EPLP, especially its 
hierarchy stood firmly behind the incumbent. Although its power over the fate of the 
PLP leader was curtailed by the fact that it did not have a direct say in a vote, the 1996 
situation nevertheless clearly displayed its considerable influence over the Parliamentary 
representatives. Hirschfeld's view was that the pro-change group 'may have vastly 
underestimated the party's response'. He assesses the EPLP's influence in the 
following terms: 
I think it was quite significant. I think that some MPs got a very clear picture that 
members of the party did recognise just how damaging this division was to the 
party, and that the party members were prepared to take the chance [and stay with 
Clark] ... (Hirschfeld, interview, 1998) 
Moore admits that the pressure which the EPLP put on the pro-change MPs was a key 
factor in swaying support away from him. Asked why he thinks some of his colleagues 
allegedly changed their positions, he replies: 
Because they were scared of the attitude of the party hierarchy. That they 
wouldn't get selected in their seats, they wouldn't get on the list... they would be 
finished politically. (Moore, interview, 1998) 
However, one may raise the question: 'If the EPLP' s influence was so significant, 
why could it not persuade pro-change MPs to change their views?' 'Why did the 
EPLP's pressure not apply equally to all the MPs?' Hirschfeld explained that the party 
organisation's influence varied according to individual parliamentarians' circumstances 
such as: 
... How much people were locked into personal relationships, and how isolated 
people felt without party support... Simply their feeling of personal strength and 
worth and how much they relied on wider networks or [whether they] were part of 
close networks on either side in the debate. Those who were in the middle and a 
little isolated and unsure were the most easily moved. (Hirschfeld, interview, 
1998) 
Each MP's sensitivity to the EPLP's pressures was also affected by the 
characteristics of their electorates. As one MP notes, those without safe seats were more 
likely to be waverers. 
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I think a marginal MP was more likely to change their support, and say: 'I was 
wrong, I was wrong [about the 1993 leadership change]. Vote for me. I'm now 
going to support Mike Moore.' The pressure was much more. (Anonymous, 
interview, 1998) 
In some electorates, the local party members had quite different views from the party 
hierarchy on who should be the leader of the PLP. One staunch Moore supporter 
attests: 
In my electorate, local party members ... if they had been given a secret ballot, there 
is no doubt in my mind they would've overwhelmingly supported Mike Moore. 
No doubt in my mind. Most of the party hierarchy people who hold office, who 
represent affiliated unions in the party's Council and so on, they'd probably have 
stuck with Helen. But amongst the rank and file it is a different story. 
(Anonymous, interview, 1998) 
However, it was ultimately the public who would determine the MPs' fate311 at an 
election. After the five frontbenchers' approach to Clark was leaked to the media, some 
caucus members encountered a strong backlash from the public (Barker, interview, 
1998). 
It is not hard to assume that if both the local party organisation and the constituents 
expressed their unhappiness about another leadership change, they would be swayed 
against it. Conversely, if MPs felt their electoral fortune would improve by ignoring the 
messages from the party hierarchy, because neither the local party members nor voters 
were in favour of Clark, they would be more likely to back a new leader. 
2) The leadership selection procedure 
The caucus rules stipulated that in order to have a leadership change outside the regular 
leadership review, a notice needed to be given to the caucus at least one week in advance. 
Having fulfilled this condition, the caucus would vote on whether there would be a 
leadership vote. If such a motion was carried, then the caucus was to choose the next 
leader from available candidates. This procedure did work to the incumbent's 
advantage. 
As documented in Chapter 6, some of the pro-change MPs argue that despite their 
having failed to obtain sufficient support to clear the first hurdle - winning the motion on 
having a leadership vote - the result of the second vote would have been far from a 
foregone conclusion. While such an interpretation of the situation is strongly disputed 
3ll Jackson reported that although the number of challenges to incumbent politicians' candidacy by 
local party organisations has increased over the years in New Zealand, they are still rarely successful. 
'In the small, New Zealand style parliamentary system in particular, the candidate is regarded first and 
foremost as a committed member of a cohesive team supporting or opposed to the government, rather 
than as a local representative. As a result the candidate selection procedure tends to be heavily weighted 
towards incumbency' (Jackson, 1994: 269-270). 
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by other MPs from both sides (and it is impossible to verify either argument), those pro-
change MPs are adamant. 
If their view is correct, why were some caucus members reluctant to support the first 
vote, while being prepared to support an alternative leader in the second vote? One pro-
change MP says that some MPs 'would wait and see and then vote for the side, once 
they are certain who is going to win' (Anonymous, interview, 1998). Cullen adds that 
they are those who 'actually don't want to face the issue if they can avoid ie12 , (Cullen, 
interview, 1998). Further, he explains that if one was susceptible to the EPLP's pressure, 
slhe was more inclined to take this non-committal position . 
... there were a lot of people who knew that the party organisations weren't keen 
on change, even though they thought it was necessary. And therefore, by voting 
not to have a vote [and then support an alternative in the second vote], they'd [had] 
satisfied, if you like, both sides of their obligations. (Cullen, interview, 1998) 
What these points suggest is that if the first motion had been carried despite their 
vote against it, those MPs would have felt their obligation to the party organisation was 
fulfilled, and they would have felt free to cast their vote in any way they wished at the 
second vote. Logically, no Clark supporters should have supported the first motion as it 
would have put her leadership position at risk. Therefore, if the majority of the caucus 
had agreed to have a vote on the leadership, that would have indicated that Clark did not 
command sufficient support among her colleagues. Although whether any alternative 
candidate could have secured more numbers than Clark would have (assuming that she 
would have stood for the second vote) in the leadership contest is speculative, if the tide 
of support was moving away from the incumbent, why should waverers have stayed with 
the losing side? 
When Moore was challenged in 1993, not enough MPs were willing to vote for a 
leadership vote, either. But, when the first motion was unexpectedly seconded by Moore 
himself, the majority of the Labour caucus decided to support Clark. While it is still 
debatable whether the situation was the same in 1996, it appears quite plausible that 
Labour's leadership 'two-step' voting procedure inherently favours the incumbent by 
deterring waverers who were wary of a backlash from the EPLP (and probably the 
public as well) for supporting a leadership change. 
3) The alternative leaders 
The issues related to the alternative leaders worked to Clark's advantage not only 
amongst a pragmatic supporter (Lange) but also waverers. There were two problems for 
the pro-change group in persuading the latter group to come their way. 
312 Moore is far less charitable in describing the same group of his colleagues. '[Y]ou've got to 
realise you are dealing with a lot of weak, cowardly people' (Moore, interview, 1998). 
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First, there was no firm confirmation of the candidacy of the alternative leader. 
Although throughout the leadership crisis, all the other possible candidates such as 
Cullen, King, Goff, and Sutton were all dismissive of their own candidacy (Laugesen, 
1996b), rumours about the identity of the alternative continued to circulate. As 
described in Chapter 6, this lack of clarity seriously undermined the credibility of the 
pro-change group. 
If there was no unified candidate, the waverers could be vulnerable to persuasion by 
the Clark supporters to stay with her. After all, if the pro-change MPs could not agree 
on who should replace the incumbent, how could it be possible to guarantee that the 
situation would improve under the new leader? For example, Maharey remembers how 
he defended Clark. 
I didn't defend her by saying: 'Look. She's wonderful. She's fantastic. She's 
marvellous.' Ijust said to them: 'Look. We're seventeen or twenty weeks away 
from the election. Who have you got that's better than her [sic]? How do you 
think you would install [hirnlher] in the caucus and get that person positioned in 
the public's mind?' And 'Why do you think he [or she] is better than she [Clark] 
is?' And they couldn't tell me who the alternative was. They had no plan as to 
how they would make it acceptable to change the leader so close to an election. 
And they couldn't identify the attributes that they thought any prospective 
candidate might have. And I said to them: 'Well, game set and match, isn't it? 
What are you asking this caucus to do? You are coming along ... asking her to 
step aside for an unknown leader, who has no plan. And you can't even define 
what it is that you think would make a difference as well ... My position is that I 
don't do it.' (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
Second, as Lange did, some MPs found the candidacy of the most likely alternative, 
Moore, unacceptable. Those MPs had corne to the view by May/June 1996 that he was 
unsuitable to lead the party again, due to his behaviour following the loss of his 
leadership. Besides, returning to the old leader who had been openly rejected by the 
majority of his colleagues could have let the party become a target of public ridicule. In 
that case, the party's credibility - let alone its electoral chances - could have been 
irreversibly damaged (Maharey, interview, 1998). One of the waverers agreed with this 
view . 
... in my opinion it is absurd to go back to him. I always felt it absolutely absurd 
when some of them said 'We've changed our mind yet again, I'm now going 
back to what we had'. There is no credibility down that path at all. (Anonymous, 
interview, 1998) 
In the end, the waverers decided to retain their support for Clark. The above MP' s 
conclusion was 'that Helen Clark would perform magnificently in an election. She's 
more intelligent, more articulate, and better informed than any other political leader' 
(Anonymous, interview, 1998). 
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Reliability of wavering support 
As in 1993, the 1996 waverers' support for Clark was not certain. Although each MP's 
support reliability may have varied, in general, this group's position was more flexible 
than that of loyalists or pragmatic supporters. If some of the above factors had been 
different, it is quite possible that their support might have been placed elsewhere. 
How did Clark succeed and fail in satisfying the expectations and eradicating 
the concerns? 
Success 
Clark's survival in 1996 was due to her success in retaining the majority of her 1993 
supporters and converting some pragmatic supporters. This, in tum, was accomplished 
through meeting their expectations. At the same time, she had no success in converting 
her 1993 opponents into her supporters or consolidating some uncommitted supporters' 
positions. In Chapter 5, the reasons why Moore failed to satisfy the expectations and 
alleviate the concerns after the 1990 election were examined. It is worthwhile to study 
briefly the reasons for her success. A comparison to Moore offers a useful perspective. 
Clark had had two advantages over her predecessor in terms of the nature of the 
given expectations: stability and suitability. Moore was elected by electorally threatened, 
panic stricken MPs313 only a few weeks before the 1990 election with one specific task -
to minimise Labour's inevitable election defeat. When the election was over, Moore was 
given a new set of expectations by the new caucus, a significant minority (24.14%) of 
which was not involved in his selection in 1990. As discussed in Chapter 5, those new 
tasks, however, required different skills and attributes from those for which he was 
elected as the leader. As a result, Moore struggled with the tasks, and ultimately was 
seen by his supporters as having failed. 
Unlike Moore, Clark was chosen by her supporters to lead the party for the 
following three years (and beyond), by the caucus which would spend the entire term 
with her. This gave Clark the lUXUry which her predecessor did not have - the stability 
of the followers' expectations (as well as the stability of the support composition). 
Although the 1993 Clark supporters' expectations.ciid change, at least for some MPs -
as the 1996 election came closer, the importance of winning it increased - such a change 
was minor in comparison to what Moore experienced. Also, the circumstances in which 
she was chosen allowed Clark's general suitability as the leader in a wider context to 
come into consideration in the alternative candidate selection process. When a 
leadership coup occurred in 1993, the pro-change group's concerns were directly linked 
to Moore's perceived leadership problems. The anti-Moore MPs' concerns later 
313 For instance, Clark commented on the 1990 leadership change: 'The only thing I regret is being 
part of the moral panic at the end of 1990. I think I was panicked - everybody was - and that's not like 
me.' (Chisholm, 1995: Cl) 
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transfonned into expectations from a new leader. They looked for a person who could 
provide better leadership and establish Labour's new identity as a centre-left PaIty, 
which was expected to bring Labour an election victory in 1996. Clark emerged as the 
alternative candidate spedfically because she was regarded by this group as best 
equipped to meet those expectations. In other words, there was a strong match between 
her and the given task from the beginning. 
a) Ideological beliefs 
It is much easier for a leader to pursue policy directions if s/he believes in them. This 
was a case for Clark during the 1993~ 1996 period. As already noted, her stance on 
some issues such as economic policy had become more conservative during her 
parliamentary years, she was not seen by her supporters as someone without principles. 
In one journalist's words, she was ' ... pragmatic but principled: someone prepared to 
shift ground, not stance, in the face of certain irreversible realities' (Welch, 1990: 16). 
In 1988, Clark stressed: 'I think my basic value structures which were set in the late 60s 
are still pretty much intact' (Legat, 1988: 90). As a long time, self-confessed social 
democrat (Legat, 1988: 92), through the parliamentary years, she had upheld a belief in 
accessible state services in housing and health as well as support for minority rights314 . 
To further Clark's advantage, by the time she became the leader in 1993, her policy 
views were actually in tune with the direction which the majority of her supporters and 
opponents hoped for. In other words, there was a powerful congruence between that 
and Clark's own view of the necessary policy shift. Maryan Street describes Clark's 
own stance in 1993 in the following tenns: 
She certainly wanted Labour to be clearer than it was. I don't think she wanted a 
radical leftward policy shift. I certainly think she wanted a distinctively leftward 
policy shift, but not a radical one. . .. This is not overthrowing the mechanism of 
capitalism stuff. This is a distinctive left of centre shift that she wanted when 
Mike had very much moved towards the centre in a way that made us 
indistinguishable from anybody else, really .... And of course MMP required that 
we be a lot clearer as well. And it certainly gave those people who didn't fit us the 
opportunity to go away and start something of their own. But I think she certainly 
wanted to clarify the position, she did want to move to a different place from where 
we had got to during the 93 election campaign which was insecure... (Street, 
interview, 1999) 
Richard Northey further attests: 'From what I heard her advocating at caucus and 
caucus committees, she has got most of what she publicly advocated for'. He further 
adds that he cannot recall any occasion on which her proposal for policy was rejected by 
the caucus during the period (Northey, interview, 1998). Indeed, after the 1996 election, 
Clark expressed her satisfaction with Labour's policy achievement under her own 
guidance. She told a journalist that she thought Labour's policies presented in the 1996 
314 For her maiden speech, see NZPD, vol. 443: 560-564. 
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election manifesto were 'about right' and that there would be little room for any big 
policy alterations (Wilson, 1997). 
b) Skills 
The key to Clark's success in delivering better leadership for caucus unity was her 
'inclusive' leadership. Unlike Moore, his successor did not need to hastily adopt a 
leadership style and skills in response to newly imposed expectations and concerns of 
which she had been a long-time advocate and employer. In 1989, she said: 'I felt a 
greater good comes from people trying to work together, rather than a solo act which 
might be gratifying to one's ego but doesn't advance the total cause a great deal'. She 
also said: 'Every person who was honest about their role in any political party would 
say the same: you give up a lot of what you would do as an individual if you accept the 
discipline of working within a system' (Clark, 1989: WI). 
At the same time, Clark's thoroughness, unquestionable intelligence (which many of 
her supporters have already mentioned), and clinically analytical skills all suited her role 
in identifying the party's policy problems and leading the subsequent delicate policy 
refining process. On her meticulous nature, she once described her working style: 
I take the view that no stone must be left unturned. And the time you didn't check 
something goes wrong. So I certainly won't be changing my style of work 
(Cocker, 1989: 35). 
With regard to Clark's analytical inclinations, Judith Tizard recalled breaking the 
news about her cancer to her old friend during the 1993 election campaign. After 
bursting into tears and giving her a hug, Clark quickly regained her composure and 
asked Tizard about the type of cancer she was diagnosed with. Then she asked: 'How 
much information do you need?' with an offer to do a literature search. Tizard attested: 
'Helen's response is to analyse it' (Chisholm, 1995: C2). 
c) Personality 
For steady handling of policy and caucus matters, the anti-Moore group recognised his 
personality as a major obstacle. Instead of his flamboyancy and erratic style, they 
sought a more sombre character in the new leadership. Clark was regarded as highly 
reliable. As she herself more recently said: 'You don't get unpredictable things from 
me. I'm very predictable'. 'It's important to signal your direction clearly' (Main, 
1998b). Also, it had been known to her supporters prior to her becoming the leader that 
she was an inclusive, consensus seeker. In 1989, Clark commented: 'It's very important 
to be engaged in coalition and consensus building, and I've put a lot of effort into that' 
(Myers, 1989: 3). 
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What also helped Clark meet her supporters' expectations was her distaste for 
egocentric leadership. While ambitious315 and confident, she did not view the leadership 
as the end in itself: 
I've observed a number of people in all walks of life fight like crazy to get a 
leadership position without knowing what on earth they want to do with it. That's 
why they disappoint when they get there. 
I am a leader because I have a positive agenda. I am task-oriented and issue-
oriented. I am not interested in position for position's sake. I am not interested in 
riding roughshod over others to prove who has the most power. Negative 
leadership hurts everyone and there's been too much of it in this country. (H. 
Clark, 1996). 
Clark was known as a team player, willing to observe the majority decisions even 
when she did not personally agree with them. 
Over the years I've come to realise that you'll never get entirely your own way if 
you work within a system ... one could have a wonderfully pure political party with 
only three people in it. But when you accept membership of a major political 
party, you accept a certain discipline, and that means that there'll be decisions 
made that you may not particularly like but you'll have the opportunity to be part 
of making other decisions that you greatly want to see made (Legat, 1988: 82). 
Failure 
Clark's failure to eradicate the concerns and meet some of the expectations may be 
explained by the following factors or a combination of them. 
a) Personality 
Clark's personality seemed both to assist but also work against her in meeting some of 
the expectations. The crucial element here was (as was in Moore's case) the leader's 
self-confidence. As already noted, Clark's competence was never challenged. Clark 
once said: 'No-one has ever attacked me on grounds of ability, because I don't think 
they could'(Myers, 1986: 164). 
Naturally, she had a healthy self-esteem regarding her abilities, skills, and judgement. 
High self-esteem and confidence in your own ability is very important. I maintain 
self-esteem by having absolute confidence in my ability to do a good job. (Light, 
1998: 21) 
The high level of self-confidence and competence caused Clark to fail to acknowledge 
and appreciate those with lesser and different abilities. It appeared that Clark built her 
expectations of others upon her own competence and areas of strengths, and some 
people feel that this prevented her from being truly inclusive. Her approach was, in 
Tizard's words: 'Basically, Helen's door is always open if you've done your work' 
315 In 1986, she said: 'I'm ambitious, yes. I wouldn't be in this job if I wasn't. But I would never 
put everything else aside for the sake of personal ambition' (Myers, 1986: 175). 
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(Tizard, interview, 1998). Not many caucus members shared her competence in the 
areas which she valued, and as a consequence, she naturally found many of her fellow 
caucus members' work wanting. 
A former Party President, Michael Hirschfeld, agreed that Clark's own abilities 
prevented her from appreciating others' efforts or their need for assistance when they 
struggled. 
I think it's fair to say that because she has her own standards, she doesn't 
[always] find it easy. ... to work with those who don't match her own standards ... I 
think there has been a constant problem for her to successfully team-build by 
getting people [recognition] ... even if their work might not be up to the standards 
of hers ... Her own standards have not made it easy for her to be as inclusive as, I 
think, she would want to be, to be a fully effective leader. 
In my view, people work well when their work is appreciated. There is no point in 
appreciating work that is below people's actual ability to deliver. But providing 
[that] people are delivering up to their ability, then I think people need 
encouragement. . And I'm not sure that she's been able to get all the members of 
her team able to do the work level because ... she has greater skills than many of 
them ... (Hirschfeld, interview, 1998) 
Her self-confidence, together with a strong desire to ensure certain outcomes316 made 
her known for being 'intense', 'demanding' (Clifton, 1996d) as well as impatient with 
those who did not meet her expectations317. On the latter, she once confessed: 
I can't stand incompetence. I can't stand people who can't spell, who can't add 
up ... I'm very intolerant of incompetence and I don't see why I should have to put 
up with it. (Smith, 1994) 
The same personal characteristics seemed to be responsible for her being 
'notoriously bad at delegating work'318 (Clifton, 1996d) as well as for her heavy 
reliance on a small number of people with similar skills (such as those of logical 
analysis), while disregarding those with different talents (such as a 'populist instinct'). 
If one's self-esteem is based upon appreciation of hislher own skills and abilities, it may 
316 An example of Clark's inclination is her decision to remove under-performing Lianne Dalziel, one 
of her supporters, from the health spokespersonship on 8 August 1997. Although the decision was 
explained as being made at Dalziel's request, Clark's concern about Labour's performance in the health 
area - one of her former Cabinet responsibilities - had been obvious for sometime. On 15 August 
1996, Clark decided to take over the 'Let's fix health' campaign from Dalziel. 
317 This tendency was demonstrated by her open criticisms of three of her own Cabinet Ministers, 
Margaret Wilson, Marian Hobbs, and Dover Samuels over their performance (see Laugesen, 2000). 
Also indicative was her frustration, expressed after the dismissal of Samuels in late June 2000 over 
allegations against his past behaviour. Challenging Labour's long standing convention of Cabinet 
selection through caucus votes, she complained: 'As the leader of the Labour Party I would much prefer 
to have the National Party's rules [which allow Prime Ministers to select their own Cabinet Ministers] 
because it is a real limitation when you cannot select your board... It is very difficult for leaders to not 
be able to select a team' (Venter, 2000). 
318 Clark herself admitted to this problem in 1994. 'What I have to learn is that you can't do it all 
yourself, you have to delegate' (Nichol, 1994). 
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not be surprising if that person gives special preference to those with similar attributes in 
selecting trusted allies. 
b. Conflicting expectations/concerns 
As documented in Chapter 7, there existed irreconcilable conflicts within the 
expectations and concerns over Labour's policy shift upon Clark's selection. It was 
simply impossible for any leader to satisfy all MPs under those circumstances. 
c. Skills and beliefs 
Clark's lack of the necessary skills and beliefs was most evident in relation to the 
elective expectation/concern. As already pointed out by her opponents elsewhere, she 
lacked the essential ingredient to become a popular leader - charisma319 . Although 
politically astute and skilful, Clark did not have Moore's skills to establish an instant 
emotional linkage with general voters. 
At the same time, as her constant refuting of charismatic leadership indicated, she did 
not regard gaining personal popUlarity as important and felt uneasy about self-
promotion320. For instance, she stated in 1995: 'It [personal popularity] doesn't 
particularly interest me; being respected for being able to do the job does interest me'. 
'I am quite comfortable with myself and what I won't do is change myself to something 
I'm not to meet other people's expectations' (Chisholm, 1995: C1). 
d. Limited resources 
Another factor which may have affected Clark's performance in terms of the unity 
expectation was the limited resources available to Clark. With regard to some 
newcomers' complaints about Clark's lack of encouragement and personal support, 
Goff defends his leader citing her scarce time resource, the result of a heavy workload as 
the leader of a major party: 
... it [the Leader of the Opposition] is a really hard, really demanding job with too 
few resources in order for you to be able to compete effectively with the 
319 Colin James noted: ' ... if there is to be vision and transformation, charisma is a necessary 
ingredient of leadership' (1998: 28). On Clark, the same author described her as 'not charismatic'. 
(1998: 30) 
320 Despite these comments and her criticism of the media for focusing on women politicians' 
appearance, she later softened her attitudes towards the issue. She appeared in different forms of the 
media, one of which was a woman's magazine (in which she did the 'fashion spread'). She recalled her 
experience fondly: '1 loved doing it ... It's like dressing-up. What do little girls do, after all? They dress 
up, don't they? No, I'm quite relaxed about all that' (Clifton, 1997c: 17). Nevertheless, she still 
seems to retain the view that it is policies, not the leader's image, which decides an election result. In 
July 1998 at the height of the popularity of Jenny Shipley, the first female Prime Minister, who 
replaced Jim Bolger in November 1997, Clark asserted: 'It doesn't matter how much personal charm 
Mrs Shipley may try to exude, no matter how well presented she looks, if she is offering a product that 
fundamentally people do not want, then it doesn't mean anything' (Rentoul, 1998). 
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Government. I make that point simply because Helen and any Leader of the 
Opposition is going to be pre-occupied with demands on them, and maybe not 
able to give collegial support that a person who is struggling feels they might 
deserve. But there's a hard world out there, and you are thrown in the deep end 
and you either swim or you sink. And I'm not sure that you could constantly rely 
on your party leader to keep throwing you a life raft if you are not swimming. 
You are there presumably because you can do your job and if there wasn't a 
strong enough relationship along the way there, then maybe the fault was on both 
sides of the people making the criticism. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
Another veteran politician, Caygill, also suggests that the problem of a heavy reliance 
on a small number of MPs and advisers was linked to her limited resources in terms of 
time and trustworthy allies. 
Well, I think much of that [criticism] is true. But I also think that it's not the least 
bit unusual. You could say exactly the same of David Lange. People certainly 
made that complaint of Norman Kirk. I suspect that they think the same of 
[National leaders] Jenny Shipley and thought the same of Jim Bolger. The truth 
is that the leader of a party is very busy. It is lonely at the top in the sense that 
there are not a lot of people who you can readily confide in. All sorts of things 
happen that you can't share widely with other people. (Caygill, interview, 1998) 
e. Clark's limited control over realisation of the elective expectation 
Clark's opponents and wavering supporters alike used the opinion poll ratings as a 
gauge of her ability to win an election. The problem for Clark was that she had no direct 
control over the poll results. As noted in the previous chapter, a series of her efforts to 
improve her personal (and eventually the party's) popUlarity were in vain. Those 
failures were at least partially due to Clark's lack of skills and personality. Moreover, 
many variables which were likely to influence public perceptions of the party and leader 
such as the media treatment, the state of economy, the performance of other political 
parties were beyond Clark's control. 
f. Followers' susceptibility to changes 
Clark's failure to convert many of her 1993 opponents was due to her failure to 
popularise the party and herself. However, even if she had been successful at this task, 
there was a question mark over the extent to which they might have changed their 
stances towards their embattled leader. For her opponents, first and foremost the leader 
had to possess the ability to win an election. Although they mostly regarded Clark's 
general leadership skills positively, those matters were secondary concerns to them 
nevertheless. The only way that Clark could have won their support was to raise the 
party's (and her own) popUlarity. Nothing else could have achieved that conversion. 
Therefore, even if she had managed to tum those 1993 opponents into her supporters, 
she could not have relaxed. Those MPs would still have continued to base their 
judgement of her worthiness on the poll results. The best Clark could have hoped for 
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was them becoming uncommitted supporters. Positive support would have not be 
forthcoming from this group. 
Conclusion 
In analysing Clark's support compositions of 1993 and 1996, this chapter has again 
verified the key hypotheses of the study. Included is the proposition that changes and 
non-changes of leaders' support compositions can be explained through the leader's 
success/failure at: a) meeting his/her followers' expectations and b) dealing with her/his 
opponents' concerns. 
Clark's failure to expand her support base after 1993 has been attributed to the fact 
that a) she failed to eradicate the general concern over her perceived inability to 
popularise the party; and b) therefore she could not satisfy some of the 1993 
uncommitted supporters. With regard to her 1993 opponents, dissatisfaction persisted 
despite her success in eliminating the other concerns through careful and prudent 
leadership. While these efforts were accepted and appreciated by the majority of her 
opponents, her failure to allay the crucial concern led them to believe that another 
leadership change was the only solution to their diminishing electoral fortune. 
In the meantime, two groups of the 1993 uncommitted supporters felt their 
expectations had been unfulfilled by Clark's leadership. The first group, a few left-wing 
caucus members, found both Clark's generous treatment of her 1993 opponents 
(especially those with moderate/right-wing views) and Labour's moderate policy 
changes disappointing. The second group, consisting of the newer intakes, realised that 
Clark's leadership style was different from their ideal image. They also became 
increasingly impatient with Clark's lack of success in raising the party's popUlarity. 
In contrast, the assessment of Clark's leadership was quite different among her 
loyalists. In their views, the leader had largely satisfied their expectations. Clark had 
provided a reliable, fair, and cohesive leadership style, replacing Moore's problematic 
leadership. Similarly, she carefully led the re-fashioning process of Labour's policies 
and identity. Clearer and more detailed policies, as well as a more pronounced centre-
left identity, were produced as a consequence. With regard to the expectation of 
winning the 1996 election, as professional politicians, they were naturally concerned 
about the opinion polls. However, they adhered to the view that Clark was the best 
leader for the party. They attributed the party's popUlarity problem to other factors and 
rejected the idea of replacing her as a solution to the problem. In their views, it was 
premature to make a judgement on Clark's ability to deliver on this expectation while 
there were still several more months to go before the election. 
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The importance of the original support composition 
While Clark's leadership was constantly subjected to media speculation on her future as 
well as criticisms from some caucus members (mostly loyal Moore supporters), she 
nevertheless survived the serious challenge in 1996. 
It appears that one of the crucial factors in her survival was her support compositions, 
which were characterised by a large proportion of loyalists among her supporters. In 
1993, fifteen MPs with positive support for the new leader constituted exactly one third 
of the whole caucus of 45. When Clark was challenged in May/June 1996, the number 
of her loyalists grew to 18, increasing its proportion to 43.90% of the then smaller 
caucus (after the defections of four Moore supporters) of 41. Although eighteen 
members were still short of the outright majority, they provided a strong base from 
which the troubled leader could defend her position. To win the numbers, the Clark 
camp needed to secure only four more votes. Such a small number enabled them to 
concentrate their lobbying and resources effectively on those who were most susceptible 
to their persuasion. 
Clark's success in retaining her loyalists resonated a similar success by Moore 
during the 1990 and 1993 period. This high reliability of the loyalists' support for 
Clark was not surprising. The Clark loyalists, like their Moore counterparts, formed 
their strong support based upon their understanding and sufficient knowledge of the 
leader as an individual. Trust and faith in her were also commonly shared within this 
group. They knew what she was capable of, and therefore their expectations of her were 
realistic and likely to be fulfilled. 
Moreover, this chapter has indicated that even when loyalists' original expectations 
were at variance with a leader's intentions, slhe can avoid loyalists' disappointment by 
altering their original expectations to suit herlhis action. Upon her election, some of 
Clark's loyalists on the left expected a marked policy shift to the left under her 
leadership. Quickly realising the impossibility of meeting that expectation, she 
persuaded those loyalists to change their positions to accommodate the political reality 
in which she had to operate. The effect of such a change should not be underestimated. 
The resultant policy shift, which fell short of their original expectations, was perceived 
by this group as a success and meeting their 'new' expectations. It is hard to imagine 
any other group but her loyalists so willingly changing their expectations so that the 
leader's action could be perceived favourably. It appears that their profound trust in her 
and strong desire to see her succeed allowed Clark to modify their viewpoints. 
This finding has an interesting implication for the study. It has become obvious that 
loyalists' support is highly reliable, as predicted in Chapter 2. However, what has not 
been accurately predicted was the nature of the relationship between a leader and 
loyalists. Clark's case study has demonstrated that it is not a zero-sum relationship; 
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when leaders fail to realise their loyalists' expectations in the complete, original form, 
the loyalists' support would not instantly diminish. Also, Clark's loyalists' response to 
Labour's popularity problem suggests that when the leader struggles to meet their 
expectations, loyalists may ascribe the blame to somewhere else. In addition, the 
conditions that they suggested for halting their support for Clark - such as radical 
personality change - were extremely unlikely to materialise. These findings all indicate 
that loyalists' positive support is even more reliable than originally assumed. 
In contrast, Clark's uncommitted supporters' support has been documented as less 
reliable. This can be explained for several reasons. Firstly, as their support was not 
based upon personal faith in Clark as a person (unlike loyalists' positive support), the 
uncommitted supporters were less forgiving when Clark's performance fell short of 
their original expectations. Lange's refusal to accept Clark's argument that caucus 
unity should be given priority over ideological purity was a case in point. Unlike his 
loyalist colleagues, he did not have a particular desire to ensure Clark's survival as the 
leader. If somebody else could have produced a better policy result, s/he would have 
gained Lange's support without hesitation. 
Secondly, the MPs who remained non-loyal supporters or became Clark opponents 
during the 1993-1996 period contained a high proportion of the 1993 new intake. This 
did not seem to be a mere coincidence. The new intake did not possess much in-depth 
knowledge of Clark as a parliamentarian when they were forced to choose their future 
leader in December 1993. Without such information, they may have formed unrealistic 
expectations which had little correspondence with Clark's personality and strengths. 
Similarly, those parliamentary novices were unfamiliar with the dynamics of politics, 
which might shape one's view of the necessary skills for a leader. If this was the case, 
their subsequent experiences in Parliament may have altered their ideal image 
(prototype) of the leader and thus their preferred person for the job. 
Although the Clark case study has confirmed uncommitted supporters' less reliable 
status in comparison to loyalists it has also documented the inadequacy of one 
classification for this group suggested in the previous chapter. It has been suggested 
that there were actually two groups, distinguishable according to the levels of support 
reliability, in this category. In order to reflect this reality, this chapter again has sub-
categorised uncommitted supporters into waverers (with wavering support) and 
pragmatic supporters (with pragmatic support). 
The former group was genuinely uncertain about which leadership candidate they 
should support. The factors that influenced those MPs in Clark's favour were: a) the 
EPLP's pressure; b) Labour's formal leadership selection procedure, and: c) the 
(unclear) identity of the alternative leader. Without them, their support could have gone 
either way. On the other hand, the stance of pragmatic supporters in 1993 and 1996 was 
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unambiguous. On both occasions, they supported Clark. Their decision was due to 
either the lack of other acceptable alternative leaders or the feelings against the 
leadership change itself. In this 'entrapped' situation, unlike waverers, their support for 
Clark was unintentionally reliable from Clark's point of view. 
All the above findings underline the importance of the initial support composition for 
new leaders. The higher the proportion of loyalists in the caucus, the less vulnerable the 
leaders' future will be. Conversely, if leaders obtain the top position based upon 
support from uncommitted supporters (especially waverers), vulnerability will increase. 
Needless to say, the leadership vulnerability increases with the number of opponents in 
the caucus. The importance of the original support composition is heightened even 
further by the difficulty of converting uncommitted supporters and opponents into 
supporters. Despite Clark's conscious effort to prove her worthiness, her success 
between 1993 and 1996 was restricted to converting three new loyalists (from being 
pragmatic supporters) and one pragmatic supporter (from being an opponent). 
The leader's ability to win an election 
This chapter has also re-confirmed the importance of the ability to win an election for a 
Labour leader. The force behind the five frontbenchers' approach and the subsequent 
scramble was their concern over the potential loss of the 1996 election. In this sense, the 
1996 situation was similar to Labour's leadership changes in 1966 (Nordmeyer to 
Kirk), 1983 (Rowling to Lange), and 1990 (Palmer to Moore), at which the unpopular 
incumbents were replaced by more popular alternatives. For example, Caygilllikens the 
1996 situation to that of 1990: 
I think what happened in 1996 was quite similar to what happened at the end of 
1990. We were coming up to an election and people were concerned about the 
possibility that the Labour Party might lose again. I think after some very intense 
lobbying, people ... some people were persuaded that Mike [Moore] or perhaps 
Michael Cullen would do better than Helen. (Caygill, interview 1998) 
In relation to the importance of the leader's ability to win an election, two points need 
to be mentioned. Firstly, it appears that the caucus members' leadership selection criteria 
were not uniform. Those who were in favour of a leadership change saw installation of 
a popular leader as the key to arresting the party's popularity decline. They accordingly 
used a candidate's (potential) personal popUlarity as a (or 'the') primary selection 
yardstick. This was evident in Moore's re-emergence as an alternative leader. While 
his shortcomings as a possible leader had been well exposed through his ill-disciplined 
behaviour after his dumping, his supporters were either prepared to overlook or not be 
particularly concerned about them. 
At the same time, a small group of MPs who were in support of a leadership change 
such as Annette King, thought that other leadership qualities should not be ignored. 
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Unlike the Moore supporters, they regarded Moore as unsuitable for re-gaining the top 
job. While this group retained popular appeal as the most important leadership selection 
criterion, other factors obviously carried some weight for them. 
Other leadership selection criteria were even more important to the Clark loyalists. In 
their minds, other 'intra-caucus' leadership qualities such as articulation of policies, fair 
personnel management, reliability, and inclusiveness were not secondary matters in 
leadership selection. They believed that Labour could win only with sound policies 
(which reflected 'true Labour values') and their accurate and unambiguous 
representation, which were achievable only by a leader with those 'intra-caucus' 
qualities. If led by a leader without those attributes, the party would look erratic, 
inconsistent, and lack a clear identity. According to the Clar15.loyalists' assessment, they 
would simply erode public confidence in the party, ultimately costing Labour's election 
chances. Perhaps it was not surprising that the Clark loyalists attributed the cause of 
Labour's election loss in 1993 to the then leader, Moore, who lacked those 'intra-
caucus' leadership attributes. For those MPs, the 'extra-caucus' qualities such as 
charisma and public appeal were at best desirable pluses but by no means were the 
substitute for the 'intra-caucus' qualities. 
The varying of the leadership selection criteria in the caucus was not new. Although 
he did not have the majority, Rowling enjoyed solid support from a number of the 
caucus members when he accepted the inevitability of his defeat and agreed to renounce 
the leadership. Similarly, the majority of caucus members were reportedly behind 
Palmer when he decided to vacate the top position without proving his strength in a 
caucus vote. Clark's victory in 1996 was further evidence that personal popularity alone 
cannot guarantee hislher success. To be a leader, slhe needs to prove to the caucus that 
there is more that slhe can offer in the top position. 
Secondly, despite the variety of leadership selection criteria, the ability to win an 
election is still important to all caucus members. The 1996 Clark loyalists were not 
oblivious to the likely fate of themselves and the party at the coming General Election. 
Their desire to win the election and preserve their seats was as strong as that of their 
colleagues with different views on Clark's leadership. The difference between the 
loyalists and the other caucus members was the former's absolute faith in Clark and her 
abilities, even in the face of a serious popularity crisis. Although it might have seemed 
to others that supporting Clark would be electorally suicidal, the uniformly shared view 
in this group was that the party would fare best at the election under her guidance. In 
other words, the Clark loyalists and her opponents were divided over the opinion as to 
who could maximise Labour's electoral fortune, not over the importance of winning an 
election. There is no evidence to suggest that the Clark loyalists thought that the party 
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would lose the coming election, or wondered whether the party would perfonn better 
under somebody else's leadership. 
The analysis of Clark's success in retaining the leadership has produced interesting, 
and sometimes unexpected, results. With the two case studies having been concluded, 
the remaining task of the study is to examine the overall validity of the propositions 
against the findings. 
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Introduction 
CHAPTER 9 
Conclusion 
The two case studies of the durability of the New Zealand Labour Party leaders have 
produced a mixed verdict for the validity of the study's original three propositions. 
While the findings have supported their general thrust, the need for altering some of the 
assumptions has also been made clear. Before wider implications of the study's 
findings are discussed, first the overall validity of the original propositions is examined. 
Support and supporters types 
The first proposition was regarding the types of support and positions adopted towards 
leaders in Labour caucuses. To win the leadership, a successful candidate in the PLP 
has to secure a majority in a caucus vote. Unless the leader is selected unanimously, the 
selectorate (caucus members) can always be divided into two groups - supporters and 
opponents. However, supporters are not uniform in terms of the strength of their 
support for the leader. 
Pl There are two degrees of quality of support (positive and non-committal) for a 
political leader. The selectorate, however, can be classified into three groups 
according to their positions towards the leader (loyalists-holders of positive 
support, uncommitted supporters-holders of non-committal support, and 
opponents). 
Positive support and loyalists 
The analysis of the supporters of Moore and Clark has revealed that there was indeed a 
group of caucus members who were distinguishable from the others for their positive 
support for the leaders. To further confirm the assumptions of the study, positive 
support was akin to personal loyalty to the leaders as individuals. The support was 
formed based upon the supporters' profound knowledge and understanding of the 
leaders. To possess such information, supporters needed to have a reasonable level of 
pre-exposure to the leaders before they assumed the loyalist status. For this reason, 
when Moore and Clark became the leaders, most of their loyalists were those who had 
known them for a reasonable length of time either as caucus colleagues or party 
officials/members321 • 
321 The amount of knowledge necessary for forming positive support appears to be subjective, 
depending upon individuals. This is tantamount to asking people: 'How much do you need to know 
about someone before you trust them?' Although as a general rule, it requires substantial exposure to 
the leader before one becomes his/her loyalist, exactly how much information one requires varies 
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There are other features commonly shared among the loyalists. Trust in the leaders 
at the personal level is one. Also, although not universal, some policy inclinations and 
worldviews are an underlying feature of some loyalists. The Moore loyalists were 
characterised by their gehder (male) and conservatism on social as well as economic 
issues. The Clark loyalists, on the other hand, were equipped with liberal views on 
social matters. Although not exclusive - with David Caygill as a notable exception - the 
majority of them were also critical of some of the economic reforms implemented by the 
fourth Labour Government. The Clark loyalists were also heavily drawn from the 
newer, 1990 and 1993 intakes. Overall, a leaders' match with supporters' ideal leader 
image (prototype) is universally high amongst the loyalists. 
Different relationship between the leaders and their loyalists 
It is important to note that loyalists do not have a uniform relationship with the leaders. 
On the contrary, the leaders and followers can have various relationship dynamics. For 
example, a comparison between Moore and Clark's loyalists reveals an interesting 
difference. 
The term 'loyalist' may imply uncritical allegiance to the leader. Nevertheless, 
Clark's example showed otherwise. Although loyalty requires profound and 
unwavering support for the leader - which was evident in both Clark and Moore loyalists 
- that support can take various forms. Moore's loyalists were generally seen as 'yes 
men'. On the other hand, some Clark loyalists like Steve Maharey and Judith Tizard 
boasted about being critical of some of her decisions and actions albeit constructively322. 
It was clear that their criticism was motivated by their desire to see her succeed. 
Maharey interestingly justified his actions as 'his earned prerogative' after his 
considerable emotional investment in the struggling leader by promoting and defending 
her (Chapter 8). 
greatly among MPs. Jill White, for example, admitted to her limited experience with Clark prior to 
entering Parliament. However, during that short period of time, the new MP quickly established strong 
trust in Clark, which she maintained throughout her political career until her resignation from 
Parliament in 1998. (White was elected as Mayor of Palmers ton North.) In contrast, some of her other 
colleagues needed more convincing. For instance, Maharey, despite his three years as Clark's caucus 
colleague, was not her loyalist in 1993. Perhaps the variance is caused by the nature of the exposure as 
well as one's personality. 
322 See Chapter 8. Borrowing the terms used by Staub (1997) in his study of patriotism, one may 
categorise the Moore loyalists as 'blind' loyalists and some of the Clark loyalists as 'constructive' 
loyalists. According to Staub, with 'blind patriotism' people 'positively value and uncritically support 
any action of their group'. With 'constructive patriotism', on the other hand, people disapprove and 
criticise actions of their own group, which are against the group's fundamental values and interests in 
the long run (Staub, 1997). Application of the blind/constructive dichotomy to personal loyalty to a 
party leader is by no means inappropriate. Staub himself wrote that his typology could be used for 
analysis of 'attachments and beliefs' which are linked to entities like 'nations or governments, leaders, 
or political movements'. (Staub, 1997: 214). 
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The different types of relationships between the leaders and their followers may 
reflect the leader's views of the roles of herlhis followers. Moore was generally 
dismissive of views incompatible with his own. When his colleagues and party officials 
became increasingly sceptical about his leadership, his distrust in them intensified, 
leaving only a small group of his caucus colleagues and handpicked personal staff 
members as receivers of his confidence. Tragically for Moore, none of them were 
regarded by his opponents as having the necessary skills, personalities, or abilities to 
assist Moore to counter (or complement) his leadership shortcomings. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that his failure to include people with diverse viewpoints and talents in 
his inner circle may have contributed to his eventual demise. 
Like Moore, few enjoyed Clark's unreserved trust, and she was criticised for placing 
too much confidence in a few selected individuals such as Heather Simpson. Again like 
her predecessor, some of Clark's loyalists were or had become her personal friends. 
However, where she differed from Moore was that she included those outside this small 
circle among her loyalists. Competent and able MPs such as Caygill, who professed not 
to be her personal friend, respected and worked closely with the leader. In turn, Clark 
listened to their suggestions/advice. Although a number of MPs (especially the 1993 
Moore supporters) still felt isolated and excluded under Clark's leadership, such 
feelings were less acute in the caucus in comparison to when Moore was the leader. 
Whether she actually encouraged her loyalists to be critical of her leadership 
shortcomings is not clear, but she was at least prepared to tolerate it. It would not be 
surprising if the Clark loyalists' allegiance to her was strengthened by her readiness to 
accept (or at least not dismiss) their opinions. 
Non-committal support and uncommitted supporters 
The assumption that there are different types of support for the leaders, one of which is 
positive support, has been verified. Also correct was the assumption that the 'non-
loyalist' supporters are those whose position is tentative, subject to some variables. 
They did not share the loyalists' absolute conviction that the incumbent leader was the 
best person to be at the helm. Nor did they have trust in the leader at the personal level. 
Some MPs who later became Clark loyalists - especially the 1993 intake - did not 
take such a position in 1993 when she was elected. This indicates that more profound 
knowledge and understanding of the leader, upon which they can form trust in hirn/her, 
is indeed a necessary condition for positive support. Without such trust, caucus 
members with sympathetic inclinations to the leader are likely to assume the position of 
uncommitted supporters. 
If insufficient know ledge of the leader is the reason for non-committal support, then 
such support status can be transitory. Non-committal support can develop into positive 
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support as supporters' knowledge of (and confidence in) the leader grows. Sound 
knowledge and understanding of the leader alone, however, is not a sufficient condition 
for positive support. If fundamental trust does not derive from them, non-committal 
support, or opposition, may be the end result. The uncommitted supporters for both 
Moore in 1993 (except for Damien O'Connor) and Clark in 1996 all had had sufficient 
exposure to their respective leaders. Instead of providing a ground for positive support, 
their knowledge of the leaders led them to the conclusion that their leaders did not match 
their ideal leadership image (prototype). In these cases, more exposure to the leaders 
would not have changed their uncommitted supporters' positions at all. In other words, 
their support status was not temporary. 
Not all the findings of the case studies have supported the propositions in relation to 
the categories of 'non-committal support' and 'uncommitted supporters'. Clark's case 
study has revealed that these blanket categorisations are rather inadequate, unable to 
cover all the support types outside positive support sufficiently. It has highlighted the 
need for sub-dividing uncommitted supporters into two respective groups, namely, 
waverers (wavering support) and pragmatic supporters (pragmatic support). 
Position types 
Supporters 
Loyalist 
Table 9-1 
SupporUSupporter Types 
Support types S reliability 
Positive support Very High 
Uncommitted supporters (Non-loyalist) 
Waverers Wavering support Low 
.s. reasons 
Fundamental 
trust 
in the leader 
(Re liability, 
leadership style, 
commitment to 
party policy etc.) 
Likely winner etc. 
Pragmatic supporters Pragmatic support High (temporary) No appropriate 
alternative 
Opponents 
Opponents None (opposition) None 
The timing of the 
coup 
Not finding the 
leader suitable for 
the top position 
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Waverers 
Waverers are perhaps closer to the initial image of uncommitted supporters: MPs who 
change their positions freely between leadership candidates, using variables such as the 
opinion poll ratings, promotion chances, and the proximity to the next election. They 
did not have fixed positions on the issue of the leadership, and were prepared to vote for 
both the incumbent and a challenger. 
Interestingly, MPs who took this truly non-committal position were very few in the 
case studies. There were at least two possible explanations for this. First, there were 
several dividing issues between the contenders. The supporters of Clark and Moore 
underlined their respective candidates' differences in terms of leadership styles, public 
popularity, and perceived ideologies in their effort to legitimise their own positions 
during the leadership struggle. It was difficult to maintain - even the image of, if not real 
- neutrality on all those points. Second, due to the small size of the caucus, MPs became 
subject to immense pressure to declare their positions. The small caucus size also 
enabled MPs and the party officials to identify the wavering minority and heavy 
lobbying from all the competing camps followed. Since the leadership issues provoked 
strong emotional reactions from all those involved, not to succumb to such high pressure 
was not easy. Of course, there are always some waverers who promise their support to 
both sides. But they do it at the cost of their reputation in the caucus. 
Pragmatic supporters 
Pragmatic supporters, unlike waverers, know exactly where they stand in leadership 
contests. Like loyalists, they support the incumbent and are not wavering. However, 
unlike loyalists, pragmatic supporters lack fundamental trust in the leader and experience 
varying degrees of dissatisfaction with the leader's performance. What determines their 
position is the resentment towards either the alternative leader(s) or a leadership change 
itself. In 1993, the Clark pragmatic supporters backed her because: 1) they wanted to 
depose Moore; and 2) Clark was the alternative candidate with the best chance of 
achieving that goal. The loyalists' conviction that she was the best person to lead the 
party was missing from their consideration. Likewise, in 1996, a few pragmatic 
supporters stood by Clark despite their dissatisfaction with her performance. Their 
reasons for doing so were: 1) they saw Moore's return to the top position as 
unacceptable; 2) no other candidate who could improve the situation for them was 
available; and/or 3) a leadership change was ill conceived. From their point of view, 
maintaining the status quo was the best available option in 1996. 
The 1993 uncommitted Moore supporters - waverers or pragmatic supporters? 
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Now with the distinction having been made clear, one question needs to be addressed: 
which category did the 199Y23 Moore uncommitted supporters fit? 
All signs indicate that the majority of this group can be safely classified as pragmatic 
supporters. To begin with, they were not uncertain about where they stood at the time of 
the leadership vote; they were not wavering between Moore - their favoured choice - and 
Clark. Their reasons for supporting Moore also exhibited the characteristics of 
pragmatic supporters. They shared some concerns held by the Moore opponents about 
his leadership, although without the same intensity. While they positively valued 
Moore's campaigning ability, their position was primarily determined by their negative 
views of the leadership coup and, to a lesser extent, Clark as the alternative. With regard 
to the coup, they felt antagonised by its timing (which implied that the coup had been 
organised during the election campaign), the manner in which it was executed, and/or its 
left-wing ideological connotation. At the same time, some of the uncommitted Moore 
supporters found Clark unacceptable for her perceived lack of public appeal- an asset 
necessary to win an election in their view. Because of these factors, their position was 
'entrapped' in favour of Moore. But this situation would have changed if those 
constraints had been removed. For instance, those who did not object to Clark as the 
alternative would have voted differently if the challenge had taken place at a later time. 
Support and leadership durability 
The second and third propositions dealt with the leadership durability, and both derived 
from the first proposition. The second proposition was: 
P2 In order to make the leadership more secure, the leader needs to increase the 
proportion of the loyalists among the selectorate. However, the achievement of this 
task is hindered by institutional, practical, and personality reasons. 
To analyse the validity of the above proposition, it is helpful to divide it into two smaller 
segments. 
P2a: The reliability of each support type varies with positive support being the most 
reliable. Hence it is in the leader's interest to increase the proportion of loyalists 
in the caucus. 
323 It is impossible to re-categorise the 1990 uncommitted Moore supporters in the new caucus after 
the General Election for an obvious reason: there was no leadership contest or crisis which forced 
caucus members to choose (or consider choosing) between Moore and alternative leaders. Without such 
an occasion, one cannot know: a) the strength of their affiliation to the leader (an indicator for 
waverers); or b) the reason for their affiliation to Moore (an indicator for pragmatic supporters). 
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P2b: The achievement of the above task is hindered by institutional, practical, and 
personality reasons. 
A. Support reliability 
Positive support 
The reliability of loyalists' support has turned out, as expected, to be high. When both 
Moore and Clark came under threat, their loyalists unfailingly offered the most 
dedicated support. The case studies have shown that remarkably, none of the loyalists 
deserted their leaders in the crises. Why was their support so dependable? A key to its 
dependability was the loyalists' trust in the leaders, based upon their sound knowledge 
of the leader. Such intimate and accurate information enabled the loyalists to come up 
with realistic expectations of the new leaders, which had a high likelihood of realisation. 
Pragmatic support 
Whether the leader can rely on pragmatic support is subject to two factors: a) the nature 
of a proposed leadership change; and b) available alternative leaders. Pragmatic 
supporters share waverers' low tolerance for the leader's deviation from expectations. 
For instance, when the extent of the policy shift under Clark's leadership fell short of 
their expectations, a few caucus left members became disillusioned. 
This low tolerance level for failure to meet the original expectations leads pragmatic 
supporters to the same behaviour as waverers: they consider withdrawing their support 
from the leader as soon as the leader's failure is recognised. Nevertheless, despite 
dissatisfaction with the leader, pragmatic supporters do not have waverers' freedom to 
move freely between the leader and available contenderes). Their option is confined (or 
'entrapped') to supporting the incumbent by the two aforementioned factors. For 
instance, Lange could not shift his support away from Clark in 1996 because no 
acceptable alternative leaders were available. Similarly, a number of the caucus members 
felt obliged to support Moore in 1993 because they saw the manner in which the coup 
was organised as deplorable. 
In the short term - or as long as the existing constraints remain - the reliability of 
pragmatic support is high, possibly as high as positive support. Its reliability in the 
long term is, however, questionable. Since they do not possess loyalists' personal 
commitment to the leader, their support may evaporate as soon as the constraints are 
removed. For instance, if the lack of appropriate alternative leaders is seen as the 
problem by this group, the emergence of a candidate whom they consider acceptable 
would move their allegiance. Likewise, if pragmatic supporters have concerns about the 
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propllety of the proposed leadership change (eg., regarding its timing and the manner of 
execution), they might consider supporting another leadership challenge (even with the 
same alternative leader) when it is organised 'properly' at a later point in time. 
Wavering support 
Amongst all the types of support, wavering support is least reliable. As seen in Chapter 
6, waverers' unreliability was well epitomised by Jonathan Hunt's comment on this 
group of MPs - who promised their support to both sides - they needed to be ruled out 
as votes in number crunching. 
Unlike loyalists, waverers have some doubts and concerns about a leader's suitability 
for the top position. The lack of loyalists' fundamental trust in hirnlher means that they 
are less forgiving if the leader fails to meet their expectations and eradicate their 
concerns. Once the leader starts deviating from their original expectations, wavering 
support starts eroding. 
NewMPs 
New MPs need a special mention in relation to their support reliability. Since sound 
knowledge of the leader is a prerequisite for positive support, new MPs with limited 
previous exposure to hirnlher are likely to offer either wavering or pragmatic support if 
they choose to support the leader. 
In general, their support appears to be more fragile than that of their more 
experienced colleagues. In 1990, the seven new MPs all initially supported Moore. 
However, six members out of this group were amongst the Clark supporters three years 
later. The 1993 new intake exhibited similar flexibility. While no loyalists of this group 
altered their positions, four MPs who supported Clark with either pragmatic or 
wavering support in 1993 seemed to have changed their views of the leader. 
New MPs' high instability rate can be explained by two reasons. Firstly, they may 
not possess sufficient knowledge about the leader as an individual to form an accurate 
perception about herlhim. The opportunity to observe the leader in a small caucus 
setting may offer them a different - hitherto unavailable - perspective of hirnlher. With 
that extra knowledge, they may realise that their initial perceptions of the leader were 
inaccurate. If their original expectations were built around such false perceptions of the 
leader, such expectations can be unrealistic with little chance of being fulfilled. Some of 
the 1993 newcomers supporting Clark who had little knowledge of her were a case in 
point. Their expectation of her as a convivial and consulting leader turned sour because 
such behaviour was simply out of her character. (More experienced counterparts did 
not have such expectations of her.) 
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Secondly, novices' inexperience in national politics may mean that they are 
unfamiliar with not only individual colleagues (including the leader) but also the nature 
of parliamentary politics. Without an understanding of how politics at that level works, 
they may not know the required qualities for a party leader. Nor can they know the 
boundary of the leadership (what one leader realistically can or cannot do in that 
environment). As a result, again, they may risk coming up with unrealistic expectations 
of the leader. 
Newly gained knowledge of parliamentary politics may also alter new MPs' views of 
their ideal leadership image (prototype) .. In this case, even if their initial perceptions of 
the leader were accurate, s/he may no longer be seen as the best person to lead the party, 
as s/he lacks the qualities which they now consider essential. Again, an example can be 
found in some of the 1993 Clark supporters. For some of the 1993 intake, the 
importance of the leader's personal popularity increased over time. This was partly due 
to their realisation thatin order to achieve anything substantive, the party needed to be in 
power first, and that the party needed a popular leader to obtain the power. As a result, 
these MPs' support was lost to a more popular alternative, Moore in 1996. 
B. The difficulties of consolidating the support base 
In supporting the new leader, supporters naturally form expectations. On the other 
hand, in objecting to (or not supporting) that person, opponents find concerns in the new 
leadership. Plus, some of the supporters - especially waverers and pragmatic supporters 
- may also share such concerns. Support erodes if the leader fails to satisfy 
expectations. Discontent develops if the leader does not attend to and eradicate, 
concerns. Therefore, the future of the leadership depends upon the leader's success 
with these two tasks. 
When facing these tasks, the leader aims to change the composition of hislher initial 
support base on hislher election so that herlhis standing can be strengthened. As 
discussed above, positive support is the most reliable, followed by pragmatic, wavering 
support and opposition in order of reliability. To make hislher position safer, the leader 
needs to increase the level of reliability of the existing supporters while converting 
opponents into (preferably reliable) supporters. 
Retaining positive support 
To retain loyalists' support is the least difficult, as evidenced by Moore and Clark's 
perfect retention records of their respective loyalists. Even when the leader fails to meet 
the original expectations, loyalists tend to stay with the leader. This was evident in 
Clark's leadership. When Moore was toppled in December 1993, Clark's supporters 
contained a number of MPs associated with the caucus left. When explained by Clark 
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later that a radical policy shift would not be politically feasible, instead of re-considering 
their support position, her loyalists accepted her stance and remained loyal to her. In 
other words, they re-adjusted their expectations to suit Clark's decisions. 
This extra room given by her loyalists may seem to echo Edwin P. Hollander's 
concept of 'idiosyncrasy credit' (Chapter 2) which a leader can earn for expectation-
meeting behaviour from hislher followers. According to the American scholar, a leader 
with such credit can deviate from the expectations of the followers, with the extent of the 
deviation being determined by the volume of credit. Clark's case study has validated 
Hollander's assertion that a leader with trust (credit) of supporters, enjoys more 
freedom, without being restricted by stringent performance evaluation. 
Hollander was also correct in arguing that loyalists' support can cease when the 
leader's behaviour exhausts the loyalists' trust by breaching their expectations too often 
or too much. However, when asked what Clark needs to do to diminish their positive 
support for her, the conditions that her loyalists listed were more limited than Hollander 
might have expected. They were, by the loyalists' own admission, best described as 
highly unlikely to materialise - such as her personality changes. It seems that positive 
support can erode only by actions which breach the supporters' fundamental trust in the 
leader. Odd deviations from (minor) expectations may not severely affect loyalists' 
views of the leader as a whole. All these findings emphasise the high reliability of 
positive support. 
Converting non-loyalists (waverers, pragmatic supporters and opponents) into loyalists 
In contrast, the task of converting non-loyalists into loyalists has turned out to be quite 
challenging - although not impossible - for the leaders. Moore seemed to have 
successfully added George Hawkins to his loyalists during his leadership, while his 
successor managed to gain positive support from Steve Maharey, Trevor Mallard, and 
Larry Sutherland before the May 1996 challenge. 
However, both leaders failed to do the same with the overwhelming majority of non-
loyalists. The case studies have shown that only one of the initial opponents of one 
leader later became hislher supporter (Braybrooke for Clark). Moreover, most of the 
movements between support positions for either leader were 'downwards' in terms of 
support reliability. Many of Moore's 1990 uncommitted supporters became his 
opponents by 1993. Similarly, Clark could not keep some of her 1993 supporters in the 
same support status when she was challenged two and half years later. 
C. Support consolidation hindrance factors 
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So, why is the task of consolidating leadership support so difficult? It has become clear 
through the case studies that there are several factors which preclude the leader from 
achieving this goal. 
a. The leader's limited control over realisation of expectations 
Firstly, the leader does not always have direct control over realisation of expectations. 
For example, caucus members expect the leader to lead the party to an election victory. 
While herlhis performance in this regard is ultimately judged by an election result, it is 
regularly scrutinised against opinion poll results. Caucus members use this information 
rather than their own judgement of hislher performance, as the assessment yardstick. 
The problem for the leader is that slhe has little control over the poll ratings. S/he 
can often reach the public only through the mass media, and the media may not 
necessarily project a favourable image - intentionally or unintentionally - of the leader. 
Furthermore, the public's evaluation of the party and the leader's performance is subject 
to other variables such as the state of the economy, the performance of other parties, and 
the behaviour of hislher own colleagues. For example, with regard to the latter, Clark 
claimed that the party and her popularity suffered from constant internal bickering and 
insurgence. As her situation with Moore proved, the leader can exert little power over 
herlhis own colleagues if they are resolved to undermine the leader. Then again, even if 
the leader and hislher colleagues present their best behaviour, there is no assurance that 
such an effort will be favourably recognised in the next opinion poll. 
Similarly, Moore's effort to meet one of his expectations - restoring the damaged 
relationship between the PLP and EPLP - was affected by the limitation of what he 
could do. To improve any relationship, one side's effort alone is not sufficient; the 
other side needs to respond positively to its initiative as well. Both Moore and the two 
Party Presidents who worked with him attest that they did their best to establish a good 
working relationship. But they could not work harmoniously with each other due to 
personality and ideological reasons. As a result, the relationship continued to deteriorate 
to the point at which the damage was simply irreversible. 
h. Conflicting expectations!concems 
Secondly, the leader can face a dilemma prioritising different expectations and concerns. 
This is because contradictions and inconsistencies can exist among them. In such a 
case, meeting one group's expectations (or resolving their concerns) can be possible 
only at the expense of another group's expectations. Therefore, the leader in this 
situation has to decide which followers and their interests need to be catered for ahead of 
others. Inaction or compromises can be an option, but the leader may risk leaving all the 
groups dissatisfied, which of course can erode the leader's support base. 
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Moore found himself in this predicament. In the earlier stages of his leadership, in an 
attempt to appease the concerns over his erratic tendency and dominant behaviour, he 
consciously tempered his natural flair and tried to be an inclusive leader. However, he 
later realised that this new leadership approach might prevent him from achieving one of 
the other expectations - winning the 1993 election. Despite being aware that negative 
reactions would ensue, he decided to resurrect his old leadership style to fight the 
election. Moore's dilemma was further complicated by mixed views of his leadership 
problems within the caucus. Although his leadership style became a concern for the 
whole caucus, the groups of MPs who found it significant enough to justify a leadership 
change were a minority in the 1990-1993 caucus. With a majority willing to tolerate his 
behaviour, Moore may have felt less compelled to tackle this problem. 
Conflicts can exist over particular expectations, too. Upon becoming the leader, 
Clark faced a dilemma in relation to the expected policy shift. The majority of the 
caucus accepted the view that a leftward policy shift was necessary to re-establish 
Labour as a credible centre-left party but no radical revisit of the existing policies was 
required in that process. However, minority groups on both left and right had different 
ideas. The former, supportive of Clark, expected her to re-write some of the 
fundamental policies. The latter, on the other hand, vehemently opposed such a view. 
They argued that the party should tailor its policies for middle class New Zealanders, 
building itself as a centre party. The only viable option for Clark, which also suited her 
personal belief, was to pursue the line supported by the majority. Although that decision 
subsequently alienated the minority groups, satisfying the whole caucus was simply 
impossible, given the diverse and conflicting expectations. 
c. The lack of necessary skills, beliefs, and personalities 
Thirdly, the leader cannot fulfil the followers' expectations and alleviate the opponents' 
concerns if s/he is not equipped with the necessary skills, beliefs, and/or personality. 
Without appropriate skills, even the most willing leader cannot accomplish what s/he 
sets out to achieve. Without appropriate beliefs, s/he fails to sympathise with the 
followers' wants and needs. Consequently, his/her efforts will be at best half-hearted. 
Without the right personality, the leader finds meeting expectations uncomfortable, 
difficult and frustrating. Or, in an extreme case, s/he may even refuse to fulfil the 
expectations at all. 
These points were well illustrated in Moore's leadership. Following the humiliating 
election loss in 1990, the party needed to redeem itself by establishing a new identity, 
disassociating itself from the Rogemomics past. At the same time, Moore was required 
to oversee the process of reconciliation with the EPLP, as the relationship between the 
two wings of the Labour Party had become seriously strained during the previous six 
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years. Among the leadership qualities required for this re-building process were 
patience, the skills to consult and organise, as well as the abilities to obtain consensus 
among various views. Moore's renowned strengths such as energy, spontaneity, and 
flamboyancy - valuable assets during the election campaign - seemed misplaced in this 
role. 
With regard to beliefs, Moore never accepted the view held by some caucus members 
and party officials that some of the economic reforms conducted by the fourth Labour 
Government were a mistake. While he recognised some problems in the reforms, 
especially in the manner in which they were implemented, he supported their main 
thrust. He never felt comfortable with complying with the expectations to disown 
Labour's policy record between 1984-1990. As a result, his attempt was regarded by 
his critics as insincere. 
Also, some of Moore's personality traits such as strong personal ambition, mistrust 
in certain individuals, and strong self-confidence seemed to affect his actions, too. 
When he saw the winning of the 1993 election (and thus fulfilling his long held 
ambition of becoming the Prime Minister again) within his reach, he jettisoned his 
attempts to adapt to the new role. Those who disagreed with him were increasingly 
treated with suspicion and as distractors, trying to deny his dream. Armed with strong 
self-confidence, Moore seemed to believe that he would eventually be vindicated, which 
may have caused him to deviate further from expectation-complying behaviour. 
Clark's failure to meet expectations and mitigate concerns was also attributed to her 
lack of necessary skills, beliefs, and personality. Without an appetite for personal 
popularity, she was reluctant to engage in activities to increase it. Without the necessary 
skills (including charisma), her efforts appeared clumsy and awkward, lacking necessary 
conviction to evoke a favourable public perception. Her strong self-confidence based 
upon her abilities, was identified as a possible source for her impatience with her 
colleagues with lesser andlor different abilities, which restricted her inclusiveness. 
d. Limited resources 
Fourthly, even with the right skills and attributes, the leader still can fail to meet the 
supporters' expectations and eradicate concerns because there are not enough resources 
to attend to them properly. For instance, in an interview with a university student 
newspaper, Clark said: 
As Leader of Opposition you're not well resourced. I mean, [the then Prime 
Minister] Mr Bolger would have a briefing every morning on everything, that 
doesn't happen to me. (Menzies, 1997: 18). 
Among all the resources, perhaps the most scarce is time. As the primary 
spokesperson of the party on every significant issue, the demands on the leader are 
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heavy. Often slhe is left with little time for consolidation of his/her support base. This 
restraint is particularly disadvantageous if expectations/concerns require the leader's 
personal time324 • For instance, if MPs expect to seek the leader's regular consultation 
and advice, their expectations are unlikely to be fulfilled. 
To bypass this time problem, the leader needs to organise well and, above all, to 
delegate hislher work where possible. Clark commented on this point when she 
discussed parliamentarians in general. 
Politicians have to be very disciplined and well organised. We have to be able to 
prioritise and to delegate and have a very clear sense of the priorities because it is 
impossible to do everything which is personally demanded of us. (Light, 1998: 
21). 
Delegation is essential for at least two reasons. First and foremost, it lightens the 
leader's workload. Second, if administered carefully, it can substantially strengthen the 
leadership. Every leader has strengths and weaknesses. If the leader chooses people 
with diverse skills and viewpoints and assigns suitable work to them, it can enhance 
hislher strengths while complementing her/his weaknesses. Delegation is the leader's 
sign of trust in delegates' competence. One of its possible and positive outcomes is that 
once shown such trust, MPs may wish to reciprocate the leader's confidence by 
strengthening their support for himlher. Clark's three converted loyalists (Maharey, 
Mallard, and Sutherland) all shared close working relationships with her during the 
1993-1996 period. 
In reality, however, delegation is a tricky business for the leader. Both Clark and 
Moore were accused of relying heavily on a small circle of trusted allies including 
handpicked personal staff. As a result: a) the feeling of isolation and resentment felt by 
the excluded opponents developed and worsened; and b) they could not provide 
solutions to their problems since both leaders chose like-minded and similarly skilled 
individuals. The leader's actions may be further restricted by his/her personality (such 
as herlhis level of trust in others and of self-esteem) as much as the limited human 
resources (ie., talents) available in the given caucus. On the limited human resources, in 
1995 Clark confessed her frustration with the caucus management to an interviewer: 
... I don't hire and fire MPs. I have to accept what is served up to me as a result 
of party selection processes and electorate voting, and I've got to then try to make 
it work (Roger, 1995: 55). 
324 While in Government, Geoffrey Palmer wrote in 1987: 'Both the leader and deputy leader (with the 
Whips) become involved in what we used to call at university the 'care and feeding of the faculty'. 
Ministers or Caucus members who have political problems, personal problems, health problems or 
some other sort of problem must be seen and talked to. Some of these problems can be quite time 
consuming and difficult' (Palmer, 1987: 69). 
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e. Followers' susceptibility to changes 
Even if the leader somehow manages to meet all the expectations, there will always be 
some caucus members who remain non-loyalists. The last factor which may limit the 
leader's task is followers' susceptibility to changing their support positions. For 
successful support consolidation, the leader's effort is only half of the equation. To 
complete the conversion, caucus members are required to positively respond to the 
leader's effort. Without it, even the leader's best effort has no effect. 
This point can be illustrated with Clark's situation. Her opponents openly admired 
the strengths and skills which she brought to the leadership. The only area where she 
was considered failing was in relation to the party and her own popularity. But even if 
she had been successful there, would her opponents have become her loyalists? Such a 
prospect is highly unlikely. It appears almost certain that if the poll ratings of herself 
and the party had been far more favourable, many of the opponents would have 
supported Clark - but only as pragmatic supporters or waverers. Why? 
Many Clark opponents were experienced parliamentarians. Through their times in 
parliament they had acquired the view that the leader's primary role was to win an 
election and to protect fellow MPs' seats. At the same time, longer experience had 
exposed those MPs to a wider range of leaders with different shortcomings. Such 
exposure enabled MPs to develop a greater tolerance for leaders with imperfections, 
especially for those with effective campaign abilities. They would support almost any 
leader as long as s/he could deliver an electoral victory. Therefore, with different poll 
results, Clark could have counted upon their support. However, their heavy dependence 
upon poll results would have also made their allegiance extremely unreliable if Labour's 
popUlarity started to decline. 
While not explored in depth in this study, like the leader, the followers' feelings and 
personalities can playa significant role in determining their susceptibility to support 
changes. For example, when leaders come under a threat, their supporters (especially 
loyalists) tend to take it personally and resent the move intensely. Leadership contests 
are almost invariably deeply divisive events. Emotional wounds and scars caused by 
intensive leadership battles take time to heal. If MPs feel strongly for the previous 
leader, it is unrealistic to expect them to change their positions immediately to support 
the new leader. 
Also, the followers' personal leadership ambitions may be of particular importance. 
Logically, strong leadership aspirations are at variance with positive support for another 
person. Only one person can be the best leader in the party. If one believes that s/he is 
that chosen one, how can s/he loyally support someone less worthy? It was no 
coincidence that two former leaders, Lange (who professed his leadership ambition in 
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April 1992, see Chapter 3) and Moore (who never relinquished his leadership ambition), 
refrained from providing positive support to another leader. 
Leadership durability 
Leadership durability and original support compositions 
The final proposition of the study was: 
P3 The leader's durability can be explained (and largely predicted) by the quality of 
support - based upon the composition of the support - which the leader receives on 
hislher selection - as distinct from herlhis numerical support. 
To win the leadership, needless to say, the leader needs majority support. On the 
surface, it appears that the greater the majority the safer the position. A small winning 
margin makes the leader look weak. However, the vulnerability of leadership cannot be 
accurately judged by the size of the winning majority. What this study has revealed is 
that it is the quality of the majority that counts. Consider the following two hypothetical 
situations. 
Leader A: 
LeaderB: 
Supporters total 
40 
30 
Opponents 
10 
20 
Majority 
30 
10 
Both Leader A and B lead a caucus of 50 members. Which leadership is more 
durable? If judgement is based upon the size of winning majority, then the answer must 
be A, whose m~ority of 30 comfortably exceeds B' s mere 10. A closer examination of 
their support compositions, however, may reveal quite a different picture. 
Leader A: 
LeaderB: 
Loyalists 
5 
26 
Pragmatic 
15 
4 
Waverers 
20 
o 
Opponents 
10 
20 
Leader A's impressive majority consists mainly of pragmatic supporters and 
waverers. Combined with opponents, waverers, whose support is the least reliable 
among all the supporters, constitute the caucus majority. The majority ofB's 
supporters, on the other hand, are loyalists. With 26 members in this group, loyalists 
alone enjoy the outright majority in the caucus. 
The relationship between a support composition and leadership is akin to the 
relationship between a foundation and a building. If the foundation is solid, the building 
has a better chance of withstanding a potential earthquake. In contrast, a building on a 
weaker foundation may collapse in a tremor of the same magnitude. Similarly, 
leadership with a strong support composition has a better chance of survival under 
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stress. In contrast, the future of a leader elected on a weak support composition is less 
certain. 
Based upon the findings of the study, as a rule: 
.. Leadership durability is determined by the strength of the support composition. 
.. The strength of the support composition, in tum, increases in accordance with the 
proportion of loyalists in it. 
.. Conversely, leadership vulnerability increases with the presence of waverers in the 
original support composition. 
" The proportion of pragmatic supporters amongst the non-loyalist supporters 
affects the short-term leadership durability. As long as the restraints on the 
movement of pragmatic support are in place, it can be regarded as guaranteed 
support. Accordingly, the higher its proportion, the more secure the leadership. 
Nevertheless, some caution is required before Proposition 3 is declared valid. In 
reality, the above rules have limited validity. The following example case illustrates the 
point. 
LeaderC:. 
LeaderD: 
Loyalists 
10 
16 
Pragmatic 
12 
4 
Waverers 
11 
8 
Opponents 
17 
22 
How secure are Leaders C and D's positions? Between them, which leadership is 
more durable? Leader D has more loyalists than Leader C does, but D has more 
opponents as well. Does that make C's leadership safer or weaker than D's? Or, 
because the combined numbers of waverers and opponents for both Leaders C and D 
are greater than the sums of loyalists and pragmatic supporters, do the two leaders have 
a similar degree of vulnerability? 
If the leader has loyalists who are the majority of the caucus, then there is no 
question that herlhis leadership is durable. But, in reality, such a situation is rare. Even 
Clark, whose support composition contained a high proportion of loyalists, did not have 
that lUXUry. The experiences of Bill Rowling in December 1980 (Bassett, 1998: 351), 
Lange in June 1989 (Sheppard, 1999: 189-190), plus Moore and Clark all suggest the 
fate of the leadership is most likely to be determined by waverers or pragmatic 
supporters. 
Given this reality, one may ask: 'Do leaders' original support compositions matter?' 
If the leader's future always lies in the hands of waverers or pragmatic supporters, what 
difference does it make if the proportion of her/his loyalists is, say, 10%,20%, or 45% 
of the whole caucus? 
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The importance of a large proportion of loyalists for leadership durability 
Even when loyalists do not constitute the outright majority of the caucus, and thus 
cannot shield the leader from a potential coup, a larger proportion of trusted allies 
increases leadership durability in several ways. 
Firstly, a higher proportion of loyalists grants the leader more time to consolidate 
his/her leadership standing in the caucus. Given the high reliability of positive support, 
the leader is not required to spend much time on retention of this group's allegiance. 
Therefore, if s/he has a sound support base in the caucus, the leader can dedicate more 
time towards dealing with less reliable supporters and opponents' 
expectations/concerns. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, more loyalists can mean stronger political 
leverage for the leader. As earlier discussed, loyalists have high tolerance if the leader 
deviates from their original expectations. Moreover, they allow the leader to modify 
their expectations to suit the political reality in which s/he needs to operate. So, if the 
leader has a larger proportion of loyalists in her/his support, s/he is able to deal with 
non-loyalist supporters' expectations and opponents' concerns without eroding the 
original support base. 
Thirdly, the more loyalists the leader has in the caucus, the fewer non-loyalist 
supporters s/he needs for survival. If the number of the latter group is smaller, it is 
easier to meet their demands. In addition, the leader also has a better chance of 
controlling or manipulating the situation to strengthen his/her standing. For example, as 
Clark's case study indicated, the small number of waverers enabled the leader and her 
proponents to concentrate their lobbying effort on them. Also, the leader may be able to 
ensure that the restraints that entrap pragmatic supporters will remain. Clark (perhaps 
not intentionally) practically locked in a few left MPs by having included all the potential 
alternatives, whom this group may have preferred to her, among her loyalists. Moore 
also successfully painted Clark's challenge in 1993 as an act of treachery and thus kept 
one of the restraints for his pragmatic supporters (ie.,the hostility towards the coup's 
timing and manner of execution). However, because of the large number of his 
pragmatic supporters, even ifhe had managed to fend off Clark's challenge in 1993, 
how long Moore could have kept that restraint on his supporters is a matter of question. 
Fourthly, a larger group of loyalists provides a more effective support system to the 
leader under pressure. They can provide her/him with various forms of assistance both 
inside and outside the caucus against distractors. As seen in Chapter 6, Clark 
recognised the importance of such help for her own political survival (H. Clark, 1996). 
A strong presence of loyalists can also serve as a deterrent for potential insurgents 
and their sympathisers. Loyalists have strong emotional attachment to the leader. As 
the case studies have shown, when the leader is threatened, they defend him/her 
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vigorously, even resorting to some unusual (or extreme) measures (such as the leaking 
to the media in 1996). If their leader is challenged, this group can ensure that the battle 
will be bloody and traurnatising. The larger the component of loyalists, the bigger the 
damage. Such a prospect can be daunting for those who may consider challenging the 
leader. Therefore, the greater the proportion of loyalists, the higher the 'threshold' 
which dissenters have to clear. 
In sum, the leader with a large proportion of loyalists has a better chance of 'leading' 
the party. The larger the group of loyalists, the fewer internal worries the leader needs to 
attend to. This may give the leader extra confidence to use his/her authority more 
effectively and convincingly in public. Such performance is more likely to improve the 
party's public standing, which in tum may lead to non-loyalists' higher approval of the 
leader. David Caygill describes this positive flow-on effect in the following terms: 
I think there's a sort of self-reinforcing thing that goes on here you know, that a 
leader will look good if [s/he] looks confident, [slhe] will be confident if [slhe's] 
been successful, [slhe] will be successful in part if [slhe's] confident. (Caygill, 
interview, 1998) 
On the other hand, if the leader has to be involved in a lot of intra-caucus squabbling, the 
opinion polls will reflect such a state of the party poorly. That may bring dire 
consequences to the leader. As Maharey notes: 
When things go wrong, you've got to drop back down to the machine again and 
start tinkering a bit, go to see people, and talk with them, and you don't have to do 
that when things are good. You can lift yourself back out of that, know it's all 
going on well, and have a few differences of [opinion with] people, you know, it's 
all just so much better. (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
So, it seems evident that even when the leader does not have the outright caucus 
majority with loyalists, the original support composition (especially the proportion of 
loyalists) still matters for hislher future. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the original support composition alone cannot 
explain - or predict - how vulnerable the leader is. Proposition 3 was inaccurate in this 
respect. If the number of loyalists fall short of the outright majority, the leader's future 
is dependent upon her/his success at the task of meeting the supporters' expectations 
and eradicating the opponents' concerns. (How much success s/he needs for survival is 
determined by the original support composition.) 
The leader's ability to meet expectations/eradicate concerns 
Based upon the earlier discussion of the factors precluding the leader from achieving the 
task, the likelihood of the leader's success can be estimated through examination of the 
following two points. 
a. The nature of expectations/concems 
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" Is the realisation of the expectations within the leader's direct control? 
" Do they contain contradictions? 
b. The leader-task compatibility 
.. Is the leader equipped with the right skills, beliefs, and personality for the task? 
.. If not, does slhe have the resources to complement hislher shortcomings? 
Leadership durability change 
The original support composition and the leader's ability to achieve the task of 
satisfying expectations and alleviating concerns are the two major determining factors of 
the leadership durability. Naturally, any alterations to either of these factors affect the 
security of the leader's position. Moore's leadership fell victim to such changes. 
a. The composition changes of the caucus 
The first type of alterations is most likely to occur after an election. Since the PLP first 
contested for parliamentary representation in1919 as a united party, every general 
election has changed its composition through the addition and attrition of MPs. In 
Moore's case, the caucus which elected him as the leader lasted only for eight weeks. 
The caucus composition had a completely different look after the devastating defeat in 
1990. On balance, the election probably helped Moore as it claimed more casualties 
from his opponents than his supporters. However, it had a far-reaching impact on his 
leadership through the addition of new MPs. This entire group, except for Hawkins, not 
only enthusiastically embraced the new expectations of the leader but also (partly as a 
result of Moore's failure to meet them) formed the nucleus of the anti-Moore force in 
1993. As time passed, they also started questioning Moore's legitimacy as the leader. 
As newcomers after the 1990 election, they had played no part in his hasty selection. 
This detachment allowed them to join the remaining former Palmer supporters in asking 
why Moore had become the leader. 
A significant change to the caucus composition also resulted from the 1993 election. 
Unlike the 1990 situation, however, this time the caucus experienced an expansion. 
Twenty Labour MPs (re )entered Parliament whereas four left, in total increasing the 
caucus size by 16. This expansion of the caucus had a fatal impact on Moore's 
. leadership. Although the dissatisfaction steadily increased in the 1990-1993 caucus, 
Moore managed to retain majority support in this group until the election. However, 
with 14 of the 20 additional MPs in favour of a leadership change, the caucus balance 
was decidedly tipped in Clark's favour. A particularly crucial role was played by the 
1993 new intake. Carefully selected by the party hierarchy, which was critical of 
Moore's leadership, the overwhelming majority (11 of 12) had natural empathy towards 
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his challenger whom they perceived to be better equipped to meet their expectations. 
With their presence in the caucus, the Moore supporters were in minority. 
b. Changes of expectations 
Expectations of the leadership may be subject to changes around an election time, too. 
Every new MP brings to the caucus hislher own perspective and expectations of the 
leader, some of which are unique to their particular generation (reflecting the mood of 
the party and electorate at the time) or to individuals. Similarly, with every departing 
MP, his/her own views on the leadership is subtracted from the subsequent caucus. As 
a result, the aggregation of the leadership expectations in the caucus changes after every 
election, which can either strengthen or weaken the incumbent's position. 
At the same time, MPs may adopt new expectations of the leader due to the changes 
of the political environment in which the party operates. For example, the caucus may 
wish to re-examine the party's strategy and the required leadership qualities to respond 
to an upcoming election if the party's electoral prospect is not bright. In particular, the 
sense of urgency to do so is strong among MPs whose seats are considered under 
threat. If they judge the incumbent as incapable of rescuing their seats, then their next 
move may be a call for a leadership change. In 1990, Moore benefited from such a 
change when Palmer continued to fail to lift the party's popularity. 
At the same time, Moore's experience suggested that if too much emphasis is placed 
upon a leadership candidate's immediate election winning ability upon herihis selection, 
some re-adjustment to the expectations at a later time may be unavoidable. After the 
1990 election, entirely different expectations were imposed upon Moore by the new 
caucus. He was now required to lead the party's re-building phase until the 1993 
election. The immediate re-claiming of the party's identity and re-establishing of a 
trusting relationship with the EPLP suddenly became the focal tasks of the leader. 
Unfortunately for Moore, this shift of the expectations exposed his unsuitability for 
these tasks (in terms of personality, ideology, and skills) and exacerbated the concerns 
about his leadership suitability, held by his opponents and a number of uncommitted 
supporters. 
Of course, the political environment and leadership requirements can change 
irrespective of an election. Events such as the installation of new leaders in other 
political parties and a change to the political system can equally affect the environment. 
In 1993, the introduction of the new electoral system helped shift the leadership 
expectations further away from Moore. The Clark proponents argued that under MMP 
the leader would need skills such as precise articulation of policies, adding that Clark 
had them and Moore did not. Such argument highlighted Moore's perceived problems 
and assisted Clark's cause. 
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In contrast, the manner in which Clark assumed her leadership featured fewer 
uncertain variables: 
.. She was selected shortly after the 1993 election, presumably for a whole three-year 
term; 
.. The expectations of her were long-term and unlikely to undergo sudden changes; 
.. Clark was chosen by her supporters because of her high compatibility with those 
long-term expectations; 
.. She was elected with the majority support of the caucus against a serious rival 
(Moore). 
Table 9-2 
Moore-Clark leadership durability affecting factors upon their selections 
Caucus composition 
Supported by: 
Expectations: 
Leader-task match: 
Clark 
Stable (possibly 3years) 
The majority against a 
serious candidate 
Long-term 
Unlikely to change 
High 
Moore (September 1990) 
Unstable (likely to change 
dramatically after the 1990 
election) 
The questionable majority 
against a weak candidate 
(Northey) 
Extremely short-term (seven 
weeks). 
To be newly formed after the 
election 
High (for the first, pre-election 
expectations) 
Low (for the second, 1990-1993 
expectations) 
The above comparison suggests that the leader may be able to control hislher 
leadership durability to a certain extent by choosing how (ie, the timing and manner of 
mounting a leadership challenge against the incumbent) slhe becomes the leader. The 
impact of changes to the expectations and/or support composition can be either 
advantageous325 or disadvantageous to the incumbent. However, every change involves 
a risk, and it may make a crucial difference to hislher survival. To gain the top position 
is only the beginning. In order to exercise the substantive leadership, one needs to hold 
the position for a reasonable length of time. While the political demands for a 
325 For example, the 1996 election seemed to have strengthened Clark's position. When Phil Goff 
organised a private gathering in early 1999, it was described by the media as a vehicle for his future 
leadership bid to succeed Clark. The list of 13 attendees plus two other MPs who were likely to 
support his attempt included only two of the seven 1996 intake. See, Laugesen (1999a:AI-2). 
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leadership change and the ideal conditions for succession may hardly coincide, it may be 
worthwhile for aspiring leaders to assess the best manner to gain the leadership. 
Other variables that affect leadership durability 
When the leader does not have the majority of loyalists in the caucus, hislher position is 
often determined by non-loyalists. Apart from the leader's performance in meeting 
expectations and handling concerns, there are other variables that affect non-loyalists' 
positions (and ultimately leadership durability). The study has identified four such 
variables: 
A. The party organisation 
The first variable is the Extra-Parliamentary party organisation. Although in New 
Zealand it has no direct say in leadership selection by the parliamentary wing, it can 
exert some influence over the outcome. Modem convention suggests that the role of the 
EPLP is to provide support to the incumbent whenever slhe comes under pressure from 
colleagues. Rowling, Lange, and Palmer all received unfailing, public endorsement from 
the Party Presidents in times of trouble326 . 
This relationship was broken in 1993 when Moore was challenged by Clark. For the 
first time in recent party history, the Party President did not endorse the incumbent 
publicly. Furthermore, behind the scene, Maryan Street, together with some influential 
party officials, was an ardent supporter of the challenger. She even attempted to 
persuade Moore to relinquish the leadership voluntarily in the party's best interest. 
Without the party hierarchy's confidence, Moore's battle to retain the top position 
became more arduous. 
The EPLP's more profound influence over Moore's fate was probably exercised 
before the actual launch of the challenge. Determined to avoid the mistake of the 1984-
1990 period, during which the Labour Government neglected many wishes of the EPLP, 
party officials carefully selected 'trustworthy' candidates. Consequently, many of the 
new candidates shared similar views on policies and politics, which were in tune with the 
views held by the party officials, and more crucially, Clark. In this sense, there was little 
surprise that in December 1993 the newcomers almost unanimously voted for the new 
leader. Although as we have seen, the party officials claimed that the candidate selection 
never aimed at assisting Clark's future leadership bid (or dislodging Moore), it 
nevertheless helped her when the occasion arose. 
The EPLP's involvement in the PLP leadership business can take a more direct form. 
Once the 1993 election was over and the intention of the coup was known, Street, who 
326 However, this was not always the norm. According to Sinclair, after the 1960 election, the then 
President, A.M. Finlay gave notice of motion to the national executive that the PLP should be asked to 
consider Walter Nash's leadership. (Sinclair, 1976: 355). 
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had been deliberately kept uninfonned of the move, became heavily involved in the 
challenge. She helped organise meetings, and actively worked with the Clark 
supporters. In 1996, Michael Hirschfeld lobbied hard, contacting MPs and their local 
organisations on behalf of the incumbent. 
However, while the EPLP plays a role in the PLP's leadership selection (or 
retention), its influence should not be overestimated. As it is MPs' exclusive prerogative 
to choose their leaders, if they so wish, they can ignore the party hierarchy's preference. 
The limit of the EPLP's power was evident in the fact that despite its explicit support for 
the incumbents and warning against leadership changes, critics of Lange and Palmer 
continued to apply pressure on them, to which both eventually succumbed. 
The effectiveness of the EPLP' s influence varies arnong individual MPs. Whether 
they can afford to ignore its views is dependent upon factors such as: a) the level of 
dependence upon the party machinery (both national and local) for their re-election; b) 
the opinions of the local party organisation, and; c) the popUlarity of the leadership 
contenders in their own electorates. For example, it is difficult for an MP in a marginal 
seat which overwhelmingly favours the existing leader to go against their preferences. 
B. The caucus rules 
The second variable which affects the fate of the leadership is the leadership selection 
(retention) procedure used. This finding is consistent with previous literature on the 
leadership that emphasised the impacts of the rules and procedure on the outcome327 • 
While the NZLP caucus rule has a provision for a regular leadership review at the first 
caucus meeting held in the year before a general election, it does not prohibit a challenge 
outside that scheduled time. Those who are dissatisfied with the existing leadership can 
test hislher durability anytime, providing they follow the required two-step procedure. 
Firstly, the caucus needs to approve, by majority, a motion to have a leadership vote. If 
approved, at the following caucus meeting, a vote will be taken on who should be their 
leader. This low threshold for a potential coup has been suggested to make the NZLP 
leader vulnerable by international standards (see Chapter 2). 
However, the case studies have demonstrated that the two-step procedure provides 
more protection to the incumbent than was initially estimated. It has been suggested that 
in 1993 despite Clark's eventual seven vote majority, Moore could have won the first 
vote to disallow the motion to carry (thus preventing the challenge from proceeding any 
further) if he had not unexpectedly seconded the first motion himself. Similarly, the 
1996 Moore supporters were quietly confident of their chance of displacing Clark, 
based upon the feedback from the fellow caucus members. However, they had to call 
327 See, for example, Alderman (1994 and 1999), Carty at.el. (1990), and Weller (1994). 
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off the challenge at the last minute when they realised that there was not enough political 
will in their camp to clear the first hurdle. 
These findings suggest that the two-step procedure inherently works to the 
incumbent leader's advantage. MPs hesitate to support the first motion, which is 
practically a no-confidence vote in the leader. Even those who are prepared to vote for 
an alternative in the second vote (thus lack confidence in the incumbent) share this 
hesitancy. The reason for this is unclear. It may be due to their sense of loyalty to the 
leader. Or, those MPs may have more tangible reasons. As already indicated, the EPLP 
normally stands by the existing leader. In addition, the New Zealand public tends to 
support the underdog - in this case, the leader under internal pressure - regardless of 
their previous opinions. If an MP is identified by the media as one of the culprits of the 
leader's demise through endorsing the first motion, slhe can be subject to subsequent 
public castigation and outcries. What the MP has to endure may intensify even further 
if the leader is a popular figure and if slhe manages to project the image of himlherself 
as a hapless victim of unforgivable treachery (as Moore did). Such bad pUblicity may 
harm the MP's chance for re-election if the next election is looming. 
The leader's advantage vanishes with the first ballot. The self-imposed restraint from 
supporting the challeng(er) does not seem to apply to the second vote. Once the first 
vote is carried, MPs feel free to express their preference. At this stage, any remaining 
sense of loyalty is outweighed by cold calculation of the merits and demerits of each 
contender. Besides, the second vote means that more than the majority of their 
colleagues have expressed their lack of confidence in the incumbent. It seems obvious 
that herlhis days are numbered. In these circumstances, waverers may find it tempting to 
switch their allegiance to a likely victor. 
This curious phenomenon is by no means unique to the NZLP. In his detailed 
account of the British Conservative Party's leadership change in 1990, Robert Shepherd 
noted how votes for Margaret Thatcher collapsed after the first ballot. 
... once members of the payroll vote had discharged their duty to the Prime 
Minister in the first ballot and the issue became the future of the party, many felt 
no longer bound by the loyalty requirement. (Shepherd, 1991: 29) 
C. The timing of a challenge 
The third variable is the timing of a potential coup. The case studies have demonstrated 
its influences over the outcome of a leadership challenge. In 1993, some of the Moore 
supporters decided to vote for the existing leader, despite their doubts over his 
leadership, due to the timing and manner of execution of the coup. 
However, it is important to note that the timing of a coup seems to be a dependant 
variable - significant only in a combination with other factors. In the case of 1993, the 
position of the Moore supporters was no doubt related to their perception that under his 
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leadership, Labour nearly won the election (and probably would do well again in 1996). 
If the party had not performed as well as it did, many MPs' positions would have been 
quite different; there would have been little political advantage in retaining an obviously 
unsuccessful leader after a decisive election loss, especially when there was an 
acceptable alternative available in Clark. 
With regard to the 1996 situation, after surviving the May/June crisis, Clark's 
position was considered safe until the 1996 election. This was because another 
leadership challenge - the second within six months - prior to the election would have 
sent the public the wrong signal about the state of the party. Besides, Clark and her 
supporters showed a strong resolve against any move to oust her. It was obvious that 
she would not vacate the position quietly under any circumstances before the election. A 
messy leadership battle was what anti-Clark sympathisers did not consider worthwhile. 
A regular leadership review of the PLP was moved from the last caucus to 
(practically) the first caucus of the mid year in the 1980s. One of the main purposes of 
this change was to provide sufficient time (approximately 20 months) for the new 
leadership team to prepare itself for an election. The implied view was that a leadership 
change any closer to the next election than 20 months would be detrimental to the 
party's electoral fortune. Nevertheless, recent cases suggest that this consideration 
figures less prominently. In August 1989 (against Lange), September 1990 (Palmer), or 
in 1996 (Clark), there was no shortage of MPs and alternative candidates who were 
willing to change the leadership with less than 20 months remaining before the next 
elections. This evidence seems to confirm that if there is sufficient political will in the 
caucus to change the leader, s/he can be replaced irrespective of the timing. 
Perhaps, the timing (or more precisely, the proximity to an election) may be a more 
important factor in deciding how (rather than if) a leadership change should be pursued. 
Since an image of party disunity only has a detrimental effect on the party's election 
result, a leadership change through a messy coup is likely to be counterproductive. 
Therefore, any attempt to replace the leader in close proximity to an election is more 
likely to prefer persuasion (and/or a threat), which leaves the outcome of such a 
challenge ultimately in the leader's hands. 
D. Alternative leaders 
The fourth and the most important variable is the availability of a suitable alternative 
leader. Without an alternative leader, who is acceptable to the majority of the,caucus, 
discontent with the existing leader remains just as that. Like Rowling (Jackson, 1992b: 
12-13), Moore benefited from the lack of suitable challengers in the caucus during the 
1990-1993 period. Although frustration with his leadership continued to build up 
towards the end of the period, any threat remained idle - until Clark emerged as a 
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serious contender. Other names mentioned, such as Lange, failed to gain any 
momentum as they lacked sufficient appeal. 
Likewise, Clark was greatly assisted by the confusion over the identity of her 
challenger in 1996. WhlIe Moore was regarded by many (including himself) as 'the' 
alternative, it was never formally confirmed among the five frontbenchers. Nor was his 
name mentioned at any stage of the ensuing lobbying. In fact, some of the leadership 
change proponents saw Moore as unsuitable for regaining the leadership, after having 
witnessed his disruptive behaviour over the past two and half years. Also, there was 
constant speculation that Michael Cullen was the serious contender, hiding under 
Moore's cloak. As a consequence, the challenge against Clark suffered a credibility 
problem. Without a unanimous alternative leader, a leadership change has little chance 
of success. 
The case studies have also recognised some common patterns in the emergence of 
alternative leaders. They are: 
.. An attempt to replace the incumbent leader originates from frustration with hislher 
performance. In this process, the problems of the present leadership are identified by 
concerned MPs. In search of an alternative leader, the primary selection criteria are the 
abilities to resolve those problems. In 1990, Moore was chosen as the alternative for his 
perceived election winning ability, which his predecessor, Palmer, was lacking. He was 
seen as an antidote to the problem of that time - the declining party popularity. 
When Moore was challenged, the pro-change group's main concerns were over his 
leadership style and skills. Clark emerged as his replacement because of her recognised 
strengths in those areas where Moore was seen as having problems. Conversely, the 
1996 leadership crisis resurrected Moore's star because his perceived strengths were 
again regarded as the answer to Labour's problem under Clark's leadership. 
This pattern was also present in previous leadership changes in the NZLP. For 
example, Lange was seen as an attractive alternative leader primarily for his popularity 
and his oratory skills which would match the abrasive Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon. 
Bill Rowling had lost three consecutive elections and was perceived by his opponents to 
be failing to make headway against the fierce Muldoon. Likewise, although it was not a 
coup, when Palmer became the leader to succeed Lange in 1989, he was preferred ahead 
of Moore for the same logic. The caucus believed that the former deputy leader could 
'pull the party together' (Jackson, 1992b: 17) after it had become bitterly divided under 
Lange's leadership. 
" Because leadership changes are a means to rectify the existing problems of a party, the 
selection criteria for an alternative leader are formed around the shortcomings of the 
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incumbent leader - the abilities and skills that s/he does not have - rather than her/his 
strengths. The incumbent leader's strengths are often overlooked in favour of the more 
desirable assets in an alternative in the selection. For instance, the strengths which both 
supporters and opponents recognised in Palmer, such as consistency, were not required 
from Moore in 1990. Similarly, when Clark was emerging as the alternative, her 
supporters were willing to ignore the fact that she lacked Moore's obvious strengths 
such as political instinct and the ability to 'connect' with voters. Likewise, Clark's 
much appreciated skills and abilities for which she was elected as the leader did not 
come into her opponents' consideration in 1996. 
.. As a result, the alternative leader is likely to be somebody who is distinct from the 
incumbent in terms of outlook, personality, skills, etc. S/he must have skills, abilities, 
and/or personality which the incumbent does not possess in order to rescue the party. 
At the same time, s/he may not be equipped with the strengths for which the incumbent 
leader is renowned. 
This finding should not come as a surprise. After all, what is the point in replacing 
the leader with someone who is more or less the same?328 An interesting point is that 
the selection criteria - both those the new leader is required to meet and what s/he is not 
required to meet - are determined by the incumbent leader's perceived weaknesses. This 
means that, unwittingly, the existing leader may help to select who should be his/her 
successor even when s/he is ousted in a coup. 
The exact criteria for a specific leadership selection are formed based upon the 
circumstances and the incumbent leader (particularly his/her weaknesses). However, 
through the case studies it has become clear that there are certain qualities which Labour 
caucuses seems to constantly seek from its potential leaders regardless of the specifics 
of the circumstances. Moreover, the caucus expectations/concerns of the leadership are 
formed around those qualities. 
The leadership selection (retention) criteria 
As noted in Chapter 2, Jackson (1992b: 28) identified three major leadership selection 
(retention) criteria in New Zealand. They are: 
1) Elective: political success in the form of likely victory or improved performance 
of the party at general elections (as monitored by the opinion polls) 
328 Choosing an alternative leader who is/looks dissimilar to the existing leader may be a universal 
practice across the party lines. A former National Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, failed to become the 
party leader in 1985 to replace Robert Muldoon. The position went instead to Jim McLay. In a TV 
interview, Bolger explained that that was because [he was 'considered too much like Rob Muldoon' 
whilst] McLay was 'distinctively different' from the former leader. (TV1, Assignment, 7 May 1998, 
7:30pm) 
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2) Policy: s/he should be capable of ensuring a degree of ideological satisfaction 
for party members.329 
3) Unity: related to this is the ability to ensure party unity. 
Jackson's list is in line with the British counterpart compiled by Leonard P. Stark, 
which contained: a) 'unity (retention of internal party solidarity as a cohesive 
organisation),; b) 'victory (winning of elections to form a government)'; and c) 'policy 
. (implementation of programmes)' (Stark, 1996: 125). The only noticeable difference 
between the two lists is their order of priority amongst the criteria. While the New 
Zealand scholar implied the supreme imperativeness of the victory criterion above the 
others, Stark stated that in Britain 'unity' was the highest in order, followed by 'victory' 
and 'policy'. 
The importance of winning 
The case studies have confirmed that those three criteria indeed feature in the NZLP's 
leadership contests. They also verified the predominance of the victory concern over the 
other two criteria, in support of Jackson's position. 'The Labour Party was primarily 
formed to become the government' (Wilson, 1989: 29), and this primary goal still seems 
intact today. 
This was most evident in 1990 when the Moore supporters were so willing to 
overlook his shortcomings and focused on his campaigning ability. In comparison, 
three years later, the question of the leader's ability to win an election was somewhat 
less prominent in the leadership struggle. This was probably because of Labour's near 
victory under the guidance of Moore, who again demonstrated his skills in this field. 
However, the issue was never away from the Clark supporters' minds. Their analysis 
was that the party suffered, not benefited, from Moore's leadership style. Blurring the 
key issues and making arbitrary and inconsistent decisions - all regarded as typical 
symptoms of his leadership - were seen by this group as the main contributor to 
Labour's election loss. According to their views, Clark would eradicate those problems, 
and thus could place Labour in a better position for the 1996 election. 
Jackson was also correct in his assertion that Labour caucus members' judgement on 
their leader is prospective rather than retrospective . 
... the real determinant [for the leader's fate] is not so much the loss of one 
particular election as the perception of the chance of winning the next under the 
same leader. (Jackson, 1992b: 16-17) 
329 This second criterion of Jackson's appears to be similar to Stark's competence criterion. 
Elsewhere Jackson asserted that a successful leader requires an ability to 'outwit skilful rivals in 
political tactics', 'mould a team' and 'carry the myriad of detailed burdens associated with running 
executive government' (Jackson, 1992b: 17). For the National Party leaders' required qualities, see 
Upton (1997). 
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In 1993, some of Moore's supporters valued his effort in bringing back Labour to the 
brink of victory - a huge turnaround from the disastrous defeat three years before. 
However, they were not-supporting him out of gratitude for his past accomplishment. 
They saw the 1993 result as an encouraging indicator of the party's likely position at the 
1996 election. Their view was that the party's future would be brighter under the more 
popular leader than unproven, charisma-less Clark. Similarly, in 1996 Clark supporters 
were behind her not because of their sentimental attachment to the embattled leader. 
They were firm in the belief that the party would fare best at the coming election with 
Clark at the helm. In both cases, MPs' concern was future-bound, not past-oriented. 
Labour caucus members' prospective outlook inevitably increase the significance of 
the opinion polls (Jackson, 1992b: 17) as a (or 'the' for some MPs) indicator of the 
leader's performance between elections. This point is openly acknowledged by Labour 
MPs. For instance, Moore states that to 'win' and 'be successful' are the best ways to 
assure the longevity of the leadership (Moore, interview, 1998). The 1996 Clark 
supporters share his view. When asked what the leader can do to strengthen hislher 
position, David Caygill replies: 'I think in the end, the simplest thing is to win. The 
simplest thing that can consolidate leadership is to be successful' (Caygill, interview, 
1998). The former deputy leader explains that people who join the Labour Party are 
those who 'care about social issues and the direction of the country'. They also do so 
because they think that more can be achieved for those causes through a collective 
organisation via government than as an individual. However, losing (a series of) 
elections can put such a rationale in question . 
. .. if for long periods of time, you lose elections ... then you have to ask yourself, 
you know, whether this makes sense, whether you are achieving what you wanted 
to achieve. Perhaps it's the policies that are out of tune with the public. Perhaps it 
is the leadership. Perhaps it's some combination. (Caygill, interview, 1998) 
Another Clark loyalist, Steve Maharey, echoes his colleagues' opinions: 
I'm a great believer that politics is a very curious environment, and one thing that 
works for sure is success. Nothing else works, necessarily. Some things can; 
you can go and be nice to people, you can do all sorts of things. But success 
works. Because ... the one thing that motivates politicians is that they want to do 
things. When they're moving forward, they're with you. (Maharey, interview, 
1998) 
And their forward movement or lack thereof is judged on the party's position in the 
polls. 
I think the ... most important measure [for] politicians is 'how we're doing out 
there', because it's that that gets you into government, holds you in government, 
lets you do what you want to do .... When the polls are up, people [are] kind of 
bound again, animosity drops away, people start ... working together. As soon as 
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that stops, the animosity starts to rise again. It's a terrible organisational form, 
really. (Maharey, interview, 1998) 
Thus, consensus exists in the caucus regarding: 1) the leader's primary role being to 
ensure an election victory; and 2) the party's opinion poll ratings being used as the 
interim indicators for hislher performance in this regard between elections. 
The above consensus, however, does not relate logically to the Clark loyalists' 
adherence to her in 1996. By the time of the May/June challenge, the party's popUlarity 
had been lagging for a considerable length of time. In addition, this group of MPs were 
the harshest judges of Moore's near-victory accomplishment at the 1993 election. What 
accounted for this paradox? 
While all the caucus members unanimously agree on the importance of winning, their 
ideas of what the best ways are to reach that goal seem to differ. This may explain the 
rarity of unanimous leadership selections in the NZLP, whose presumed goal is to 
become a government. With regard to the 1996 situation, the anti-Clark MPs regarded 
the leader's personal popUlarity as a way of attaining that goal. 
On the other hand, the Clark supporters believed that clear and coherent presentation 
of well defined policies, as well as reliable and fair (intra-caucus) leadership skills, 
constituted the successful formula for winning. Naturally, the two groups arrived at 
quite different conclusions as to the value of Clark, as well as Moore, as the leader. 
There is no question that the leader is held ultimately responsible for the welfare of 
the party. If the leader is not seen as an apt guardian of it (and if there is someone else 
who is believed to do a better job of it), slhe is in trouble. To retain the leadership, the 
leader needs to produce the result. Clark's deputy, Michael Cullen, was fully aware of 
this. Before the 1999 election, he openly predicted a grim future for the leadership team 
if Labour failed to win the 1999 election: ' ... if we don't win the next election, both of us 
will, no doubt, be gone' (Cullen, interview, 1998)330. 
The importance of ideology 
The leader's ideological position also requires consideration in the PLP leadership 
selection process. For example, one of the major concerns over Moore's leadership in 
1993 was his 'centre-oriented' policy views which were increasingly at variance with the 
position held by the caucus (centre )left. In their campaign against him, Clark and her 
supporters zealously stressed the necessity for Labour to clearly re-define its identity as 
centre-left. At the other end of the party's ideological spectrum, some right MPs such 
as Austin and Dunne aired their anxieties over a possible radical leftward policy shift 
under Clark's leadership. The1996 leadership crisis also had ideological undertones. 
330 Cullen elaborated on his future if Labour failed to win the 1999 election in another interview 
without referring to Clark. 'If we lose the next election I think the likelihood is that the party will be 
looking to replace me'. (Venter, 1999b) 
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Upon the five frontbenchers' approach to her, Clark quickly referred to it as 'the last 
gasp of Rogernomics' . 
However, how crucial the ideological aspect was for these leadership issues is 
unclear. It was true thaf Clark attracted strong support from the 'post-Rogernomics' 
generations (ie., the 1990 and 1993 intakes) who were generally critical of some of the 
policy reforms of the fourth Labour Government. In contrast, the 1993 and 1996 
Moore supporters were mainly from the pre-1990 intakes, many of whom were part of 
the controversial Government. But it was too premature to describe the 1993 leadership 
coup and the 1996 leadership challenge as ideological battles between the left and right. 
There were some notable exceptions in each camp, such as Caygill and Cullen, that 
prevent such generalisation. 
It is true that in 1993, Moore's lack of commitment to the Labour values and policies 
was often cited by Clark and her supporters in their justification of the coup. At the 
same time, the need for Labour to shift its policies to the left (so that it could be seen as 
a centre-left party) was widely acknowledged by this group. However, the subsequent 
policy shift that took place under Clark's leadership was by no means major. Certainly, 
there were some notable changes including proposals for an increase of top income tax 
and a re-introduction of the flat tertiary fees. But they were not by any standard radical, 
and most of the other changes merely added details to, and shifted emphasis from the 
1993 policies. In this sense, a better description of Clark's 'policy shift' was 'policy 
re-definition' or 'policy clarification'. 
So, was the Clark proponents' expressed concern over Moore's ideological stance 
just an excuse to discredit Moore? The short answer is no. Two points need to be made 
here. Firstly, despite what ensued, many of the 1993 Clark supporters genuinely 
believed that a clear change of the policy direction was necessary, and that that was not 
forthcoming as long as Moore remained as the leader. And there was an ideological 
difference between Moore and Clark; the former a centrist and the latter a centre-left 
'social democrat'. Although this difference in real terms was actually small - small 
enough to leave moderate/right MPs like Caygill undisturbed - it had symbolic 
importance nevertheless. Moore's reluctance to dissociate the party from the 
Rogernomics past was a complete anathema to the post-reform, 'centre-left' MPs. 
Secondly, Labour's policies are made and approved through the official, collective 
procedure, and the leader's own policy views have only a limited impact on them. 
However, the leader can exert a considerable influence when it comes to their 
presentation and interpretation. The leader is the party's primary spokesperson on 
every major issue. Moore used his power to control some aspects of Labour policies, of 
which he personally disapproved, during the 1993 election campaign. His refusal to 
reaffirm Labour's intention to repeal the Employment Contracts Act and his objection to 
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the release of some policies have been noted as such examples. In his opponents' eyes, 
the leader was letting his personal opinions override (or obscure) the official party 
policies. In other words, the issue was not about his personal ideology per se, but about 
his willingness to disregard collective decision making. 
These points suggests that the focal point in leadership selection is the leader's 
perceived ability to implement the [agreed] party policies and do so faithfully. If the 
leader is seen as likely to represent and adhere to the party policies, as expressed in the 
manifesto, hislher personal ideology should not become an issue. 
It seems safe to assert that ideological consideration enjoys only secondary 
importance to electoral concerns in Labour's leadership selection (retention) process. 
For example, Phil Goff points out that the PLP's leadership choices have always been 
about the leader's personalities and the party's perceived electoral fortune under hislher 
leadership . 
... I've never seen a major division in the Labour Party as representing different 
ideological viewpoints. Most of the contests of leadership have represented 
personality differences and perceived differences in an ability to win elections. 
The ideology is the superficial overlay rather than the driving and motivating force 
in the leadership change. That's true of all of the leadership changes or attempted 
changes that I have observed. (Goff, interview, 1998) 
One may question the historical validity of the above assertion on the secondary 
importance of ideological concerns - especially in relation to Douglas' leadership 
challenges against Lange in 1988 and 1989331 , which eventually led the latter's 
resignation. Henderson described the dispute between the two as fundamentally 
ideological (Henderson, 1992: 106). 
Lange believed he had a special responsibility to care for the poor and 
disadvantaged. Douglas put his faith in the free market. Lange accepted that 
changes had to be made, that the highly protected nature of the economy could not 
continue. But for Lange there was a limit to how far the Labour Government 
could deviate from its traditional collectivist values and accept the extreme 
individualism of the New Right's faith in market forces. (Henderson, 1992: 106) 
Former Cabinet colleague of both Douglas and Lange, Michael Cullen agreed: 'I think 
the real issue was the policies', adding: 'The personality stuff arose out of the policy 
differences' (Sheppard, 1999: 71). 
There was no doubt that ideological concerns were of particular importance to both 
Lange and Douglas as well as to some of their core supporters332 during their battles. 
With regard to Douglas, some even suggested that he was more interested in the purity 
331 Former Party President, Margaret Wilson, also mentioned the ideological undertone of the 
Rowling/Lange leadership transition (Wilson, 1989: 70). For a similar view, see, Bassett (1998: 370) 
332 Since then, at least three former Labour MPs from the fourth Labour Government joined Douglas' 
ACT party following either their retirement or defeat. They are: Trevor de Cleene, Richard Prebble (the 
current leader of the party) and Ken Shirley (the deputy leader). 
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of his ideology than in the party's electoral fate (see, Baysting et aI., 1993: 88; and 
Mulgan, 1992: 520). Also, little doubt existed over the diversity (and, in some cases, 
incompatibilities) of ideological positions held by the caucus at that time333 • However, 
these points do not autOIbatically suggest the supreme importance of ideology to the 
caucus at large during their lengthy battles. Indeed, some evidence suggests that 
winning was the most crucial concern for many Labour MPs at that time. 
First, Douglas himself seemed to be aware that his policy views would be an 
insufficient reason for many caucus members - including those who shared his 
ideology - to vote for him ahead of charismatic Lange. He knew that, in their eyes, 
Lange was a more valuable asset for Labour's re-election. Realistic about his chance, 
Douglas reluctantly made himself available as the alternative candidate for the caucus 
leadership vote on 21 December 1988 only because no other MP decided to stand. The 
result was a sound and predictable defeat for the former Finance Minister - allegedly by 
a 23 vote majority (Sheppard, 1999: 167-169). Even during the subsequent and 
prolonged attack on Lange's leadership, despite his strong commitment to his own 
ideas, Douglas never attempted to win Labour MPs' support based upon the merits of 
his policies alone. Instead, his rhetoric emphasised their appeal to the electorate, 
portraying his proposed reforms as the key to Labour's securing its third term334 • 
Second, many Labour MPs failed to appreciate the ideological nature of the disputes 
between the two figures. At least two factors contributed to this. The first factor was the 
speed of the deterioration of the relationship. Although their ideological differences 
became noticeable towards the end of the first term (1984-1987), especially over the 
future direction of the Government, they agreed to put them aside and fight the 1987 
election as a united team (eg. Russell, 1996: Chapter 12 and 13). However, once the 
election was over, it did not take long before the differences re-surfaced; only this time 
they both knew that the growing gap between them was irreconcilable. The second 
factor that shielded many Labour MPs from the reality of the deteriorating relationship 
between Douglas and Lange was Lange's inability or unwillingness to articulate his 
333 As already noted in Chapter 6, apart from those who have joined ACT, Peter Dunne, Clive 
Matthewson, Margaret Austin, and Jack Elder left the party ostensibly (at least partly) for policy 
reasons. The ideological distance between Lange and Douglas is best illustrated by the fact that ACT is 
now widely recognised as the most rightwing party in today's Parliament while Labour is seen as a 
party of centre-left. In between are Labour's traditional rival, National as well as United and New 
Zealand First. See, Brechtel and Kaiser (1999). 
334 For example, Douglas was reported to have said in 1989 during his campaign against Lange: 'They 
[policy issues] are, in my view, the way ahead for New Zealand and the way to victory for Labour' 
(cited by Sheppard, 1999: 186, emphasis added). Also in his own book published in 1993, Douglas 
criticised Lange's policy preference in the electoral context: 'There was no way we could expect to win 
the election in 1990 with this combination of high-tax and high-spending policies' (Douglas, 1993: 
48), 
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concerns and actively seek assistance from his like-minded colleagues (eg., see 
Henderson, 1992: 106; Russell, 1996: 193-194; Davies, 1997: 80) 335. 
Because of these two factors, even the Cabinet Ministers who had closely witnessed 
the steady deterioration of the relationship between them incorrectly believed that the 
problem was solvable through improved communication336 prior to Douglas' 
resignation33? Based upon this misconception, several attempts to reconcile them were 
made through Palmer (Russell, 1996: 170-171, see also Sheppard, 1999: 188-189) and 
backbench delegations of Annette King, Jim Sutton, and Clive Matthewson (Baysting, et 
aI, 1993: 93) without success. 
The importance of party unity 
The third and last leadership selection (retention) criterion, identified by Jackson was the 
leader's ability to ensure party unity. From the case studies, however, it appears that 
this concern does not register in Labour MPs' minds prominently; and when it does, it 
is only due to its potential impacts on the party's performance at an election. 
In the past, there have been occasions upon which the leader's unifying ability 
became the central focus for leadership selection. Palmer's success in 1989 was a case 
in point. After open warfare between Lange and Douglas, as well as between their 
respective supporters, party unity was at a devastating low. Given this, many caucus 
members saw restoration of internal peace as the primary task for the new leader after 
Lange. On this point, Palmer emerged as an ideal candidate. Although his repeated 
attempt as the deputy leader to reconcile Lange and Douglas was ultimately a failure338 , 
he was generally viewed as a pacifying figure, untainted by the debilitating factional 
fights. 
However, for those MPs, party unity was only a means to an end, not an end in itself. 
Their real concern was their fate at the coming election. Since the image of party unity 
had been long regarded as one of the key ingredients for electoral success in New 
Zealand339 , failure to attend this urgent problem was believed to cost seats. (In this 
sense, one may argue what they sought was the image of party unity, not necessarily the 
335 Douglas appeared to be more effective in this regard, although not significantly so. He had a small 
bloc of supporters in the Cabinet as well as limited support in the caucus (Russell, 1996: 169-170). 
336 However, communication was a problem for the two figures. Instead of talking through the issues 
face to face, they resorted to lengthy letter exchanges, which some of the close observers thought 
aggravated the situation. See, Russell (1996), p.l70. 
337 See Douglas' comments in Russell (1996: 199). Annette King (Baysting, et aI., 1993: 93) and 
Helen Clark (Baysting, et aI., 1993: 88) made similar remarks. 
338 Palmer himself referred to it as 'probably the greatest failure I ever had in politics' (Russell, 1996: 
171). 
339 In describing the situation before his resignation, Lange said: 'That's one of the dilemmas of 
politics because, you see, the public marks you down terribly for division. Manifested unity is worse 
than looking slightly weak in leadership. It's a hard thing to choose from'. (Russell, 1986: 198). 
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reality of it.) Palmer's perceived ability to regain party unity, thus, was valued only in 
the interest of the party's electoral fortune. 
The leadership selections after Palmer have confirmed that party unity is a secondary 
criterion to election winning abilities in leadership selection. His successor, Moore, was 
hardly a unifying character. In 1990 his buoyant and energetic yet highly divisive 
leadership style had been well recognised by his colleagues, and indeed some found him 
unsuitable for the top position on this ground. But in any event, such concern was 
overshadowed by MPs' stronger thirst for electoral survival. 
Three years later, one of the major concerns about Moore's leadership was his 
domineering behaviour. A notable number of MPs felt marginalised by him and found 
it difficult to work as a team in the caucus, led by him. Nevertheless, when a vote was 
taken on the leadership on 1 December 1993, 19 MPs (including himself) were prepared 
to support the leader. For his supporters, his perceived ability to win an election 
weighed more heavily than his reported lack of unifying power. 
In 1996, disregard for the leader's ability to unite the caucus became evident again. 
A significant minority were backing Moore, who had constantly fuelled the internal 
divisions through provocative comments and constant attacks on the party and the 
leadership after the loss of his leadership. If anything, his behaviour re-confirmed that 
he was a dividing, not unifying, force in the caucus. But this point counted little for his 
supporters. Although being aware of the strong feelings against him in the caucus (and 
the likelihood of serious divisions following his appointment), they pressed his cause 
anyway. As far as his supporters were concerned, his divisive nature had to be 
overlooked for the sake of his recognised campaigning ability. It was further testimony 
to the minor, subordinate status of the concern for unity when compared to the party's 
electoral prospect as a leadership selection (retention) criterion in the NZLP. 
However, questions arise regarding the 1993 and 1996 Clark supporters, whose 
reasons for supporting her included her 'inclusive' leadership skills To them, party 
unity seemed imperative. There was little doubt that the leadership team (Clark and 
Caygill) at least genuinely cared about the matter, as their shadow cabinet portfolio 
allocation decisions epitomised. Nevertheless, how many of Clark's supporters shared 
her willingness to achieve party unity was debatable. For instance, some MPs of this 
group became agitated with the impartial shadow cabinet decisions. Similarly, several 
'post-Rogernomics' caucus members were reported to have sustained their criticism of 
their older colleagues, hardly 'unifying' behaviour. 
The low priority of unity in the NZLP is in sharp contrast to Stark's findings in 
Britain. This may seem particularly curious, considering that all the recent PLP 
leadership contests have been fought between two contenders; under these 
circumstances, fights are more likely to be intense and personal. Since MPs are either 
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supporting or opposing the eventual leader, the ensuing divisions are more likely to be 
severer and more enduring than multi-contender contests. If any party requires a leader 
with a unifying ability, it seems to be the NZLP, or one very much like it. 
There are two possible explanations for this paradox. Firstly, the NZLP, together 
with the National Party, was once described as one of the most cohesive political parties 
in the Western world (Jackson, 1987: 46). The two party system, fostered under the 
First-Past-the-Post electoral system, strongly heightened the importance of party unity 
almost as a norm for MPs. The future of defectors was immensely grim. Between 
1946 and 1990, six MPs resigned from the PLP during their terms, and none of them 
returned to parliament in the subsequent elections340 • Presenting a united front, thus, is 
in MPs' best interest. Because of this political convention, Labour MPs may not 
actively seek unifying abilities as a requirement in leadership selection. 
Secondly, even if there are MPs who might be tempted to disrupt party unity, it is not 
the leader's role to discipline them. In the PLP, Whips and the deputy leader are more 
responsible than the leader for maintenance of party unity; the roles of internal 
coordination, 'trouble-shooting', and 'crisis-management' (Palmer, 1992: 150-151341 ) 
are normally carried out by them. However, as seen in Clark's case, if there are 
divisions, the leader needs to step in to ensure that they do not deteriorate any further. 
In sum, in the NZLP, party unity is something that the caucus (and the leader) can 
take for granted more confidently than any British party. The low priority of the 
leader's unifying ability as a leadership selection (retention) criterion perhaps reflects 
this confidence. When party unity increases its importance as a leadership selection 
criterion - as it did in 1989 - it is always within the context of winning an election. 
Conclusion 
In Chapter 1, this study set out to achieve two aims. The first aim was to reconstruct the 
1993 and 1996 leadership crises as accurately as possible. The second aim was to make 
a substantive contribution to the existing knowledge and understanding of the 
mechanisms of leadership (de )selections in the NZLP. One of the major problems in 
studies of leadership durability in general was identified as the absence of systematic 
theories on the subject. In an attempt to counter this, the study's ultimate goal was set 
out to provide one for the NZLP leadership. Have these aims been accomplished? 
Accurate reconstruction of historical events is always difficult. The difficulty 
increases if the events deal with recent political issues, especially with the sensitivity 
surrounding leadership crises. As warned in Chapter 1, the findings in this study have 
no doubt been restricted by limited access to information, caused by several key actors' 
340 This record was broken by Jim Anderton in 1990 who retained his seat of Sydenham as a break-
away NewLabour candidate. 
341 In making these descriptions, Palmer was referring to the roles of Deputy Prime Minister. 
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unwillingness to participate in the research. Despite this drawback, sufficient 
infonnation has been collected, which in tum has shed new light on the events which had 
hitherto been little known. 
The case studies have also provided further understanding of the leadership 
(de )selection process of the NZLP. Furthennore, through verification of a series of 
propositions, the study has fonnulated a theory on leadership durability of the NZLP, 
which can be summarised below: 
" While acquisition and retention of the NZLP leadership requires numerical strength, 
its durability is greatly affected by the quality of hislher support in the caucus upon 
his/her selection. 
" The quality of support is determined by the proportion of four types of MPs in the 
caucus. The types are, according to their support reliability: loyalists, pragmatic 
supporters, waverers, and opponents. 
" The quality of support (and potential leadership durability) increases as the 
proportion of more reliable supporters rises. 
.. It is in the leader's interest to improve the quality of support through conversion of 
types of supporters. This is achievable only through success in meeting supporters' 
expectations and eradicating opponents' concerns. Conversely, a failure in these 
tasks decreases the support quality, and accordingly, leadership durability. 
" Labour MPs' expectations and concerns are related to leaders' abilities in three areas, 
although the exact contents of each expectation may differ, probably significantly. 
They are, in order of priority, abilities to: a) win an election; b) represent and 
implement agreed policies; and c) unify the caucus. 
.. The leadership often requires waverers (and pragmatic supporters) to secure the 
numerical strength for survival. Their positions are influenced by four variables, 
which are: a) the extra-Parliamentary organisation; b) alternative leaders; c) the 
selection procedure; and d) the timing of the challenge against the incumbents. 
The importance of followership 
Overall, the study has highlighted the importance of followers for successful leadership. 
This has been recognised by industrial psychologists who have studied various fonns of 
organisations (eg., Rosenbach and Taylor, 1998). But the prominence of the followers 
is particularly heightened in the PLP because of its leadership selection/de-selection 
system - the followers (the caucus members) have the sole power to determine the 
leader's future. In the PLP, the leader has two levels of relationships with the caucus 
members simultaneously; at one level it is as the leader-follower, and the other as the 
appointee-appointer. There, support of the followers is necessary not only for more 
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effective and efficient running of the organisation, but also for the leader's immediate 
survival. 
Traditionally, analysis of the PLP leadership vulnerability has tended to focus on the 
leader and herlhis perforinance. There is a very good reason for this: to attain and retain 
the leadership, slhe must perform. However, good performance alone is not sufficient 
for hislher survival; it needs to be evaluated favourably by herlhis caucus colleagues. In 
the absence of any 'objective' performance measurement - apart from triennial elections 
- the leader's fate is dependent upon caucus members' subjective opinions of his/her 
performance342 • It has been documented here that the Labour caucus members are not a 
faceless group, passively and uncritically waiting for the leader's orders. On the 
contrary, they have clear expectations and concerns of the leader as well as self-interest 
and aspirations, against which they constantly judge the leader's worth. To understand 
the PLP leadership and its durability, no doubt we have to continue examining the leader 
- in terms of herlhis personality, skills, ideology, etc. But it is also clear that without 
studying the followers as well, the picture will never be complete. 
MMP and leadership durability 
In concluding, it seems worthwhile to discuss briefly potential impacts of the new 
electoral system on the PLP leadership durability. 
Although irrelevant to MMP, in the aftermath of the 1996 leadership crisis, an 
amendment to the selection procedure of the PLP leadership was proposed by the then 
Party President (Michael Hirschfeld) with Clark's enthusiastic support (Kilroy, 1996b). 
The suggested change was to extend the selectorate to include ordinary party members, 
assimilating the direction taken by the British Labour Party and, more recently, the 
British Conservative Party343 (Alderman, 1999). It was believed that if approved, this 
change would considerably benefit Clark who had widespread support amongst the rank 
and file party members344 (Kilroy, 1996b). Nevertheless, this move failed to gain 
momentum, and PLP leadership selection procedure remains as the exclusive privilege 
of MPs to date. 
342 One may suggest opinion polls as an 'objective' measurement available to Labour MPs. As 
evidenced in the study, poll results can have immense impacts on the leader's fortune, precisely because 
there are not any other' objective' performance gauges. However, as also documented in the study, how 
opinion polls are read varies from one Labour MP to another. In comparison to an election result -
the definite measurement -poll results allow MPs' subjectivity to playa significant role in their 
interpretation. 
343 In Britain, the purpose of those changes was believed to be to boost the dwindling party 
memberships. See, Seyd (1999). Interestingly, such an argument was absent in the NZLP's debate. 
See, Kilroy (1996b). 
344 Weller's argument that an expansion of the selectorate generally helps incumbent Prime Minsters 
may also be applicable here. 'The broader the constituency, the more difficult it is to call together and 
the less vulnerable the prime minister is likely to be' (Weller, 85: 63). 
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The retention of the leadership selection procedure means that one of the main 
themes of this study - the importance of the original support composition - is still 
applicable under the new electoral system. The Labour leader still needs majority 
support in the caucus to win and survive. To increase leadership durability, the leader 
needs to meet the supporters' expectations and eradicate the opponents' concerns, in the 
hope that that will result in more loyalists. The general rule is still: the higher the 
proportion of loyalists in the caucus, the safer the leadership. 
What is of interest is whether the view of Labour's (likely) coalition (or supporting) 
parties will affect the Labour leader's durability. If s/he attracts strong support (or 
opposition) from those parties, upon whom Labour's chance of governing depends, 
does it make the Labour caucus think twice before it replaces the leader? Or, does it not 
count at all? If the experience so far can be seen as a sign of what is to come, the latter 
seems to be the case. When Jim Bolger was ousted, National's coalition partner, New 
Zealand First (NZF) Was barely consulted (Bolger, 1998: 16). Furthermore, Bolger's 
replacement, Shipley, was chosen despite (or because of) her widely recognised 
incompatibility with Winston Peters, NZF's leadef'l45. If this was any indication, the 
Labour caucus also is unlikely to welcome interference from other parties346 . Besides, if 
they are unwilling to share their jealously guarded privilege with their own party 
members, why should they wish to share it with other political parties, even unofficially? 
If the leader's ability to work with possible coalition partners becomes an issue, it 
will most likely be dealt with internally in the leadership selection process. Probably, it 
will feature as one of the necessary leadership selection (retention) criteria for the leader 
under MMP. In fact, this change has already been taking place in the Labour caucus. 
In 1993, one of the justifications for Clark's challenge was her suitability (and 
Moore's unsuitability) to lead the party in a new era. The implications were that MMP 
would require different roles and skills from the leader to what were demanded by FPP. 
The new roles and skills are likely to re-shape expectations of the leader, and those new 
expectations in tum affect the leadership selection (retention) criteria. So, what changes 
have already taken place so far and what changes are likely to happen in the future? 
What has not changed, and is unlikely to change in the future is easy to point out. 
That is the primary importance of the leader's ability to deliver an election victory. 
Regardless of the electoral system, the PLP's main aim is to govern. What has changed 
345 After the leadership change, Peters took two weeks to decide to stay in the coalition with Shipley-
led National. During this period, he also wrote to Clark regarding the possibility of forming another 
coalition Government (Boston and McLeay, 1997: 241-242). When the National-NZF coalition broke 
down in August 1998, it was partly ascribed to the personality differences between the two leaders. 
See, for example, Clifton (1998). 
346 This sentiment was expressed in March 1999 when another rumour about a coup against Clark 
surfaced. The leader of the Alliance, Jim Anderton's comments on the rumour were seen by Labour 
MPs as unhelpful, inadvertently lending weight to the rumour (Main, 1999) 
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with the introduction of MMP is the definition of 'winning'. Under the new 
proportional electoral system, a single party majority government is likely to be a rarity. 
What has become the nOlm instead is governance with direct (through formal coalition) 
or indirect (guarantee or'support on confidence matters) support of another party (or 
other parties). In this sense, an election is now fought at two stages. Firstly, political 
parties attempt to maximise their representation in the House. Secondly, after the votes 
are counted, and if any party fails to secure a majority in its own right, parties have to 
reach an agreement with (an)other party (or parties) for support to form a government. 
These two stages require different roles and skills from the leader. For the first 
stage, party leaders need to have the FPP-type, conventional, 'rhetorical' campaigning 
ability. As seen in Chapter 5, it was initially argued by the Clark supporters that new 
skills such as clear and articulate presentation of party policies would replace this ability. 
However, the Labour caucus quickly realised that those skills may not have been 
enough. The unchanged importance of the party leader's personal campaigning ability 
under MMP was clearly reaffirmed at the 1996 election, ironically, by Labour's 
resurgence in popularity that was triggered by Clark's improved personal performance 
(Aimer, 1997). 
For the second stage of 'winning' - new with MMP - the leader needs to have good 
interpersonal and negotiation skills. Those skills are also essential for the survival of the 
Labour(-led) government, as an initial agreement for support does not necessarily 
warrant governance for a full term. The supporting parties and/or individual MPs have 
their own interests that may not coincide with those of the major party. If they see fit, 
they will renege on the initial agreement, depriving the major party of the right to 
govern347 • To avoid this, the leader continuously needs to work on the relationship with 
the coalition partners. 
One possible ramification of this is that the leader's 'unifying' ability may rise in 
importance as one of the leadership selection (retention) criteria, along the same line as 
the British political parties. Since Labour's traditional norm of strong internal cohesion 
cannot be applied to its coalition partners, unity of a government is no longer so reliable. 
Sensing this, Henderson asserts that a successful MMP leader needs to be pragmatic, 
flexible, and ready to compromise. The domineering and power-seeking type, on the 
other hand, is believed to be disadvantageous (Henderson, 1997: 79). Clark concurs. 
After surviving the 1996 leadership crisis, she boasted: 
347 Under MMP, government can take four forms. They are: single-majority government, single-
minority government, multi-party (coalition) majority government, multi-party (coalition) minority 
government (see Boston, et aI, 1996: 31). Unless Labour wins enough seats in the House to become a 
single-majority government, it needs support of (an)other party (or parties) either through formal 
coalition or agreement to support Labour on confidence issues. 
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1. .. believe that the skills I have of networking, managing a diverse team of people, 
and working in a collaborative manner are ideally suited to the MMP governments 
of the future. Neither the authoritarian character, the bully, or the person with the 
messiah complex will get far in a political system in which governments have to 
negotiate their programmes and can't impose them through sheer weight of 
numbers. (Clark,1996) 
To the list of necessary skills and attributes for a successful MMP leader, one may 
add highly developed communication skills. The leader cannot conduct effective 
negotiations or maintain good working relationships without them. Thomas E. Cronin's 
following comments are particularly apt: -
A leader has to resonate with followers. Part of being an effective leader is having 
excellent ideas, or a clear sense of direction, a sense of mission. But such ideas or 
vision are useless unless the would-be leader can communicate them and get them 
accepted by followers. A two-way engagement or two-way interaction is 
constantly going on. When it ceases, leaders become lost, out of touch, imperial 
or worse. (Cronin, 1993: 10) 
However, it is important to stress that the roles of the leader under MMP are still 
unfolding and yet to be settled. Perhaps this was most evidently exemplified by the fate 
of the first MMP Prime Minister, Bolger. When he was ousted in a bloodless coup in 
November 1997, one of the causes of his downfall was his closeness to Peters (Boston 
and McLeay, 1997: 241). In other words, Bolger fell victim to his (excessive) success in 
forging a good relationship with the coalition partner. In the coup supporters' eyes, the 
close association with the accident prone and increasingly unpopular New Zealand First 
was threatening National's re-election chances. In an attempt to rectify this problem, 
they opted for another leader who was expected to provide a 'clear sense of purpose and 
direction' (Smith, 1997) distancing the party from its coalition partner. 
Therefore, a successful leader under MMP has to carefully balance the two roles of 
'winning'. Without successfully playing both roles, the party cannot attain or retain 
power. At the same time, if the balance is handled poorly, the two roles can easily create 
- possibly fatal- conflicts for the leader. For example, pressing Labour's cause to 
increase its re-election chances may alienate its supporting partners, possibly resulting in 
a loss of power. Similarly, as Bolger painfully learnt, too much harmony with 
supporting parties (and individuals) may be seen as blurring the party's distinctive 
'brand' image348 • In order to carry out this delicate balancing act, the ability to make 
sound political judgements, together with political sensitivity, may be essential for the 
leader. 
348 It is commonly seen that the current coalition agreement between Labour and the Alliance is 
designed to allow each party to retain individual identity. See, for example, Boston (1999). See also 
Clark's speech to the 1998 Alliance annual conference (R. Clark, 1998). 
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The background of the introduction of MMP was wide-spread public disillusionment 
with politics following the Labour (1984-1990) and National (1990-1993) Governments 
(Mulgan, 1997: 64). The new electoral system was expected to let the voters regain 
power over future governments and, ultimately, the destiny of the country. However, 
after witnessing a series of crises, including the collapse of the first coalition 
Government and a number of defections from their original parties, the public seem to 
have already lost confidence in MMP - even before the completion of the first three-
year term. Astonishingly, calls for yet another change to the electoral system have arisen 
both from the public349 and politicians350 • 
Needless to say, every pealthy democracy needs the public's confidence in the 
political system as its foundation. At the moment, there are many signs indicating that 
the foundation is under significant strain. Whether New Zealand decides to retain 
MMP as the method to select its national representatives or not, restoring people's ailing 
faith in the political system is one of the most urgent tasks for political leaders. But the 
leaders cannot carry out the task alone; they need the followers' support and good will. 
Leaders can lead only while followers let them. Without the latter's confidence, the 
leadership is just a token title. Regaining lost public trust of may take time. And time is 
allowed to leaders only if their leadership is durable. Constant changes of political 
leaders not only make the accomplishment of the task impossible, but also enhance 
people's doubts and cynicism in politics. 
Democracy is like a long, connected chain of responsibility. Political parties have 
responsibilities to recruit and stand the best possible candidates. It is our duty then to 
choose our representatives wisely. But once elected, it is the politicians' task to select 
leaders worthy of their constant and loyal support. 
349 For the level of public dissatisfaction with MMP, see, for example, Laugesen (1999b), Corbett 
(1999), and Hunt (1999). In August 1998, a petition to cut the number ofMPs from 120 to 99 
collected sufficient signatures (10% of registered voters) to force a referendum on the issue, adjunct to 
the 1999 General Election. 
350 One of the most vocal politicians who tried to capitalise on the public feeling was former Prime 
Minister, Shipley. At the 1998 National Party Conference, she expressed her belief that 'some change 
will be required in the future' with regard to both the number of MPs and the electoral system. See, 
Shipley (1998). 
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